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SUMMARY
The International competitiveness of machine tool manufacturing 
companies 1n the UK 1s In long term relative decline. This 1s 
evident In diminishing UK shares of world production and exports, 
Increasing Import penetration and the higher technical 
sophistication of Imports over exports.
Executives 1n the Industry tend to explain declining performance by 
referring to exogenous factors beyond their control, such as adverse 
currency movements, weak demand and conservatism among users In the 
domestic market. Rising Imports are often explained away as the 
Inevitable consequence of growing specialisation and 
Internationalisation. These claims are not without foundation but 
they are at a high level of generalisation and do not shed light on 
the managerial problems of adapting to unprecedented levels of 
foreign competition and technological change.
Most policy prescriptions for restoring competitiveness 1n the 
1980's have highlighted awareness of the International dimension and 
the contribution of technology In overall strategy development. One 
strategic option finding Increasing Interest among executives 1n 
machine tool manufacturing companies and receiving substantial 
encouragement from the UK Government, 1s that of supplementing 
indigenous technological capability by Increasing the "inward" 
transfer of foreign technology.
This dissertation examines the sourcing of appropriate machine tool 
technology from overseas via foreign direct Investment, joint 
ventures and licensing arrangements. The approach is 
multidisciplinary and focusses on the strategic management of 
technology at the level of Individual business units, giving due 
consideration to existing patterns of foreign ownership and 
collaboration. Particular emphasis 1s placed on understanding how 
foreign technology emerges as a strategic option, the conditions 
under which It is assimilated and the relative merits of the three 
modes of Inward technology transfer.
The research shows that providing a critical mass of Indigenous 
skills and capital expenditure can be maintained, the Inward 
transfer of foreign technology offers considerable potential for 
achieving and sustaining a future level of technological capability 
comparable with that of International best practice. To facilitate 
effective exploitation of these opportunities, however, the 
priorities are threefold: firstly, executives must pay greater 
attention to competitor analysis and monitoring technological 
developments worldwide; secondly, many companies should use foreign 
technology to reposition themselves 1n existing segments and/or 
redirect their strategies towards growth segments; and finally, 
there 1s an urgent need for management/organlsatlonal development 1n 
machine tool companies to create a balanced Internal environment 
which Is more receptive to the potential "total" benefits embodied 
1n both Internally generated and foreign technology.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 THE PROBLEM OF DECLINING COMPETITIVENESS OF THE UK MACHINE TOOL 
INDUSTRY
The International competitiveness of the UK machine tool industry, like 
that of many other engineering and manufacturing industries, is in long 
term relative decline. Arresting this decline in the face of intense 
foreign competition has been the concern of Government and machine tool 
manufacturing companies throughout the 1980's.
Machine tool manufacturers have been labelled by the financial press as 
'ailing and unglamorous' and 'exhibiting lacklustre performance'. Of 
the few manufacturers who have performed well, it has Invariably been 
relative to the rest of their Industry and not compared with investment 
opportunities elsewhere. Under pressure to earn short-term profits, the 
major engineering groups have shown decreasing strategic commitment to 
their machine tool businesses, as evident 1n the lack of Investment and 
continuity of ownership.
Executives have frequently attributed poor and erratic performance to 
uncontrollable factors such as the vagaries of world trade, business 
cycles, underlying weaknesses 1n the UK domestic economy and reluctance 
on the part of UK machine tool users to embrace automation. High Import 
penetration has tended to be dismissed as part of the wider trend 
towards specialisation and internationalisation within the industry. 
Executives have been less vociferous about their own shortcomings but 
quick to offer opinions on the demise of long-established names In the 
industry and to point to foreign competitors in strategic trouble. 
Notwithstanding the Impact of unfavourable external factors, especially 
currency movements, few executives could find comfort 1n the feeling 
that these problems are not a peculiarly UK phenomenon.
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When the UK economy plunged Into recession in 1979/80, manufacturers 
sought retrenchment as they had done in earlier cyclic downturns. 
Gradually it was realised that this was to be the most severe and 
prolonged recession since the second world war. To say that executives 
were complacent and ill-prepared for the downturn is to understate the 
magnitude and complexity of the strategic problem. The stark reality 
was of late response to a longer term trend in deteriorating 
international competitiveness. Retrenchment, as the traditional recipe, 
became increasingly untenable on its own and simultaneous strategic 
change along several key dimensions was required.
Among the competitive deficiencies exposed by the recession were mature 
product lines, outdated skills and equipment, poor product 
quailty/rellability, high costs and low productivity by international 
standards. To survive 1n the short-term and reposition themselves ready 
for the upturn, most manufacturers needed to quickly catch-up 1n their 
core technology and/or diversify into growth areas.
This research aimed to address four important inter-related issues in 
the response of machine tool manufacturing companies in the UK to 
restoring competitiveness:
(a) the strategic problem of ensuring that product technology and 
manufacturing technology are at least abreast of international 
best practice;
(b) the potential for Improving competitiveness by supplementing 
indigenous machine tool technology via the inward transfer of 
foreign technology;
(c) the managerial processes by which technological issues and 
specifically, technology transfer enter the overall 
decision-making framework;
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(d) the Implications of strategic reorientation for management/ 
organisational development.
The motivation for this research 1s rooted 1n rçy Industrial-experience, 
Initially 1n engineering design and later as a commercial manager with 
responsibility for International operations, Including technology 
transfer. Exposure to the dynamics of the International business 
environment had a profound Influence on n\y personal development. 
Consequently, technological and International aspects of strategy 
development have continued to provide the driving force behind my 
research and consultancy work on taking up academic appointments at 
Coventry Polytechnic In 1980 and Cranfleld School of Management 1n 1988.
Earlier experience had focussed my attention on the Inadequate knowledge 
and skills base on which many strategic technological decisions are 
taken. Executives 1n UK-owned and forelgn-owned engineering companies 
appeared, like myself 1n previous jobs, to be working 1n Isolation, with 
very little 1n the way of a practical framework against which to 
interpret their own limited experiences and evaluate opportunities. 
Simultaneously, Government policy prescriptions regarding Inward foreign 
direct Investment and collaboration were emerging which had been 
formulated at a high level of aggregation, based on seemingly 
superficial knowledge of the nature and scale of existing Inward 
transfer arrangements. Selection of the UK machine tool Industry for 
research satisfied my personal criteria of examining strategic aspects 
of electro-mechanical technology, coupled with a high degree of foreign 
participation and competition. The following characteristics of the 
Industry Illustrate Its strategic Importance and why consideration of 
the International dimension 1n technology strategy development 1s a 
fertile area for research:
(a) The "products" of the machine tool Industry provide the 
"processes" of a wide range of user Industries. This 
Interdependence 1s characterised by what the historian LTC Rolt 
(1965, pl2) referred to as 'the propogatlng power' of machine 
tools, whereby a new or Improved machine solves a particular 
production problem, which in turn makes possible the better 
construction of a similar or different kind of machine. In this 
respect, the comparatively low UK production (-€413 million) and 
employment (23,000 people) 1n 1983 did not adequately reflect the 
industry's overall Impact on the national level of competitiveness 
and belied its role as a strategic defence Industry.
(b) Machine tools is an international market with approximately 40-45 
percent of world production entering the export market In the 
1980's. Evidence of declining International competitiveness 1s 
not difficult to find. UK manufacturers have claimed a reducing 
share of world production and exports over the last two decades.
UK import penetration has Increased dramatically. The technical 
sophistication of Imported machines 1s higher than that of 
exported machines, and over the period 1975-83, UK machine tool 
production declined at a greater rate than the "all manufacturing" 
index and the index of production for major customer Industries 
such as motor vehicles, mechanical and electrical engineering.
(c) Technological change In the machine tool Industry 1s increasing In 
both pace and complexity. Firstly, the technologies associated 
with mechanical engineering design, production engineering, 
microelectronics and computing are converging; leading to new 
demands on managerial and technical capabilities to deal with 
machine "systems". Secondly, many of the changes have originated 
outside the traditional boundaries of the Industry and outside the 
UK. These trends present major strategic challenges for machine 
tool manufacturers as they struggle to maintain competitiveness 1n 
stand-alone machines and to exploit the opportunities for higher 
added value inherent 1n the supply of machining cells and flexible 
manufacturing systems. Among the strategic options attracting 
management and government interest are those of extending 
technological links with foreign manufacturers.
The process of Internationalisation of the UK machine tool Industry 1s 
not a new phenomenon. In a relatively open economy such as the UK, It 
has long been recognised that the national "technological state-of-the- 
art" 1s a function of Indigenous research, design and development and 
Imported technology. Any restructuring of the Industry and 
repositioning of Individual companies must start from the situation of 
foreign ownership of manufacturing capacity already accounting for an 
estimated 40 percent of sales by UK manufacturers, and additionally, a 
number of Inward licensing agreements and other collaborative 
arrangements already in operation.
1.2 UK GOVERNMENT RESPONSE
Central features of the approach to Industrial policy pursued by the 
Conservative Government immediately after 1979 were to promote: (a) the 
awareness and adoption of 'key facilitating technologies', of which 
advanced manufacturing systems was one, and (b) to offer financial 
support for approved projects In Individual companies. Emphasis was 
placed on the autonomy of individual companies and ways of assisting 
them to respond to International competition. No formal policy document 
emerged at that time. The general direction had to be Interpreted from 
statements by ministers and the various schemes Implemented by the 
Department of Industry. Indeed, 1t was during the embryonic stage of 
this research that the Government's attitude towards sectoral policies 
and Innovation unfolded, Initially showing a marked reluctance to extend 
Intervention beyond that of disseminator of Information and provider of 
selective financial support. This was to some extent reflected In the 
statement of Michael Marshall (1981), Under Secretary at the Department 
of Industry, who said:
'Firms are responsible for Identifying projects .... they provide 
most of the money to demonstrate their belief In the value of the 
work. They are responsible for the exploitation of the results
.... primary responsibility must be with the industry Itself. It 
is an illusion to believe that their responsibility can be assumed 
by governments1.
Subsequent statements by ministers have consistently shunned the notion 
of sectoral policies and reinforced the view that individual businesses 
should be left to make decisions about deployment of their resources. 
While selective financial support for advanced manufacturing technology 
has been forthcoming to Industry 1n general, Kenneth Baker (1983), then 
Minister of State for Industry and Information Technology, said that the 
machine tool Industry was not a priority area. He went on to assert 
that every Government since the War had announced a strategy for the 
British machine tool Industry and none had worked.
One of the first comprehensive statements of Government thinking was 
published by the Department of Industry (later Trade & Industry) 1n a 
pamphlet entitled: "Strategic Aims" (1983). This outlined the 
Department's central aim of achieving: ‘a profitable, competitive and 
adaptive productive sector In the UK'. This was to be achieved by 
promoting: (a) a climate for UK Industry as conducive to enterprise as 
that 1n any other Industrialised country, (b) Industrial efficiency 
through the selective use of the powers of government to achieve 
International competitiveness, and (c) opportunities for Innovation, 
with technology available and applied on the scale necessary to ensure 
UK competitiveness.
Under the headings "Efficiency" and "Innovation" there were three
elements of direct relevance to the themes developed In this research:
Efficiency (para. 2.4) highlighted 'Inward Investment and 
collaboration with foreign companies yielding competitive 
advantage to the UK ....
Innovation (para. 3.1) referred to 'the scale and nature of 
research effort and Inward technology transfer geared to UK 
Industrial needs ....'
Innovation (para. 3.3) covered 'the awareness and rapid adoption
of key technologies to maintain competitiveness'.
The foregoing statements are based on assumptions about declining UK 
competitiveness, technological deficiency and the superiority of foreign 
manufacturers. Implicit 1n this prescription 1s the perceived need for 
changes in the structure of Industry and managerial practices and how 
they should be made. This Is a much more "structurally-or1entated" form 
of Intervention than the "arms length" approach of 1980/81.
For over a century the traditional source of foreign machine tool 
technology has been the USA and this continues to be so across a wide 
front. The ascendency of Japan 1s a relatively recent phenomenon and as 
far as imports are concerned, these tend to be focussed on computer 
numerically controlled (CNC) lathes and machining centres. Government 
and Industry attention has therefore turned to Japanese manufacturers, 
resulting In a "voluntary" restraint on Imports and the encouragement of 
inward direct Investment and collaboration. At the time of writing, one 
leading Japanese manufacturer, Yamazakl Machinery, had commissioned a 
¿35m plant in the UK and several Inward licence agreements and joint 
ventures had been signed between Japanese and UK manufacturers. The 
Yamazakl Investment received a ¿5.2m grant from the Government and was 
described by Mr Norman Lamont (1984), Minister of State for Industry,
as: 1--- a showpiece factory at the forefront of advanced manufacturing
technology'. Similar encouraging signs were evident In the Department 
of Industry's submission to the House of Commons Committee on Industry 
and Trade (1983) which highlighted examples of robot licence deals with 
Japanese manufacturers as:
'.... an effective way to build up the UK's robot capacity as 
quickly as possible without wasting effort and resources on 
duplication of technical progress made elsewhere'.
The arguments 1n favour of attracting further foreign direct Investment
and Inward licensing to British manufacturing Industries typically hinge
on: (a) the potential for short and long term job creation, (b) 
substitution of imports and the generation of exports, (c) stimulation 
of competition and revitalisation of Indigenous manufacturers, and (d) 
acceleration of the flow of Incoming technological and managerial 
know-how, which 1t Is hoped will diffuse throughout the economy.
Clearly, this 1s 1n the sphere of national political, economic and 
industrial policy, and extending beyond the mere Increase of fixed 
capital formation. Moreover, It should be noted that although such 
inward investment policies tend to be associated with the Conservative 
Government, post-1979, they are not unlike the policies put forward by 
the Labour party both In government and in opposition. It was the 
Labour Government under James Callaghan, for example, which set up the 
Invest in Britain Bureau (IBB) to promote Inward Investment and this was 
retained after the general election of 1979.
1.3 THE COMPATIBILITY OF GOVERNMENT AND COMPANY POLICY
Throughout the five-year period of this study, research has focussed 
primarily on technology strategy and technology transfer at the level of 
Individual business units. That Government policy evolved partially 
along similar lines not only reinforced the timeliness of the work but 
also heightened awareness among executives of foreign sources of 
technology.
Since the Government has had no specific policy for the machine tool 
Industry per se, some of the Initiatives outlined earlier have been 
variously criticised as a 'shotgun' approach to declining 
competitiveness, throwing money at 'technological fix' solutions and 
'capitulation to foreign competition'. Such generalisations, however.
9by both Government and critics alike, say little about the nature of the 
competitive and technological challenges facing machine tool 
manufacturing companies, their receptivity to particular strategic 
options and managerial constraints on adjustment.
The machine tool industry exhibits low overall concentration and Its 
products are highly diverse. It is also a highly cyclical Industry.
This means that It 1s unlikely that any single machine tool producing 
nation or company would wish to pursue developments on all fronts and 
specialisation based solely on the home market is of questionable 
viability. Thus business strategies must be framed 1n an International 
context and the timing of technological developments becomes a critical 
factor. It 1s only by examining strategic behaviour at the micro-level 
that Insights may be gained Into which technological options are likely 
to be the most effective and under what set of circumstances. Such 
research reveals whether the fundamental problems are technological or 
managerial, or both; and also provides a valuable perspective on the 
efficacy of Government policy.
The focus on technology strategy and international technology transfer 
Implies neither technological determinism nor any preoccupation with the 
minutla of machine tool technology. No attempt has been made to Impute 
success/fallure to technological factors alone. Rather, while 
technology 1s regarded as making Its own distinctive contribution to 
international competitiveness, this cannot be understood unless it 1s 
placed in the wider context in which business decisions are made.
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2. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE LITERATURE 
2.1 CORPORATE/BUSINESS POLICY AND STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 
2.11 Corporate/Buslness Policy
The early writers on policy (Ansoff, 1965; Learned et al, 1965; Andrews, 
1971) and management philosophy and practice (Barnard, 1938; Drucker, 
1954, 1968, 1974) adopted a prescriptive approach which was Intended for 
a general audience of business school students and practising top 
executives. Their influential work centred on the analytical content of 
strategic decision-making embodied 1n the sequence of steps required to 
achieve desired managerial outcomes.
Ansoff (1965) 1s worthy of special mention 1n this critical review, 
mainly for his four 'components' of strategy which have entered the 
language of business strategy: product-market scope, the growth vector, 
competitive advantage and the concept of synergy. He offered these to 
help sharpen the firm's search for, and evaluation of, opportunities.
In the critical selection of competitive advantage, straightforward 
steps were said to be taken but 'really successful results require 
uncommon skills in anticipating trends 1n markets and technology'. 
Technology per se was identified by Ansoff as a factor in the growth 
vector and appeared 1n his checklists to aid Industry analysis and the 
appraisal of competitlve/competence profiles.
Andrews (1971, p60) makes the profound statement that ....'technological 
developments are not only the fastest unfolding but the most 
far-reaching in extending or contracting opportunities for an 
established company'. And in a similar vein, Drucker's prolific writing
11
frequently refers to 'technical change', 'technical aspects of work' and 
'technology assessment'. But 1n seeking generality, there has been a 
tendency to understate technological and International factors under the 
broad umbrella of "business environment". This Is not to denigrate the 
pioneering work of Ansoff, Andrews, Drucker and others, for they have 
stimulated strategic thinking and made valuable contributions towards a 
more ordered approach to business management. Intuition and 
common-sense observation tell us that they are close to reality and, 
Indeed, many of their arguments have re-appeared in modified form In the 
work of later writers.
North American experience dominated the early literature. There 
continues to be a stream of publications from the previously mentioned 
writers and others (Harvey, 1982; Glueck A Jaunch, 1984; David, 1987), 
along with parallel works on corporate planning (King * Cleland, 1978, 
1987; Lorange, 1980; Grant A King, 1982). A much-needed UK orientation 
towards business policy has been provided by Thomas (1977), Johnson A 
Scholes (1984), Howe (1986), Bowman A Asch (1987) and Luffman et al 
(1987); and on corporate planning by writers such as Hussey (1979,
1982), Argentl (1974, 1980), Higgins (1980) and Scholes A Klemm (1987). 
Some writers describe their personal experiences and refer to examples 
or case studies, while others draw on empirical research to enrich and 
support their various points.
Thomas, for example, follows a broadly based approach to business 
policy, defining 1t as the study of the nature and process of choice.
H1s belief 1n the Influence of socio-political forces 1n shaping 
declslon-making behaviour 1s evident throughout, and he makes the 
Important point that to study the nature of choices Independently of the 
process of decision and the decision-takers 1s Impossible In the real
12
world. Thomas briefly considers technology in the context of 
organisation structure and managerial behaviour, and discusses 
technology transfer 1n two useful chapters covering policy options 
arising from product markets and International operations.
Johnson & Scholes and Bowman & Asch present a more structured approach, 
typical of a teaching book. They treat technology 1n soclo-technlcal 
terms and, like Thomas, carefully build in personal values and power 
structures into their analytical framework. Johnson & Scholes make 
passing mention of franchising and licensing as \1o1nt development' 
options but disappointingly, apart from briefly discussing the 
multinational company as an organisation type, international business 1s 
conspicuously absent. As a general observation across the business 
policy literature, it seems that writers have neglected the 
technological dimension and have been slow to Integrate the 
international dimension, leaving the latter open to separate treatment 
by economists.
2.12 Strategic Management
With the change 1n business environment from growth and relative 
stability associated with the 1950's and 60's to the turbulent 
conditions of the 1970's and Into the 1980's, perspectives on business 
strategy have widened. This Is particularly noticeable 1n the writing 
of Ansoff, who extended his narrow concept of product-market strategy to 
consider the multidimensional nature of strategic problems within a new 
paradigm of "strategic management", first articulated in Ansoff,
Declerck i Hayes (1976).
Initially, strategic management appeared to offer little more than
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merely Integrating some of the established concepts and techniques of
business management; or possibly, due to Ansoff's rational stance,
representing an emerging branch of operational research or management
science. Gradually, however, as Ansoff elaborated on the
organisation-environment link through "strategic issue management"
(1980) and attempted to deal with the Impact of technology (1984, 1987)
1t became clear that he was redefining the role of general management 1n
a systems view of external change and Internal adjustment :
'Strategic management is a systematic approach to a major and 
increasingly important responsibility of general management: to 
position and relate the firm to Its environment 1n a way which 
will assure Its continued success and make It secure from 
surprises.' (Ansoff (1984, pxv).
Ansoff (1980,pl33) defined a strategic Issue as ....'a forthcoming 
development, either Inside or outside of the organisation, which is 
likely to have an important Impact on the ability of the enterprise to 
meet Its objectives.' The overall purpose being to prevent strategic 
surprises by assigning responsibilities for surveillance of trends and 
to sense signals of impending change. Ansoff (1984), however, stopped 
well short of detailed consideration of Industrial setting, preferring 
Instead to examine 'technological turbulence' and 'technological 
capability' as generalised phenomena; noting that: 'the strategic 
success of firms is less sensitive to the specifics of a technology than 
to certain key technological variables which are common across the 
spectrum of technology-based Industries'. Building on earlier work 
(Ansoff 4 Stewart,1967), the variables Ansoff (1984) Identified were :
(a) investment In research and development, (b) competitive positioning, 
(c) product dynamics, (d) technological dynamics and (e) competitive 
dynamics. He proposed a simple framework for assessing their Intensity 
and priorities, which In practice amounts to a technical audit. This 1s 
consistent with his declared aim of providing guidelines for general
managers.
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Schendel S Hofer (1979) have also emphasised the integrative role of the
general manager 1n their Interpretation of strategic management as:
'--- a process that deals with the entrepreneurial work of the
organisation, with organisational renewal and growth, and more 
particularly, with developing and utilising the strategy which Is 
to guide the organisation's operations.' (Schendel « Hofer, 1979, 
pll).
Responsibilities for the process of strategic management 1n Schendel & 
Hofer's terms are typically shared by all managers rather than being 
divided by level or function, highlighting the need to move away from 
the artificial separation of medium/long term strategy and day to day 
operations. A key task of general management in their model Is to 
facilitate cross-functional and multi-level Interaction and they 
advocate giving greater prominence to strategy implementation.
Notable among the growing number of publications on strategic management 
to have significant Impact on current thinking are the outstanding 
contributions from Michael Porter on competitive strategy (1980) and 
competitive advantage (1985), and from Kenlchi Ohmae on Japanese 
business strategy (1982) and global competition (1985).
Porter (1980) sets out a framework for analysing Industries and 
competitors. H1s book has the virtue of being highly "readable", which 
has widened Its acceptability among practitioners. Porter's approach is 
developed around the Identification of five competitive forces which 
determine Industry structure (buyer power, threat of substitution, 
supplier power, Intensity of rivalry, and potential entrants) and three 
generic strategies (overall cost leadership, differentiation and focus) 
for creating a défendable position In the long run and outperforming 
competitors. Sustained commitment to one generic strategy Is 
recommended as the primary target to avoid dilution of effort, although 
Porter concedes that a focus (segmentation) strategy may Involve a low
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cost position, high differentiation or both. Failure to develop 1n at 
least one of the three directions is described as 'stuck in the middle'.
Considering the high number of citations of Porter's work in the 
literature on strategic management, empirical validation has been 
remarkably slow and several studies have produced contradictory evidence 
(Hambrick, 1983; Dess & Davis, 1984; White, 1986; Miller & Frlesen, 
1986a, 1986b). The Intense debate generated by these studies Initially 
centred on the relationship between market share and profitability to 
show whether pursuing one generic strategy or mixed strategies separates 
high performing companies from less successful competitors. Hambrick, 
for example, used the Profit Impact of Market Strategies (PIMS) database 
to examine producers of capital goods. Among his high performing firms 
he identified clusters of differentiators and clusters of cost leaders, 
but never both combined. In contrast, Miller 4 Frlesen used the PIMS 
database to examine producers of consumer durables, finding that none 
reflected Porter's pure types. Their differentiators also employed low 
cost strategies, cost leaders employed significant elements of 
differentiation, and some focussers were also cost leaders.
The controversy surrounding these findings then shifted Its focus. On 
the one hand, attempts to Identify generic strategies were welcomed, 
especially the Insights gained on factors underlying competitive postion 
1n a given industry and the potential for changing combinations of 
strategies with Industry evolution. On the other, there was a growing 
challenge to the robustness of market share effects on profitability 
using PIMS data (Rumelt 4 Wensley, 1980; Jacobson 4 Aaker, 1985), with 
attention later turning to other strategic variables such as product 
quality (Phillips et al, 1983; Jacobson 4 Aaker, 1987). There seems 
little doubt that Porter's work will spawn more empirical Investigation
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of this kind.
Porter's second book (1985) examined sources of competitive advantage 
and how two basic types (cost leadership and differentiation) may be 
sustained to achieve long term competitiveness. He devoted a whole 
chapter to understanding technological aspects of competitive advantage 
and it 1s written in the style of an industrial economist with few clues 
to his earlier training in mechanical engineering. He neatly defined 
technology strategy as: 'a firm's approach to the development and use of 
technology' and then Incorporated an explicit reference to external 
sources of technology:
'Technology strategy must Include choices about what important
technologies to Invest In, whether to seek technological
leadership in them, and when and how to licence technology'.
(Porter 1985, pl65).
Porter saw 'strategic alliances' and 'coalitions' as vehicles for 
coordinating and sharing technology development to broaden and enhance 
the scope of the firm's overall "value chain". His concept of the 
"value chain" Involved disaggregation of activities underlying 
competitive advantage 1n order to understand cost behaviour and existing 
or potential sources of differentiation.
Omhae's (1982) work is useful for h1s "key factors for success" which 
distinguish winners and losers in an Industry, and "degreees of freedom" 
surrounding a key factor. In essence, his dictum 1s simple - first 
grasp the whole picture, then assess the direction(s) In which resources 
should be concentrated and exploit them aggressively. If there Is 
freedom surrounding a key factor, say a technological factor, then an 
attempt must be made to assess the direction of technological innovation 
presented by opportunities. Surprisingly, Ohmae's reference to the role 
of foreign technology 1s limited to Japanese companies borrowing Western 
technology through licensing arrangements so that technology would not
become a bottleneck to their growth and the need to work hard at 
improvement to catch up with the foreign licensor. Very little 
amplification is forthcoming in his later book on global competition.
It is difficult to compare Ohmae's style of writing with contemporary 
Japanese authors because few have received similar acclaim in North 
America and Western Europe. Ohmae did not set out to write academic 
books and the results must be viewed in this light. The content is 
unmistakably McKinsey & Company in origin and many of the concepts are 
to be found elsewhere (see Morrison, 1971; Morrison & Lee, 1979). His 
choice of examples drawn from Japanese business, like those of "popular" 
writers on business excellence (e.g. Peters & Waterman, 1982), is 
informative but there is little to enlighten strategists in the majority 
of companies which are not leaders. If any further adverse criticism 
may be made of both Ohmae and Porter, it is that they over-emphasise 
large firms operating in oligopolistic markets and under-emphasise 
strategy implementation and complexity of the environment in which 
individual firms operate. Their prescriptions are deceptively simple.
Progress towards operationalisation of ideas about strategic management 
has been achieved by addressing the question: how can we compete 
effectively in a given business? It is at the level of individual 
business units that understanding of products, markets and technologies 
is required and academic writers have begun to re-examine the strategic 
contribution of their discipline or function in the quest for sources of 
differential advantage. This is most evident in the marketing 
literature where proximity of strategic management to the 
organisation-wide "marketing concept" has received scrutiny along with 
opportunities for securing and sustaining competitive advantage through 
market segmentation, positioning, product innovation etc. (Murray,
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1979; Biggadike, 1981; Day & Wensley, 1983, 1988; Gardner & Thomas, 
1983; Day, 1984, 1986). There appears to be similar scope for an 
empirical investigation of contributions from technology within the 
integrative framework of strategic management.
2.2 TOWARDS THE STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT OF TECHNOLOGY
2.21 A Technology Strategy Schema
The 1980's has seen numerous calls to incorporate technological Issues 
into the overall business decision-making process (Kantrow, 1980; 
Frohman, 1982; Buffa, 1984; Eschenbach 8 Geistauts, 1988), ranging from 
the need to know technological strengths underlying business success and 
using them as a competitive weapon (Morton, 1983; Frohman, 1985), to 
inadequacies of educational programmes for those who will manage design 
and technology (Oakley, 1984; Crisp, 1984). The quality of these and 
other publications 1s variable and most do not go much beyond projection 
of the general message that technological capability requires top 
management attention.
One of the best articles to emerge is by Maidique & Patch (1982) who 
start off by giving a useful definition of technology policy as .... 
'involving choices between alternative technologies, the criteria by 
which they are embodied Into products and processes and the deployment 
of resources that will allow their successful Implementation'. They 
envisage an overlap between technology policy and manufacturing policy
and describe the latter as ---  'encompassing decisions regarding the
location, scale and organisation of productive resources within the 
bounds of a given technology'.
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Maidique 4 Patch (1982), along with McLeod (1969), Freeman (1974) and 
Kotler (1988) have refined earlier work on a schema of four technology 
strategies first put forward by Ansoff 4 Stewart (1967). These 
strategies, based on timing considerations, may be summarised as follows:
Leadership - an offensive strategy requiring strong research, 
design and development capability due to proximity of the 
state-of-the-art.
Fast Follower - a reactive, second-to-the-market strategy aimed at 
learning from the leader's mistakes and requiring a strong design 
and development effort.
Late Follower - a strategy based on overall cost minimisation and 
manufacturing capability. Often referred to as a "me too" 
strategy.
Niche Exploitation - a segmentation strategy emphasising 
specialisation and requiring skills in design and applications 
engi neeri ng.
Maidique 4 Patch regard the above strategies as neither mutually 
exclusive nor collectively exhaustive. Ansoff 4 Stewart suggest that 
most companies should adopt a blend according to the requirements of 
their different markets or product lines. In contrast, McLeod advises 
that success 1s most likely to come to divisions which choose one 
strategy and stick to 1t, adding the rider that a niche (segmentation) 
strategy based on applications engineering 1s so different from anything 
else that it should not be combined with other strategies. These 
arguments surrounding compatibility of strategies are similar to those 
raised by Porter (1980) In pursuing his three generic strategies.
The fundamental questions emanating from the work of these writers are:
(a) what technologies should the company Invest In and what are the 
timing requirements, (b) what mix of research, design and development 1s 
necessary and how should this be organised, and (c) what are the sources 
of technology and how might these be evaluated? Two major factors 1n
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arriving at answers to such questions and choosing a strategy are: 
knowing the stage of evolution of the technology life cycle (Ford 4 Ryan 
1981, Foster, 1982, 1985; Lee 4 Nakicenovlc, 1988) and proximity to the 
leading edge of technology. These have managerial and resource 
implications for all functions of the business.
Most writers have emphasised the Inherent Instability of working at the 
frontiers of technological knowledge. Casson (1987, p253), for example, 
reminds us that It 1s a feature of any frontier that the environment 1n 
which people operate 1s 'not properly mapped out or understood'. Leach 
(1971) makes the Important point that leaders must continually strive to 
repeat the advances by which they have attained their position, while 
simultaneously being sensitive to threats caused by either competitive 
emulation of their efforts or a breakthrough on costs. Porter (1985, 
pl83) suggests that leadership strategies are costly and can only be 
justified 1f the Initial lead is translated into first-mover 
advantages, a factor endorsed by Day (1986, plOl) who saw most of the 
benefits accruing to pioneers as derived from 'opportunities to define 
the rules of competition to their advantage'.
Follower strategies have the main aim of 'learning from the Innovator's 
mistakes' (Maldique 4 Patch, 1982, p277). Some followers may wish to 
stay a reasonable distance behind the leader, whereas others may attempt 
a 'second-but-better' approach (Urban 4 Hauser, 1980, p20; Foxall, 1984, 
p61). According to Day (1986, pl05), fast followers are faced with the 
critical decision of whether to Imitate or try to leapfrog the pioneer, 
or to enter a previously untapped market. He suggests that the question 
of "how fast is fast" 1s answered by the length of the Introductory 
period of the life cycle: 'The window for a fast follower may be open 
for only a few months for microprocessors but several years for new
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machining systems'. Timing 1s, therefore, crucial to success. Waiting 
too long, runs the risk of customers placing faith in the leaders' 
products and substantial inducements may be required in terms of product 
superiority and performance to switch to a second-comer (Foxall, 1984, 
p61). Late followers generally need to exploit some distinctive 
competence such as customer service or low cost over selected product 
lines (Biggadlke, 1977; Kotler, 1988).
All the aforementioned writers agree that successful leadership 
strategies are associated with access to strong in-house research, 
design and development capability; whereas follower strategies require 
design and production expertise. They also appear to recognise that 
external sources of technology may be used to augment any of the four 
strategies by reducing cost and lead time. 'Willingness to take new 
knowledge on licence and enter joint ventures' was identified by Carter 
A Williams (1957) as one of the characteristics of a 'technically
progressive firm', defined as a firm which ___ 'on a necessarily
subjective judgement, 1s keeping within a reasonable distance of the 
best current practice in the application of science and technology'. To 
avoid lengthening lead times and erosion of overall competitive 
position, it is also necessary to maintain a 'critical mass' of effort 
(Ansoff A Stewart, 1967) or 'threshold' level of resources (Freeman, 
1974). Assessment of the absolute level and quality of such resources 
and the way they are managed 1s said to be a highly judgmental exercise.
2.22 Redefinition of the Business in Technological Terms
Against a background of severe economic recession 1n the early 1980's 
and the increasing cost of product/process development, there has been a 
resurgence of interest in redefining businesses in terms of their
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technological resource base. This was stated in its most penetrating 
form by Gold (1980, p504):
1--- many industrial managements might well consider beginning
their long range planning with a definition of technological 
Improvement objectives and then redefining marketing strategies 
and financial requirements in accordance with resulting planned 
changes in technological capabilities'.
Fortunately, though much of the recent literature has re-opened the
polarised and often fruitless debate on "technology push" versus "market
pull" (Baker et al, 1987; Shanklin A Ryans, 1987), some writers are
seeking a more balanced approach. Abell (1980), for example, proposed a
simple three-dimensional model of customer groups, customer functions
(benefits) and alternative technologies. In essence, he has mixed
outputs and Inputs by taking Ansoff's product-market approach and adding
a third dimension defining alternative product/process technologies.
This is useful where there may be several ways to satisfy customer
product requirements and the choice of manufacturing process technology,
thereby allowing scope for differentiation. Abell warns of the danger
that consideration solely of product-market strategy may mean ending up
in a lot of unrelated technologies with leadership 1n none. Similar
recognition of technological capability is evident In (a) Ansoff's
(1984) attempt to segment the environment in terms of "strategic
technology areas" as an aid to defining strategic posture and (b)
Delrickx A Cool's (1988) suggestion that the firm can be viewed as both
a bundle of resources and a bundle of markets which operate
simultaneously to determine competitive advantage.
Pursuing this line further hinges on the exploitation of "distinctive 
competence" residing In the highly specific nature of technology and how 
1t can be Incorporated into market positioning strategy and overall 
business strategy.
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2.23 Cost Leadership Through Acquiring Technology
An approach to competitive strategy popularised by the Boston Consulting 
Group (BCG) combines the experience curve with product portfolio 
analysis (Conley, 1970; Day, 1977, 1986). The interesting extension of 
the BCG model is that by acquiring cost-reducing technology, the 
manufacturer with a moderate market share may approach the cost position 
of the dominant share holder by shifting to a lower experience curve 
(Day, 1977; Porter, 1979). This principle is at the heart of the cost 
leadership, and when coupled with capacity optimisation and high volume 
market penetration strategies, it ultimately affects price 
competitiveness. Unfortunately, experience curves are dynamic and 
seldom as smooth as the textbooks show. The permanence of cost 
advantages may be quesionable. Technological "leapfrogging" down the 
experience curve is evident in industries such as microelectronics and 
1t is often very difficult to identify the cost leader for any length of 
time. The situation is further exacerbated by the timing of new product 
innovations, shared costs across product lines, and how executives 
interpret the threats and opportunities of emerging technologies 
(Mlllman, 1983).
2.24 Matching Business and Technology Portfolios
Booz, Allen & Hamilton have developed techniques for analysing 
technology alternatives and priorities using separate business and 
technology portfolios (Harris et al, 1982; Pappas, 1984). The business 
portfolio is a two by two matrix showing market attractiveness against 
competitive position. To facilitate matching, a technology matrix 1s 
constructed of "technology Importance" (the relative Importance that a 
specific technology plays in a given business segment) against "relative
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technology position" (a measure of firm's investment in technology). 
Though there are sound reasons for wishing to assess technology position 
to ensure consistency of business and technology portfolios, the 
technique 1s difficult to operationalise with any precision. As with 
all techniques of this kind there are problems 1n defining market share, 
market growth rate and dealing with cyclicality; and the definition of 
"relative technology position" using such measures as number of patents, 
human technical resource strengths, product history and expenditures, is 
fraught with difficulty. It is interesting to note that one of the 
foremost writers on portfolio analysis, George Day (1986, p215), devotes 
only half a page to this particular technique, completely omitting the 
kind of rigorous critique that 1s the hallmark of his work. 
Correspondence with Professor Day revealed his scepticism regarding the 
Identification of discrete technologies.
2.3 THE MANAGEMENT OF RESEARCH A DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCT INNOVATION
2.31 The Narrow Perspective of R A D
A cursory review of the literature on research and development 
immediately reveals that this Is a prolific source of reports and 
articles. Much of this work 1s Interesting, particularly that on 
project management, but only a few publications provide more than a 
tenuous link with the themes of technology strategy and Inward 
technology transfer. Nevertheless, perceptions about the importance of 
R A D  expenditure form a powerful Influence on managerial 
decision-making.
The preoccupation with R A D as a key factor 1n economic growth 1s 
epitomised in the econometric work of Edwin Mansfield et al at Wharton
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School of the University of Pennsylvania. Mansfield (1968) and Romeo 
(1975) Identified R 4 D intensity (annual R 4 D expenditure as a 
proportion of sales turnover) as a determinant of an Industry's rate of 
diffusion of technological Innovations, noting that the higher the 
intensity, the greater the readiness to adopt Innovations and the more 
likely the Industry Is to be 1n a position to assimilate new technology. 
Unfortunately, single Indicators lack sensitivity as measures of 
innovative activity and competitiveness. They tend to hide differences 
1n national product mix, technological Inputs from outside the sector, 
cyclicality of sales and lumpiness of investment. Attention must also 
be drawn to the hazards In formulating policy and making budget 
allocations based on measures which use a ratio of current Investment 1n 
R 4 D or Innovation to sales turnover generated from the fruits of 
earlier Investments. Various economists have attempted to remedy the 
last point by using time series data and distributed lag models to seek 
correlations between growth and R 4 D expenditure, patent counts, 
licence royalties etc (see Scherer, 1965; Branch, 1982; Odaglrl, 1983). 
These multi-sector studies are technique-bound and at such a high level 
of aggregation as to lose much of their explanatory power.
A welcome shift away from consideration of formal R 4 D towards the 
wider concept of Investment 1n product Innovation was made by Mansfield 
et al (1971) 1n their examination of the proportions of total Innovation 
cost and time arising at various stages In the process. Their study of 
chemicals, electronics and machinery product groups 1s valuable because 
1t shows the cumulative nature of cost and time and that the non-R 4 D 
activities are substantial 1n product Innovation. Precise 
Interpretation of their averages 1s hazardous due to difficulty 1n 
assessing the degree of overlap between stages In the Innovation process 
and the large variation 1n previous experience of the sample companies
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1n the relevant technological area. For machinery products, the 
prototype stage and deslgn/constructlon of tooling and manufacturing 
facilities accounted for about two-th1rds of total Innovation costs and 
over three-quarters of the time elapsed. Mansfield et al suggest that 
there are cost/tlme trade-offs to be had 1f executives wish to take them 
up but they make no reference to further savings 1n cost and lead times 
by using external sources of technology.
Potentially the most useful research on "innovative activity" has been 
conducted by Pavltt (1980, 1982, 1985) who combined R 4 D expenditure 
with measures of patenting and manpower resources. International 
comparisons have well known problems but he has made the best 
Interpretation of such data as 1s available. Patent counts alone leave 
a lot to be desired because they say nothing about the economic value of 
Individual patents. When examined 1n the light of national shares of 
patents filed 1n other countries, clues begin to emerge on export 
competitiveness and international orientation. Similarly with counts 
which do not reveal the quality of human resources and the redeployment
of skills. As Pavltt (1980, p47) noted..... 'the process of creating
and incorporating technology 1s labour Intensive' and there Is 
Inadequate recognition of the importance 1n mechanical engineering of
--- 'the growing need to be able to design and develop total systems
within which particular machines operate'. Taken together, Pavltt 
concluded that the three measures Indicate there has been a decline In 
Innovative activity In the UK mechanical engineering sector since the 
late 1960's.
2.32 Empirical Studies of New Product Innovation
One of the best new product studies conducted during the 1970's was
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Project SAPPHO by the Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) at the 
University of Sussex (Freeman, 1974). This involved a comparative 
analysis of pairs of successful and unsuccessful innovations, and 
identified several factors which discriminate success from failure: (a) 
better understanding of user needs, (b) attention to marketing and 
operating in familiar markets, (c) efficient product development, (d) 
employment of external technological expertise, and (e) authority vested 
1n the project leader.
Rothwell (1977) has compared the findings of Project SAPPHO with eight 
other studies, and concluded that despite the pluralistic nature of 
explanations, responsibility for the success or failure of innovations 
rests firmly in the hands of management. He found that in most of the 
studies there was a bias towards "radical" rather than "incremental" 
innovations, a tendency towards project execution variables to the 
relative neglect of project selection, and greater emphasis on 
endogenous factors than exogenous factors. Additionally, Rothwell noted 
that factors associated with success and/or failure are significantly 
different in different industry sectors and that these differences are 
as important as the cross-sectional points of similarity. He pointed to 
the danger of casting the net too widely and that 1n-depth sectoral 
studies would appear to yield the potentially most meaningful results.
Subsequent empirical research by SPRU (1981) has provided a database on 
more than 2000 significant innovations covering 30 sectors of UK 
industry. The findings are broadly corroborative of Project SAPPHO and 
other studies compared by Rothwell. An interesting possible direction 
for future research to emerge from the 1981 SPRU report was the need for 
better information on the use of foreign technology through formal 
licensing transactions and more informal methods such as personal
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contracts and copying through reverse engineering. Several years later, 
the same need for research on different forms of Internationalisation 
and technology transfer was Identified by Francis (1987, p2) In an 
Economics A Soda! Research Council report.
A valuable Insight on the value of external sources of technology in 
speeding up the rate of Innovation was provided by Gee (1978, 1979). He 
reported the results of a project commissioned by the US National 
Science Foundation which examined 500 significant (from the 
technological and socio-economic point of view) Innovations originating 
from six countries over the two decades 1953-73. Despite the 
difficulties of defining end points, the "average Innovation time 
period" was used as a convenient indicator of Innovative performance on 
the justification that all the confluent factors which act to stimulate 
or Impede the innovation process will be reflected 1n the Innovation 
period.
Gee concluded that internally generated technology was the principal 
source for all firms, although there was a strong correlation between 
shorter Innovation periods and higher dependence on external sources of 
technology. An International comparison showed that Japan exhibited the 
shortest average Innovation period of 3.4 years, West Germany 5.2 years, 
the USA 7.4 years and the UK 7.7 years. Improved Innovative performance 
and competitiveness was associated with a balance of external and 
Internal sources of technology.
2.33 Managerial Perspectives
Traditional approaches to research and development as project-based 
activities or front-ended Inputs to the product Innovation process have
- 29 -
shaped the treatment of Innovation itself in the literature. Many of 
the publications on the management of Innovation, Industrial marketing 
and product management include multi-stage models describing the process 
to be one of taking an Idea through a number of sequential stages to 
commercialisation (Twlss, 1980; Wind, 1982; Chlsnall, 1985; Cooper, 
1988). Invariably 1t Is recognised that there are substantial overlaps, 
iterations and feedback loops; and various screening and review 
procedures to check cumulative cost/t1me projections and conformity with 
business objectives (Mlllman, 1986). These models resemble the 
analytical-rational approaches found In the literature on business 
policy and planning.
In one of the most cogent books on the management of Innovation, Twlss 
(1980) has tackled Inward licensing 1n a positive way, referring to 1t 
as 'buying the fruits of another company's R ( 0 investment'. He opens 
h1s book by posing two strategic questions facing executives 1n 
Industrial companies:
Can objectives be achieved more economically by licensing another 
organisation's technology than by Initiating an Internal R 4 D 
project?
Can the potential of licence agreements be realised without a 
strong 1n-house R 4 D capability? (Twlss, 1980, p2)
While noting that many companies are markedly reluctant to pursue an
active licensing policy, he adopts a pragmatic approach to the familiar
problem of limited resources:
'Even the largest companies cannot afford to examine all the 
technological alternatives or produce all the worthwhile 
Innovations ... there 1s little gain from rediscovering what can 
be obtained from another source more cheaply'. (Twlss, 1980, p58)
Twlss offers no explanation for cautious approaches to Inward licensing
and has nothing to say about the Integration and compatibility of
licensed technology with existing systems. Most authors have treated
these 1n a superficial way. Resistance to Inward licensing 1s typically
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dismissed in a few sentences as fears of technical dependency and 
inhibition of in-house skills (Fielden, 1963), legal uncertainty 
(Cawthra, 1978), and lack of a strong enough coupling with the licensor 
(Robertson, 1969). Licensed products are assumed to enter the 
decision-making framework as opportunities ready to be assessed for 
profitability or techno-commercial fit (Berridge, 1977; Pessemeir,
1982).
One of the foremost researchers on technology management 1s Thomas Allen 
at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Allen's early work (1966, 
1972, 1977) clearly showed that the flow of technological information 
from group to group and from stage to stage in the innovation process 1s 
critically dependent on social interaction and that the possibility of 
communication between work groups Is rapidly suppressed with Increasing 
distance apart. To fulfill a communications need that the formal 
organisation is incapable of satisfying, Allen & Cohen (1969) noted the 
role of 'technological gatekeepers'. These boundary-spanning 
Individuals were said to be found at lower levels of the organisation 
and provide a mechanism for the inward transfer of information. The 
more clearly defined the organisation boundary and dynamic the 
technology, the greater the 'communication Impedance' and the need for 
gatekeepers (Allen et al, 1977; Allen et al, 1979). Correspondence with 
Professor Allen (May 1986) resulted in receipt of a number of 
unpublished MIT Sloan School of Management Working Papers. These 
described research which replicated the existence of technological 
gatekeepers and the dominance of personal contact In successful 
technology transfer in a range of organisation types.
Later, Allen et al (1983) extended their research on technology transfer 
across international frontiers by tracing 'sources of
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Innovation-producing messages' that brought technology into small 
manufacturing companies in Ireland, Spain and Mexico. An important 
conclusion from their work was that domestic companies relied heavily on 
messages from overseas and sources in the same industry, and in 
particular, contact with foreign competitors. In contrast, 
foreign-owned subsidiaries obtained the greatest proportion of their 
technology from their parent company but were often constrained in 
exploiting external channels, resulting 1n 'stifling creativity and 
entrepreneurial behaviour'.
2.33 Inward Licensing and the Adoption of Innovations
After making the earlier point that much of the literature 1s of the 
rational-analytical type, 1t comes as no surprise to find similar models 
and checklists 1n the literature on Inward licensing (Brazell, 1966; 
Marcy, 1979; Hamman 4 Mittag, 1985). This rationality of purpose and 
behaviour 1s Implicit in Gee's (1981, pl05) description of the early 
stages of Inward licensing:
'The acquisition of technology developed by others being highly 
demand responsive means that decisions to do so usually are 
carefully weighed and reached only after extensive and 
comprehensive search and evaluation of candidate technologies for 
technical and economic appropriateness...'
The above statement 1s by one of the foremost practitioners of licensing
at the US Naval Surface Weapons Centre at Maryland and may well Indicate
closer adherence to the normative model In military research
establishments and other highly project-based organisations. Parallels
are to be found in the logical flow models 1n the early literature on
Industrial/organisational buyer behaviour (Robinson, Faris 4 Wind,
1967). Subsequent models have encompassed receptiveness to new ideas
and the Influence of a host of contextual factors on pre-purchase
behaviour, much of which has value in the study of Inward licensing.
Licensing and joint ventures are negotiated transactions more akin to 
the Interactive models of buy1ng/sel11ng (Hakansson, 1983; Hutt & Speh, 
1984) and there are other useful concepts to borrow such as the dynamics 
of the "Decision-Making Unit" (Buzell et al, 1972). From the few 
empirical research studies on licensing, there 1s evidence of 
'satisficing' during negotiation (Contractor, 1981), licensing as the 
result of 'ad hoc factors' rather than a rational examination of 
alternative strategies (Lowe & Crawford, 1983, pl6), and the decision 
process Influenced by 'casual encounter or even the personal 
peccadilloes of an executive' (Davies, 1977, pl65).
The way 1n which Internal and external pressures are perceived and 
evaluated by executives appears to be crucial to whether particular 
product/process technologies are adopted. Pertinent questions Include:
(a) Are executives aware that foreign technology is available, and 
from whom?
(b) Is there unanimity at board level?
(c) Is the company risk-averse?
(d) Has executive attention been diverted to solving more urgent 
problems, perhaps of a non-technlcal nature?
(e) Is the company 1n strategic trouble and pursuing what Knight 
(1967, p485) called 'distress Innovation'?
(f) What are the potential benefits of adoption and the penalties of 
non-adoption?
The purpose of this U n e  of enquiry 1s captured succinctly by Gold et al 
(1980, pl4):
'In order to provide more useful guidance for policy making by 
government agencies and Industrial managements, research must 
provide fuller understanding about the bases on which those facing
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such decisions choose to adopt, reject or defer action; about why 
firms within a category of active prospects arrive at different 
decisions; and about the probable effect on such decisions of 
alternative future developments.'
Underlying the decision to pursue licence-based product and process 
innovation are complex socio-political processes. These Involve 
resistance to external sources of technology captured in the so-called 
“not-invented-here" syndrome (Schon, 1967; Katz 4 Allen, 1982) and the 
tricky area of personal Innovativeness (Rogers, 1962, 1983; Rogers 4 
Shoemaker, 1971; Hage, 1980; Foxall, 1984).
The NIH syndrome is a well known, yet under-researched, aspect of 
receptivity to change. Schon describes resistance to change not as 
inertia, but a state of "dynamic conservatism" 1n which members of an 
organisation are actively striving for survival, stability and 
continuity against threats to their identity. Similarly, Katz 4 Allen 
in one of the few empirical investigations of the NIH syndrome, noted 
that the long tenure of R 4 D project groups reinforces the status quo 
and that individuals may come to rely more heavily on their own 
knowledge, views, experiences and capabilities, thereby reducing their 
attentiveness to outside sources of information and expertise.
No empirical research Is thought to have been carried out specifically 
on the lingering effect of bad experiences on the NIH syndrome and 
receptivity to foreign technology. A 'negativity bias' has, however, 
been identified 1n cognitive processing (Kanouse 4 Hanson, 1972) and bad 
experiences are said to have greater persuasive Impact than positive 
experiences (Wright, 1974; Mizerski, 1982; Rlchlns, 1983).
Hage (1980) suggested that as people become exposed to different 
cultures, languages, social groups, and so on, the less they will resist 
radical change. Rogers (1983), mainly known for his work on the
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diffusion of innovations, referred to this external orientation as 
'cosmopoliteness', which he found to be positively associated with 
innovativeness. Foxall (1984, pl28), in turn, simply defined 
innovativeness as ....'the capacity and tendency to purchase new 
products and services'. In a useful review of the empirical research, 
Foxall noted that among other things, innovators exhibit greater 
Internal and external social Interaction, have positive attitudes to 
change and greater interest 1n the product area to which the Innovation 
belongs.
Some of the recent expositions on "business excellence" have taken up 
these themes in the form of "international orientation". Senior 
managers have been urged to maintain a high natural curiosity about how 
things are done elsewhere, establish networks for the exchange of 
information and ideas, and to encourage business intelligence gathering 
through foreign travel (Goldsmith & Clutterbuck, 1987; Heller, 1987). 
These observations and empirical findings suggest that a study of Inward 
technology transfer should at least explore the earlier background of 
key decision makers, their external orientation and contextual factors, 
in an attempt to assess the extent to which their behaviour strays from 
the normative model.
2.34 Product Design Management
A strong case for product designers making a more pro-active 
contribution to international competitiveness has been made in the 
literature (Roy et al, 1981; Rothwell et al, 1983; Kotler & Rath, 1984; 
Millman, 1986; Lorenz, 1986), but there are only a few publications 
covering design management (Topallan, 1980; Oakley, 1984; Heap, 1989). 
Emphasis is placed on the potency of design in achieving product
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through aesthetics, ergonomics, reliability and maintainability. Cost 
reductions have also been highlighted by urging careful attention to 
design for economic manufacture and assembly.
The Fell den Report (1963) was one of the first to recognise the change
in International competition brought about by the rise of West Germany
and Japan. Feilden's brief was primarily to recommend remedies for
shortcomings 1n the training and professional status of engineering
designers. He also drew attention to strong evidence of the :
'....failure of particular sections of British engineering 
industry to keep abreast of foreign competitors in redesigning 
their products to take advantage of advances in technology'.
The Corfleld Report (1979) centred on product design and ways of
compensating for deficiencies against a much more serious background of
declining competitiveness. Corfleld amplified many of Feilden's earlier
words and demonstrated the clear connection between good design (in the
sense of design that facilitates production) and higher productivity.
He also emphasised the need to be internationally-minded about standards
and codes of practice and that:
'--- international links should be encouraged to ensure that the
body of technology is fully representative of International 
expertise and not excessively nationalistic 1n Its traits'.
In the hope of placing design responsibility on a par with other
functions, Corfleld and others (Height, 1986) have recommended separate
design representation on boards of directors. This is likely to find
limited support among engineering and technical directors who already
see it as part of their role. There appears to be consensus of opinion
that the design activity should be raised 1n visibility, yet conflicting
Ideas abound on how this should be achieved. A factor underlying this
concern 1s the shift from labour-intensity towards capital-intensity,
particularly in draughting tasks, with the advent of computer aided
design (CAD) systems. CAD is forcing design-related expenditure
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decisions to a higher level 1n the organisation, but while the costs may 
be associated with the design function, the benefits are far-reaching 
and not easy to measure.
2.4 MANUFACTURING POLICY AND PRODUCTION/OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
2.41 Internal Barriers to Achieving Competitive Advantage Through 
Manufacturing
The debate relating to the strategic role for manufacturing and 
production has highlighted two issues of crucial concern: (a) a cluster 
of controversial developments of an "Internal" nature, ranging from 
perceptions about the relative status of the manufacturing function, to 
Its Input to business strategy formulation and the need to encourage 
linkages between the strategic level and operations, and (b) changes 1n 
the external competitive environment which demand new responses from 
managers and engineers to the matching of product design and 
manufacturing process technology to achieve systems benefits.
An early Influential article which captured the essence of the Internal 
problem was that by Skinner (1969) who postulated manufacturing as 'the 
missing link' 1n company success. He saw manufacturing as traditionally 
carrying low status and emphasising the achievement of high productivity 
and low cost. Top management was said to unknowingly delegate a large 
proportion of policy decisions to lower levels 1n the manufacturing 
area, thereby binding the company to a non-compet1t1ve posture which may 
take years to turn around. Later, Skinner (1978) offered the concept of 
Improving 'Infrastructure' to achieve competitive advantage, Involving 
the matching of technology to human components 1n a complex social 
system of people, administrative systems and policies. Implicit 1n this 
concept was the need to move down from top management levels to lower
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levels at which decisions are made and 1n the area of operations where 
the Implications of technology are felt.
Skinner's dictum has since encouraged others to elaborate on the status 
of manufacturing and consistency among multi-levels of decision-making. 
H111 (1980, 1983), for example, contends that manufacturing managers see 
their role as "responding". They join the corporate debate late and 
seldom expose the manufacturing Implications and production perspectives 
to others. Manufacturing departments, he asserts, are typically asked 
to comment on the feasibility of a plan already formulated. This 
inward-looking, short-term, orientation was a prominent behavioural 
characteristic emerging from an empirical study of production managers 
by Buckingham A Lawrence (1985):
'These managers are keeping a creaking system going but they are 
not on the whole a force for regeneration .... questions of 
planning, systems and policy are neglected while those who 
understand how to sort out Immediate problems get on and sort 
them. But this will not stop the same problems arising tomorrow'.
Further support for this view 1s offered by Wheelwright (1985) who
suggests that a static view of manufacturing keeps 1t In a responsive
mode and process evaluation 1s seen as an after-thought. According to
Wheelwright, top management attention devoted to activities normally
thought of as short-term and situation-specific 1s a factor underlying
Japanese business success. He saw this 'strategic operations policy' as
sadly neglected 1n Western Industrial companies, leaving hands-on
experience untapped 1n strategy formulation.
The matching of product and process technology has always been a central 
Issue 1n achieving competitive advantage because of acceptance that as 
products and markets mature, a "dominant design" emerges and the 
emphasis shifts from product Innovation to process Innovation (Abernathy 
A Utterback, 1975, 1978). Commenting on the changing competitive
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situation in the 1980's, Williams (1983) noted ___ 'a shift from the
investment characteristics of product technology to those of process 
technology as the primary focus of competition'. This generates a 
number of questions about changing power structures and organisational 
rigidity with increasing capital intensity, and the need for strong 
linkages between product design, manufacture and assembly.
2.42 Coping with the Introduction of New Manufacturing Technology
Machine tool manufacturers are facing the same set of decisions 
concerning computer integrated manufacture 1n their own plants as their 
customers. As they progress towards machining cells and flexible 
manufacturing systems, the notion of economies of scale is replaced by 
'economies of scope', bringing the cost of small batch production closer 
to that of high volume production (Panzer & W1111g, 1977; Jelinek A 
Goldhar, 1983, 1985). Thus computer integration offers the opportunity 
to tackle the age old trade-offs between "efficiency and flexibility" 
(Katz & Allen, 1985; Easton A Rothschild, 1986; De Meyer et al, 1987).
There 1s general agreement 1n the literature that the transition to 
computer integration Is problematic. Structural reasons lock companies 
Into outdated technologies (Hayes A Abernathy, 1980) and the 
dlvisability of machine tool technology has meant a better chance of 
survival of older techniques (Ray, 1984). Moreover, to exploit the full 
systems potential of computer Integrated manufacture, 1t must be 
accompanied by the implementation of just-in-time philosophies and 
materials requirements planning systems, which rely heavily on a well 
developed Internal and external Infrastructure for their smooth running. 
As Voss (1985) pointed out: the new manufacturing technologies represent 
the first radical change in process technology for some time. Due to
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greater flexibility and responsiveness, the benefits extend beyond 
productivity and they also involve a new discipline, computer software, 
that Is not embedded Into traditional manufacturing and engineering 
operations. Such changes have long term consequences for career 
hierarchies (Lee, 1985) and have prompted calls to abandon or radically 
revise organisation structures (Bhattacharyya, 1985; Ingersoll, 1987; 
Hayes 4 Jaikumar, 1988).
Organisational integration has been highlighted as one of the key 
manufacturing Issues 1n the 1980's. Indeed, "Towards Integration" was 
the theme of a Department of Trade 4 Industry (1987) Initiative aimed at 
Increasing managerial awareness of the need for cross-functional 
integration and providing assistance with feasibility and implementation 
studies. Unfortunately, the debate has been dominated by 
"back-to-bas1cs" approaches which, no matter how well-intentioned, 
concentrate more on "what to do" than "how to do 1t" (Daughters, 1986; 
Heard, 1987; Ingersoll, 1987).
Among the management consultants, Ingersoll's (1987) attack on 
'traditions' 1s a case in point. They recommend abandoning obsolete 
functional organisation structures, dismantling 'brick walls' between 
functions, and re-organising around ....'the mainstream of your business 
(1-e. people, products, markets) or even profit'. This resembles 
earlier Ideas on the structural configuration of 'adhocracy* (Toffler, 
1970, 1985; Mlntzberg, 1978) but with little advice on how to bring 
about 'mutual adjustment' as the Integrative mechanism In a complex 
environment. Managing discontinuities Involving substantial attltudlnal 
and behavioural changes requires more than the 'courage* or 're-writ1ng 
the rules' that Ingersoll suggest. The gap between proponents of 
radical change and those seeking more Incremental approaches Is poorly
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breached 1n the manufacturing literature, leaving practltloners who 
might wish to pursue the middle ground 1n a difficult position. This 
Issue is Important and will be raised again later 1n the context of 
organisational development.
2.43 The Assimilation of Foreign Manufacturing Technology
The problems exposed 1n the previous discussion provide the backdrop for 
the Inward transfer and assimilation of foreign manufacturing 
technology. Many of the aforementioned problems may arise Irrespective 
of the source of technology. In the case of Inward technology transfer, 
however, additional difficulties reside 1n the firm-specific nature of 
process know-how and how cultural differences affect suppl1er/rec1p1ent 
relationships.
The Impact of foreign technology depends on whether assimilation takes 
place in a greenfield plant or in the potentially more disruptive case 
of assimilation Into existing operations. Replication of the technology 
suppliers' systems may be possible when setting up greenfield 
operations or when the transfer 1s Intra-company and Internal procedures 
are common (Behrman & Wallender, 1976). But In most cases, earlier 
changes of ownership, varying degrees of autonomy and presence 1n 
different markets precludes such close and continuous matching of 
systems. A more likely situation 1s that of technology suppliers being 
further along the product/process life cycle than the recipient, 
producing larger volumes and using different (Incompatible) equipment. 
This Is often the case with unrelated suppliers and recipients, such as 
1n joint ventures and licensing, where extensive adaptation of the 
Incoming technology may be necessary. These Issues are poorly covered 
1n the literature on technology transfer and absent from the managerial
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literature on manufacturing/production operations.
To ease assimilation, technology suppliers attempt to: (a) "embody" 
their technology via the Import of capital equipment, knock-down kits 
and components, or (b ) "codify" it in the form of engineering drawings, 
software, parts lists, manuals, process schedules etc. Managerial and 
other know-how, less amenable to codification normally involves initial 
training and continuous interaction. Existence of these practices is 
noted in the literature (Vaitsos, 1974; Kerr, 1981), especially from the 
legal perspective (Cornish, 1981; Fowlston, 1984; Hearn, 1986,1987). 
Again, detailed consideration of the implications for manufacturing has 
received little attention.
Teece (1976), an industrial economist, identified four main determinants 
of the resource cost of transferring and assimilating 'unembodied' 
know-how: (a) the degree of codification, (b) its proximity to the 
state-of-the-art, (c) accumulated managerial and technical skills of the 
recipient, and (d) previous experience of manufacturing products in the 
same or related product groups. Teece found that the costs were both 
substantial and highly variable. Lower costs were associated with more 
experienced companies. This tends to suggest the importance of a 
learning curve in technology transfer and provides further support for 
the notion of maintaining a critical mass of skills.
2.5 ORGANISATIONAL DESIGN AND BEHAVIOUR
2.51 Strategy, Structure and Power Distributions
The literature on organisations complements and often pre-dates that on 
business strategy. Of the many different conceptual and empirical
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approaches pursued by writers, there are Important linkages to be made 
which underpin any study of technology strategy development. The first 
point of reference 1s the seminal work of Chandler (1962) who examined 
the Impact of strategy on organisation structure, showing that a change 
in strategy is likely to eventually result In a change 1n structure.
This spawned a number of studies aimed at either replicating Chandler's 
thesis or extending It to cover other variables. These Included: (a) 
Fouraker A Stopford's (1968) study showing that structure constrains 
strategy, (b) Child's (1972) "strategic choice" approach, Indicating 
that management decisions influence the relationship an organisation has 
with Its environment, (c) Rumelt's (1974) study of performance against 
different degrees of diversification, and (d) Franko's (1974) findings 
that competition has a moderating effect on strategy/structure 
relationships, with competitive pressures leading to deterioration in 
performance and requiring structural adjustments to restore 
profitability.
After reviewing these and several other contributions, Galbraith A 
Nathanson (1979) concluded that although there Is substantial support 
for Chandler's thesis, subsequent empirical research has Introduced 
modifications and the causal sequence Is Increasingly difficult to 
establish. They felt It was less Important to know whether strategy 
causes structure (or vice versa) and more useful to ensure they are 
eventually brought In line. Complete explanations were said by 
Galbraith A Nathanson (1970, p283) to lie 1n multiple perspectives,
giving --- 'an adequate understanding of market conditions performance
and the relative power of dominant managers, coupled with an historical 
perspective of Individual firms'.
Widening the strategy/structure debate to Include the sources and
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distribution of power within organisations Is Important because 1t
raises the Issue of power as a property of social relationships, the
formal division of labour and Interdependency (Perrow, 1970; Hickson et
al, 1971; Hinlngs et al, 1974; Pfeffer, 1981). According to these
writers, power Is distributed Internally among Individuals and groups
mainly depending on: (a) their position In the hierarchy, (b) their
ability to cope with environmental uncertainty, (c) the availability of
alternative sources of expertise, and (d) the degree to which their
activities are Interlinked. These provide the basis on which power may
be exercised to Influence strategy and cannot be separated from
associated»political behaviour and questions of legitimacy. The
methodological problems of studying and operationalising the concept of
power were sharply articulated by March (1981, p216):
'It tends to become a tautological summary of the (large) residual 
variance 1n studies of collective choice; 1t confounds a variety 
of quite different behavioural mechanisms; 1t has no consistent 
measure; and the models that underlie 1t seem often to be either 
clearly wrong or Impossible to test'.
Despite the dangers of masking Ignorance Implied 1n March's statement,
it 1s generally recognised that power structures may be diagnosed,
albeit crudely, by examining various Indicators, such as status symbols,
resource allocations, rituals, rewards and representation on key
committees (Pfeffer, 1981; Johnson, 1987; Harrison, 1987).
The Implications of power distributions for strategy development and 
organisation structure design arise from the Imbalance that may occur 1f 
one subunit 1s allowed to dominate for any length of time. As Maldlque 
A Hayes (1984, p22) point out: 'strategies that appear to elevate one 
function above the others, either In preslge or rewards, can poison the 
atmosphere for collaboration and cooperation'. 'Nothing', according to 
Shanklln A Ryans (1984, p35), 'shapes the overall direction of the 
organisation more than this (functional) pecking order'. The challenge
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facing managers is neatly summed up by Ansoff (1987, p30) as the need 
for 'strategic orientation': a balance of functional influences, power 
centre shifts from the dominant function to general management, and 
optimisation of the firm's Investment in the market place.
2.52 Contingency Approaches
Attempts to pay greater attention to the way 1n which business 
organisations Interact with their environment are at the heart of open 
systems or contingency theory. This has evolved partly 1n response to 
growing dissatisfaction with normative models which assume universal 
transferability of strategy and managerial skills from one environmental 
setting to another. Among the early writers encouraging the adoption of 
contingency approaches were Burns * Stalker, Woodward and Lawrence & 
Lorsch.
Burns * Stalker (1961) posited "organic" and "mechanistic" structural 
styles as appropriate responses to relatively dynamic and stable 
environments respectively. Woodward (1965, 1970) Identified 
manufacturing technology as a primary determinant of organisational 
form, her studies concentrating on the coordination and control imposed 
by technology. Organisations were grouped according to their mode of 
production 1n ascending order of technological complexity: small batch, 
large batch, and contlnuous/automated mass production. Successful firms 
In the first and last production modes tended to follow more permissive 
organisation styles and 1n the second mode an hierarchical style. 
Organisation researchers appear to agree with Woodward that technology 
is an Important variable but there is considerable debate concerning the 
primacy of organisation size (Pugh et al, 1969; Hickson et al, 1969), 
technological interdependency and 'mutual adjustment' (Thompson, 1967),
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and information processing requirements (Galbraith A Schoemaker, 1978).
Lawrence A Lorsch (1967a, 1967b) focussed on the relationship between 
environmental uncertainty and organisation structure, observing that 
environmental change affects the sub-systems of an organistion in 
different ways. Functional differentiation was seen by Lawrence A 
Lorsch as necessary to deal with different sub-environments and the need 
to Integrate functional Interdependencies was brought about by the key 
competitive requirements of the industry. Most definitions of 
integration may be traced back to Lawrence A Lorsch (1967, pll) as :'the 
quality of the state of collaboration that exists among departments that 
are required to achieve unity of effort by the demands of the 
environment'. Subsequently, researchers have tended to place more 
emphasis on the use of Integrative devices and liaison roles to achieve 
collaboration than such Issues as political accommodation and 
legitimacy.
The main criticism of contingency theory Is levelled at the extreme case 
of highly "situational" perspectives which assert that performance and 
behaviour depend on the set of circumstances at a particular point In 
time (Mockler, 1971; Lufthans A Stewart, 1977). Miles A Snow (1978) 
suggest that the notion of "every situation is different" becomes an 
atheoretical point of view, providing even less guidance than the 
universal assumption that "every situation 1s the same". They 
criticised contingency approaches for the emphasis on deterministic 
views of environment, rather than how managerial choice affects the 
direction, shape and actions of the organisation; and for their bias 
towards individual differences rather than similarities.
Miles A Snow were principally concerned with modelling organisational
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adaptation and proposed a typology of adaptive behaviour. An essential 
element of their model 1s the Identification of three Inter-related 
'problems' which they classified as entrepreneurial, engineering and 
administrative. The engineering problem was characterised mainly by 
choice among technologies and represents one of the few attempts to 
build technology Into a conceptual framework for the understanding of 
adaptation to change. Miles & Snow’s research Is typical of the 
neo-cont1ngency approach suggested by Hast & Rosenzwelg (1973), who saw 
this as occupying the middle ground between the view that there are 
universal principles of organisation and management, and the view that 
each situation must be analysed separately.
2.53 Socio-Political Perspectives
Consolidating and extending the aforementioned contingency studies 1s a 
group of researchers dedicated to understanding the "process" of 
strategy development. Their studies largely grew out of the early work 
on 'bounded rationality' and 'satisficing' (Simon, 1957; March & Simon, 
1958) and pollctlcal processes (Cyert A March, 1963). Since then, 
empirical studies have included: (a) further Investigation of political 
and cultural processes (Pettigrew, 1973, 1985; Fahey, 1981; Johnson, 
1987), (b) combined analytical and political processes embodied 1n 
'logical Incrementalism' (Quinn, 1980), (c) unstructured decisions 
(Soelberg, 1967; Mlntzberg et al, 1976; Mltroff A Emshoff, 1979;
Mltroff, 1980), and (d) the distinction between "Intended" and 
"realised" strategy (Mlntzberg, 1979).
Most of the recent studies of social systems 1n business contexts draw 
to some extent on the writing and research of the last-named author, 
Henry Mlntzberg. He made two Important observations on the process of
strategy development: (a) that strategy should be viewed as a mediating
force between the organisation and Its environment: and (b) that
strategy formulation is not necessarily the prerogative of top
management and may originate In other (lower) levels of the
organisation. Specifically, Mlntzberg (1979, p25) states:
'Strategy formulation Involves the Interpretation of the 
environment and the development of consistent patterns 1n streams 
of organisational decisions to deal with 1t'.
the process of strategy formulation 1s not as cut and dried 
as all that: for one thing, the other parts of the organisation, 
in certain cases even the operating core, can play an active role 
In formulating strategy, strategies sometimes form themselves, 
almost Inadvertantly, as managers respond to the pressures of the 
environment, decision by decision'.
The process school of researchers 1s also responsible for pointing out 
that 1t Is crucial to understand the problem-sensing and diagnostic 
stages leading up to the definition of strategic problems as these 
largely determine subsequent courses of action (Gilmore, 1973;
Mintzberg, 1976; Pettigrew, 1985). One of the best attempts to model 
strategic problem formulation among top managers was by Lyles (1981), 
who proposed a two-stage model which commences with Individual processes 
and then evolves into organisational processes. It 1s attractive 
because it recognises that: (a) attitudes, values, cognitive styles and 
job characteristics affect the way Individuals conceptualise strategic 
problems; and (b) political behaviour among sub-units shapes definition 
of the nature of strategic problems, perceptions of their causes and 
significance for the organisation.
To paraphrase Lyles, the first stage of her model Involves Individual 
executives becoming aware that a potential problem 1s emerging - a sense 
of unease that something Is wrong. This occurs before supporting data 
1s available and 1s followed by an Incubation period during which 
diverse Information 1s pieced together. When sufficient Information has 
accumulated and the problem can no longer be Ignored, a "triggering
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point" is reached and the process moves Into the second, organisational 
stage, precipitating a more formal information-gathering exercise and 
wider discussion among top managers. She notes that recycling may take 
place between the individual and organisational stage as more 
information becomes available and there may be soliciting of support for 
particular interpretations prior to problem definition. Alternatively, 
no definition may be attained or the problem reduced 1n priority, or 
ignored. Such behaviour is likely to feature in the definition of 
technological deficiencies and receptivity to foreign technology. As 
Child (1984, p264) succinctly put it: 'the introduction of new 
technology Into organisations 1s a political process around a political 
issue'.
2.54 Organisational Development
A major theme throughout the literature on organisational development is 
that of "planned change to Improve organisational effectiveness". 
Emphasis 1n the early literature was placed on the need for 
Interventions which Involved (a) "unfreezing" organisations, (b) 
attempting to change attitudes and obstructive behaviour of individuals 
and groups, and (c) "refreezing" once the desired relearning was thought 
to have been achieved (Lewin, 1947; Uppltt et al, 1958; French £ Bell, 
1973). This rather mechanistic approach was eagerly adopted by 
consultants 1n the organisation development field and has had 
considerable Influence among others concerned with the introduction of 
new technology. It is now giving way to more subtle, yet penetrating, 
approaches which view organisational development as a process of 
continuous change, requiring deeper understanding of organisational 
learning (Argyris £ Schon, 1978; Fiol £ Lyles, 1985; Garratt, 1987) and 
the relationships, values and beliefs comprising organisational culture
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(Schein, 1983, 1985; Marshall « McLean, 1985).
Hrebinlak & Joyce (1984) retained the notion of "planned change" and 
proposed an integrative framework for managerial intervention based on 
the magnitude of strategic problems and their implementation time 
horizon. Styles of intervention in their framework ranged from 
evolutionary (small strategic problem, long time horizon) to complex 
(large strategic problem, short time horizon) with a corresponding 
Increase in the difficulties of formal planning, coordination and 
Integration. Hrebinlak & Joyce ask the crucial question: how long will 
the organisation stay in business if it continues its activities as it 
is today? If the answer is several years, then they suggest that 
sequential interventions are feasible. If the answer is a few months, 
then complex concurrent interventions must be made.
Emerging views of organisational learning and organisational culture fit 
comfortably 1n Hrebinlak & Joyce's framework and throw light on why 
radical change Is so difficult to achieve. Marshall & McLean (1985, 
p6), for example, suggest that two orders of change should be 
considered: (a) 'first order* change involving adjustments to ways of 
working, with the ground rules remaining essentially unaltered, and (b) 
'second order' change where the basic assumptions change requiring 
modification of attitudes and behaviour. While observing that most 
managers attempting the latter actually achieve the former, Marshall 8 
McLean go on to criticise some of the harsher Interpretations of 
obstructive behaviour. They argue that forces for stability 1n an 
organisation are not necessarily obstacles to change but are legitimate 
needs which require attention and can become sound platforms for 
eventual change. Earlier work by Watzlawlck et al (1974) on problem 
formulation offers a similar approach in which they note that little
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true change can occur because people become stuck in routine behaviour 
and restrict their frame of reference for handling problems. Thus, 
breaking existing patterns of thinking to effect second order change 
requires Interventions which challenge the "world view" of managers and 
result In what Kuhn (1970) referred to as a 'paradigm revolution'.
The concept of an 'organisational paradigm' (Sheldon, 1980) is Important 
because new knowledge is unlikely to be accepted 1f 1t conflicts greatly 
with the prevailing paradigm (Duncan * Weiss, 1972, p95). In the 
context of technology strategy development, this was usefully extended 
by Dosi (1982) who proposed a model based on 'technological paradigms' 
and 'technological trajectories' as a way of characterising 
technological change. In essence, he argued that continuous 
(Incremental) technological change relates to progress along a 
trajectory within the prevailing paradigm, while discontinuous (radical) 
change is associated with shifting to a new paradigm. Technological 
paradigms, according to Dos1, also have a powerful 'exclusion effect' 
which may Induce blindness with respect to other technological 
possibilities.
Staw & Ross (1978) observed that the longer individuals have 
participated In, and become responsible for, a set of strategies; the 
stronger their attachment to them, even though they may eventually 
become outdated. As Child et al (1977, pl04) point out, these
individuals --- 'assign priorities to goals and declare constraints to
be movable or rigid, by filtering Information and applying analytical 
models or templates that worked in the past and are therefore widely 
accepted'. This reliance on conventional wisdom later found expression 
1n Rumelt's (1979) 'strategic frame' for an industry and Spender's 
(1980) 'recipes'.
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Three main conditions for change were Identified by Tofler (1982, p2): 
(a) enormous external pressures, (b) people inside the organisation who 
are strongly dissatisfied with the existing order, and (c) the existence 
of a coherent alternative embodied in a plan, a model, or a vision.
Given the role of the chief executive and board of directors as the 
'dominant coalition' and that their collective Ideology is firmly 
embedded 1n the prevailing paradigm, It has been suggested that 
fundamental changes may have to await disruptive events that remove the 
basis of their power, such as crises triggered by recession or hostile 
takeovers (Child, 1977, pl05; Pettigrew, 1985, p429). Clearly, in the 
absence of the kind of shock treatment associated with crises, Tofler's 
preconditions place a premium on the general management capability or 
capacity of Individual board members and their functioning as a team 
(Penrose, 1980; Norburn A Schurz, 1984).
Identification of the board as a prime target for development is well 
established in the literature. The nature of proposed Interventions has 
ranged from awareness that changing organisational culture requires a 
clear vision of the new strategy and what is required to make 1t work 
(Huse & Cummings, 1985), to the specific and urgent need to turn 
specialists Into generalists (Bower, 1970; Garratt, 1987). Despite the 
difficulties of assessing the effectiveness of particular forms of 
Intervention at board level, the literature on organisational 
development is well endowed with techniques, among which "teambuilding" 
Is the most prominent. It 1s beyond the remit of this review to examine 
these techniques 1n detail. It 1s sufficient here to say that these 
typically Involve some combination of experiential learning by 
confronting board members with real problems, questioning long held 
assumptions, reflection and reframing, sharing Information, gaining 
commitment etc (Argyrls, 1971; Huse & Cummings, 1985; Mumford, 1986).
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There is universal acceptance in the literature that attempting to
change organisational culture, management styles and organisation
structure is a time consuming process. Indeed, the time horizon for
strategic change was one of the two key dimensions of Hrebiniak &
Joyce's framework. Any approach which purports to shorten time scales
has attracted managerial attention. One such approach deserving special
mention 1s that of "action learning", of which the definitive work is by
Revans (1982). Practltioners of action learning claim 'accelerated
learning' (Casey, 1983, p39) and that 1t 1s 'significantly faster and
more effective' than other forms of organisational change (Garratt,
1983, p27). Action learning was seen by Garratt (1983, p23) as ___'a
process for the reform of organisations and the liberation of human
vision', Involving the devolution of powers and the recasting of
managerial roles. Two statements from Garratt capture the problem of
management development at board level and a possible way forward:
'Structural elements of Action Learning are that the authority and 
responsibility for analysis and implementation are given to those 
people who have psychological ownership of the problem and must 
live with the proposed solution' (Garratt, 1983, p23).
'The necessary psychological condition is for directors to be 
willing to start letting go of some of their deeply learned 
specialist thoughts and behaviour, to allow time and space for 
learning of new attitudes, knowledge and skills' (Garratt, 1987, 
p45).
Garratt (1987) was particularly scathing about the ability of directors 
to monitor the external environment, observing that effective directors 
must 'look upwards and outwards'. He touched on ways of breaking down 
'campus thinking' by Immersing potential directors 1n International 
Issues and helping them reframe the way they see their business. But 
Garratt and other writers have barely scratched the surface of the 
problem of Incorporating the international dimension Into the notion of 
second order change. Although one major feature of the problem was 
defined some time ago as the managerial attitude of 'ethnocentrism' 
(home-country orientation) by Perlmutter (1969), it would appear to be
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an under-researched area of organisational development where practice, 
particularly 1n some multinational companies (eg ICI, Unilever, IBM), 
maybe ahead of the literature.
2.6 MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
2.61 Assessing the Complex Cost/Benefits Associated with Inward Foreign 
Direct Investment
Throughout the 1950's and 60's the literature on multinational companies 
and the International diffusion of Innovations was largely preoccupied 
with filling the "technology gap" between Europe and the USA (Dlebold, 
1968; Servan-Schrelber, 1968; Ohkawa & Rosovsky, 1968; OECD, 1970). 
Initially, post-war economic growth 1n Europe was stimulated by the 
regeneration of manufacturing industry, creating a demand for capital 
equipment and technology which only the USA was able to supply (Dunning, 
1970, pi73)- By 1960, the role of the USA as dominant generator of 
managerial and technological know-how was well established and the 
associated country an firm-specific advantages were exploited 
commercially through and extensive network of multinational operations.
The search for an Integrative model of foreign direct Investment and 
International trade continues unabated. Explanations for particular 
trading patterns and modes of entry Into International markets 
Invariably Include the monopolistic exploitation of proprietary 
technology as an Important contribution to competitive advantage. 
Prominent among researchers and writers on the post-war operation of 
multinational companies are John Dunning et al of the University of 
Reading school. Dunning has probably done more than any other academic 
to Improve theorectlcal and practical understanding of foreign 
investment decisions by compiling a comprehensive database on 
International business. H1s work 1s at a high level of aggregation but
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the quality 1s high and 1t provides a rich source of research questions 
for narrower fields of Investigation.
From the point of view of the Investing company, the focus of attention 
has been the preference for "Internalisation" of f1rm-spec1f1c 
capabilities Instead of using the open market (Coase, 1937; Vernon,
1970; Williamson, 1975; Buckley * Casson, 1976). This assumes that 
direct Investment Is superior to other forms of "going International" 
due to lower relative costs, higher returns and better control. 
Additionally, the more vulnerable the technology 1s to Imitation, the 
greater the Incentive to Internalise (Rugman, 1981).
There is considerable support for the view that Inward foreign direct 
Investment has a positive impact on economic and technological progress 
1n the recipient country and Industry. Based on h1s assessment of US 
Investment 1n the UK over the period 1945-55, Dunning (1958, pl90) cited 
access to the competitive and dynamic qualities of the Investors' 
national economy; and access to R 4 D, manufacturing and managerial 
know-how as advantageous to the UK; and that contact of this kind had 
Increased receptiveness to new Ideas. Chen (1983, p67) regarded foreign 
owned subsidiaries as providing a breeding ground for technical and 
managerial personnel who may later serve local firms or become 
Indigenous entrepreneurs. Gray (1972, p57) wrote of "training up" 
Indigenous workers and raising the general level of technical know-how 
by Involving local supplier firms as subcontractors. Others have 
emphasised the greater rivalry and competition from the entry of new 
technology-based ventures by existing firms and new firms aimed at 
Invading established markets (H111 4 Utterback, 1979, p321), and when 
'Ineffective practices come glaringly to light .... even reluctant 
managers under sufficient pressure seek better production and management
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techniques' (Quinn, 1969, pl54).
Despite the temporal aspect of Dunning's (1958) study he posed two 
questions which are relevant to the competitive situation of the 1980's: 
(a) should the UK Government have a well-defined policy on Inward 
foreign direct Investment, with controls, and (b) what mode of 
technology transfer might be the most appropriate for particular 
Industrial sectors? While generally favouring foreign ownership, he 
went on to write a 'partnership on an equal footing', with the UK not 
simply a 'buyer of US knowledge'. This seemed to Imply that joint 
ventures or some other form of two-way collaboration might be desirable 
1n the future.
In a study of the consequences for the UK of foreign direct Investment, 
Steuer et al (1973) found some of the popular theories about the 
advantages unconvincing:
'--- the very great benefits which some observers expect to
follow, on technology grounds, through encouraging Inward 
Investment seem to exaggerate spill-over effects, pay Insufficient 
attention to the question as to who benefits from Improved 
technology, and give little weight to alternative ways of 
promoting technological growth' (Steuer et al, 1973, p9).
They dismissed the view that Independent technological capability 1s
essential to UK prosperity and the avoidance of US domination as
'romantic nonsense'. At the same time they recommended 1tens1f1ed
monitoring of foreign activity In the UK. Selecting among applicants
was rejected, as was keeping them out of certain Industries, though they
were sympathetic to the Idea of an overall (unspecified) general limit.
Their chapter on technology was the weakest In the report and 1t Is
perhaps Indicative of the difficulties they encountered that technology
was referred to as ---  'one of the most elusive of the direct
Investment topics'.
- 56 -
2.62 Intra-Company Channels of Communication
The major criticism of macro-economic models of foreign Investment is 
their preoccupation with capital flows and the tendency to treat 
technology. Information and knowledge as mere factor flows (Dunning, 
1958, 1970, 1974, 1980, 1985; Vernon, 1970; Buckley & Casson, 1976; 
Casson, 1979, 1983; Rugman, 1981). It Is, therefore, worth reviewing 
the findings of the few economists who have had something to say about 
the transfer and absorption of technological information as part of the 
internalisation process.
Findlay (1978), for example devised a model which attempted to 
Illustrate that the presence of foreign firms Increases the rate of 
international technology transfer and that when this technology 1s 
diffused locally, the rate of technical progress is likely to be higher 
in that Industry. H1s model was partly based on "contagion theory" 
(Rogers, 1962; Arrow, 1971) which draws on the analogy that technology, 
like the spread of contagious diseases, is most effectively transferred 
by personal contact between supplier and recipient.
Gray (1972, p 129) postulated that when a foreign parent company 
generates a new piece of knowledge, subsidiaries are likely to receive 
access to that knowledge more quickly than a licensee. He considered 
the "ownership" element to facilitate the efficient flow of proprietary 
know-how due to the 'greater awareness and camaraderie between personnel 
In the parent and subsidiary companies'. In contrast, Crookell (1973, 
p56) observed that multinationals expect Initiatives 1n communication to 
originate In their divisions and that .... 'their strength rests less 1n 
the power of ownership than in the attraction of competence'. He 
supported the need to develop 'enduring relationships through which
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Information can flow quickly with the minimum of distortion' and 
emphasised the need for 'adaptive strength at the receiving point'. 
Crookell's last point is a function of the parent company's strategy 
regarding the centralisation or dispersion of R 4 D facilities and 
nurturing the critical mass of capability In subsidiaries to assimilate 
and exploit technology.
2.63 The Location of R 4 D
A number of writers have noted the historical tendency for most, 1f not 
all, R 4 D activity to be centred In the parent's home country 
(Terpstra, 1977; Roman and Puett, 1983; Dunning, 1985). Explanations 
are to be found 1n the desire among top executives 1n parent companies 
to exercise strategic control, to avoid duplication and maintain 
economies of scale within R 4 D, often accompanied by an emotional 
attachment to the R 4 D function Itself. Vernon (1971, p137), for 
example, refers to subtle geographical biases such as keeping .... 
'exciting work close to home'. Caves (1982, p257) writes of effective
supervision being seen to depend on keeping R 4 D Investments ___
'within earshot of the parent's head office'. And Stopford 4 Turner 
(1985, pl64) note an 'headquarters effect' and that .... 'the prime 
long-term gains come from the location of the brains of the firm'.
Doz (1986) observed that balancing national responsiveness versus 
integration Is a major dilemma for the parent company because 
proliferation of local R 4 D projects 1n response to adaptation 
undermines the key competitive advantage of spreading cost. From the 
host country's perspective, centralisation of R 4 D activities Is 
perceived as undesirable because 1t leads to technological dependency 
and runs down creative capacity, thereby blocking opportunities to catch
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up. Moreover there also appear to be strong feelings that the presence 
of an R & D function 1s symbolic of "good citizenship". These arguments 
have long been used against multinationals, no matter what the state of 
economic development In the host country. Such arguments also feature 
strongly in the debate on ethnocentric (home-country orientated), 
polycentric (host-country orientated) and geocentric (world-orientated) 
managerial attitudes towards International business operations 
(Perlmutter, 1969; Heenan 4 Perlmutter, 1979; Booth, 1979) and the 
nature of globalisation (Levitt, 1983; Porter, 1986; Douglas 4 Wind, 
1987; Prahalad 4 Doz, 1987).
2.7 INTERNATIONAL LICENSING AND JOINT VENTURES 
2.17 Recent Empirical Research
Macroeconomists have traditionally treated licensing transactions as an 
integral part of the operations of multinational companies. The 
dominant perspective 1n the literature Is that of large US 
multinationals seeking entry Into foreign markets via outward licensing, 
either at an Intermediate stage 1n the progression from exporting to 
foreign direct investment 1n manufacturing plants or at some later stage 
of maturity 1n the technology life cycle (Posner, 1961; Wilson, 1975; 
Rugman, 1980). In these respects outward licensing has tended to be 
regarded as a secondary strategic option, largely related to timing, 
rather than as a true alternative to foreign direct Investment, Ignoring 
many other motivations such as: (a) limitations on the availability of 
capital, (b) economic and political barriers to entry In foreign 
markets, and (c) response to currency exchange problems and unforeseen 
opportunities. Challenges to the prevailing view and contributions to 
opening up the debate on International licensing transactions have come
59 -
from a series of Independent multi-sector empirical studies by Killing 
(Western Ontario), Telesio (Harvard) and Contractor (Wharton).
Killing’s excellent work 1s Important for h1s coverage of recipients of 
technology and his additive approach over several years. H1s original 
study of 30 Canadian companies participating 1n licensing (1977a) was 
extended to Include 10 UK companies (1977b, 1978) and then further 
extended to examine 37 joint ventures 1n North America and Western 
Europe (1980, 1983). Killing (1980, p38) framed his proposition 
underlying the choice of either inward licensing or joint venture 
arrangements around relationships: 'The more the technology-dependent 
firm needs to learn about the business to which the technology relates, 
the stronger the relationship it needs to form between Its personnel and 
those of the technology supplier'.
Killing sensed the need for "learning" as depending on the extent to 
which the recipient company Is moving away from its established base of 
knowledge and skills. Licences and joint ventures were, therefore, 
categorised according to their degree of diversification and the scale 
of the project for the recipient, 1n order to show how the strength of 
relationships develop.
Killing accepted his proposition for licence agreements but rejected 1t 
for joint ventures because of the 'unexpected discontinuities' 
discovered In the 'relatively low use of majority Joint ventures and 
seemingly Inappropriate use of 50 percent of joint ventures'. Killing 
concluded that many firms with valuable technology will not supply It to 
a joint venture 1n which they own less than 50 percent. Many 
technology-seeking firms had tried to set up joint ventures In which 
they would be majority owner but were offered and had settled for 50
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percent ownership. In discussing the International market for 
technology, Killing (1980, p43) observed that: 'the overwhelming 
Impression Is of a small, fragmented, Inconsistent market In which 
buyers and sellers operate with little Information', going on to suggest 
that 'neither buyers nor sellers of technology seem to have a clear Idea 
of the value of the commodity'.
Returning to the theme of communications, the conceptual framework 
offered by Bolsot (1983, 1986, 1987) provides a useful complement to 
Killing's work on technology supplier/redplent relationships and the 
mode of transfer. Bolsot's basic premise is that the diffusion of 
knowledge can be described as a pattern of flow and that the rate at 
which It flows depends on how far 1t has been codified. He devised a 
three by three matrix of the degree of codification of knowledge 
(uncodified, semi-codified, codified) vertically, against specificity of 
knowledge (firm, industry, market-specific) horizontally.
Boisot suggested that Intra-company knowledge is subject to hierarchlal 
considerations and will be codified if the cost is justified by better 
communication between organisational units. Codified knowledge may 
require "use of the proper channels" and uncodified knowledge may be 
limited by the scope for face to face situations. A joint venture is a 
negotiated relationship which Bolsot saw as not easily reduced to a 
routlnised decision-making sequence amenable to hierarchical forms of 
control. Moreover, the quality of personal contact is Important in 
joint ventures and the way undiffused Information 1s used as a 
bargaining strength. In contrast, licensing agreements make use of well 
codified knowledge because of their "arms length" nature and they 
require less personal contact. According to Bolsot's framwork: (a) 
knowledge transferred internationally within wholly-owned operations is
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likely to facilitate the full range of codified and uncodified 
firm-specific knowledge, (b) joint ventures deal mainly 1n uncodified 
and sem1-cod1f1ed knowledge of the firm, Industry and market-specific 
kind, and (c) licences Involve codified knowledge of all kinds.
The studies by Telesio (1979) and Contractor (1979) take the viewpoint 
of the licensor. Though rigorous 1n their use of statistical methods, 
the level of aggregation 1s high 1n both cases and at the expense of 
assessing managerial behaviour and key firm-specific data.
Nevertheless, their findings have been widely quoted by academics and 
deserve comment here. Telesio examined the operations of 40 US and 26 
Western European multinationals and discovered that they did consider 
licensing alongside direct Investment as an alternative, but preferred 
the latter for Its potential for greater returns. 43 multinationals 
licensed their technology to unrelated companies as a substitute for 
direct Investment or majority joint ventures, and 23 licensed to gain 
access to reciprocal technology. The last finding may be attributed to 
the presence of chemlcal/pharmaceutical companies and electronics 
companies in his sample and this may also explain why he found few 
companies willing to divulge to him their royalty rates.
Contractor's research largely centred on the relative amounts of 
managerial and technological expertise comprising the package and how 
this 1s related to the mix of affiliates and non-aff1 Hates and the 
degree of Industrialisation 1n the host country. Composition of the 
package was found to depend on the recipient's capability and Contractor 
noted that the character of the Hcensor/licensee relationship 1s the 
same In both cases (affiliated and non-afflUated). The fundamental 
difference lies 1n the closeness of the ties and duration of the 
relationship. This seems to suggest a tendency towards 'de-facto
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internalisation' (Cory, 1982, pl33). Contractor conceded that global 
taxation and strategic considerations may over-ride managerial and 
economic considerations when negotiating compensation.
There have been very few empirical studies on licensing transactions and 
other collaborative ventures in the UK. Taylor & Silberston (1973) 
Investigated the impact of the patent system and offered a number of 
useful observations on the Incidence and content of particular clauses 
1n agreements. Indeed, because of the importance of Industrial property 
law and competition law, most of the general guides to licensing and 
joint ventures adopt a legal perspective. Only three empirical studies 
are of direct interest in this research: (a) the broadly based work of 
Ryan (1980, 1984) at the University of Bath, (b) the work of Lowe A 
Crawford in the Important area of licensing In smal1/medium-sized firms 
(1983a, 1983b, 1984), also at the University of Bath, and (c) a study by 
Trevor (1985) at the Policy Studies Institute on UK collaboration with 
Japanese companies.
Ryan's research Is valuable mainly for his survey of the content of 
licence agreements across a range of engineering industries and for his 
conclusion that: 'technical specifications and the selection of the 
(technology) supplier are In the hands of engineering management’. This 
conclusion, coupled with his findings that In over two thirds of h1s 
responding companies the Initiative was taken by the licensee company, 
of which three quarters were due to personal contact, suggests that the 
engineering function may be expected to Influence both receptivity to 
foreign technology and the type of technology acquired.
The research reported by Lowe A Crawford shows that both inward and 
outward licensing may be attractive to small businesses whose major
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objective is fast growth, especially where there Is a strong desire to 
remain independent. Their multi-sector study examined s1ze/growth, R & 
D, environment and culture-related factors and Included both UK and 
foreign sources of technology. Inward licensing firms were found to be 
generally poorer profit and market performers than those licensing out 
and those Involved 1n both, though more successful than non-11cens1ng 
firms. Inward licensing was also found to provide a useful way of 
widening the product portfolio quickly while offsetting some of the 
disadvantages of size such as lack of specialist knowledge, scarce cash 
resources and risk of developing new products.
Trevor addressed the question of whether encouraging Japanese Investment 
and collaborative ventures 1s likely to foster or hinder the 
regenerations of UK industry. From 13 case studies 1n various
collaborative situations, he concluded that ---  'the main attraction to
the Japanese partner 1s an Increase in market share in the EEC, and 
concurrently corporate growth and competitiveness'. Trevor observed 
that UK partners had entered ventures from a position of weakness and
saw it as ---  'an exaggeration to see collaboration alone as capable of
lending to the regeneration of British industry'. It Is difficult to 
find fault with h1s overall findings but the report 1s short on what 
could be done to remedy the situation and assist future negotiations.
2.72 Learning from the Experience of Other Countries
Most of the literature on recipients of technology through licensing Is 
related to developing countries. The starting point Is economic and 
technological deficiency and ways of providing a countervailing force to 
the power of multinationals. Strong themes 1n the literature Include:
(a) fears about loss of sovereignty and growing technological
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dependency, (b) the need for agencies acting 1n the national Interest to 
regulate Imported technology, and (c) Indigenous capability to absorb 
and adapt technology and ultimately to Improve upon 1t. Leaving aside 
the national political Issues and problems of poor Infrastructure 
associated with developing countries, there 1s one area of technology 
policy that has attracted less attention in Western countries than 1t 
deserves - the procedure of "unpackaging" or "unbundling" licence 
agreements.
The movement towards "unpackaging" by recipients of technology gained 
Impetus 1n the late 1960's when the United Nations Organisation focussed 
Its attention on the behaviour of multinationals and technology transfer 
to developing countries. The original model for disaggregating Inputs 
was said to be Japan; which, with guidance from Its Ministry of 
International Trade A Industry, tightly controlled imports of capital 
and technology during the postwar era. Later, South American countries 
adopted the procedure and this became a central feature of Decision 24 
of the Cartegena Agreement (1970) and subsequent legislation typified by 
Brazil's Normative Act (1975).
UNCTAD (1972) advised the separation of direct costs (royalties and 
other fees related to Industrial property rights) from Indirect costs 
(purchases of capital equipment and Intermediate products and equipment, 
dividends on equity holdings etc.). The report acknowledged the problem 
of separating and measuring technological components because of the 
difficulty of defining a "unit of technology" but urged exposure of the 
scope available to suppliers of technology for collecting profits and 
manipulation of transfer prices. Britton A Gllmour (1978) proposed 
similar unpackaging procedures as an Important responsibility of their 
revamped Foreign Investment Review Agency In Canada, to separate modular
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("core") technology from peripheral technology and to ensure maximum 
benefit for the licensee.
According to Gee (1981, pi17): 'Identification of the key technology 
stripped of its product embodiment constitutes a major step In 
minimising the influence of disparities In national R A D  priorités'. 
Britton A Gilmour were particularly concerned with Canadian investment 
in R A D and ways of diluting the unique dependency of their 
manufacturing industry on the US multinationals. They recommended that 
inward licensing agreements and joint ventures should be sought 1n 
preference to foreign direct investment, with licensing preferred 
because the licensee is not perpetually tied to a single source of 
techno!ogy.
A second recurring theme in the literature on International licensing 1s 
the feasibility of "catching up" with competitors. This 1s a dynamic 
situation and as Gold et al (1980, p324) have pointed out: 'adopting 
available technology, at best, only allows catching up. Competitors 
continue to advance and there 1s normally a time lag'. To be able to
catch up quickly, technology-seeking firms ---  'have to be thoroughly
familiar with the problems, techniques, blind alleys and Ideas In the 
emerging domain' (Gold, 1979, p254). In the case of Japan, Peck A Goto 
(1981, p627) doubted the simple "catch up" hypothesis, giving the useful 
analogy that technology Is not like water. It does not flow 
effortlessly from high levels to low levels until they are equalised. 
They argued that the ability of certain Japanese manufacturers to catch 
up and surpass foreign competitors Is a function of domestic R A D  
leading to cost reductions, product and process Improvements and new 
product Introductions. Continuing use of Imported technology was said 
to be necessary In expectation that significant advances will originate
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abroad. In similar vein, Blumenthal (1976, 1979) distinguished between 
"absorptive" and "creative" R ( D, the former being directed towards 
adoption of foreign technology and Its adaptation to domestic needs and 
the latter directed to more original Inventions. This ties-1n with the 
notion of "critical mass" of capability mentioned earlier in the context 
of product Innovation and multinational companies.
2.73 Payment for Technology
Most international comparisons of technology flows 1n the pattern of 
world trade and Investment originate from data presented 1n national 
accounts on the "balance of payments for technology". These indicate 
that 1n absolute terms, Japan and West Germany spent approximately twice 
as much on imported technology as the UK and USA 1n the late 1970's. 
Viewed from another angle, the ratio of receipts to expenditure for 1984 
show Japan and West Germany in deficit with ratios of 0.30 and 0.50, and 
the UK and USA 1n surplus with 1.4 and 15.5 respectively (Deutsch 
Bundesbank, 1986).
From survey data in the Business Monitor M4, 1t is possible to examine 
UK trends 1n receipts and expenditure for related and unrelated 
companies, and also to obtain a breakdown by Industrial sector. In the 
case of mechanical engineering, for example, royalty expenditures 
averaged about 14 percent of R * D expenditures in the late 1970's and 
early 80's, with a ratio of 7:1 for related and unrelated companies, 
revealing the importance of foreign multinationals as generators and 
suppliers of technology. A number of writers have attempted to assess 
the significance of technology transfer in the UK economy by grossing up 
these data and making assumptions about average royalty rates and sales 
arising from foreign direct investment (Buckley & Davies, 1979; Davies &
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Rosser, 1984). Although statistics of this kind are severely limited by 
their crudeness and high level of aggregation, they provide a useful 
starting point for empirical work. As Davies * Rosser (1984, p208) 
point out, the value of Inward technology transfer to UK firms tends to 
be understated in the statistics because the risk of tried and tested 
technology 1s much less than with 1n-house R & D, and these transfers 
are too large to be sensibly Ignored.
No systematic assessment 1s available on the magnitude of royalty rates
and heavy reliance Is placed 1n the literature on "rules of thumb". Two
examples which illustrate the apparent Irrationality or lack of
knowledge surrounding payments will suffice:
"Most licensors think that 1t Is fair to ask for a royalty of at 
least 5 percent and 1f a downpayment is also required, this could 
represent something like 60 percent of the profits which the 
licensee receives 1n the early years --- ' (Kent, 1976, p61).
'.... when asked about licensing terms, Bendix officials indicated 
that, If a broad cross-section of American industry were polled, 
one would find that the average goal is a return to the licensor 
of one-th1rd of the profits of a well-run, well established 
licensee with a broad market' (Baranson, 1978, p64).
Clearly, these guidelines suggest a need for empirical Investigation of
the composition of packages on offer and the ways in which executives
arrive at valuations.
2.8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE LITERATURE
This critical review has explored the linkages between technology 
strategy and Inward technology transfer at both the macro and 
micro-levels, and across several broad fields of literature. Given the 
fragmented nature of the literature, strategic management at the level 
of Individual business units appeared to provide the best Integrative 
framework. The following recurring themes emerged as worthy of special 
mention 1n guiding empirical research:
- 68
(a) business strategy development is fundamentally a process of 
matching an organisation with its environment, within resource 
constraints;
(b) the general manager's role is that of mediator between externally 
induced change and internal pressures for stability;
(c) antecedents play an important role in shaping internal power 
structures and the ways organisations respond to strategic threats 
and opportunities.
The first theme centres on the dynamic interaction of organisations and 
their environment. This tends to be portrayed in the normative 
literature as a relatively straightforward, step-by-step process, 
typically commencing with managerial awareness of a mismatch, triggered 
by the appearance of a "gap" between expected and current performance. 
After assessing the magnitude and future consequences of the performance 
gap, managers then proceed to rationally evaluate/select strategies from 
an array of options, followed by the allocatlon/deployment of resources 
and controlled implementation. Technological Inputs to this process are 
invariably seen as Involving the interpretation of technological change 
and the choice of product/process technologies.
The key lesson from the process school of researchers 1s captured 1n the 
last two themes: that prevailing Ideologies and political behaviour 
impinge on decision processes and outcomes. While empirical studies of 
business/technology strategy development should retain some of the 
analytical aspects of normative approaches, they urgently require the 
real-world corrective offered by socio-political approaches.
The normative stance so evident in the business literature has 
influenced the treatment of technological issues in two important ways:
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(a) Writers have tended to adhere to the Darwinian adage that
"classification is the key to clarification", mainly in the guise 
of high/medium/low technology, stages in the innovation process, 
generic strategies etc. But business problems, technological 
change and executive behaviour are dynamic and seldom fit into 
neat parcels. Moreover, implicit assumptions of homogeneity 
within classifications often mean that subtle technological 
contributions to competitive advantage may be lost, or at best, 
understated. After all, one of the key tasks of strategy 
formulation and implementation is to create hetrogeneity through 
differential advantage.
(b) Normative models of business strategy development often label
technology as a factor in the external environment or as a "black 
box" in the internal conversion process. Such models reinforce 
the apparent need for classification and it is not unusual to find 
technology appearing as an item in a checklist or position audit. 
This is consistent with views of technology as a highly contextual 
factor leaving practitioners to interpret their own particular 
situation and incorporate the findings at an appropriate stage in 
the model.
Part of the blame for superficial treatment of technology in the 
literature lies with the writers and researchers themselves. Business 
writers, for example, have been drawn towards the more tangible aspects 
of business, either because they are uncomfortable with the pervasive 
nature of technological inputs or they lack understanding of the 
technology itself. Conversely, writers on technology have been slow to 
characterise the art and practice of technology management and there is 
a lag in the literature.
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Belated awareness of technological contributions may also be attributed 
to the relative Isolation of technological activities within companies 
due to specialisation. Functional specialisation is mirrored 1n the way 
strands of literature have evolved separately to support the scientific 
and technology-based professions. The integrative mechanism provided by 
managerial approaches has found a place 1n the literature on research, 
design, development, manufacturing and production; but 1t has been 
inward-looking and conspicuously lacking In strategic perspectives. It 
was not until business strategy began to focus on International 
competitiveness and the effectiveness of scarce resources 1n the 1980's 
that a need for the strategic management of technology was recognised. 
Although it has been shown that formation of a body of literature on the 
strategic management of technology 1s still In its Infancy, several 
Inter-related Issues were uncovered 1n this review which clearly 
comprise the core of such literature and need to be addressed:
(a) whether to seek leadership or followership in particular products, 
markets and technologies;
(b) how to ensure that product and process technologies are 
representative of international best practice;
(c) whether to close technological gaps by supplementing Internally 
generated technology with externally sourced technology and In 
what proportions;
(d) how to shift away from traditional emphasis on the short-term 
productivity of manufacturing operations (within the "black box") 
towards a more pro-active approach to "customer orientation";
(e) how to achieve greater organisational Integration to facilitate 
exploitation of systems benefits;
(f) how to assimilate new product designs and manufacturing technology 
(Including the Inward flow of foreign technology) Into existing
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operations and organisation structures.
To pursue international aspects of technology strategy and technology 
transfer it was necessary to analyse the literature on multinational 
companies. This is largely the domain of economists, whose empirical 
work has tended to be of the cross-sectional, multi-industry, 
multi-country variety. Consequently, their studies have been at a high 
level of abstraction, paying scant attention to the major participants 
in the decision-making process and the organisational context in which 
technological collaboration 1s accepted/rejected. Most of the research 
relates to foreign direct Investment. It 1s only recently that joint 
ventures and licensing transactions have attracted the attention of 
academic researchers. Gaps in the empirical literature at the 
micro-level are substantial. The growing volume of publications and 
press reports is testament, at least 1n part, to current interest in 
these modes of technological collaboration. A parallel trend should be 
noted 1n the field of "franchising" In the retail services sector. The 
following themes have been distilled from the literature:
(a) "ownership" and control relationships may promote or retard the 
inward flow of technology to UK subsidiaries and joint venture 
partners;
(b) the appropriate mode of Inward transfer is Influenced by the 
amenability of the technology to codification and the capability 
of UK recipients;
(c) managing the interaction between foreign suppliers of technology 
and UK recipients 1s beneficial;
(d) prospective UK licensees and joint venture partners should subject 
technology packages to a cost/benefit analysis so as to determine 
Incremental contributions to competitive advantage.
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Nowhere 1n the literature is 1t suggested that foreign sources of 
technology might replace indigenous capability and provide the total 
solution to declining UK competitiveness. Rather, writers have stressed 
the need to increase Investment 1n research, design and development, not 
only to boost In-house innovation but also to ensure that the skills are 
available to enable opportunities from foreign technology to be 
identified, assimilated and exploited.
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3. METHODOLOGY
This section reviews the salient features of the methodology and methods 
used in the research programme. A  more detailed account is to be found 
in Appendix A.
3.1 THE PROBLEM OF OPERATIONALISING THE CONCEPT OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT
3.11 Towards an Integrative Framework for Strategic Management
There are inherent difficulties in conducting empirical research in the 
field of technology strategy and technology transfer. These stem on the 
one hand from the need to maintain a total picture of organisations as 
complex open systems, and on the other from the pervasive nature of 
technological inputs to competitiveness and the need to unscramble 
issues of strategic significance in order to make them comprehensible.
Maintaining an holistic view is of practical importance to general 
managers who are responsible for overall strategy and concerned with 
direction and effectiveness. Equally, research purporting to seek 
improvements in current practice and recommend interventions, must adopt 
a systematic analysis of strategy development, giving due consideration 
to socio-political behaviour and interface relationships.
Drawing on the issues raised in the review of the literature in Section 
2, it was possible to construct the integrative framework for strategic 
management research shown in Figure 1. This highlights the central role 
of business strategy and importance of the business/technology and 
functional interfaces. As will be discussed later, a number of useful 
models, schemas and techniques were used within this framework to assist
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in operationalising the analytical aspects of the research. That these 
provide only a partial analysis is accepted, given the dynamic and 
complex nature of the problem area and in the knowledge that strategic 
management research is in its infancy.
3.12 The Scope of Research: "Width" versus "Depth"
A  review of the literature on research methodology in the general arena 
of business policy, strategic management and social decision-making 
revealed a wide range of personal predisposition among writers towards 
particular research traditions. This is clearly evident in the 
long-standing, and often fruitless, debate on the suitability of 
"scientific" and "naturalistic" methodologies in social research (see 
Hatten, 1979; Duncan, 1979; Das, 1983; Tomkins & Groves, 1983; Miles 
& Huberman, 1984; Chua, 1986; Strauss, 1987).
Proponents of the scientific approach tend to base their case on the 
statistical validity of multivariate representations of business 
strategy which regress combinations of environmental and strategic 
variables against measures of performance. Such quantitative approaches 
typically utilise large cross-sectional samples of companies, using 
factor analysis and clustering techniques to examine statistical 
correlations and to identify recurring patterns of strategic behaviour. 
The results have the benefit of generalisability but fail to capture 
underlying managerial processes and the logic of strategy development.
In contrast, the naturalistic approach has been applied to longitudinal 
studies which attenpt to describe complex dynamic processes over time 
using a small number of case studies. Qualitative research of this kind
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aids theory building and provides rich insights into socio-political 
influences on strategy development, but poses problems of comparison, 
replication and generalisability.
Of particular interest at the extreme naturalistic end of the spectrum, 
is the view of Mintzberg (1977) who is intellectually committed to what 
he calls 'inductive, creative and intensive fieldwork' aimed at 
conceptual knowledge in preference to 'methodological elegance'. 
Mintzberg went as far as to suggest that demands for measurement had 
discouraged policy research and he criticised the growing tendency to 
focus on well defined, easily isolated phenomena, with measurable inputs 
and outputs. His views are well supported in the "grounded theory" 
approach popularised by Glaser & Strauss (1967) and claims by others, 
including myself, that over-emphasis on the scientific approach often 
impairs empirical analysis by forcing data into an artificial framework 
(Lundberg, 1976; Blumer, 1978; Hill, 1978).
In view of the lack of homogeniety within data and taxonomies used by 
some researchers, and the questionable reliability of their subsequent 
analyses, I have some empathy with Mintzberg's sentiments. My own view, 
however, is much less polarised, having due regard for Checkland's 
(1980) important observation that any given research study is likely to 
contain both 'hard' (well-defined) and 'soft' (ill-defined) aspects.
This suggests consideration of a more pragmatic line of enquiry and the 
kind of "middle ground" approaches advocated by Burrell & Morgan (1979), 
Morgan & Smircich (1980), Reichardt & Cook (1980) and Jemson (1981). 
Reichardt & Cook, for example, regard the scientific versus naturalistic 
debate as partly dysfunctional because it fosters the belief that the 
only available option is choice between two extremes, ultimately leading 
to the (wrong) conclusion that quantitative and qualitative methods are
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mutually exclusive.
It would seem that there is an increasing willingness among researchers 
to adopt multidisciplinary approaches and to trade "width" and "depth" 
in order to get closer to a comprehensive picture which best reflects 
reality. Jemson (1981), for example, urges researchers to become more 
eclectic by developing mid-range theories that draw on the existing 
knowledge base in the disciplines contributing to strategic management. 
He saw this as providing 'the conceptual building blocks on which 
integrative, hypothesis testing research can be based'. In similar 
vein, McGee & Thomas (1986) sought a measure of reconciliation among the 
various 'disciplinary lenses' through which strategic management has 
traditionally been viewed, making a plea for 'mixed scanning' 
perspectives for future advancement in the field. Surprisingly, 
however, of the 10 lenses they identified (e.g. economic, historical, 
marketing, political etc), the notion of a "technical" lens was 
conspicuously absent.
Shrinivastava & Lim (1989) examined 88 strategy-related doctoral 
dissertations over the period 1960-83 and noted a wide variety of 
methodologies and disciplinary orientations. Most dissertations were 
found to be exploratory (54.5 per cent), reflecting the emerging nature 
of the field, with a trend towards 'interpretive rather than statistical 
methods of data analysis'. While on the one hand their findings 
revealed fragmentation, they also saw opportunities open to researchers 
in having the flexibility to experiment legitimately with new 
methodologies not constrained by a dominant (disciplinary) orthodoxy.
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3.13 Relevance of the Research to Practitioners
Much of the criticism from business executives of academic studies in 
strategic management may be attributed to misunderstandings surrounding 
the aims of research programmes, their intended audience and perceptions 
of relevancy. Questions of relevancy were central to the thinking of 
Tomkins & Groves (1983), who were concerned with bridging the "schism" 
between academic research and practitioner needs. To make research less 
detached and more relevant to practitioners they emphasised the need for 
research styles and detailed fieldwork consistent with the nature of the 
problems studied and the underlying ontological assumptions upon which 
problems are constructed.
Whitley (1984) defined "relevant" research as making a contribution to 
changing a situation which is regarded as requiring improvement, arguing 
that it is necessary not only to understand why the situation arose but 
also to intervene in such a way that the situation is improved:
'Any research which is premised upon the objective of change 
and improvement of social realities must go beyond surface 
impressions and descriptions if it is to achieve an understand­
ing of how these are produced and reproduced'.
Whitley saw relevant and practically-oriented research as more them 
"trouble shooting" and simply addressing problems of current interest to 
managers formulated in their terms. He believes that 
practically-oriented research does not differ in kind from other 
intellectual endeavours but added the rider that the need to change 
beliefs, perceptions and practices means that conclusions must be 
translatable into everyday terms and be acceptable, at least to some 
extent, to lay audiences.
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From the outset, the relevance of my research to the target audience of 
industry executives was an important influence on the choice of 
methodology and methods. Given the scope of the research problem and 
the objectives stated in Section 1, the decision to adopt an 
integrative, multidisciplinary approach is considered justified, it was 
necessary, for example, to ensure sufficient width so as to characterise 
the competitive environment in which machine tool mauiufacturers operate, 
combined with adequate depth and rigour when researching the complex 
processes of technology strategy development auid technology transfer.
To this end, my maxim throughout has been to select methods, both 
quantitative and qualitative, considered to be the most suited to the 
stage of investigation and the level at which decisions are made.
3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN
The overall shape and phasing of the research programme is illustrated 
in Figure 2. This commenced with desk research and developed into an 
intensive exploratory study of the machine tool industry. The specific 
aims of the exploratory study were:
(a) to define the research problem and establish its theoretical 
underpinnings in the literature;
(b) to ascertain the structure of the industry and gain a thorough 
appreciation of the antecedents leading up to the problem 
situation;
(c) to establish the scope of the research programme;
(d) to examine in greater depth some of the "softer" amd more 
"sensitive" elements of the problem situation;
Figure 2. The Research Design
Start date: 6/83 
Finish date: 6/88
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The exploratory study sharpened the search for an approach that would 
secure an acceptable level of cooperation from participating companies 
and give representative coverage of the industry. Initially, while 
industry knowledge was being accumulated and a set of questions 
formulated, the study was restricted to opinion leaders, reference 
groups and other external stakeholders. To have included machine tool 
manufacturers at this early stage would have run the risk of holding 
incomplete interviews and tainting the sponteneity desired at a later 
stage. Eventually, however, this restriction was relaxed as it became 
increasingly necessary to test access to manufacturers and run a pilot 
questionnaire. Given the sensitive nature of the problem area it was a 
short step to the selection of personal interviews as the main 
instrument for data collection. The potential benefits of this method 
were outlined by Selltiz et al (1959) as:
'— the unstructured or partially structured interview, if 
properly used, helps to bring out the affective and value-laden 
aspects of the subjects' responses and to determine the personal 
significances of his attitudes.. .the subjects' responses are 
spontaneous rather than forced, are highly specific and concrete 
rather than diffuse and general, are self-revealing and personal 
rather than superficial.'
Two "friendly" managing directors in machine tool manufacturing 
companies were approached and they agreed to be interviewed: one in a 
UK-owned company involved in inward licensing and the other in a UK 
subsidiary of a US multinational company. The interviews lasted 
approximately two hours and mainly covered issues related to business 
strategy and relationships with their respective licensor and parent 
companies. The learning experience gained from these interviews and the 
open-ness of the discussion greatly relieved anxiety surrounding both
(e) to aid the formulation of research questions that would be used
later in the fieldwork phase.
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access to senior executives and their willingness to release 
confidential information.
Examination of industry statistics showed that the machine tool industry 
exhibits a high degree of hetrogeneity, making stratification or 
segmentation a pivotal decision in the research design. Segmenting on 
the basis of machine product technology (ie the method by which metal is 
removed, formed or handled) was chosen because this is the way 
specialisation has evolved within the industry. The five main 
technological segments used in this study are described in Table 1.
These segments represent the full range of intensity of competition and 
rate of technological change found in the UK machine tool industry. 
Manufacturers of standard and customised machines or both, were 
identified in each segment, with some moving towards "systems 
integration". Collectively, including spares, it is estimated that they 
accounted for 80-85 per cent of UK production in the mid-1980's.
Table 1. Segmentation of the UK Machine Tool Industry by Product 
Technology
Turning: metal chip removal from cylindrical parts where the
workpiece rotates and the cutting tool is 
stationary.
Milling: metal chip removal from prismatic parts where the
workpiece is stationary and the cutting tool 
rotates.
Grinding: metal removal using a rotating abrasive cutting
wheel. Hie workpiece normally reciprocates when 
grinding prismatic parts and rotates when grinding 
cylindrical parts.
Metal Forming: the hot or cold flow of metal using pressing,
bending ana other methods of manipulating the shape 
of metallic materials.
- 83 -
Automation: a broad category of special purpose equpiment
incorporating metal cutting, forming and handling 
processes (e.g. automated assembly machines, 
transfer lines, robotic loading devices).
3.3 CONCEPTUAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The over-arching dynamic framework of strategic management adopted in 
this research is applied at the level of individual manufacturing 
"strategic business units" (SBUs). These are defined here as autonomous 
profit centres with their own set of competitors and a Head responsible 
for overall strategy development. The term SBU is normally used in the 
context of divisions within groups of companies but is equally 
applicable to independent companies, including those which are 
owne r-managed.
Selection of the SBU as the "unit of analysis" facilitates exploration 
of the problem of declining international competitiveness at a level 
consistent with the aims of the research. Specifically, this allows 
empirical research to:
(a) focus on the problem owners in their organisational setting;
(b) examine the process of strategy formulation/implementation and the 
acceptability of prescriptions which involve the sourcing of 
foreign technology;
(c) assess the extent of functional differentiation/integration;
(d) examine the resource allocation process;
(e) identify sources of sustainable competitive advantage residing in 
products, markets and technologies;
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(f) diagnose competing forces for stability and change, and assess the 
implications for management/organisational development 
interventions.
A  central feature of my attempt to operationalise this framework is the 
set of seven working propositions shown in Table 2. These propositions 
were generated largely from key issues emerging from the critical review 
of the literature and are to some extent grounded in my personal 
experience.
The first working proposition (WPl) examines the nature of 
"technological gaps" and how technology, specifically foreign 
technology, enters the decision-making framework. The wording of this
proposition contains the corollary--- "moderated by internal political
behaviour", representing my deliberate attempt to highlight at the 
outset that power relationships and political contingencies are 
important intervening variables. The second proposition (WP2) and two 
subsequent inter-locking propositions (WP3 and WP4) explore 
relationships between product engineering, marketing and manufacturing 
activities and how these influence the prevailing internal environment 
in which foreign technology is assimilated. And finally, three 
propositions (WP5, WP6 and WP7) analyse the characteristics and relative 
merits of the three principal modes of inward technology transfer.
Testing propositions using multidisciplinary approaches may lack the 
methodological elegance of single disciplinary approaches but the 
benefits of realism were considered to far outweigh any loss of rigour 
and precision. It is doubtful anyway whether such precision is possible 
or appropriate in the study of strategy development. I had few 
reservations about taking the propositions and seeking 
acceptance/rejection by confronting them with careful fieldwork and
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intellectual argument.
The foregoing comments do not pretend to hide the difficulties I 
encountered in collecting, ordering, analysing and interpreting data.
An accepted method of dealing with such complexity, however, borrowed 
from social science research, is that of compiling case studies and 
extracting themes. Despite the shortcomings of replication and 
validity, this method was adopted in a way that minimised the potential 
distraction of technological detail, yet allowed data to be distilled 
and presented thematically for analysis under the working propositions.
To boost the analytical power of this approach and move beyond 
description towards understanding and explaining strategic behaviour, 
several models were used. The most important of these is the robust 
four-strategy schema of leadership, fast followership, late followership 
and niche exploitation. I chose this schema because: (a) it is based on 
timing and may be related directly to the dynamics of the technology 
li£e cycle, providing a familiar point of reference for examining 
relationships between product and process, and (b) it is possible to 
observe different strategic responses at various stages in the cycle. 
Products/processes originating from both in-house development and inward 
technology transfer fit comfortably with this schema. One particular 
advantage, for example, is that of tracing the "mobility" of SBUs which 
had used technology to re-position themselves. As will be discussed 
later, I expected, a priori, that "buying lead time", as in the case of 
say a shift from late follower to fast follower, would be an important 
motivation underlying inward licensing.
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3.4 THE SAMPLE OF MACHINE TOOL MANUFACTURERS
The sample comprised manufacturers drawn from the UK and US machine tool 
industries.
Using directories, exhibition guides and the advice of opinion leaders 
it was possible to locate and cross-check the existence of 330 
"suppliers" of stand-alone machines and systems in the UK in the five 
technological segments identified. Of these, 205 were regarded for the 
purpose of this research as manufacturing SBUs, thereby representing the 
best estimate of the population. From this population I envisaged that 
about 50 SBUs could be visited to interview the target respondents and 
others without imposing constraints on selection due to geographical 
location.
A  judgmental sampling procedure was preferred to ensure the inclusion
(a) at least the top three SBUs in each technological segment, based 
on annual sales turnover;
(b) a mix of SBUs which allowed comparison of technology strategy 
development in UK-owned independent companies and subsidiaries of 
larger engineering groups, both active and non-active in 
licensing; and foreign-owned companies using technology supplied 
by the parent company and licensing technology from outside the 
group;
(c) SBUs which had made a significant technological contribution to 
the industry not reflected in their annual sales turnover.
Initially, 38 SBUs were identified as desirable for inclusion in the UK
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sample. Later, a further 27 SBUs were added on a "snowball" (series) 
basis, giving a total cumulative sample of 65 SBUs. Of these, 54 agreed 
to cooperate, resulting in a response rate of 83 per cent. The main 
advantage of the snowball sampling technique was that it recognised the 
cumulative learning process and allowed SBUs to be included that were 
perceived by respondents as competitors, rather than relying solely on 
my own judgment.
The sample drawn from the US machine tool industry was constrained by 
time and cost. I decided that over a period of one month (20 working 
days), it would be possible to visit 10 companies in four geographic 
locations and, additionally, to spend at least five full days meeting 
executives from other companies at the International Machine Tool Show 
in Chicago.
The general aims of the visit to the USA were:
(a) to meet senior executives connected with the transfer of 
technology from the US to the UK;
(b) to cross-check strategic issues emerging from the earlier 
interviews with UK Heads of SBUs;
(c) to explore perceptions of the US/UK relationship and gain insights 
into factors impinging on policy decisions affecting UK 
operations;
(d) to see their manufacturing facilities;
(e) to characterise patterns of adoption of certain key technological 
innovations.
8 of the 10 US companies visited were parents of UK subsidiaries and 2
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were licensors of UK companies. Contact was made with the US companies 
through the Head of the UK subsidiary or licensee and all agreed to 
cooperate. Senior executives and other staff in a further 11 companies 
having formal technology transfer agreements with UK companies were 
approached during the week at the trade show.
3.5 DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
Data was collected in three main stages by personal interviews. The 
first stage was completed as quickly as possible and before commencing 
stages 2 and 3. As indicated in Figure 1, the last two stages 
overlapped.
The first stage targetted UK Heads of SBU. The strategic management 
capability of the Head is regarded as critical to the success/failure of 
the SBU and he was the person most likely to provide a strategic 
overview. He also possessed the authority to disclose details on 
strategic issues and provide access to senior managers and other staff.
Contact was made with Heads by personalised letter on Coventry 
Polytechnic headed note paper. Each letter briefly mentioned the scope 
of the interview, emphasising strategic issues and inward flows of 
technology. Assurances of anonymity, confidentiality and non-alignment 
with competitors were given. Letters were followed up by telephone and 
interviews of about one hour's duration were requested to take place in 
his office. The location was deemed to be important because it allowed 
observation of the respondent's behaviour in his own surroundings and 
facilitated access to documentation. A  total of 45 Heads agreed to be 
interviewed, representing a response for this target group of 83 per 
cent. In practice, the duration of the interviews was typically
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The main instalment for gathering data in this group was the 
semi-structured questionnaire. This method was chosen principally 
because of the need to elicit responses on a range of common topics 
across the sample and to facilitate comparison.
The second stage involved informal interviews with two groups: UK 
directors and senior managers, and US vice-presidents and senior 
managers.
Interviews were held with UK directors and senior managers in a subset 
of SBUs. Respondents were drawn from the three main functions of 
raarketing/sales, engineering/technical and manufacturing/production.
Each was approached either by letter or telephone, again requesting to 
meet them at their office. These interviews provided the opportunity to 
triangulate earlier data and probe sensitive areas such as 
cross-functional reltionships and internal power structures. By meeting 
respondents in their functional setting it was also possible to observe 
the extent of office/factory automation, office geography, status 
symbols, day-to-day procedures etc. This group, together with the Head, 
comprise the "dominant coalition" and were frequently re-visited to 
validate my findings.
Interviews with US vice-presidents and senior managers mainly focussed 
on gathering data on relationships with their UK subsidiary or licensee, 
the differences between US/UK operations and detailed mechanisms of 
transferring know-how. This enabled several themes to be explored which 
would not have been possible without the opportunity to tie up both ends
extended to two hours or more, with many opportunities to explore side
issues over lunch and during factory visits.
of the transfer chain.
The third stage comprised data collection from a wide variety of 
informal interviews, meetings and conversations with middle managers 
and lower level staff. Multiple methods were used to acquire data and 
uneven access precluded the same level of consistency as in the previous 
two groups of respondents. My aim was primarily to probe the softer 
areas of company operations, to gain a feel for the nature of 
temporary/enduring sources of competitive advantage. A  special effort 
was made to meet applications engineers in all SBUs because they were 
felt to provide reliable comment on the adoption of product innovations, 
problems at the customer interface and competitor activity. Similarly 
with engineers in the manufacturing area. It was considered essential, 
for example, to gain an operations perspective on the assimilation of 
inward manufacturing process know-how in UK subsidiaries of US parent 
companies and UK licensees.
Data analysis in my research tended to take place alongside data 
collection in each of the 3 stages, as part of a continuous learning 
process. Notes were taken during the interviews and written up 
immediately afterwards. Hard data was often coded for subsequent 
analysis. Soft data went through an interactive process of summarising, 
cross-checking and aggregating with secondary data to build up concise 
company profiles. Validation was continually sought by taking multiple 
perspectives and, where possible, via 'triangulation' with documentary 
evidence (Denzin, 1970, Jick, 1979).
3.6 A  SHORT CRITIQUE OF THE METHODOLOGY
(a) The adoption of an integrative multidisciplinary approach was
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satisfactory, though somewhat cumbersome. Careful thought was 
given, a priori, to the systematic acquisition and handling of 
vast amounts of data; but the effort required in codification, 
cross-referencing and extracting themes for discussion under the 
seven working propositions was underestimated.
(b) Given the fragmented nature of the machine tool industry and the 
problem of incomplete data at the SBU level, it is doubtful 
whether a more quantitative approach overall would have been 
possible and/or appropriate. A  more rigorous application of 
statistical techniques in narrower areas, however, may have 
benefited the interpretation of attitudinal data and 
cross-functional linkages. Discussion on generalisability of the 
research is to be found in Section 6 and references to 
shortcomings of the research in specific areas is deferred to the 
context in which they arise in Section 4.
(c) Any bias entering the analysis may be largely attributed to my 
state of familiarity with the industry during the early round of 
interviews and my own "disciplinary lens" failing to detect 
nuances of significance to the line of questioning being followed. 
These were partially offset by conducting a pilot study, through 
triangulation and confronting areas of perceived difficulty with 
colleagues.
(d) With hindsight, it would be wise for research of this kind to be 
either narrowed down by splitting up the work among multiple 
researchers, or limiting the investigation to companies 
participating in just one of the three modes of inward technology 
transfer. The former would, inevitably, require greater
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co-ordination and involve some loss of consistency. The latter 
would sacrifice coverage of the inpact of technology transfer on 
the industry. The former is preferred and it is hoped that this 
research will be extended and partially replicated in other 
engineering industry contexts.
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4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
This section presents discussion of the research findings under the 
seven working propositions. Supporting data and analysis is to be found 
in Appendix B.
4.1 RECEPTIVITY TO FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY
The first working proposition Is:
The probability of closing technological gaps using foreign 
technology is enhanced by an internationally-orientated top 
management and moderated by Internal political behaviour.
4.11 Radius of Competition
4.111 The UK
Broad Insights Into the International orientation of senior executives 
were gained Initially by exploring their perceptions of "radius of 
competition". In essence, this invited them to define the geographical 
areas in which their SBU 1s active and the origin of competition, while 
simultaneously revealing first indications of an hierarchy of 
competitors and the intensity of competition 1n different technological 
segments.
The UK was chosen as the starting point for discussion by executives and 
they appeared to feel at ease when describing the position of their SBU 
1n relation to other UK manufacturers and Importers. There was good 
awareness of structural characteristies of the Industry such as machine 
tool production, sources of Imports, destination of exports, etc., based 
on statistics collated and disseminated by the Machine Tool Trades
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Association. It Is believed that this initial emphasis by executives on 
the UK should be largely attributed to them finding a convenient way of 
ordering replies and no attempt was made to impute ethnocentric 
tendencies at this stage. ’Moving within the machine tool and user 
industries' was frequently mentioned by executives as indicative of 
their "external" orientation but this was not always synonymous with 
"international" orientation. A number of executives in larger SBUs, for 
example, were participating in the activities of the Machine Tool Trades 
Association (MTTA), the Machine Tool Industry Research Association 
(MTIRA) and other bodies at industry level. Not surprisingly, the same 
names were to be found on lists of delegates at conferences, making 
submissions to pari 1 amentary committees and quoted in the press as 
opinion leaders on the state of the industry. Overall, however, the 
industry was found to be poorly represented at both national and 
international level. The MTTA lacks the strategic vision and 
techno-commercial initiatives taken by its foreign counterparts. It has 
only partially performed the coordinative role between government and 
its member companies, leaving the onus on the latter to respond to 
international competition. This 1s not to suggest that individual 
machine tool manufacturers should rely totally on collective action.
The critical point 1s that as a small, fragmented industry with 
declining lobbying power, it has lost the ability to shape and stabilise 
the trading environment to its strategic advantage.
While many executives had grasped the significance of 
internationalisation and could offer instant opinion on almost every 
aspect of the industry, some had spent inordinate amounts of time on 
their external, almost ambassadorial, commitments and neglected their 
executive role. In several interviews, occasions arose when further 
probing of competitor awareness had to be re-directed or postponed to
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avoid embarrassment. One executive, for example, the managing director 
of a well known company and a prominent figure 1n the Industry, was 
about to launch a new range of computer numerically controlled (CNC) 
machines In a crowded segment of the market. When asked about h1s 
expectations for the machines and which competitors would be the ones to 
watch, he proffered a target market share (unrelated to time period) and 
struggled to name three competitors, two of which were clearly not 
direct competitors. After fumbling unsuccessfully through a copy of the 
corporate planning document, he conceded that he 'left that sort of 
thing to h1s sales director'.
Most executives were able to name the leading competitors in segments of 
interest to their SBU In the UK but there were marked differences 1n 
their detailed knowledge of the competitive situation In the major 
machine tool produclng/consuming countries. In order to assess these 
differences, Heads were asked to rank the state of their SBU's knowledge 
of competitors and market requirements in the US, Japan and West 
Germany. The results are shown In Table 3 and each country will be 
considered In turn.
Table 3. The Head of SBU's Ranking of Knowledge on the Competitive
Situation 1n the Top Three Machine Tool Producing Countries.
Country Rankingn  v--------- p-•___I"
USA 69 23 8
Japan 0 21 79
West Germany 31 56 13
FT7ÏI----- Second Third
<%) (%) (i)
N=39 SBUs
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4.112 The USA
The USA is the largest consumer of machine tools and has the largest 
installed machine tool base. It can be seen from Table 3 that it is 
also the best known to executives within the UK industry, mainly because 
of the historical level of US direct investment, the importance of the 
US as the major destination for UK exports and, of course, common 
language. Statistics are readily available on the US market and it 1s 
well served by the technical press.
The Interviews revealed that it cannot be automatically assumed that 
executives in US-owned SBUs are better Informed about the US market than 
executives 1n UK-owned SBUs. The nature of their contact with the US 
market is often very different: US-owned SBUs, for example, have 
indirect contact through their parent company with the benefit of an 
"insiders' view"; whereas UK-owned SBUs have a combination of direct and 
indirect commercial contact via agents/distrlbutors, sales/servlce 
visits etc. This provided two different perspectives on the same 
market:
(a) Executives 1n the 17 US-owned SBUs studied demonstrated 
comprehensive knowledge of the changing structure of the US 
Industry and the plight of US manufacturers. Executives were 
pleased to have the opportunity to air their views and this also 
revealed some of the pressures Imposed by US ownership. Many had 
great faith In the dynamism of the US economy and Its ability to 
recover.
(b) Executives 1n the 37 UK-owned SBUs offered a more pessimistic view 
on the state of the US market and there was wide variation in
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their awareness of developments. Though the best knowledge was 
found among the 56 per cent of SBUs actively exporting to the US, 
there was a tendency to dwell on the tactical situation 
surrounding particular orders rather than to expand on the longer 
term Impact of structural change.
4.113 Japan
Japan 1s the largest producer of machine tools worldwide and 1s the 
second largest exporter after West Germany. Import penetration In Japan 
1s negligible. Thus Japanese manufacturers enjoy the enviable position 
of dominating their thriving domestic market, while competing overseas 
with local producers on their own ground. The need for an "Insiders' 
view" on Japan 1s underlined by the UK trade statistics which show that 
since the mid-70's, Japanese manufacturers have moved from seventh to 
second largest source of Imports, closely behind West Germany.
The top 5-10 Japanese manufacturers have concentrated on general purpose 
CNC machines and this provided the main discussion point among 
executives 1n about one third of SBUs studied. The activities and 
aspirations of this high profile group of Japanese manufacturers has 
been well documented and over the years executives have observed them 
building up a superior global position. Many executives believed the 
Japanese domestic market to be almost impregnable and their export drive 
Implacable.
Executives 1n SBUs producing special purpose equipment and highly 
customised machines were beginning to show more interest In Japan. 
Previously, they had seldom met up against Japanese manufacturers and 
there was a long-standing assumption that the manufacturer/user
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relationship Implied in "customisation" provided a barrier to their 
entry to the export field. Overseas Investment by Japanese motor 
vehicle manufacturers and machine tool manufacturers has modified 
earlier views and the role of the former as a specifier cannot be 
ignored.
Knowledge of Japanese machine tool manufacturers was sketchy, to say the 
least. Little appears to be known about the large number of so-called 
"second division" Japanese manufacturers and even less about the 
customer base. Executives generally agreed that first hand experience 
is the only way to monitor developments 1n Japan but there were few 
signs that an intensive Intelligence gathering exercise was a priority.
4.114 West Germany
Discussion on West Germany was approached 1n the context of the EEC. 
Unfortunately, this proved to be a frustrating exercise 1n which many 
lines of questioning were abandoned. UK membership of the EEC aroused 
minimal interest and the role of West Germany as the dominant machine 
tool producer/exporter has received passive acceptance by most sections 
of the UK Industry. Two factors suggest that the status quo 1s unlikely 
to be challenged:
(a) The machine tool industry reflects the relatively low proficiency 
In European language skills throughout the UK. Only 9 senior 
executives claimed to be capable of holding commercial/technical 
conversations In a second European language and of these, only 4 
had lived and worked 1n a non-English speaking country for an 
extended period. Formal training in languages was offered in 3 
SB Us.
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(c) Intra-Community trading has settled into a stable pattern. Over 
the period since accession to the Treaty of Rome In 1972, other 
member countries have accounted for a steady 48-55 per cent of 
total UK imports and 20-25 per cent of exports.
It was only when two issues concerning West Germany were Introduced Into 
the discussion that any substantive response was forthcoming. These 
issues were the ascendency of Siemens as the leading European controller 
supplier and the increasing number of prestige UK orders for high 
value-added machining cells being won by West German manufacturers, 
notably Scharmann, Werner and Haunl Blohm. Only executives 1n SBUs 
facing direct competition from West German manufacturers were able to 
elaborate on comparative strengths/weaknesses and develop a coherent 
view of the competitive situation in Europe. The notion of the EEC as 
the "domestic" market for machine tools was remote for most executives 
and 1992 seemed a long way off!
4.12 International Business Operations
4.121 The scope of international activities
From the previous wide-ranging assessment of radius of competition 1t 
was clear that the perception of some executives was based on first hand 
experience of international operations, whereas that of others was 
heavily influenced by secondary sources such as trade associations and 
technical journals. In order to deal with responses in a systematic way 
and to get behind the "public face" image often projected by front-11ne 
executives, it was decided to gather data on the extent of their 
international activities 1n such areas as exporting, overseas 
manufacturing/assembly, importing and licensing. These provide the
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context for proxy measures of the international orientation of senior 
executives.
Table 4. Exporting, Importing and Licensing Activity by Ownership of 
SBUs for 1984
Ownership
Percentage of SBUs 1n Each Category of 
Ownership Active 1n:
Exporting Importing Inward Outward Inward
Licensing Licensing and Outward 
__________Licensing
UK-owned Independent 
SBUs (22% of sample)
100 64 45 9 9
SBUs of UK Engineering 
Groups (35% of sample)
95 58 47 21 21
SBUs of UK M/C Tool 
Groups (12% of sample)
100 29 29 0 0
SBUs of US M/C Tool 
Groups (31% of sample)
94 88 18 18 6
All SBUs 
N=54 SBUs
96 65 35 15 11
Table 5. Sales of Exported Machines as a Percentage of Total Production by 
Ownership of SBUs for 1984
Percentage of Exporting SBUs 1n Each Category of 
Export Ratio:
Ownership <10% 10-29% 30-49% 50-69% 70%+
UK-owned SBUs 
(69% of Exporters)
27 24 22 11 16
US-owned SBUs 
(31% of Exporters)
12 24 18 28 18
N-52 SBUs
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A breakdown of the international operations for the sample of 54 SBUs by 
type of ownership is presented In Table 4. This data was obtained from 
the interviews and suggests that a significant degree of management 
attention is devoted to international activities 1n most SBUs.
4.122 Export distribution channels and overseas production
The high proportion of SBUs In the sample active in the export field Is 
not surprising given that UK exports were running at the rate of 45-50 
per cent of total production throughout the 1970's and early 80's.
Export ratios, however, are notoriously difficult to interpret at such a 
high level of aggregation and it 1s only at the SBU level that a 
meaningful assessment can be made. The ratio can vary considerably in 
machine tools with the placing, loss or deferment of a few large orders. 
Some SBUs have become increasingly dependent on exports as their home 
market has declined. Table 5 shows the spread of export ratios by type 
of ownership and points to the danger of making generalisations about 
export performance. Underlying the data are two Important trends which 
raise questions about the true extent of executive's exposure to 
International operations:
(a) UK-owned SBUs have been reluctant to set up overseas
manufacturing/assembly plants and tend to export machines via 
networks of Independent agents/dlstrlbutors. Only 11 per cent of 
SBUs studied had Invested In overseas plants and 18 per cent in 
wholly-owned sales offices. This compares poorly with Japanese 
and West German manufacturers who have Invested heavily overseas 
1n the 1980s, especially to protect their market position in the 
US.
- 103 -
When It was put to executives that there is merit in establishing 
a "permanent" presence 1n certain key countries, not only for 
selling purposes but also to monitor competitor and customer 
activities, there was good appreciation of the benefits. Their 
over-riding objective, however, was invariably stated as 'the need 
to fill UK capacity first' and there was widespread perception in 
SBUs of larger groups that investment proposals would be unlikely 
to receive corporate approval. The last point regarding 
decision-making behaviour at the corporate/SBU Interface 1s 
Important and will be taken up again later 1n this sub-section.
(b) US-owned SBUs had achieved export ratios marginally higher than 
their UK-owned counterparts but over half of these were known to 
be exporting machines destined for the US via their parent 
company. Often these exports comprised part-finished machines to 
take advantage of temporary cost and currency differentials, 
suggesting that some orders were "placed" rather than "won".
4.123 Importing
Examination of Importing activities revealed many linkages with 
reputable foreign principals, representing an important Inward transfer 
of product knowledge. The extent of Importing by type of SBU ownership 
is shown in Table 4 and a breakdown by Import ratio In Table 6.
Table 6 Indicates the spread of Import ratios and like the data on 
export ratios, conceals Important trends relevant to the involvement of 
executives in Import operations:
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Table 6. Sales of Imported Machines as a Percentage of Total Sales by 
Ownership of SBUs for 1984
Percentage of Importing SBUs in Each Category of 
Import Ratio:
Ownership <10% 10-29% 30-49% 50-69% 70%+
UK-owned SBUs 
(57% of Importers)
35 20 20 15 10
US-owned SBUs 
(43% of Importers)
40 27 13 13 5
N=35 SBUs Note: Figures exclude kit assembly
(a) 57 per cent of SBUs of UK machine tool groups and 11 per cent of 
SBUs of UK engineering groups were not active in importing due to 
separate SBUs being given this responsibility;
(b) 65 per cent of US-owned SBUs were importing machines from their 
parent company or another division within the group.
4.124 Licensing
Referring again to Table 4, deeper examination of the Incidence of 
licensing activities completes the picture. Of the 54 SBUs studied, 19 
(35 per cent) were Involved 1n "Inward" licensing. Of these 19 
licensees, 18 (95 per cent) were exporters of machines, 15 (79 per cent) 
Importers, and 14 (74 per cent) involved 1n both exporting and importing 
operations. Of these exportlng/importing SBUs, 8 were Involved 1n 
"outward" licensing and 6 of these were also licensees. This evidence 
suggests the convergence or mutually reinforcing effect of International 
operations In some SBUs. It is not regarded as coincidence that 
executives in the 6 SBUs active across the full range of activities were
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among the most travelled, that 4 of these SBUs had above-average export 
ratios and 2 had overseas manufacturlng/assembly operations.
4.13 International Orientation
4.131 An international learning effect?
The evidence presented so far 1s largely extracted from cross-sectional 
data and has captured the "outcome" of earlier decisions (1 e those 
International business arrangements reaching fruition and current at 
that "snapshot" 1n time). To assess the International orientation of 
senior executives, it Is also necessary to add a longitudinal component 
related to cumulative learning and experience.
At the Individual level this involves continuous updating of knowledge, 
skills and experience. At the SBU level, the stock of knowledge and mix 
of skills/experlence Is Integrated Into the prevailing culture. This Is 
a complex and dynamic situation, not easily reduced to a set of 
quantifiable dimensions and deserving more rigorous treatment than 
Intended here. Nevertheless, by examining: (a) the recent travelling 
patterns of senior executives, (b) their particlpatlon/attendance at 
International trade shows, and (c) setting these against their 
background experience of International operations; 1t Is possible to 
explain, albeit crudely, their predisposition towards foreign 
technology. The data on overseas visits made by Heads and Directors 
responsible for the three main functional areas 1s shown In Tables 37 
and 38 and the findings will now be summarised by SBU ownership.
4.132 UK-owned SBUs
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Market*ng/Sales Directors were the most frequent visitors to Europe and 
the US, closely followed by Heads of SBU and Eng1neer1ng/Techn1cal 
Directors. Overseas visits by Manufactur1ng/Product1on Directors tended 
to be limited to trade shows within Europe and to assess potential 
machine purchases for their own plant. Japan was the least visited 
country by all executives and most of the recent visits were connected 
with Inward agency and licence agreements. Normally, the main purpose 
of an overseas trip to any country would be to service export agents and 
customers. The existence of Inward licensing arrangements was found to 
be an Important additional factor 1n justifying extended visits to the 
US and most executives said that they had benefitted significantly from 
exposure to their licensor's operations and customers.
An investigation of UK-owned SBUs exhibiting at major international 
trade shows 1n the early 1980s (1.e . Paris, Hanover, Chicago and Osaka) 
indicated decreasing participation with Increasing distance from the UK. 
The relative merits of the shows 1n Paris, Hanover and to a lesser 
extent, Chicago, frequently entered discussion. Osaka was considered 
beyond their resources and aspirations. There was little evidence to 
suggest that participation was part of a systematic campaign to Increase 
penetration overseas and the level of discussion seldom moved beyond 
criticism of the growing cost of setting up and manning a stand. Both 
exhibiting at, and visits to, foreign trade shows were severely 
curtailed by most SBUs during the recession.
4.133 US-owned SBUs
Heads of SBU and Marketlng/Sales Directors were the most frequent 
travellers within Europe, with a typical visit lasting no longer than 
about three days. Heads were generally more mobile Internationally than
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their counterparts In UK-owned SBUs; partly as a consequence of foreign 
ownership and the requirement to attend parent company board meetings, 
and partly due to their responsibility for European subsidiaries. 
Marketlng/Sales and Eng1neering/Techn1cal Directors visited their US 
parent company to attend sales meetings and project review meetings 
respectively, often timed to coincide with some special event such as an 
industry conference or trade show. It was also clear that the Incidence 
of visits to the US by middle managers and engineers exceeded that found 
in UK-owned SBUs. As 1n the previous case, Manufacturlng/Productlon 
Directors were the least travelled.
Underlying the data was a strong commitment among US-owned SBUs to trade 
shows as a means of maintaining visibility world-wide. Participation 
and attendance depended largely on the parent company's allocation of 
territories to their network of sales and manufacturing subsidiaries.
In the case of Japan, for example, US parent companies normally retained 
responsibility for exploitation themselves, thereby limiting the 
exposure of UK-based executives to an Important source of competition.
4.134 Predisposition towards foreign technology
When the foregoing evidence 1s Interpreted against the data 1n Table 7, 
a useful picture of International orientation begins to emerge. Because 
the measure of predisposition towards foreign technology 1n Table 7 Is 
based on perceptual data, 1t represents a composite of all learning and 
experience. The following observations summarise the findings:
(a) Heads of most SBUs, irrespective of ownership, who have had 
experience In the Inward licensing of foreign technology from 
unrelated companies appear to be happy with this mode of transfer.
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Table 7. The Head of SBUs’ Predlsposlton Towards "Inward" Technology 
Transfer via Licensing, Joint Ventures and Direct Investment
Ownership
Predisposition Towards Licensing 
Favourable "Don't Know" Unfavourable 
(%) (*) (t)
UK-owned SBUs
Involved 1n inward licensing 69 6 25
(N-16)
not involved 1n inward licensing 38 43 19
(N-21)
US-owned SBUs
involved in Inward licensing 100 0 0
(N-3)
not involved 1n inward licensing 64 14 22
(N-14)
Predisposition Towards Joint Ventures
UK-owned SBUs (N-37) 41 38 21
US-owned SBUs (N-17) 59 17 24
Predisposition Towards Direct
Investment
UK-owned SBUs (N-37) 32 43 25
US-owned SBUs (N-17 41 24 35
(b) The high predisposition towards joint ventures, particularly among
US-owned SBUs 1s surprising given the lack of experience of this
mode 1n machine tools. Executives 1n US-owned SBUs tend to be 
more comfortable with shared equity arrangements than executives 
In UK-owned SBUs.
(c) Heads of US-owned SBUs appear to be dissatisfied with Inward
technology transfer via direct Investment. Discussion of whether 
this amounts to rejection of Intra-company transfer or 1s related 
specifically to temporal aspects of US ownership will be deferred 
to a later sub-section.
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(d) "Unfavourable" responses of the order 20-25 per cent are 
associated with the identification of a "negativity" bias. This 
surfaced during the Interviews with some executives, particularly 
in long-established SBUs, and was often rooted in events 
stretching back two or three decades, suggesting that executive's 
age and tenure are Important variables In the learning process. 
Overall, it was bad experiences that were given the most airing 1n 
the unsolicited sense and good experiences had to be probed in a 
soft, indirect way. This is an Important observation because past 
experiences of success/failure in international operations were 
found to respectively widen or constrain executive's consideration 
of strategic options involving foreign technology.
(e) The high proportion of responses 1n the "don't know" category 
among UK-owned SBUs reflects a combination of agnosticism towards 
foreign technology and lack of awareness. Either way, this has 
identified a target for intervention. Recent developments related 
to the sourcing of technology from Japan may be expected to 
provide a powerful Influence on Inductive learning 1n SBUs In the 
"don't know" category. Executives 1n all but the most laggardly 
SBUs were closely watching this emerging cluster of agreements.
Taken together, the evidence presented under the first part of this 
first working proposition has established that the probability of 
closing technological gaps using foreign technology 1s, Indeed, enhanced 
by an Internationally orientated top management. The research will now 
proceed to examine the mechanism by which foreign technology enters the 
decision-making framework and the moderating effects of political 
behaviour stated under the second part of the proposition.
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4.14 Environmental Scanning Behaviour
4.141 Partitioning of the external environment based on technological 
specialisation
As discussion of the radius of competition widened, technological 
specialisation featured strongly and executives quickly centred on the 
way particular segments were dominated by manufacturers from certain 
countries. Typical generalisations included the strength of Japanese 
manufacturers in CNC lathes and machining centres, West German and Swiss 
manufacturers in precision grinding machines, US and West German 
manufacturers in transfer equipment, etc.
Technological specialisation at the level of individual SBUs and their 
narrower specialisation in product/market niches has led to 
heterogeneity in machine tools and severely limited some executives' 
perception of their domain. Diffusion of CNC technology provides many 
examples where partitioning of the environment obscured signals of 
technological change and the evolution of product/market segments. Had 
some executives scanned developments on a wider front, they might have 
been better equipped to answer such strategic questions as: (a) how can 
we ensure that what happened in other segments will not happen to us,
(b) how are advances in automation, robotics, assembly equipment, etc. 
likely to blur the traditional boundaries of the Industry, and (c) what 
are the time scales and what new competitors might this bring?
Informal, and often haphazard, monitoring of the external environment 
was widely practised by executives In all SBUs studied. In the case of 
Inward licensing opportunities, for example, the Initiation of over two 
thirds of the 31 agreements was attributed to chance meetings and
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Informal sources such as personal contacts and "the grapevine". At 
least 12 SBUs were known to have access to corporate service departments 
which provided a formal mechanism for commissioning market studies, 
scanning patent specifications, technical reports, data banks, etc.
These were rarely acknowledged as of strategic value. Proactive 
searching for opportunities and anticipation of threats on a continuing 
basis seemed more related to the managerial style of key executives than 
to the rigorous use of business/management information systems. From 
hereon It was possible to discern a pattern of responses which fitted 
well with the four-strategy schema of technology leaders, fast 
followers, late followers and niche exploiters.
4.142 Leaders
Executives 1n the few SBUs operating 1n close proximity to the leading 
edge of machine tool technology exhibited two sets of distinguishing 
characteristics: firstly, they were sensitive to maintaining secrecy and 
expressed concern about potential leakages through staff losses and 
'loose talk'. This hindered research initially but became more relaxed 
as relationships developed. Secondly, they placed considerable value on 
'being first' and were not content to merely keep abreast of competitors 
and technological advances. Product performance dominated their 
thinking and they were particularly adept at monitoring progress 1n 
related fields. One of the key competences which seemed to separate 
SBUs able to sustain their leadership position from temporary Incumbents 
was an awareness of competitors 1n terms of their "total strategic 
capability" rather than solely from the narrow perspective of particular 
machine tool models.
The history of the machine tool Industry 1s littered with examples of
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leaders and aspiring leaders who paid the penalty for their njyopic 
"product-driven" view of competition. Some were first to the market 
with Innovative machines and features, only to be leapfrogged 
unexpectedly by competitors offering Improvements or outmanoeuvred by 
growth-minded competitors intent on establishing a global position.
This partly accounts for the absence of UK-based leaders in the standard 
CNC turning and machining centre segments, where certain aggressive 
Japanese manufacturers have captured substantial market shares 1n Europe 
and North America by showing a better understanding of the coupling 
between technological and commercial leadership.
4.143 Fast followers
Followers are associated with predominantly reactive approaches to 
competitors, customers and technological change. Moreover, there is a 
tendency to use the term "follower" In a pejorative way due to 
connotations of immitatlon, risk-aversion and allowing their future to 
be largely determined externally. Such generalisations obscure the 
variety of reactive strategies along the contlnum from fast to late 
follower and the differing demands placed on executives to process 
information.
Among the fast followers, for example, there were SBUs aspiring to 
leadership, some content to stay a 'comfortable distance' behind the 
leader and others slipping away. Executives 1n fast followers were 
found to have a good feel for their proximity to the frontier yet shared 
some of the leader's anxiety. As one executive explained: 'We know 
where the leader 1s going but they may be way out on timing and 
direction. We like to maintain a breathing space'. He used 
techno-commercial Intelligence to pursue a "second-but-better" approach.
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In contrast, most of the late followers were less conscious of their 
technological shortcomings and more preoccupied with 'responding to 
customer requirements'.
4.144 Late followers
An alarming ignorance of foreign competitors was found among some of the 
late followers and more laggardly niche-exploiters, often verging on 
apathy. This shortcoming is, of course, precisely why some of them are 
late followers and find themselves defending a diminishing niche or 
caught out by technological obsolescence. The most poignant example of 
their lax approach was the ease with which they dismissed foreign 
competitors as 'the Japanese' or 'the Germans' per se, as 1f they were a 
faceless enemy. For many of these SBUs, in mature products and markets, 
the strategic threat originates not only from manufacturers in the 
countries they mentioned but also from newly emerging producers (e.g. 
South Korea, Taiwan). This competitive factor was generally recognised, 
yet far from characterised and understood at the SBU level.
4.145 Niche exploiters
Outstanding detailed knowledge of foreign competitors' activities was 
identified among certain niche exploiters where a limited number of 
manufacturers compete for orders worldwide. This International 
oligopolistic market has on the one hand eased the task of keeping 
abreast of technological developments, yet on the other, orders are 
sporadic and considerable effort 1s necessary to monitor customer 
requirements. Examination of export ratios 1n these SBUs revealed the 
depressed state of the UK market, forcing them to become 
export-orientated and often accounting for over 70 per cent of total
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production to ensure survival. Some senior executives were spending up 
to 180 days per year overseas chasing orders. They had good awareness 
of competitors' order book status and product/process capabilities, and 
some had visited their plants. The highest incidence of Inward 
licensing was found among these SBUs, many agreements resulting from 
early Identification of opportunities and negotiation within a short 
time scale.
4.146 Reconciling the possession of market intelligence with position on 
the strategy continuum
The timely use of intelligence on competitor's capabilities was found to 
be an essential pre-requisite for sustaining and improving position on 
the strategy continuum of leadershlp/followership. Early possession of 
techno-commercial Intelligence proved to be an important competitive 
advantage in that 1t assisted in the identification of licensing 
opportunities and allowed discretion in decision-making. Paradoxically, 
some executives across the full continuum of followers were as alert to 
environmental change as those found in leaders, yet their possession of 
intelligence was often Inconsistent with their competitive position.
Why, in the face of mounting evidence of technological obsolescence, had 
some Internationally orientated executives apparently acted quickly and 
others delayed or failed to act at all? Why had certain strategic 
options, such as sourcing foreign technology, only received 
consideration during economic recession? Clearly, to progress further 
with analysis It was necessary to explore some of the softer areas 
associated with executive's boundary-spanning role and the 
identification of technological gaps.
4.15 The Nature of Technological Gaps
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4.151 The tendency to focus on product gaps
Conceptually, the term "gap" Is used in this research to describe the 
lag 1n technological capability relative to major competitors or the 
state-of-the-art. Thus a technological gap is a particular type of 
strategic problem.
Many executives in machine tool manufacturing SBUs found it difficult to 
articulate how they sensed technological gaps, offering 'gut feeling' 
and 'intuition' as Initial explanations. Further probing related to 
specific events and developments proved to be a fruitful line of enquiry 
because it focussed attention on more tangible aspects of their 
operations and allowed triangulation. This revealed a confluence of 
factors, with competitor and customer activities featuring prominently 
in their reconstruction.
Some executives spoke of discovery that competitors were planning to 
launch a new model, investing in plant/equipment, recruiting a certain 
set of skills, sponsoring external research programmes, etc. Several 
had noted changing patterns of customer requirements and developments 
further down the derived demand chain or 1n other fields of engineering. 
Others seemed oblivious to events taking place in their immediate 
environment and relied mainly on the technical press. But by the time 
announcements reach the press, competitors had normally used the lead 
time to establish a temporary advantage.
One consistent pattern of scanning behaviour observed 1n this research 
was partitioning of the environment due to functional specialisation.
It was noted, for example, that while Heads appeared to take a more 
rounded view of the machine tool industry, directors and senior managers
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responsible for the three main business functions (marketing, product 
engineering and production) tended to scan their own areas of Interest. 
Nevertheless, there were substantial overlaps 1n their perceived domain 
and by far the most Important of these was their common interest in the 
product. It was the balancing of these functional perspectives on the 
product that emerged as a key managerial task.
The prominent position accorded to the product 1n machine tools is to be 
expected since it provides the focus for buyer/seller Interaction. 
Machine tool models also arouse a level of emotional affinity among 
people 1n the industry which may be likened to that encountered 1n more 
glamorous industries such as aerospace and motor vehicles.
Over-emphasis on the product, however, has tended to encourage 
supply-side approaches to marketing 1n which product engineers have 
strongly Influenced the definition of customer requirements. Other 
characteristics of this product-dr1ven behaviour will be developed at 
various stages throughout this section.
Marketing, as a concept, has been slow to permeate machine tool 
manufacturing companies. As a function, 1t has assumed the tactical 
role of a commercial or sales activity, with the production function 
offering an equally short-term supporting role. In these circumstances, 
deteriorating performance has tended to find Its Initial explanation as 
a "product gap", often obscuring the emergence of a longer term 
strategic "technological gap". Recognising the nature of these gaps and 
the time scales Involved 1n closing them was Identified as an Important 
component of strategic management capability.
4.152 Illustrative examples
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Obsolescence of an SBUs core technology 1s an extreme case of 
technological deficiency and normally requires a turnaround strategy. 
For most machine tool SBUs, the problem was that of defining priorities 
within limited resources. They sought foreign technology to extend 
their product range or to fill gaps, to take them Into a new area of 
technology quickly or to catch up. The following public statements by 
senior executives Illustrate the motivation underlying three inward 
licence agreements:
'A tie-up with a Japanese manufacturer was the logical step as we 
didn't really have the resources to develop a range of suitable 
smaller stand-alone machines as well as our other commitments.'
J. Dawson (1984), Manufacturing Systems Director, 
Kearney & Trecker Marwln.
'We could have developed our own (electrically-driven process 
robot) but it would have taken several years. We wanted one now!' 
C. Jansen (1982), Managing Director 
GEC Electrical Projects.
'We needed to get into a new field quickly, and we did not have 
the capability to design a machine ourselves.'
A. Aldridge (1983), Managing Director 
Bridgeport Machines Division of Textron.
The last case of Bridgeport Machines deserves brief mention at this 
early stage of discussion because I regard them as a model of success In 
systematically utilising foreign machine tool technology to provide a 
platform for organic growth. This compares with the sad case of 
Wickman, whose fragmented and belated attempt to use foreign technology 
was Insufficient to offset the combined effects of technological 
obsolescence and diminishing customer base 1n their core business.
(a) Bridgeport Machines 1s a US-owned company possessing a
world-renowned name 1n milling machines. Up until the late 1970's 
they were predominantly a manufacturer of conventional turret 
machines with a strong customer base In toolrooms, jobbing shops 
and educational Institutions. By repositioning themselves In the
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market through a ¿5 million investment programme involving the 
Introduction of a range of horizontal CNC machining centres built 
under licence from Yasuda in Japan and vertical machining centres 
of their own design, they brought about a remarkable 
transformation from late follower to fast follower and aspiring 
leader over a five-year period.
(b) Wickman was one of several machine tool SBUs In the John Brown 
Group and generally regarded as the premier UK manufacturer of 
cam-operated mult1-sp1ndle automatic lathes. The seeds of 
Wlckman's demise may be traced back to the 1970's, when they 
failed to adapt to the changing market, eventually finding 
themselves a prisoner In their own diminishing niche. Wickman 
attempted to get Into CNC through an Import agency, a deslgn/build 
agreement with Talyo Selki 1n Japan and latterly, the acquisition 
of Olofsson in the US. None of these ventures was sufficient to 
save the company and it was divested in much-reduced form in 1983.
The case studies show that foreign technology played an Important part 
in the fortunes of Bridgeport and Wickman. The former rebuilt their 
business by Integrating product design and manufacturing technology Into 
a coherent business strategy aimed at systematically closing the gap on 
their major Japanese rivals. The latter applied a series of piecemeal 
measures, best described as "too little, too late". Both companies 
entered the recession with a large part of their current business 
dependent on models in which the basic design had changed little over 
the post-war period. It was the dramatic downturn in the machine tool 
order cycle which triggered review of their product ranges and exposed 
the true state of maturity of their technology. The analysis will now 
turn to the order cycle and its effect on strategic development.
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4.16 The Machine Tool Order Cycle
The phenomenon of the order cycle is well known in capital equipment 
industries and machine tool orders are frequently referred to as the 
"barometer" of the engineering and manufacturing industries. As shown 
in Figure 4, postwar cycles have typically exhibited 4-5 years peak to 
peak, with downturns often dipping below a level of 50-60 per cent of 
the previous peak. Production and sales tend to lag orders during the 
expansion phase and lead orders during recession, giving "order intake" 
a prominent role in conditioning optimism and short/medium term strategies.
Substantial evidence was uncovered in this research to show that 
executives closely monitor their order intake against trend data 
disseminated by the Machine Tool Trades Association. Tbe speed with 
which deteriorating performance was detected varied across the different 
technological segments and depended on whether SBUs were offering 
standard or customised machines. Mediunyhigh volume producers of 
standard or customised versions of standard machines, for example, 
needed to continuously monitor their market share and react quickly to 
changes in demand to avoid building up stocks. Producers of highly 
customised machines and flexible cells were less concerned with market 
share, and more preoccupied with the outcome of tendering procedures and 
dealing with the "lumpiness" of their order intake. In both cases, it 
was noted that a common feature of successful companies was the way they 
anticipated changing patterns of capital expenditure among their 
customer groups. Some were actively monitoring the conversion of 
enquiries into firm orders and conducted "lost order" analyses. 
Simultaneously, this enabled them to keep an eye on competitors and to 
separate false alarms from genuine downturns in the order cycle.
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In most long-established SBUs, the first sign of Incipient downturn 
triggered reversion to "coping strategies" based on the extrapolation of 
past experience, often accumulated over several order cycles. For SBUs 
operating 1n mature products and markets, this Invariably meant 
retrenchment. Many executives spoke of 'conditioning themselves to 
feast and famine' and 'riding out the troughs'. One technical director 
in an SBU of a large machine tool group, referred to h1s group board's 
'siege mentality' during recession. A main board director 1n the same 
group put forward the common defence of retrenchment policies of 
'surviving where others had failed' and shedding staff at less than the 
industry rate as evidence of strategic management capability. Little 
thought had been given to how long the recession might last and the 
consequences of slow recovery.
What 1s perplexing about reliance on this recipe for survival 1s that 
very few executives had attempted to examine the vulnerability of their 
business to the recession they knew to be Imminent. Their 
product/market scope was allowed to widen through customisation and 
importing arrangements, and it was not until the downturn was well 
underway that expectations were revised and attention focussed on the 
composition of product ranges, staffing levels and technological 
obsolescence.
Over the early part of the recession 1980-84, the validity of 
assumptions underlying conventional wisdom was questioned as anxiety 
surrounding the timing of the upturn Increased. There was, for example, 
a temporary bottom1ng-out of orders towards the end of 1981, only to be 
followed by a further downturn 1n 1982. For some SBUs, the prolonged 
recession precipitated two rounds of redundancies and executives found 
1t difficult to reconcile what they saw happening to their order book
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against more optimistic forecasts from the Confederation of British 
Industry, the Engineering Employers Federation and various forecasting 
units.
The magnitude of the downturn in the order cycle and Its impact on
machine tool companies 1s captured 1n the public statement by the
Chairman of Butler Newall, part of the B Elliott Group:
'In 1980/81 the combined Butler (Halifax) and Newall (Peterborough 
and Keighley) businesses had an £80 million turnover capacity, and 
a £ 2  million order book. That is how bad 1t was' (Financial Times 
2/9/87, p8).
4.17 Business Planning and Technological Issues
The cyclicality of machine tool orders has greatly Influenced attitudes 
towards business planning systems. Formal planning was viewed with 
scepticism by senior executives 1n both UK-owned and US-owned SBUs and 
found to be conspicuously absent 1n Independent companies. Beyond 
compilation of the annual budget found 1n all SBUs, it may be Inferred 
from the general tenor of discussion that very few executives would have 
devoted time to medium/long term planning procedures without pressure to 
do so from their parent company. The following comments Illustrate the 
range of opinions expressed by Heads of UK-owned SBUs about business 
planning:
'We have no med1um/long-term plan written down. The current 
climate 1s changing so fast 1t's not worthwhile doing it'.
'Our parent company treat each business on Its merits and seem to 
understand the problems we are facing ... I'm keen on the planning 
process but I don't have much faith 1n the result'.
'Planning 1s not relevant to our operations but we have prepared 
one-year, three and five-year plans for the bank*.
'We don't do formal medium/long term planning though It 1s claimed 
that we look ahead at plant and products. We ought to do more for 
communications reasons'.
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It can be seen that planning was a contentious issue and every care was 
exercised in the research to avoid imposing personal values and tackling 
sensitive areas head on. This Is an important methodological point 
because some executives had preconceptions of njy academic position and 
equated this with "planning 1s good". Several gave mild apologies for 
them not formalising planning or abandoning it during recession.
Though business plans and product plans were frequently made available 
for inspection, no attempt was made to analyse procedures and content in 
detail. Instead, the aim was to probe some of the softer areas of 
objectives and corporate/SBU relationships, to gain a feel for the 
mechanism by which technological Issues emerged and perceptions of their 
time scale.
Table 8 shows the findings on the business planning horizons adopted by 
a sub-set of 48 SBUs. The salient features of this data are the high 
proportion of UK-owned SBUs exhibiting an "order book" planning horizon 
and the higher incidence of medium/long term planning systems in 
US-owned SBUs. The latter point 1s to be expected: partly because of 
the corporate/business planning orientation 1n US multinationals and 
partly due to the desire of parent companies for accountability and 
control among their foreign subsidiaries.
Business planning 1n US-owned SBUs Is characterised by the handing down 
of corporate policy statements and the use of manuals to ease 
consolidation. Top-down financial performance targets (e.g. return on 
capital, return on sales, liquidity) were typically accompanied by 
requests for bottom-up projections of how these might be achieved 1n 
terms of product/market strategies and capital Investment. Beyond this, 
the pressure on Heads of SBU to meet corporate criteria, the
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Table 8. Business Planning Time Horizons
Time Horizon 
(Years) UK-owned
Number of SBUs 
US-owned Total
Budget Period (1 Year) 31 17 48
"Order Book" 19 2 21
2 1 2 3
3 7 2 8
4 1 1 2
5 5 11 16
Long-term Outlook 1 5 5
N=48 SBUs
bureaucratisation of planning systems and the role of US vice-presidents
carrying responsibility for UK operations, defies generalisation. In 
some SBUs, planning was found to be an Intensive, highly iterative 
process requiring executives to attend lengthy meetings at US head 
office and to present their document before a committee. In others, the 
first document submitted appeared to be accepted with little feedback 
and it was almost as though UK operations were considered immaterial to 
parent company performance. The diversity of approaches 1s Illustrated 
in the following comments:
'Since we were acquired by XYZ Corporation we have been Inundated 
with various vice-presidents and corporate planners. They left me 
this tome (planning manual) on the last occasion. We're 1n for a 
tough time'.
'We have no hard written objectives. We try to achieve what we 
say we can do. We respond to Chicago to some extent but we have 
nothing beyond the formal budget. Chicago would show you piles of 
paperwork and computer projections'.
While most Heads of SBU, Irrespective of ownership, bemoaned the coming 
of the annual planning cycle, the main source of pressure on them during 
recession may be attributed to the tightening of control systems. This 
varied considerably across all SBUs, taking the form of more active 
interest from group directors, shortening reporting periods, continuous
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updating of order projections and more frequent meetings. Cyclic 
downturn forced even the most undisciplined of SBUs to perform a 
"position audit", if not by name, and to examine their future direction. 
Though Heads claimed responsibility for the audit and subsequent 
Interpretation of Its findings, it was often difficult to trace who had 
handled the mechanics of compilation and the extent of technical Inputs. 
Depending largely on their managerial style, about a quarter of the 
Heads Interviewed had performed the whole audit themselves In a rather 
peremptory manner. Most had delegated the work to the various functions 
and acted as coordinator. Corporate planners and business development 
executives had made an active contribution In some SBUs which were 
divisions of larger groups, whereas 1n small and Independent companies, 
the managing director or a small cabal of top managers had reviewed the 
competitive situation and produced little In the way of documentation.
The absence of formal planning systems did not necessarily mean that 
executives had no vision of the future, nor that they were failing to 
think and act strategically. It 1s interesting to note that while many 
claimed to be unable to plan beyond their current order book, this had 
not precluded them initiating development projects for new models and 
sanctioning capital Investment 1n plant/equipment. Moreover, 48 per 
cent of SBUs 1n the "order book" time horizon category had committed 
themselves to inward licence agreements extending 5 to 10 years ahead!
4.18 Resistance to Change and the "Not Invented Here" Syndrome
The "not Invented here" (NIH) syndrome 1s a colloquial description of 
the tendency of individuals and groups to reject external ideas which 
threaten their values, status and continuing stability. It 1s a well 
known, yet under-researched, aspect of behaviour in response to change
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and Is often associated with low job mobility, complacency and 
employee's perceptions of the superiority of their own abilities.
In the recent history of machine tool manufacturing companies there is 
no shortage of anecdotal evidence to Illustrate the dysfunctional effect 
of resistance to change. This ranged from open hostility against the 
introduction of new equipment and procedures, to more subtle, 
obstructive behaviour such as 'working to instructions from people who 
know best' and sitting on paperwork. In attempting to unravel instances 
of resistance to the Introduction of foreign technology, I was well 
aware that these may appear in many guises and feelings vented on say an 
inward licensing decision, may well be manifestations of some other 
event or underlying discontent at the time.
After 1980/81, there was a marked softening of attitudes In some SBUs as
orders declined and technological obsolescence became exposed by the
recession. This is clearly Illustrated 1n the following comments from
two Heads of UK-owned SBUs who had quickly signed inward licence
agreements as part of their survival strategy:
'Five years ago it would have been difficult, not so now. Any 
resistance soon evaporated... Most people felt relieved'.
'The attitude seemed to be: if It preserves jobs, then OK. You 
have to remember that at that stage we had already shed 280 
people'.
These findings lend support to the "crisis-innovation'1 hypothesis that a 
large performance gap can Induce a willingness to adopt radical change, 
despite the challenge to vested Interests.
The two groups feeling the most anxiety of dislocation from the signing 
of Inward licence agreements were, for different reasons, the horizontal 
group comprising the board of directors of the SBU and the vertical 
group representing the product engineering function. Heads possessing
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an engineering background found the decision particularly sensitive as 
they were seen to be reneging on earlier decisions 1n which they had 
participated and letting down their former colleagues. This personal 
discomfort, coupled with dependence on an external source of technology, 
heightened their perceived risk of failure and generated considerable 
anxiety. The reaction from product engineers was regarded by executives 
as predictable:
'It's a vote of no confidence in our ability to design and develop
new machines'.
'It's the thin end of the wedge... our first step towards a
"screw-driver" operation'.
As might be expected, the intensity of resistance was higher 1n SBUs 
using foreign technology to introduce extensive product/process 
diversification than 1n those merely filling a gap in the product range. 
Heated exchanges took place during the pre-signing period but the 
pattern of resistance varied in different SBUs as the implications 
unfolded. In two cases, product engineers behaved 1n an almost 
ritualistic way, offering their own hastily prepared design schemes to 
compete with the proposed licence. In these, and 1n two other cases, 
there was fragmented evidence of rallying support to mount an appeal to 
the Head, pointing out the contributions of product engineering to 
earlier successes and under-lining the danger in running down their 
activities.
It should be noted that in only four cases of inward licensing could it 
be stated with any acceptable confidence that political behaviour had 
delayed negotiation with the licensor. Each case resulted in the 
signing of an agreement. No attempt was made to estimate the cost of 
delays. A series of in-depth longitudinal studies would be necessary to 
take analysis further. This was considered beyond the scope of the 
current research. For longitudinal studies to be of strategic value in
- 127 -
this area, it is believed that it is as important to examine covert 
behaviour as it is to map the more visible political posturing described 
here.
Negative feelings were found to persist long after initial licensing 
decisions had been taken and continued to work against implementation. 
While some Heads of SBU were expounding how the 'all-British mentality' 
and the NIH syndrome had been broken down, their middle managers and 
product engineers occupied pockets of resistance and could often see 
little good coming from agreements. Their difficulty in reconciling the 
tightening of constraints on Internal design and development with the 
diversion of funds to acquire foreign technology surfaced in numerous 
conversations. The following comments capture parochial views of 
product Innovation and the failure 1n some SBUs to communicate reasons 
for sourcing foreign technology to those who might feel the most hurt by 
it:
'When we took the licence for this equipment we were under the 
impression that 1t would open our eyes. It turned out that we are 
paying for the nameplate... The design is largely mechanical and 
obsolete'.
'The design 1s so simple, even a first year undergraduate could 
have handled it'.
'There's nothing special about what we've bought. All the licence 
has proved is that we have been doing the right things for years. 
Given equal resources, we could easily have come up with something 
better'.
The second comment above 1s a familiar one 1n the product design field. 
Once revealed, good aesthetic and functional aspects of design appear 
simple. The competitive edge often lies In being first-to-the-market 
and building a name for innovative products.
When the third comment above was put (anonymously) to the managing
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director, he said that he too once held the view that his company could 
design and build almost any Item of machinery: 'We probably could have 
done, but not with commercial viability'. H1s mental concept of 
viability was cogently argued but he seldom shared his thoughts with 
colleagues and avoided any formal statement of objectives. Like many 
executives Interviewed in this study, he involved himself extensively 
during the early stages of inward licensing and handled negotiation, yet 
neglected the post-decision Implementation stage, leaving middle 
managers to maintain continuity towards 111-defined objectives.
Executives were normally reluctant to divulge their detailed aspirations 
and expectations for both Internal and external consumption. This was 
particularly so for new product Introductions and they were wary of 
inviting too much publicity to products derived from foreign sources of 
technology. 'High hopes' and 'encouraging prospects for future growth' 
were phrases selectively appearing 1n press releases, not only to 
maintain secrecy but also to avoid the risk of embarrassment at some 
later date should their predictions fail to materialise. Exceptions to 
this rule were found 1n five cases of "crisis Innovation", three 
involving licence-based products and two involving products derived from 
parent company technology. The public statements accompanying these 
product Introductions were as much designed to reassure employees that 
stability had been restored as they were to maintain customer 
confidence. DeVlleg, for example, on signing an inward licence 
agreement with Okuma 1n 1983, publicly announced their aim of producing 
75-100 machining centres per year within two years, thereby doubling UK 
sales turnover to ¿15-20 million with the possibility of creating 100 
additional jobs (Machinery 6/7/83, p6). DeVlleg's actual sales turnover 
for 1985/86 was ¿9 million and their workforce had remained almost 
unchanged.
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Some of the most entrenched resistance to change was Identified among 
Heads, engineering directors and product engineers 1n late follower SBUs 
which were heavy subscribers to the recipes outlined earlier. They 
frequently referred to past achievements and the shelving of ideas .... 
'only to see them re-emerge embodied 1n competitor's machines offered 
under licence'. For years, Incremental product Innovation had been 
pursued on many fronts with tacit agreement of the Head with little 
medium/long term guidance from the sales function. It is to some extent 
amazing that 1n the changed competitive climate of the 1970's and 80's, 
such a free rein was allowed to build prototypes for their intrinsic 
technical Interest with minimal market justification. Several of these 
SBUs faced collapse and five did so over the period of research. 
"Strategic technological Issues" was not an expression they used and the 
notion of acquiring foreign technology to relieve their predicament 
beyond their comprehension. Only with new leadership, a substantial 
Infusion of new staff and products could they have hoped to survive.
4.19 Executive's Perceptions of Corporate Constraints
4.191 Independent UK-owned SBUs
Indpendent machine tool manufacturing companies, representing 22 per 
cent of SBUs studied and many of them owner-managed, Imposed 
considerable self-restra1nt on the financing and direction of new 
developments. Maintaining Independence and not wishing to overstretch 
themselves were Important factors In their highly personalised business 
strategies.
Most had attempted to update their existing product range through 
Internal design and development. Some were struggling to keep abreast
- 130 -
of technological change in diminishing market niches but were in no 
position to consider closing technological gaps by any means that 
impaired cash flow. Others were reluctantly forced to phase their way 
out of manufacturing and take on import agencies (factoring) in the 
medium/long term. A strong affiliation towards 'building machines' was 
found among independent companies, often so strong as to make inward 
licensing one of the few acceptable alternative strategies because, 
above all, it preserved their independent status and presence in 
manufacturing.
4.192 SBUs of UK engineering groups
SBUs which were machine tool divisions of larger UK-owned engineering 
and manufacturing groups (35 per cent of SBUs studied) had found 
themselves in the precarious position of poor relation in the corporate 
portfolio. Losses were tolerated by parent companies during downturns 
In the order cycle. When profits were generated with the upturn, cash 
was often taken out of the business, resulting in investment being run 
down to a level below the critical mass for ensuring continuing 
participation In particular product/market/technologlcal segments.
Often the parent company Itself was 1n financial trouble, resulting 1n 
ailing machine tool SBUs being sold off (e.g. John Brown Group and their 
Wickman and Webster & Bennett subsidiaries), or closed (e.g. Renold 
Group and J. Parkinson) or subject to management buy out (e.g. Redman 
Heenan Group and Fielding i Platt). SBUs of financially stronger parent 
companies often fared no better and many executives felt that they had 
long been candidates for divestment, pointing to other SBUs in the group 
which could always justify a better case for funding. Proposals to 
pursue certain strategic options Involving capital Investment frequently
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revealed perceptions of a serious mismatch between corporate 
expectations and what was considered achievable in individual SBUs. 
'Unrealistic financial criteria' and 'lack of understanding of our 
business' were cited by executives who felt aggrieved when proposals had 
been turned down.
Discussion on the receptivity of group boards towards proposals 
Invariably drifted towards rejections, yet the actual Incidence of 
rejections was believed to be low. Evidence suggests that the timing 
and presentation of proposals were key factors In gaining approval, with 
corporate planners providing valuable assistance to some SBUs In 
Interpreting 'the mood of the group board' and 1n 'framing proposals In 
an attractive way'. There appears to be some scope for further 
empirical Investigation Into this relationship.
The overall Impression gained from Interviews was on the one hand of 
group boards applying dispassionate scrutiny of proposals based on 
short-term financial performance and on the other of realisation that 
the diminishing size of some SBUs was becoming Important. Group boards 
were found to be sensitive to their stock market position and executives 
1n machine tool SBUs were clearly aware of this situation.
Acceptability of particular options tended to hinge on the relative 
magnitude of capital payments, deferred payments (e.g. royalties) and 
the extent of equity arrangements. Import agencies and inward licence 
agreements therefore encountered a less tortuous route to approval than 
joint ventures and acquisitions.
4.193 SBUs of UK machine tool groups
SBUs which were divisions of UK-owned machine tool groups (13 per cent
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of SBUs studied) competed for resources as in the previous category but 
their role in overall group strategy required careful definition to 
avoid duplication and conflict. Evidence from the interviews suggests 
that manufacturing SBUs specialising in particular machine tool 
technologies had not achieved a good fit with SBUs set up to handle 
import agencies.
Corporate/SBU relationships were complex in this category of ownership 
due to mutual interest 1n the machine tool industry. Chairmen and 
executive Heads of SBU were often members of the group board, leading to 
intense rivalry and political behaviour related to resource allocation 
and their personal vision of the future. Although 1t was not possible 
to examine board room dynamics 1n a study of this kind, certain overt 
aspects of strategic adaptation provided prlma facie evidence of 
simmering discontent at SBU level regarding constraints on 
product/market/technol ogical scope.
Executives in manufacturing SBUs had accepted narrowly defined missions 
in the 1970s. The recession from 1980 onwards severely tested their 
survival as separate business entities and some were merged. Short-term 
priorities based on financial stringency were felt to penalise 
manufacturing more than Importing activities, due to the differing 
magnitude and time scales of Investment. Policy guidelines which 
perpetuated the manufacturlng/lmportlng demarcation were perceived to be 
inappropriate In the light of changing circumstances.
Replies to two questions were pertinent 1n this respect: What 
opportunities have you Identified? and .... Can you give me an example 
of a recent proposal from your SBU which challenged group policy? These 
revealed the absence of group synergy and the failure of some ideas to
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emerge as proposals because of doubts surrounding receptivity at group 
level. Some executives and middle managers bitterly resented exclusion 
from Importing and said that they were reluctant to waste time 
considering agencies if these would be handled by another SBl). Imported 
machines, it was argued, provide an important Inward transfer of product 
technology and their home lay naturally 1n specialised manufacturing 
SBUs. As one Head of SBU put it: 'If we were a private company we would 
be allowed to supplement our Income by selling complementary products'. 
Similarly, there was little incentive to Importing SBUs to recommend 
that certain established agencies should be converted to manufacturing 
licences.
Policy guidelines for manufacturing SBUs regarding Inward licensing, 
joint ventures and acquisitions were ill-defined. Financial criteria 
and market feasibility were Important hurdles to be overcome but group 
boards tended to adopt a more "negotiated" approach to proposals from 
their SBUs. One group director spoke of 'taking each proposal on Its 
merits' and another of 'not wishing to exclude options'. In reality, 
the absence of formal statements meant that executives at SBU level 
based their perception of acceptability on earlier precedents and the 
expected behaviour of key decision makers. In one group, for example, 
the acceptance/rejectlon of proposals clearly hinged on their 
endorsement by a powerful group director. He dominated technology 
strategy and seemed oblivious to the fact that his autocratic style had 
stifled bottom-up Initiatives.
Towards the end of this research, the two major UK machine tool groups 
(600 Group and Elliott) had appointed new Chief Executives. Since then, 
each has expressed concern about their dependency on the vagaries of the 
machine tool business and declared an intention to diversify Into other
- I n ­
fields of engineering.
4.194 SBUs of US machine tool groups
UK subsidiaries of US parent companies (31 per cent of SBUs studied) 
exhibited many of the opportunities and constraints of the previous 
category, along with an additional set imposed by foreign ownership. 
Tight financial control pervaded all relationships between US parents 
and their subsidiaries. Beyond this, it was difficult to generalise on 
strategic behaviour because of policy constraints placed on sales 
territories, local design and development, sourcing of particular 
machine models and components. While some parents and subsidiaries had 
sought extensive interaction, others had grown away from each other and 
were tied largely by the financial link accompanying ownership. The 
intensity of relationships appeared to depend mainly on the contribution 
of UK and European operations to total group performance and executives' 
perceptions of technological dependency.
The more diversified the US parent company's product range, the stronger 
their belief in intra-group self-sufficiency. Inport agencies, inward 
licensing, joint ventures and acquisitions normally only emerged as 
strategic options after a search within the group had failed to show 
that modifications of existing designs were unsatisfactory. Many UK 
executives felt that acquiring technology from outside the group would 
be considered 'a strategy of last resort' and a convincing case would be 
essential to secure parent company approval. Again, the discussion 
tended to centre on agencies and evidence was uncovered of several 
instances where formal proposals had not materialised.
One executive said that he h a d ---'looked at the possibility of
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importing a CNC grinder but It was not worth the hassle' with the US 
parent company. Others had 'sounded out' parent company interest and 
had been 'discouraged from proceeding further without the possibility of 
wider group participation'. This was particularly noticeable In the 
case of Inward licensing opportunities. Closer examination of some of 
the agencies and licences which had not materialised showed that 
executives' definitions of "complementary" machines were often linked 
with their existing business and their main motivation was to offset the 
rapid downturn in sales of existing machines.
Executives 1n both US parent and UK subsidiaries had detected changing 
attitudes to external sources of technology 1n response to Increasing 
competition and technological obsolescence. As one operations director 
put 11: 'The single most important factor in current US/UK relationships 
is the recognition by our parent company that we now face a common set 
of competitors'.
4.195 Implications for strategic management
Serious questions have been raised surrounding Corporate/SBU 
relationships, particularly 1n the third category of ownership. Why do 
group board members Intervene so frequently 1n the affairs of their 
SBUs? Part of the answer lies In the management style of some group 
directors who have a strong personal affinity for machine tools and feel 
the need for "hands on" control beyond financial reporting. Over time 
this has tended to breed Heads of SBU who are reactive and short on 
general management ability. A further explanation 1s of wider 
significance, related to economic conditions and the selge mentality. 
Having most of their SBUs 1n machine tools, extreme hostility 1n the 
environment has driven groups to centralise their structures
- 136 -
temporarily. The dilemma facing these groups is that the speed and 
coordination associated with a centralised response clashes with the 
need to decentralise in order to comprehend environmental change.
From these four categories of ownership it can be seen that the range of 
strategic options actually evaluated was often quite narrow compared 
with the opportunities arising. Much subjective screening was carried 
out by individuals and in management meetings before feasibility studies 
were set up and formal proposals emerged, if at all. Such behaviour has 
Implications for the "entrepreneurialism" and "organisational renewal" 
which are at the heart of strategic management capability.
The foregoing analysis and discussion has established the moderating 
effect of Internal political behaviour on receptivity to foreign 
technology at two key levels: (a) at the functional level, mainly in the 
form of resistance to change among product engineers; and (b) at board 
level where the identification and closure of technological gaps is 
typically as much about the selection of a politically acceptable option 
as an economically viable one. On this evidence and on the earlier 
evidence presented on the international orientation of top management, 
the first working proposition is accepted.
4.2 RELATIVE STATUS OF THE PRODUCT ENGINEERING, MARKETING AND 
PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS
The second working proposition 1s:
Technology strategy development 1n machine tool manufacturing 
companies is dominated by product engineering considerations to 
the relative neglect of marketing and manufacturlng/productlon 
activities.
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4.21 Antecedents to the Focus on Product Innovation
During the post-war period up to the late 1960's, machine tool 
manufacturers in the UK operated in a protected environment. There was 
little international competition and imports mainly comprised special 
purpose machines from the USA for which there was no local manufacturer. 
Profit margins were good compared with present standards. Order books 
were lengthy. Weak manufacturers could survive and in some cases, 
prosper.
Increasing Intensity of competition in machine tools first appeared with 
the re-emergence of West German producers from about 1955 onwards. The 
challenge from West Germany was expected by manufacturers in the UK and 
when it came, it took the form of product innovation coupled with a 
carefully nurtured strategy to build a reputation for high quality 
precision engineering across a range of machines. Similarly, as other 
European producers returned to the scene, notably Italy, France and 
Austria, there was room for them to find a place 1n a steadily expanding 
world market by matching or Improving on the product designs of existing 
competitors in both standard and customised machines.
Throughout the 1960's competition stimulated product Innovation 1n 
traditional areas of mechanical engineering design and 1n the 
Increasingly Important field of control systems. Numerical control (NC) 
was still 1n its Infancy and early adopters were largely confined to the 
aerospace Industry. Some machine tool manufacturers in the UK had kept 
up with Incremental NC developments but the scope for sales was 
restricted compared with the US.
Japanese manufacturers at this stage were rapidly increasing their
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machine tool production, though almost all output was for domestic 
consumption. Unlike the UK and US, design and development by leading 
Japanese manufacturers was concentrated on the application of NC to 
smaller general purpose machines of the type found in a wide variety of 
engineering and manufacturing plants.
Japanese manufacturers first entered the export market in a serious way 
in the early 1970's. By employing product/market strategies which 
focussed on a limited range of standard NC lathes and machining centres, 
they were able to exploit growing national capability in 
micro-electronics and build export volume on their strong domestic 
customer base.
Three techno-commercial factors contributed to the competitive edge 
enjoyed by Japanese manufacturers of standard machines :
(a) sustained investment in micro-electronics allowed them to dictate 
the pace of product innovation and model life cycles through 
computer numerical control systems;
(b) meticulous attention to product and process improvement created 
the de facto world standard for quality and reliability;
(c) high volumes reduced unit costs, thereby enhancing price 
competitiveness.
While Western commentators were referring to NC and later, CNC machines, 
as 'advanced technology' which would eventually trickle down from 
aerospace applications, the Japanese had begun to produce and distribute 
them as near-commodity products. This alone would probably have been
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sufficient to underpin an export-led market development campaign. The 
window of opportunity, however, finally opened in the late 1970's when 
the value of the Yen was at a low level relative to major world 
currencies and manufacturers in Europe and the US could not meet the 
surge in demand. Japanese manufacturers had built up stocks of standard 
CNC machines 1n what proved to be the growth segments, and sold them on 
price, product reliability and availability.
As the world entered recession 1n 1979/80, all Western countries felt 
the presence of Japanese manufacturers 1n general purpose CNC lathes and 
machining centres. By the mid-80's the top 5 Japanese companies had 
achieved production in these segments of at least an order of magnitude 
higher than found in the UK. Only in conventional (non-CNC) centre 
lathes and milling machines could it be said that UK manufacturers had 
comparable volumes. Unfortunately, these were not only declining 
segments under threat from more sophisticated CNC machines, these were 
also the target segments for low-cost producers from Taiwan and South 
Korea.
For most executives in the UK, the dilemma was whether to compete 
head-on in general purpose CNC machines or to join the well publicised 
"retreat" to customisation. As shown later in this sub-section, the 
former strategy was adopted by several SBUs with mixed success, while 
most pursued the latter strategy because it provided temporary respite 
from price competition and allowed them to fall back on traditional 
strengths in product engineering.
4.22 Observations on the Prevailing Socio-Economic Climate in the UK 
Machine Tool Industry in the 1980's
An holistic assessment of the contextual factors influencing
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organisational response to change provides a useful precursor to 
understanding the nature of internal power structures and 
cross-functional relationships between product engineering, marketing 
and manufacturing/production. Such an assessment is descriptive rather 
than analytical and is inevitably limited by the degree of access gained 
to key functions within the 54 SBUs covered by the research. 
Consequently, the observations made here refer to a sub-set of 39 SBUs. 
Any shortcomings with regard to comparability and lack of precision are 
considered acceptable when exploring broad Issues of this kind.
The sharpest social division pervading machine tool manufacturing 
companies In the UK is the "staff" and "works" demarcation so widely 
documented by the labour process school of researchers. This 1s highly 
visible in remuneration systems whereby staff are paid a salary on a 
monthly basis and works employees "clock-in" to earn an hourly wage.
The two groups are further differentiated by privileges and incentive 
schemes, the clothes they wear in the workplace and trade union 
membership. Such ubiquitous inequalities appear to be deeply embedded 
in the Industrial culture of certain geographical regions.
Many manifestations of social division emerged during Interviews and 
factory visits. My lasting Impression relates to the bitterness and 
dejection surrounding the Implementation of redundancy schemes. On the 
one hand, top management had clearly gone through a traumatic period as 
they attempted to scale down operations to a level they believed 
consistent with survival and future recovery. On the other, it was 
Impossible to ignore extensive anecdotal evidence of management 
Insensitivity and claims by works/productlon employees of Inequitable 
treatment. Inspection of the case material set against sectoral data 
throws light on whether managers in machine tool manufacturing companies
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were even-handed 1n their approach to shedding labour :
(a) The Engineering Industry Training Board statutory returns for the 
years 1978 and 1984 set out in Table 45 show that while the total 
industry workforce was reduced by 60 per cent, the proportion of 
employees retained in most job grades marginally increased at the 
expense of operators. The greatest psychological Impact was felt 
in the absolute numbers of operators and skilled craftsmen leaving 
the industry over the period (1e over 8700 and 10200 respectively).
(b) Comparing the trends in output and employment post-1979 presented 
in Table 46 offers evidence of the latter falling at a lesser rate 
than the former. Unfortunately, the picture of employment over 
the early 1980's 1s distorted due to short-time working, largely 
among production staff. In some cases this resulted 1n rising 
hourly production although annual output per employee had been 
reducing. The true position was further confused by SBUs taking 
on jobbing work or sub-contract machining to fill capacity and 
keep the workforce together.
The overall picture in the early 1980's was one of Internal turbulence 
and low morale. There was widespread acceptance of the Inevitability of 
cyclic downturn, yet when It came, everyone was ill-prepared for the 
consequences. Despite extensive trade union consultation, there was an 
apparent mismatch between senior management and workforce perceptions 
about the depth of crisis facing some SBUs, leading to prolonged 
uncertainty and Instability. The greatest upheaval was observed 1n SBUs 
which simultaneously Implemented redundancy schemes and seized the 
opportunity to radically change their mix of skills and product range 
required for the upturn. In contrast, executives who had merely
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"managed down" their operations could be said to have done so in an 
even-handed way but they often failed to tackle key human resource and 
capital investment Issues.
While it was outside the scope of this research to analyse complex 
industrial relations processes 1n detail, it must be noted that both 
sides had perpetuated adversarial behaviour and there were few signs of 
a genuine search for common ground. Conflict in machine tool 
manufacturing companies never seemed far below the surface. Clearly, 
there is much work to be done by Government In creating an external 
industrial climate conducive to restoring competitiveness and by 
management in recognising the need for strategic change and preparing 
the ground for effective organisation development.
Informal discussions with executives 1n foreign multinational companies 
and Importers of machine tools, especially those people who had 
previously worked for UK manufacturers, suggest that although industrial 
disharmony is not a particularly UK phenomenon, 1t Is potentially more 
Inhibiting to strategic change than 1n many foreign competitor's 
operations. Even allowing for national stereotyping, there 1s consensus 
of opinion about the lack of open-ness 1n UK machine tool manufacturers, 
rigid hierarchies and compartmentalisation, failure to respect manual 
skills and wider assertions associated with an anti-industrial society.
4.23 Relative Power and Status Systems
4.231 Product standardisation and customisation
Having briefly outlined aspects of the International competitive 
situation and social background relevant to the working proposition, It
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1s now necessary to assess the extent to which Internal power 
relationships have been shaped, and are shaped by, the nature of the 
work carried out 1n machine tool manufacturing SBUs. A useful starting 
point 1s to examine how SBUs deal with the conflicting requirements of 
product standardisation and customisation.
The level of customisation found In machine tools varies from minor 
modification of standard machines to highly specialised equipment 
tailored to the individual needs of large users. Though the national 
machine tool statistics separate out "unit construction" machines, the 
overall categorisation 1s unhelpful in detecting shifting patterns from 
standard to customised machines. Thus the main evidence of changes in 
product mix or product/market scope over time and their managerial 
Implications must be gleaned from the adaptive behaviour of SBUs. This 
behaviour will be explored 1n the three operational contexts shown 1n 
Table 9.
Table 9. Breakdown of Sample by Type of Machine Production
Type of Machine Production
Percentage of 
SBUs Studied
Percentage of Total 
Sales for the Sample
Highly Customised Machines 
("unit construction") 17 18
Standard Machines 26 34
Standard Machines and Customised 
Versions of Standard Machines 57 48
N-54 SBUs
4.232 Producers of highly customised machines
SBUs producing highly customised machines were characterised by
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extensive day to day Involvement of product engineers In production 
activities and their close coalition with sales engineers. Two key 
factors in the coalition were :
(a) the integrative role performed by proposals engineers, mainly 
located 1n the sales function and typically possessing the same 
background experience as both product and sales engineers (eg an 
apprenticeship, drawing office experience and several years 
service 1n the company);
(b) the central importance of product specifications as the vehicle 
for cross-functional communication.
Product engineers considered themselves to be the 'keepers of the 
specification1. Drawings were handed over to production less abruptly 
than 1n most SBUs with a distinct preference for 'liaison' rather than 
documentation. Scheduling the work flow was deemed to be important due 
to the "lumpiness" of order intake and uneven demand on resources. 
Involvement of production staff 1n compiling specifications and 
proposals depended on the size of orders and initiatives taken by 
individual production managers. When negotiating small orders, 
proposals engineers were considered to be sufficiently 'well-rounded' to 
handle cost/t1me estimates.
Large orders often resulted in the formation of a project team under the 
control of product engineering. This enhanced their status over sales 
and production, especially when conceptual and development work was 
necessary. Normally, however, machine design did not start from scratch 
and there was extensive reliance on modular construction and accumulated 
know-how. Manufacturing and assembly work was "craftsman-like" with
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considerable discretion exercised at all stages by supervisors and 
toolmakers. It Is suggested that producers of highly customised 
machines provide the closest parallel to the much-admired Meister system 
1n West Germany.
4.233 Producers of standard machines
Standard machines may be of the manual or CNC type and are normally 
produced 1n high volumes. Bridgeport, for example, celebrated UK 
production of their 40,000th Series One milling machine in 1985 with 
output of this single model peaking at 300 units per month in 1969/70. 
Cumulative volume and historical output rates, however, may be 
misleading: (a) due to order cycles, and (b) because models tend to be 
updated or superceded by more expensive CNC versions which are often 3 
to 5 times more productive. The overall trend is one of shortening 
model life cycles, falling unit output and higher unit value.
Producers of standard machines operate in price sensitive segments of 
the world market where long term competitiveness depends on an effective 
sales distribution network and low cost production. Given these 
requirements it was not suprising to find that the status differential 
among the three main functions was much narrower. Product engineering 
appeared to carry marginally higher status than marketing/sales and 
manufacturing/productlon but there was evidence to tentatively suggest 
that volume and its cyclicality were important determinants in 
establishing the pecking order of the last two functions. In 
particular, whereas the power base of product engineering had remained 
fairly stable over time, the power bases of marketing and manufacturing 
fluctuated with order intake and production output respectively.
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It is tempting to speculate that if SBUs increased their volume, then 
production or marketing might emerge as the dominant function. Two 
scenarios are worthy of brief mention here. It could be argued, for 
example, that as overall volume and batch sizes increase, production is 
the critical function. Alternatively, if flexible manufacturing systems 
are Installed, production becomes almost based on a continuous process 
and marketing Is the critical function. In the range of volumes found 
in standard machine tool manufacture, it 1s reasonable to conjecture 
that at least one element In the stability in Japanese companies may be 
due to a better functional balance and predictability of order Input.
Based on the widely documented experience of Japanese manufacturers, the 
role of production engineers was expected to provide a key factor for 
success 1n standard machines. Yet in both UK and US-owned SBUs, they 
were few in number and their status was closely allied to that of the 
production function as a whole. Their Influence was evident in some 
SBUs which had equipment dedicated to particular operations and linked 
by conveyors and gantries. Only 4 SBUs were using flow-line assembly. 
Most production engineers could outline their Involvement in production 
plannlng/control systems, monitoring machine utilisation, quality 
initiatives and proposals for introducing advanced manufacturing 
technology. But theirs seemed a closed world and only exceptional 
individuals had raised their competence to meet the wider challenge of 
manufacturing systems engineering.
The salient organisational features of SBUs producing standard machines 
were: (a) their clear separation of the three main functions, often 
geographically, and (b) their greater formalisation of horizontal and 
vertical communication channels. Functional Identification among staff 
at all levels was at its strongest. Top managers were more Involved in
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new model Introductions than in other SBUs, mainly because of the 
implications for resource allocation and potential for disruption of 
ongoing operations.
4.234 Producers of both standard machines and customised versions of 
standard machines.
These SBUs pose a set of intrinsically interesting research questions, 
mainly because the "retreat" to customisation has repercussions 
throughout the organisation. For some SBUs, particularly those in the 
low/medium volume range of production, difficulty 1n forecasting the mix 
of orders had caused problems for plant loading and severely tested the 
appropriateness of their service back-up and control systems In the 
changed circumstances. A familiar comment from sales managers was that 
they could estimate with reasonable accuracy how many orders might be 
placed over the next quarter but they had less confidence 1n naming 
which models would sell and how much customisation would be required.
The underlying trend towards customisation was frequently explained away 
by the need for flexibility and a search for added value. The questions 
not properly addressed by executives 1n SBUs primarily geared up to 
manufacture standard machines and drifting Into customisation were : 
flexibility of what kind and at what cost?
Sales executives, 1n particular, had given little thought to defining 
the limits of product/market scope. Selectivity among orders was seldom 
an Issue and most SBUs had succumbed to the temptation to accept any 
orders coming their way. When asked about the effects on production, 
there was good appreciation that long runs of standard machines are 
desirable for stability, yet general resignation that this was 
increasingly remote. Production executives tended to perceive
- 148 -
flexibility 1n terms of workforce tasks or machine utilisation; whereas 
product engineers perceived it as modifications in machine design, 
customisation and new product introductions. Substantial evidence of 
trade-offs between variety in the product range and buying criteria such 
as price, delivery time and spares back-up was found 1n only 8 SBUs 1n 
this category.
Many instances were identified 1n the course of this research where top 
management failed to offer or communicate policy guidance on product 
mix, leaving lower levels of staff or interest groups to make their own 
interpretation of overall direction. Such inconsistencies tended to 
hide the true nature of performance gaps and their existence was usually 
discovered late on. Few had perceived a need to modify their internal 
information systems. This was largely because their costing and 
budgeting procedures were so broadly based that they could accommodate 
changes 1n product mix. Thus the profit contribution of individual 
products and product lines was obscured, resulting 1n inadequate 
monitoring and control.
One example of both inconsistency and lax control, involved a UK 
subsidiary of a US parent company. The managing director was newly 
appointed from outside the industry and later opted to double up as 
sales director. He asserted that company policy was to manufacture and 
sell standard machines from stock and that an exceptional case had to be 
made for customisation. This was later confirmed on visiting the US 
parent company, although some disappointment was expressed by a US 
vice-president about the diminishing scale of UK operations. UK staff 
were well aware that pressure was mounting to improve performance but 
there was lack of unanimity about how this should be brought about and 
little faith in strategies based on 'volume orientation'.
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Product and sales engineers indicated that their priority Increasingly 
lay in customisation, offering the forward order book as evidence of the 
(self-fulfilling) trend and pointing to the Inordinately high stocks of 
standard machines and sub-assemblies which had been allowed to 
accumulate. Production staff appeared to play a passive role in 
decision-making and 1n one year stocks (¿6.4 million) had almost 
equalled annual sales turnover (¿7.9 million). As one senior engineer 
put it: 'Demand for our machines fell away but we kept making them', a 
comment also indicative of his contempt at the demise of the company. 
After three successive years of losses, amounting toi.8 million, the SBU 
pulled out of manufacturing 1n the UK and the sales/service operation 
that remained took two years to run down stocks.
The apparent passivity of production staff noted in the above example Is 
not an Isolated case but it is Insufficient as an explanation of 
behaviour across the 31 SBUs producing both standard machines and 
customised versions of standard machines. Production managers appeared 
quite adept at dealing with variety and uncertainty, though they readily 
conceded that It incurred hidden costs and Involved devotion of a large 
part of their working day to "firefighting". Adverse effects on set-up 
times were the most commonly mentioned penalties of customisation. For 
evidence of firefighting, 1t was necessary to look no further than the 
series of interruptions taking place during n\y interviews In the 
production manager's office. Plant supervisors, sales engineers and 
others were continually seeking assistance for reasons such as progress 
chasing, breakdowns, shortages etc.
Many production managers were aware of the wider commercial issues and 
how they impinged on their job. But glaring Inconsistencies passed 
unchallenged, the pressures and frustrations were absorbed within the
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production activity and seldom felt by top management. The plight of 
these production managers responding to customisation was not helped by 
abdication of responsibility at board level. One production director's 
Idea of participation In declslon-making was captured 1n h1s comment
--- 'they (sales and product engineering) tell me what they want, and I
will make 11 '. And another director who felt that his Ideas and 
criticisms would carry little weight as 'the name of the game 1s 
survival'. Very few executives 1n the manufacturlng/productlon function 
saw product mix decisions as within their domain.
Product engineers emerged as the dominant group because 1t was they who 
Initiated solutions to customer problems (1e 'the essence of 
customisation'). In the same way as sales managers appeared reluctant 
to turn away orders, product engineering managers were pleased to 
customise machines and production managers seldom refused to make them. 
To admit that a particular machine could not be made represented "loss 
of face", resulting In a willingness to Improvise and be "all things to 
all men". In the event of being unable to handle certain parts of an 
order Internally, it was relatively easy to revert to sub-contracting.
4.24 A Top-Down Perspective
4.241 The Influence of top management educatlon/experlence
Consideration of the three types of machine production has shown that 
the status differential between product engineering and the other two 
functions of marketlng/sales and manufacturlng/productlon was the 
greatest In SBUs producing highly customised machines and the least In 
SBUs producing standard machines. Plausible explanations lie mainly 1n 
the perceived value of the expertise of product engineers and their
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Table 10. Formal Higher Education of Heads of SBU
Higher Education $
Graduates (Eng1neer1ng/Sc1ent1f1c) 34
Corporate Membership of a Professional
Engineering Institution via Non-Graduate Entry 26
Professional Qualification (Non-Engineering) 9
None 31
Table 11. Disciplinary Background of Heads of SBU
Discipline *---------
Engineering : Mechanical/Electrical 34
Manufactur1ng/Product1on 23
General Engineering 20
Commercial/Sal es 11
F1nance/Accountl ng 8
Other 5
N=54
TÖÜ
Table 12. Appointment Before Becoming Head of SBU
Heads of SBUs E/T — P7H— — F— Other
Producing : % % % % %
Highly Customised Machines 
(N*9) 11 56 22 11 .
Standard Machines 
(N«14) 21 30 21 14 14
Standard and Customised
Versions of Standard Machines
(N-31) 19 39 26 3 13
All SBUs (N-54) 19 39 24 11 7
Key : M/S = Marketlng/Sales, E/T ■ Eng1neer1ng/Techn1cal (product 
engineering), P/M ■ Product)on/Manufactur1ng, F » Finance
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control over specifications. Although no evidence was uncovered to 
indicate that the high status enjoyed by product engineers was 
reinforced by financial reward, there was widespread acceptance of the 
legitimacy of their position and that it carried prestige. It is now 
necessary to examine whether some of these overt manifestations of 
status and power are reinforced by the earlier education and functional 
background of Heads of SBU. The following observations relate to the 
data in Tables 10, 11 and 12 :
(a) Almost two thirds of Heads were eng1neer1ng/sc1ence graduates or 
held equivalent qualifications accepted for corporate membership 
by the professional engineering Institutions. When asked to 
describe their early career discipline, over half of the Heads 
interviewed named the traditional fields of mechanical or 
electrical engineering.
(b) The career progression of the majority of Heads was through the 
ranks of functional management, with the highest proportion 
appointed from the engineering/technlcal (product engineering) 
function. This data provides further evidence of the ascending 
Importance of product engineering with Increasing levels of 
customisation and suggests that hitherto, product engineering 
experience has offered the "fast track" for career progression 1n 
machine tools.
The most consistent pattern of responses, representing a high 
degree of unanimity at board level, was found among executives 1n 
SBUs producing customised machines. These executives were fairly 
rigid 1n their belief In the value of product engineering 
experience. This compares with responses from 4 SBUs producing
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standard machines 1n which executives showed consistency 1n citing 
marketing as the critical function for the future. Some 
executives 1n this cluster felt that the trend was well underway 
and they cited anecdotal evidence of recent appointments and job 
mobility (from product engineering to marketing) to support their 
views.
(c) Only 3 Heads had received formal education 1n business management 
and all were below the average age of 51 for this group. It 
should be noted that 1n the late 80's the current generation of 
Heads were educated before business/commercial topics appeared as 
an Integral part of the engineering curriculum and when business 
education In the UK was 1n its infancy. A similar situation was 
found among functional directors. Some executives had attended 
self-selected conferences, short courses and training progranmes, 
but their choice tended to be knowledge-based rather than
skills-based and time away from the office was an Important 
determinant of participation. This suggests a critical deficiency 
1n the preparation of functional directors and managers for the 
wider role of general management.
(d) The affinity of Heads towards their previous function created 
difficulties In several SBUs : firstly, because they had failed to 
assume the general management role; and secondly, due to the 
discomfort Imposed on the director taking up the functional 
appointment vacated by the Head. As one engineering director In 
this position put it : 'Sometimes we feel the “most favoured"
department --- most times we resent the Interference'. And from
another director : 'He's doing too much second guessing at the 
moment --- we each telephoned the same customer about the same
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thing last week'. Anecdotal evidence of friction generated by 
this duplication of effort was mainly related to the early 80's, 
when some Heads adopted a centralised, "hands on" approach to 
crisis management.
(e) When Heads were asked what skills they envisaged their SBU would 
require in the future, by far the most common response was that of 
"systems capability". This was not surprising since systems 
integration was one of the major talking points 1n the machine 
tool industry 1n the 1980's. Some executives were merely 
repeating slogans but it was relatively easy to separate out those 
who were seriously pursuing systems capability from those whose 
ambitious rhetoric failed to match the limited resources at their 
disposal and whose views often conflicted with their senior 
colleagues. The most important finding from this question, 
however, was the overwhelming support for systems capability 
perceived as falling largely within the domain of product 
engineering.
4.242 Cross-functional interaction at board level
A useful indirect indication of power relationships may be gained from 
examining the level of day to day contact board members have with the 
various functions. This interaction is captured 1n Table 13 and the 
main observations may be summarised as follows :
(a) Heads of SBU claim the most frequent interaction and 
manufacturing/production directors the least.
(b) Among the functional directors, marketing/sales directors sought
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Table 13. Cross-Functional Interaction at Board Level
What level of day 
functions ?
-to-day contact do you have with the various
V Infrequent Infrequent Regularly Frequent 
(%) (%) (%) (%)
V Frequent 
(t)
Head of SBU with: 
(N«39)
M/S Function 18 35 47
P/M Function - - 16 36 48
E/T Function - - 12 39 49
F Function - 4 21 41 34
M/S Director with: 
(N-32)
Head of SBU 
P/M Function 
E/T Function 
F Function
-
12
8
11
53
29
51
39
25
43
22
50
10
28
19
P/M Director with: 
(N-28)
Head of SBU 4 65 24 7
M/S Function - 10 53 26 11
E/T Function - 5 24 44 27
F Function 4 16 46 24 10
E/T D1rector with: 
(N-33)
Head of SBU 27 31 42
M/S D1rector - 4 34 21 21
P/M D1rector - - 53 22 25
F D1rector 6 22 48 15 10
Key : M/S ■ Marketlng/Sales, E/T * Englneerlng/Technlcal (product 
engineering), P/M ■ Product1on/Manufactur1ng, F * Finance 
Note : Finance Directors were not Interviewed
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greatest Interaction with the Head and manufacturlng/production 
directors least with the Head. The frequency of Interaction with 
the finance function was comparatively low, though some executives 
said that the content of meetings was often more Important than 
frequency.
(c) Overall, the most frequent Interaction on a day to day basis was 
sought with the englneerlng/technlcal (product engineering) 
function. Probing the nature of this contact more deeply revealed 
that board level Interaction was significantly exceeded by 
mlddle/lower management Interaction. Evidence of the latter 1s to 
be found 1n product engineering membership of Important committees 
- a factor which will be pursued later In the context of achieving 
"systems" benefits and when examining the key players 1n 
technology transfer.
4.243 Top Manager's perception of relative status
Heads of SBU and directors responsible for the three main functions were 
asked to comnent on the status of marketing/sales and production/ 
manufacturing relative to the englneerlng/technlcal (product 
engineering) function. Expressing this as an Index In which product 
engineering provided a base line of 100, the results are presented In 
Table 14 for the three types of machine production. The following 
observations on the data are pertinent to the proposition under 
Investigation:
(a) There was a high degree of consistency 1n the responses from Heads 
of SBU 1n their portrayal of equal status across functions. These
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Table 14. Executive's Perceptions of the Overall Status of Marketing/ 
Sales and Productlon/Manufacturlng Relative to the 
Eng1neer1ng/Techn1cal Function for Three Types of Machine 
Production
Function
Mean Status 
Head of SBU
N-39
Ratings* by Senior Executives 
M/S E/T P/M 
Directors Directors Directors 
N=32 N=33 N=28
Customised Machines
E/T Function 100 100 100 100
M/S Function 98
(SD=2.3)
91
(SD-11.3)
89
(SD-5.0)
93
(SD-10.1)
P/M Function 96
(SO*4.2)
89
(SD-9.2)
93
(SD-6.1)
83
(SD-12.2)
Standard Machines:
E/T Function 100 100 100 100
M/S Function 100
(SD*4.1)
98
(SD-7.4)
92
(SD-6.5)
96
(SD-8.1)
P/M Function 98
(SDs3.2)
96
(SD-8.1)
96
(SD-6.1)
90
(SD-10.7)
Standard Machines and Customised Versions of Standard Machines:
E/T Function 100 100 100 100
M/S Function 96
(SD=3.9)
90
(SD-11.1)
92
(SD-5.2)
93
(SD-10.1)
P/M Function 98
(SD*4.2)
92
(SD-9.1)
98
(SD-4.3)
81
(SD-14.2)
* Index based on E/T (Product Engineering) = 100.
Key: M/S = Marketlng/Sales, E/T * Eng1neer1ng/Techn1cal (product 
engineering), P/M = Productlon/Manufacturlng
findings should be Interpreted with caution as It Is difficult to 
know whether they represent true feelings or an attempt to convey 
the "public face" Impression of even-handedness In their approach
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to general management and career development. Functional status 
was found to be a sensitive political issue with some Heads, 
typified by responses such as ....'there Is no obvious fast track
to the top in this company', --- 'we try to avoid favouritism',
and ....'an obvious bias would make it difficult for us to recruit 
and retain good people'. Nevertheless, there is sufficient 
anecdotal evidence and Insights gained during unguarded moments 1n 
the Interviews to speculate that a greater spread of responses 
might have been elicited from Heads had closer research 
relationships developed over time.
(b) Production/manufacturing directors' perceptions of their own
status was markedly lower across all types of machine production. 
The mean score of 81 and wide spread (SD=14.2) for SBUs 
manufacturing both standard and customised machines provided the 
worst case. This changed little over the course of the research 
and may be mainly attributed to the firefighting, low morale and 
social divisions highlighted earlier in this section.
4.25 Resource Allocation
4.251 A confused picture of cross-functional resource allocation
An understanding of the process and outcome of resource allocation 1s 
generally regarded as providing a guide to patterns of power and 
Influence within organisations.
Initially, njy research 1n this area centred on a proposition based on 
the "zero-sum" approach, Involving winners (product engineering?) and
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losers (sales and production?). It then shifted towards cash being 
allocated sequentially to product, process and sales activities. The 
underlying reason for this change 1n proposition, and occasional 
oscillation between the two, was that while most SBUs had committed cash 
to projects at the acceptance stage, subsequent reviews often trimmed 
back original budgets, leaving the later stages severely depleted. Many 
projects were shelved or downscaled during the course of my research, 
suggesting that projects with a life of up to 3 years are extremely 
vulnerable. Thus the timing of project Initiation and commercialisation 
was found to be an Important variable 1n determining cumulative amounts 
of expenditure and how resources are allocated across various 
activities.
Ascertaining even a crude Indication of resource allocation across 
functions was fraught with difficulty. This Is partly because 
statements by executives were often vague or misleading, and partly due 
to Industry surveys and press reports that were Impossible to reconcile 
with the situation as I found 1t. Two examples Illustrate the problem 
facing outsiders attempting to make sensible Interpretations :
(a) One managing director was reported 1n the press as claiming that 
h1s SBU had Invested £700,000 on developing a new model. This was 
clearly Inconsistent with the potential market for the machine 
envisaged by the marketing director and with company payback 
criteria. The reported figure was later explained away as 
'misinterpretation of the word "several" .... the true figure 
being closer to £.400,000'!
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(b) Another managing director had made a public statement via a press 
release that his SBU's expenditure on R4D would be running at over 
4 per cent of sales turnover in the coming year. Closer 
Inspection of historical expenditure on RSD within this SBU 
revealed not only a relatively low level of projected sales but 
also that a moratorium had been imposed on R4D during the previous 
two years. Almost all of the current expenditure could be 
attributed to "defensive" RAD.
There 1s no legal requirement for the disclosure of RAD expenditure 1n 
financial statements and even 1f this were mandatory, 1t would be a poor 
indicator of "technical effort" 1n machine tools. This 1s because 
technical effort 1s spread over research, design, development, 
applications engineering etc., and there are unaccounted inputs from 
component suppliers and customers. Best estimates of technical effort 
were as follows :
(a) Technical effort typically represents about 5-10 per cent of sales 
turnover and Involves 10-15 per cent of employees. These 
proportions could be higher in SBUs producing highly customised 
machines and lower 1n SBUs producing standard general purpose 
machines.
(b) The division of technical effort between product and process only 
emerged as a discussion point 1n 4 SBUs producing highly 
customised machines, 5 SBUs producing standard machines and 11 
producing both standard and customised versions of standard 
machines. The consensus of opinion was that process-related 
activities typically account for up to 25-30 per cent of total 
expenditure on technical effort prior to major product
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Introductions, settling down below 15 per cent under normal 
conditions.
4.252 Product engineering
Most Heads of SBU approached resource allocations to product engineering 
with some trepidation. Projects were becoming more risky for those 
wishing to maintain their position as leaders or fast followers and the 
mix of human and physical resources was changing rapidly. Some changes 
reinforced the existing power structure, while others challenged 1t.
The product engineering function of the 1960's and 70's, for example, 
typically comprised: (a) a handful of key designers Involved 1n 
conceptual and layout work, surrounded by a team of detail draughtsmen, 
and (b) development groups employing specialists working on prototype 
machines, sub-systems and applications. The skills profile of the 
product engineering function of the 1980's shifted on the one hand 
towards specialists In electronics and software, and on the other 
towards multidisciplinary skills associated with computer-aided design 
(CAD) and systems engineering. There are signs of a rising scientific 
and technological elite related to these new skills and a shortage of 
software engineers In the late 1980's led to higher salaries. This 
tended to enhance the standing of product engineering and several 
Instances were recorded of machine tool SBUs "poaching" software 
engineers from each other or losing them to companies outside the 
machine tool Industry where prospects were more attractive. Product 
engineering managers faced the dilemma of whether to Invest 1n training 
and build up an 1n-house team or to seek an alliance with a software
house.
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The adoption of CAD provides a topic worthy of empirical research 1n Its 
own right and 1s beyond the scope of this research. It Is sufficient 
here to note that CAD 1s reshaping communication systems and 
cross-functional behaviour. In both UK and US-owned SBUs it was found 
that CAD was Initially seen as a product engineering Investment and 
attention focussed on localised factors such as building up a design 
database, staff retraining and stemming job losses. At a later stage of 
Implementation, when the benefits of a common CAD/CAM database emerged, 
1t was observed that emphasis switched to production engineers, process 
planners, tooling engineers and others gaining earlier and freer access 
to product information. This trend towards information sharing 
represents gradual erosion of an historical product engineering power 
base.
4.253 Manufacturlng/Productlon
Unlike product engineering, the manufacturlng/productlon function has 
always had to contend with capital Investment appraisal, though there 1s 
continuing debate about the Inadequacies of appraisal methods and what 
criteria constitute successful Implementation. Over 70 per cent of 
Heads said that their manufacturing processes had become more capital 
Intensive over the previous decade. Surprisingly, few Heads reported a 
shortage of funding for the new equipment. During the good years, 
purchases of equipment had been funded out of profits. Invariably, 
these were for stand-alone general purpose equipment to facilitate the 
machining requirements of Individual new model prograirmes rather than as 
part of an Integrated effort to Improve productivity or expand capacity.
When asked about the applicability of advanced manufacturing technology 
to their type and scale of operations, executives frequently cited low
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volume throughput and long payback periods as a powerful argument 
against installing flexible manufacturing cells and 1n favour of general 
purpose equipment. This may be partly attributed to: (a) short-term 
objectives imposed by parent companies on some SBUs, and (b) to the 
difficulty in evaluating Integrative technologies In which the cost of a 
particular Investment may be nominally allocated to one function and the 
benefits emerge 1n other functions and collectively. The last theme 
will be taken up again later in the context of systems benefits.
4.254 Marketing/Sales
The historically low position of marketlng/sales 1n the functional 
pecking order mainly reflects Its Inherent lack of professional skills 
and failure to bring stability to the flow of orders. Accurate 
identification and anticipation of customer requirements, Increasing 
volume and improved order predictability, were recurring aspects of 
internal stability emerging 1n this research as valued by both the 
product engineering and manufacturing/production functions. Some 
marketing directors attempted to convey the Impression of their SBU 
becoming more 'market orientated' or 'responsive to customer needs'. 
These assertions often appeared hollow 1n the light of reluctance to 
allocate resources to market research and poor awareness of 
product/market segmentation and positioning. Under pressure to maintain 
short-term profitability, most SBUs pursued productivity Improvements to 
preserve margins 1n preference to aggressive volume-based strategies 
such as market development and market penetration.
At the extreme ends of the machine tool production continuum (1e highly 
customised machines and standard machines), it was expected that the 
role of marketing and the allocation of resources would be much clearer
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than within those SBUs in the middle. The evidence suggests that 
marketing is vaguely articulated as "conrnercial/sales engineering" 1n 
customised machines and "sales/marketing" 1n standard machines. One SBU 
producing standard machines had separated the role of sales and 
marketing at board level in recognition of the wider and longer term 
responsibilities associated with marketing. This exceptional marketing 
director had earned the respect of his colleagues In sales and brought 
both order and vision to his SBU' s activities. In contrast, sales 
directors in several other SBUs had, over the course of this research, 
changed their job titles to sales/marketing with little evidence of a 
change 1n behaviour or a better appreciation of the need to allocate 
resources to market position. It 1s difficult to envisage the 
market!ng/sales function improving Its Internal status and gaining a 
greater say 1n resource allocation without some form of intervention 
Involving marketing education, training and development.
4.26 The Urgent Need for Strategic Re-0r1entat1on
The foregoing analysis has shown that the ascending status of product 
engineers 1s associated with Increasing levels of customisation and may 
be reinforced by the earlier educatlon/experience of top managers. 
Existence of the functional Imbalance Implied 1n the working proposition 
has, therefore, been established and existing power relationships shown 
to Impede strategic re-or1entat1on in-line with the changing nature of 
international competition in machine tools.
Since the late 1970's, strategic re-orientation has clearly meant a 
shift away from the long-standing emphasis on product engineering-led 
innovation towards a business strategy which embraces the marketing and 
manufacturing dimensions. In this respect, re-orientation is as much
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about raising absolute levels of functional capability as 1t Is about 
reducing status differentials with product engineering. Manufacturers 
of standard general purpose machine tools 1n the UK were among the first 
to feel the full Intensity of Japanese competition and some have 
responded by Implementing strategies which recognise the Importance of 
both marketing and manufacturing capability as key success factors. 
Retreating towards customisation does not provide a safe haven from 
competition. Unwillingness and/or Inability to change, not only 
suggests continuing exclusion from critical sources of competitive 
advantage but also represents a serious threat to survival during the 
next economic downturn.
4.3 SOURCES OF SUSTAINABLE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE
The third working proposition 1s :
Failure to manage Internal relationships (eg the coupling between 
product and process) and external exchange relationships (eg 
interaction with sub-contractors, component suppliers and 
customers) as an Integrated system Involves sacrifice of 
sustainable competitive advantage.
4.31 An Integrative Approach
The traditional stance on product design and manufacturlng/productlon 
process technology Is that the former 1s about achieving product 
differentiation through aesthetics and performance to specification, 
while the latter has tended to focus on output and cost reduction. More 
recently, burgeoning interest 1n computer Integrated manufacture has 
emphasised "systems" benefits In two Important ways: firstly, by 
promoting a stronger coupling between product and process through the 
concept of "design for economic manufacture or makeablUty"; and
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secondly, by widening the debate to Include strategic alliances with 
sub-contractors, component suppliers and customers. This integrative 
approach suggests that exploration of the way machine tool manufacturers 
manage internal and external linkages will reveal the nature of 
competitive advantages and their potential for sustainability.
4.32 The Coupling Between Product and Process
4.321 Modular construction
Modular construction is at the heart of product/process simplification 
and offers potential for the cost-efficient production of both standard 
and highly customised machines. Two disparate examples, extracted from 
the case studies, Illustrate what can be achieved by combining modular 
design with a fundamental re-think of market requirements and 
manufacturing support:
(a) After many years of customising a wide range of machine tools, a 
UK manufacturer, Wadkln, took the bold decision In 1978/79 to 
reverse the trend and focus their efforts on standard CNC 
machining centres, starting with a vertical model Incorporating a 
single bought-1n proprietary control system. Wadkln's challenge 
lay In producing machining centres to a unit cost, which by the 
end of 1983 was clearly a matter of being competitive with the 
leading Japanese Importers who had claimed 53 per cent of all 
machining centres sold 1n the UK.
Wadkln recognised early on that product rationalisation and cost 
cutting exercises eventually reach a threshold beyond which It 1s
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difficult to make worthwhile savings without major redesign.
Their response was the "unit-build" concept, not merely the 
breakdown of an existing machine Into modules but the Integration 
of rigorous testing, simulation and assembly procedures. By 
progressively testing sub-assemblies, Wadkin eliminated lengthy 
fault-finding work on finished machines prior to delivery and 
vastly Improved In-service reliability. Specifically, they 
claimed that assembly lead times had been reduced from 20 weeks to 
20 days and first year warranty costs reduced by a factor of 4.
(b) The US Bodine Corporation 1s an outstanding example of good
practice In the field of automated assembly equipment. It 1s a 
family owned/managed company with licensees 1n the UK and Japan. 
Bodine has excelled 1n the US by combining customer orientation 
with product/market/technology definition. Their distinctive 
competence resides in applications know-how for the high-speed 
(40-50 parts per minute) synchronous assembly of small parts for 
key customers such as Black & Decker, 3M and GM Delco. Access to 
multinational customers 1s an Important competitive advantage 
available to Bodlne's licensees.
Bodlne's technology centres on the manufacture of basic modules to 
achieve an In-line chassis configuration, Itself the result of an 
inward licensing arrangement with AG Russell In 1963. They 
operate a policy of targeting orders to suit their particular type 
of assembly machine but this has not prevented them from moving 
Into flexible assembly systems Involving sophisticated computer 
monitoring and control techniques.
Market focus and modular construction were Important Ingredients leading
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to Internally consistent strategies 1n Wadkin and Bodlne. Such clarity, 
however, was seldom found among the many SBUs Increasingly willing to 
customise standard machines. As Indicated In the discussion under the 
previous proposition, product engineering tends to occupy a pivotal 
position between marketing and production. On the one hand, modular 
construction and Interchangeability of components may be used to justify 
variety 1n the product range; but on the other, this must be supported 
by sustained investment 1n advanced equipment and the appropriate 
managerial control systems to cope with the potential disarray Imposed 
by unpredictability of the order mix.
Modular construction was widely and successfully practised by producers 
of highly customised machines. By shifting some of the responsibility 
for production backwards Into the design activity, significant progress 
had been made in the areas of product and process simplification. 
Evidence was found of standard mechanical modules and to a lesser 
extent, electrical modules or sub-assemblies, facilitating 
Interchangeability and allowing customisation to be put back to the 
later stages of production. Such advantages were measurable 1n terms of 
reduced lead times, stock-holding and work-in-progress; reduced labour 
costs. Inspection and commissionlng times etc. These were, 1n turn, 
translated Into customer benefits 1n the market place as competitive 
price and delivery; and most Importantly, as Improved product 
reliability.
4.322 Value engineering and value analysis
The techniques of value engineering and value analysis Involve cost 
reduction on new and existing machines respectively without loss of 
value to the customer, while simultaneously offering the opportunity to
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achieve a closer coupling between product and process.
Whether machine tool designers consciously build-in value and consider 
the "makeability" of their designs Is not easy to assess In a general 
way. Designers quickly asserted their claim to value engineering as an 
Integral part of their thinking processes at the conceptual design stage 
for new machines. Some machines were originally conceived, and hence 
value-englneered.rnany years prior to the period of investigation, 
thereby constraining product/process Innovation embodied in current 
models. It was noticeable in several machines how Incremental changes 
had led to an assembly of parts with only tenuous visual connection.
This was typically due to the Incorporation of proprietary components 
from different suppliers over the years and the personal Inclination of 
designers making the modifications. Other machines had undergone major 
redesign or were completely new configurations. And yet others were the 
result of value engineering carried out In foreign licensor and parent 
companies.
In SBUs producing highly customised machines and those with low volume 
production, greater weight was attributed to 'up front' value 
engineering than 'ongoing' value analysis. As one senior design 
engineer described the situation In h1s SBU: 'We put more effort into
the end result than Into getting costs down ---  We build the best
machine In the time available'. On receiving the order, priorities were 
discussed at an Internal meeting of all Interested parties, followed by 
an allocation of man-hours to each task to build up a total cost. This 
reduced the risk of cost/t1me over-runs and allowed for contlgencles, 
but gave little Incentive to Improve designs and reduce future costs.
Value analysis of existing machines through redesign, appraising
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bought-in materials and components, and searching for more efficient 
methods of production was found 1n varying degrees 1n most SBUs. It was 
expected, a priori that the Incidence of systematic application of the 
technique would be higher among larger SBUs producing standard machines 
In the med1um/h1gh volume range. This was partly based on the 
assumption that these SBUs employ more production engineers who would 
exploit opportunities to reduce costs over a larger volume. In 
practice, greater Interest 1n value analysis was found 1n larger SBUs 
but implementation was fragmented and tracing the locus of 
responsibility was particularly difficult.
There was little evidence to suggest that producers of standard machines 
were more rigorous In their application and commitment than those 
devoting an increasing proportion of output to customised versions.
The normative element 1n the assumption was acknowledged by executives 
and they were conscious of their shortcomings, yet some kind of Inertial 
phenomenon seemed to prevent them from operationalising Ideas they knew 
to be beneficial. Often this was rationalised, either by turning 
discussion to other Issues which had temporarily diverted their
attention or dismissing value analysis as '---we can't do everything'.
One engineering director, for example, said that formalised approaches 
to value analysis had been a victim of earlier retrenchment and current 
priorities lay In 'working capital reduction through Improvement of lead 
times and stockholding'. Customisation was at an Increasingly high 
level and he regarded costing as 'a nightmare'.
The main triggers for value analysis were price competition on 
particular models or an edict from top management to reduce overall 
costs In response to the recession. Engineers 1n several larger SBUs 
had attended short training courses and this had rekindled enthusiasm
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for value analysis. The formation of multidisciplinary teams was 
claimed by some executives but further investigation often revealed that 
tasks had been delegated to design engineers, production engineers and 
buyers either as part of their functional role or under the auspices of 
a new product committee. Surprisingly, few executives could give 
spontaneous answers to questions relating to the areas offering most 
scope for cost reduction within their control. Minor Improvements such 
as waste reduction, parts consolidation, better use of jigs and 
fixtures, and 'squeezing a better deal from suppliers and 
sub-contractors' were conmon replies. Simplification of work flows, 
leading to the regrouping of machines and the introduction of advanced 
manufacturing technology, seldom emerged as more radical cost-reducing 
strategies.
One of the least publicised aspects of value analysls/engineerlng 1s the 
contribution of "reverse engineering". From 39 useable responses, 
executives in over half the SBUs felt that acquiring and stripping down 
competitor’s machines was prevalent 1n the Industry. Two thirds of 
these said that Japanese and US manufacturers of standard general 
purpose machines were the most active. Only 5 executives in UK-owned 
SBUs admitted doing it and a further 6 said they would like to do it but 
that 1t would be too large an Investment for them. Executives in 4 
US-owned SBUs said that they left reverse engineering to their parent 
company. Most attempts to copy and Improve on competitor's designs were 
based on Information gleaned from leaflets, manuals, trade shows and 
poaching staff. Only two examples of blatant copying were discovered.
4.323 Experience curves
A popular belief in the UK machine tool industry is that the volume
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orientation of Japanese manufactures 1s a major factor underlying their 
success, particularly In standard CNC machines. Exploring attitudes to 
experience curves, therefore, provided an indication of the strategic 
importance attached to unit cost reduction with cumulative volume and a 
useful perspective on the exploitation of competitive advantages 
embodied 1n manufacturing processes. Of the 46 useable responses, 36 
executives (78 per cent) showed more than a passing Interest 1n 
experience curves and 25 (54 per cent) said that they were relevant to 
their operations. The most frequent replies may be paraphrased as: 'We 
know they exist but we do not apply them scientifically' and ....'We 
know we incur losses on the first few machines and soon reach the flat 
portion of the curve'.
Many executives tended to express unit cost reductions for new models 1n 
terms of the number of batches of machines. In one SBU producing high 
volume standard machines, for example, 1t was said that rapid cost 
reductions had been achieved on a new model over the first two batches 
of 50 machines, followed by a flattening out of the cost curve for the 
third and fourth batches. Several executives referred to the effects of 
"learning" on the reduction of hours rather than total "experience", 
with one executive claiming a 50 per cent reduction In assembly time for 
a new CNC model after producing the first 10 machines. Very little 
evidence was found of the classical way of relating percentage unit cost 
reductions to the doubling of cumulative volume.
While some executives had good Intuitive understanding of the benefits 
from tracking unit costs, they had abandoned doing 1t for a range of 
practical reasons:
'I have tried to conduct an historical analysis. We have 
flow-line production and should know. I found no useful data and 
had difficulty 1n determining how overheads had been allocated.
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Prices have been adjusted according to the Industry index. About 
15 to 20 models have common components and this complicated the 
Issue'.
'Our measuring systems are not sophisticated enough to do 1t. I 
know that our 25th machine Is not the same as the first 2 or 3, 
both In cost and features'.
'We know about the phenomenon but have not attempted to measure 
cost reductions. We recently stopped making certain machines
temporarily ---  We normally produce them 1n batches of 20-30,
some to order, some for stock. We ran out of stock and had to 
make a few 1n a corner of the workshop. The costs soared'.
'Experience curves have been considered. The company once said of 
a vertical machine: "We could make 40 per year and the unit costs 
will be so low it won't be true". We sold one machine 1n 18 
months'.
The third comment above is partially indicative of the dislocation 1n 
production processes felt by many SBUs during the recession. 
Unfortunately, product rationalisation programmes, concern for 
break-even volumes and Increasing levels of customisation tended to take 
precedent over longer term views of cost competitiveness and Introduced 
a degree of circularity Into discussions. The fourth comnent Is by no 
means an isolated example of a product engineering-led SBU 1n which the 
sales staff were left to find a market for the machine and production 
staff awaited volume that never materialised.
Cost reduction strategies were pursued with varying degrees of vigour In 
all SBUs. Executives were well aware of volume-related cost behaviour 
1n the case of standard machines but achieving cost leadership was not 
regarded as a realistic possibility. Many executives were content to 
reduce cost differentials to a level where they could 'live with the 
Japanese'. The need to 'design and build to a cost' was equally 
appreciated 1n SBUs willing to customise machines. A major problem 
facing customlsers was that they were Increasingly caught between the 
Inadequacies of their internal systems, particularly costing and 
production control, and the unwillingness of customers to pay premia on
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specials.
4.324 Quality management
Total quality management was declared by most executives to be a top 
priority for the 1980's. This was mainly in response to: (a) heightened 
awareness of competitor's achievements, (b) the demands placed on SBUs 
for better dimensional accuracy and finish due to the rapid diffusion of 
CNC technology, and (c) the need to secure approval to BS 5750 and ISO 
9000. Indeed, all SBUs had Initiated some form of quality Improvement 
programme Involving staff training, the purchase of sophisticated 
equipment and adoption of new procedures.
The most visible commitment was found 1n 3 large SBUs which had created 
separate representation for quality management at board level, though it 
was too early to assess their overall Impact on cultural change. The 
longest serving quality director referred to 'cost re-d1str1but1on' as a 
source of Improvement leading to customer satisfaction. By this he 
meant that cost savings of the order 5-8 per cent of total manufacturing 
cost had been made by virtually eliminating rectification costs Incurred 
during final assembly and commissioning, with some of these savings 
being reinvested 1n "preventative" measures. On the negative side, he 
expressed disappointment with h1s company's consultative process: 'We 
tried quality circles ....but after 12 months or so, they (a team of 
mlddle/junlor managers and shop floor workers) didn't feel they wanted 
to continue, and no-one wanted to pick 1t up'. The precise reason for 
abandoning quality circles In this case 1s unclear. In several other 
cases, Interest 1n quality circles or productivity teams waned over time 
mainly because they became a 'talking shop rather than action 
orientated' due to poor organisation and failure to devolve
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responsibility for problem solving.
Another quality director put forward the view that superior product 
quality had offered a clear competitive advantage to Japanese machine 
tool manufacturers 1n the 1980's, coupled with the assertion that 
differentials would soon be eroded to the point of quality becoming 
almost a "given" on the list of customer buying criteria. This seems a 
plausible prognosis 1n the long term. However, 1t should be noted that 
time scales for catching up may depend as much on complementary changes 
In national supply Infrastructure as on Internal attitudes to quality 
management. As will be shown later, the evolution of a closely knit 
supply Infrastructure 1n Japan facilitated their exploitation of quality 
as a differentiator and gave them significant "first mover" advantages, 
In which they continue to Invest.
Many production managers were proud of their achievements, offering 
documentary evidence of lower defect rates, meeting campaign targets and 
extolling the virtues of operator-inspection procedures. No attempt was 
made to examine auditing procedures and techniques 1n detail, nor to 
track Improved performance over time. It was considered more Important 
to examine: (a) the Internal climate for continuous improvement In 
quality, and (b) how executives perceived these Improvements to enhance 
competitiveness. The overall findings on both counts were somewhat 
disappointing. It must be concluded that for most SBUs, quality Is 
perceived narrowly as compliance to a product specification and largely 
within the domain of the production function. By the end of 1988, 
Institutionalised concepts of total quality management still seemed a 
long way off. On the question of enhancing competitiveness, great 
strides had been made, but it Is difficult to Ignore the fact that the 
ultimate measure of quality should be derived externally from an
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assessment of customer satisfaction, yet few SBUs had the marketing 
capability to carry this out.
4.33 External Relationships
4.331 A model for machine tool manufacturers based on strategic 
alliances
There 1s mounting evidence across a range of engineering and 
manufacturing Industries to suggest that sustainable competitive 
advantages at the heart of "world best-practice" require the formation 
of strategic alliances with sub-contractors, component suppliers and 
customers. Such alliances are claimed to enhance the probability of 
successful implementation of "just-1n-t1me" philosophies, materials 
requirements planning systems and full or partial computer Integrated 
manufacture; all of which rely heavily on well developed internal and 
external infrastructure for their smooth running.
Throughout the 1980's the focus of attention has been the Japanese model 
of quasi-integration typically found 1n the motor vehicle and 
electronics Industries, Involving multi-layers of sub-contractors and 
component suppliers. Powerful manufacturers often hold minority shares 
In their first tier suppliers and tend to prefer long term contracts 
under single sourcing arrangements. High standards of quality and 
reliability are demanded, yet relationships tend to remain In tact 
because of apparent willingness to devote considerable time and effort 
to joint problem-solving. Other features Include pricing linked to 
productivity, mutual disclosure on costing and extensive Information 
sharing at the early stage of product/process design.
Associated with the above model Is a school of thought which advocates
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the partial or full withdrawal from manufacturing operations and 
concentrating on product engineering, procurement, marketing and 
assembly. This approach has already found some support 1n machine tools 
and 1s based on the notion that resources tied up in plant and equipment 
are the least flexible and inhibit strategic adaptation. Amada, for 
example, the leading Japanese producer of metal forming equipment, 1s a 
successful exponent; and among West German producers, Trumpf and 
Scharmannn are showing the way.
The extent of external Interaction 1n the UK machine tool Industry and 
the readiness of manufacturers to embrace various elements of the 
integrative model will now be examined.
4.332 Linkages with sub-contractors
The outward sub-contracting of manufacturing processes 1s a common 
occurrence in machine tools and other engineering industries. 
Simultaneously, some machine tool manufacturers were found to be 
Involved In both outward and Inward sub-contracting, depending on the 
set of skills and facilities at their disposal and levels of capacity 
utilisation. Thus "make or buy" decisions have Important Implications 
for capacity planning and the level of value added by the business.
They also reflect the willingness of executives to allow the separation 
of product design from manufacturing process.
Multiple reasons were cited for wholly or selectively sub-contracting 
manufacturing operations. Most executives claimed the existence of 
policy guidelines (or precedents) encouraging the sub-contracting of 
processes deemed to be uneconomic or disruptive to Internal operations.
In practice, this was either Interpreted tactically, depending on
- 178 -
economic conditions; or strategically as a continuing bought-1n service 
(1e as an effective extension of capacity).
Tactical use of sub-contracting was common during the cyclic upturn of 
1975-79 when 1t relieved bottlenecks; whereas during the downturn of 
1980 onwards, cost was to the fore when machine tool manufacturers and 
sub-contractors had spare capacity. One approach adopted by several 
machine tool manufacturers, which had the sound strategic aim of 
stabilising operations, Involved sub-contract1ng component manufacture 
during the Introduction and decline phases of model life cycles.
Pulling In component manufacture during the growth/maturity phases, 
however, was resented by some sub-contractors and soured relationships. 
In contrast, other machine tool manufacturers were reluctant to delete 
ageing models from the range and often felt It expedient to retain 
component manufacture 1n-house. Production managers admitted that 
continuing to produce declining models was disruptive and pointed to 
similar problems 1n the production of spares and In refurbishing work. 
Hidden costs associated with these activities were tolerated even though 
they could have been partially eliminated by either sub-contracting or 
more efficient use of machining centres. For some SBUs, lucrative 
spares business, together with refurbishing work, provided their main 
source of orders and justification for maintaining the workforce over 
the deepest part of the recession.
Careful consideration of the overall production cycle was evident 1n 
SBUs which had retained 1n-house manufacture of "core" components, 
especially those laid down first, and had sub-contracted less critical 
Items. No clear dichotomy of good/poor practice emerged between 
manufacturers of standard and customised machines, nor was there a 
dlscernable pattern across the various machine types. Judicious make or
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buy decisions appeared to be one aspect of the professional approach to 
production/manufacturlng management adopted by a few outstanding 
Individuals.
Strategic consideration of the make or buy decision was at Its best in 
SBUs in which senior production executives and engineers were 
quality-conscious and had thought through the Implications of building 
machines from the "floor up". The most obvious examples of 
sub-contracting to achieve desired quality were found In willingness to 
use specialists proficient 1n certain operations such as gear cutting, 
precision grinding, sheet metal fabrication, electrical sub-assemblies 
etc. The quality of sub-contracted items was summed up by one Quality 
Director as:
'--- a very variable picture. 80-90 per cent we are comfortable
with, the other 10-20 per cent require attention and take up a lot
of our time ---  Some sub-contractors have good "quality" but
poor "quality management"'.
Later, the executive quoted above gave a seminar presentation at a 
professional institution meeting. In response to questions, he 
recounted the difficulties 1n changing attitudes among existing 
suppliers and sub-contractors and the need for auditing new suppliers as 
a prequallflcatlon procedure. He had been willing to help them achieve 
British Standard 5750 (Quality Systems) but noted that access to their 
plants 'had not been Japanese style'. Several production managers 
reported similar experiences. Rather like the findings on value 
engineering and value analysis, there was an underlying aversion to the 
level of formality and dedication required to "pursue the last grain of 
rice" so widely documented on Japanese companies.
4.333 Linkages with component suppliers
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Many of the points regarding sub-contract1ng apply to bought-1n 
components. Both Involve a set of decisions related to the scale of 
operations and tying up resources. Additionally, there was a desire to 
ensure security of supply and to protect competitive advantages embodied 
In certain components. In CNC machine tools, for example, the critical 
component 1s the control unit, which may constitute up to 40 per cent of 
the total cost of a machine depending on size and degree of 
sophlstication.
Worldwide, there are large machine tool manufacturers who produce their 
own 1n-house CNC systems (eg Cincinnati Mllacron, Giddlngs 4 Lewis, 
Okuma) while others have formed strategic alliances (eg Yamazakl with 
Mitsubishi). In the early 1980's, the majority of machine tool 
manufacturers bought-1n proprietary systems freely available In the 
International supply market from such producers as Fanuc (claiming an 
estimated 60 per cent world share). General Electric, Allen-Bradley and 
Siemens. Others Include Philips, NUM and Anllam, together with a number 
of smaller specialist producers (eg Cybelec and Hurco In press brakes). 
Regretably, no UK-owned controller manufacturer or machine tool 
manufacturer was able to offer a CNC system equivalent to the Fanuc 6 
and GE 2000. Europe's hopes lay with Siemens, while Plessey, GEC and 
others withdrew from the business, having failed to develop a world 
class system. By 1987, GE and Fanuc had formed a joint venture and 
dominated the market. The first major Innovation likely to be launched 
by GE Fanuc will be the Series 16, based on the highly acclaimed RISC 
(reduced Instruction set computer) microprocessor technology.
Competitive systems will find 1t difficult to match this new generation 
of controllers for speed and precision when machining complex 
workpieces.
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Some UK-owned machine tool manufacturers felt bitterly disappointed that 
they have had to rely heavily on Imported systems to keep abreast of 
developments. Indeed, almost all executives had a bad experience of 
control systems to recount, frequently citing reliability as a major 
problem with earlier hard-wired NC systems; and In recent years, late 
deliveries and apparent lack of Interest on the part of suppliers in 
servicing low volume CNC machine tool manufacturers 1n the UK. It 1s 
believed that these perceived shortcomings are partly responsible for 
cautious approaches to single sourcing by manufacturers and also for 
preferences among users for certain controllers. While noting these 
recurring themes 1n the Interviews and their Inhibiting effect on the 
development of long term relationships between manufacturers and 
suppliers, once they had been aired, many valuable Inputs from 
controller suppliers were revealed (eg interfacing, training, 
touch-probing and diagnostic routines) which were much appreciated by 
product engineers.
For machine tool manufacturers, there are penalties for 
non-part1c1pat1on 1n the design and manufacture of CNC systems.
Firstly, dependency on standard controllers means that machines tend to 
be designed around them, sometimes having to Incorporate redundant 
multi-axis capability beyond that required to perform the job 1n hand to 
facilitate future enhancement. This 1s particularly noticeable 1n 
special purpose machines. Secondly, controllers, being based on 
microelectronics, present valuable process opportunities for unit cost 
reduction with cumulative volume. Generally speaking, access to 
low-cost controllers Is a prime requirement for entry and continuing 
presence 1n smaller price-sensitive CNC machines. Hence the success of 
Japanese manufacturers In segments such as small CNC lathes, machining 
centres and electro-discharge machines.
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Purchasing of other components aroused only mild Interest 1n the 
Interviews with executives. Responses centred on price and delivery of 
Items such as bearings, ball-screws, hydraulics, servodrlves etc, giving 
prominence to the leverage gained from volume off-take. Discussion of 
technological Inputs from component suppliers arose 1n the context of 
performance and quality. These criteria were foremost in the purchasing 
of specialised sub-assemblies (eg Indexing units, boring heads) and 
certain foundry items. Few close associations had emerged, possibly 
because the suppliers themselves were often also machine tool 
manufacturers. Some executives seemed more concerned about potential 
leakages of know-how through collaboration than overall benefits. Joint 
applications development 1n tooling, Instrumentation and software had 
made Important contributions to the state-of-the-art but the 
competitive advantages accruing to machine tool manufacturers were 
temporary and lay mainly in early adoption. Most forms of collaboration 
were on a project by project basis rather than resulting In a strategic 
al1iance.
4.334 Linkages with customers
The substantive Issue emerging from examination of relatlonshlps at the 
manufacturer/customer Interface was the dominating Influence of a 
strategic group of customers In the motor Industry. Traditionally, 
these customers have accounted for about one quarter of annual purchases 
by value and they represented the highest proportion (16 per cent) of 
the Installed base of machine tools in the UK.
The Importance of customers 1n motor vehicles and components was 
mentioned by executives In 13 SBUs In this study (1e 28 per cent of 
useable responses). Of these, 9 SBUs highlighted Ford as continually
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pushing for Improvement. The intensity of machine tool manufacturer/ 
customer relationships was found to vary according to the magnitude of 
the investment to the customer, the extent of customisation and the 
stage in the process from specification to coronissloning.
Negotiating machine tool sales or putting contracts out to tender are 
common procedures within the motor vehicle Industry, though much 
interaction may take place before a specification 1s finalised. These 
documents tend to be compiled by engineers and buyers 1n the customer 
company after a thorough survey of current practice or by requesting 
selected machine tool manufacturers to prepare the best solution to a 
particular component machining problem. Many executives Interviewed 
regarded the resulting specification as close to the "state-of-the-art" 
because 1t represented a distillation of what all competitors 1n the 
field are able to offer. This revealed the International nature of 
specifications and preferences in the motor Industry. Some executives 
claimed that they could detect the Influence of certain competitors and 
centres of automotive engineering (eg Cologne, Detroit, Dagenham).
Motor industry engineers frequently visited machine tool manufacturers 
to monitor progress, especially at stages requiring the sanctioning of 
part-payments. One executive said that customer's engineers were
---'almost living on the premises’ and wanted to Involve themselves 'to
an absurd level' during proving runs prior to commissioning. He 
recalled with a combination of embarrassment and frustration, an 
instance when a grinding machine had not received Initial approval 
because the cycle time was 3 second out on specification. Another 
executive felt that customer's engineers and buyers were Judging his SBU 
not only on machine performance to specification, but also on their 
'standard of housekeeping'. This last point seems to have been
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overlooked by all but a few enlightened executives familiar with vendor 
rating schemes. Even 1f such schemes are not formalised, the 
psychological effect of poorly organised plants, ageing equipment and 
Inadequate control procedures, 1s often sufficient to ensure early 
exclusion from certain contracts. The best awareness of the commercial 
Implications of deteriorating facilities was found among staff In the 
sales function. Many sales engineers felt that it placed them at a 
competitive disadvantage against Importers - on the premise that having 
no manufacturing facility to show customers 1s often better than having 
a poor one. The lesson to be learnt 1s that discerning customers are as 
much Interested in the processes of machine tool manufacturers as their 
products.
From the foregoing comments 1t 1s clear that motor vehicle companies, 
either in direct contact with machine tool manufacturers or Indirectly 
through their component suppliers, are responsible for user-initiated 
innovation. Two outstanding Initiatives from General Motors, for 
example, are: the Introduction of programmable logic controllers 1n the 
early 1970's and Manufacturing Automation Protocol (MAP) to achieve 
networking compatibility, announced In 1982. These reflect General 
Motors' desire to set de facto standards in the Industry, backed up by 
their Immense purchasing power.
While 1t Is encouraging to note that machine tool manufacturers 1n the 
UK have been willing and able to respond to such customers In the past, 
1t 1s likely that In future, much closer "collaboration" will be 
necessary to deal with higher levels of Interdependence and to receive 
early warnings of Impending technological change. One major national 
competitive disadvantage for UK machine tool manufacturers 1n this 
respect Is the absence of significant captive user experience along the
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lines of Toyota and Its machine tool subsidiary, Toyoda; Flat and Comau; 
Renault and Acma-Cr1bier. This 1s disappointing because Intra-group 
user experience was one of the factors underlying the early success of 
the UK machine tool Industry.
Outside the concentrated grouping of customers In the motor vehicle 
Industry, only aerospace companies such as British Aerospace, Rolls 
Royce and several other top engineering companies were perceived by 
executives 1n machine tool manufacturers as ’moving them forward 
technically'. The majority of customers were said to be widely 
scattered and these have borne the brunt of allegations of conservatism.
4.34 The Reality of "Catch1ng-Up" Strategies
While most executives were found to accept the notion of an Integrative 
model, it Is clear from the foregoing analysis that progress has been 
slow and fragmented. The reasons for this laggardly approach were not 
readily apparent during the exploratory phase of research and 1t was 
coincidental that the working proposition was framed 1n a way which 
artificially separated Internal and external linkages for the purpose of 
analysis. It was only later that this separation suggested a two-stage 
process of "catching-up" behaviour In which all SBUs tended to tackle 
deficiencies 1n their Internal systems first and only a few moved on to 
encourage external linkages Implied 1n the second part of the working 
proposition.
It was not, of course, surprising to find emphasis on Internal systems. 
These are within the control of executives and 1t was relatively easy to 
Identify real progress 1n such areas as modular construction, cost 
containment and quality. The main problem with these Improvements,
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however, was: (a) the preoccupation with technical performance, and (b) 
that In terms of competitive advantage, such Improvements were either 
ephemeral or merely provided a minimum requirement for continuing 
presence In various segments of the machine tool market. It 1s 
difficult to envisage SBUs closing the gap on tenacious international 
competitors without recourse to a more systematic approach.
The greatest scope for catching up and exploiting opportunities for 
sustainable competitive advantage Is evident 1n the external exchange 
relationships and strategic alliances stated 1n the second part of the 
proposition. External linkages were found to be Important because 
maintaining close relationships with customers 1s an effective barrier 
to entry against foreign Imports and machine tool manufacturers are 
becoming Increasingly dependent on suppliers of proprietary components. 
Yet few machine tool manufacturers In the UK enjoy the level of customer 
loyalty in their home market as found 1n other Industries and "arms 
length" relationships with suppliers are preferred. Selection of 
suppliers, for example, continues to be based largely on price/quality 
criteria. As one chairman of an SBU manufacturing standard machines put 
it: 'We are not close enough to them (suppliers). Perhaps what we 
should be doing 1s guaranteeing them levels of business 1n return for 
other Inputs'. Significantly, he made this comment during an Interview 
Immediately after returning from h1s first visit to Japan.
The same ideology pervaded Alfred Herbert In the 1950's and 60's. Even 
though they occupied a powerful position In the Industry, they were 
plagued with quality and delivery problems among their suppliers and 
sub-contractors, and never achieved the benefits known to accrue to 
benchmark companies outside the Industry such as Marks S Spencer In 
retailing and IBM 1n computer systems. Investments by Japanese
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companies 1n machine tool manufacturing operations 1n Europe are already 
showing that some of the distinctive features of the Integrative model 
are transferable, as they strive to meet stipulated levels of local 
content and replicate their manufacturing systems.
The working proposition 1s, therefore, accepted, with the following 
observations:
(a) The problems of approaching world best-practice 1n machine tools 
are primarily managerial rather than technological.
(b) Greater appreciation 1s necessary of how technical success can 
contribute to commercial success. This requires senior executives 
to transcend the narrow functional or "product" perspective to 
gain a total picture of their business.
4.4 ORGANISATIONAL BARRIERS TO THE TRANSFER AND ASSIMILATION OF 
FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY
The fourth working proposition Is:
Current organisation structures 1n machine tool manufacturing SBUs 
present a barrier to the Inward transfer and assimilation of 
foreign technology.
4.41 Organisational Design Issues
With few exceptions, organisation structures 1n UK-owned SBUs have 
evolved primarily to handle Internally generated technology; and In 
US-owned SBUs, to accommodate a blend of their own technology and that
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from their parent company. Irrespective of ownership, however, the 
predominant structure Identified in machine tool manufacturing SBUs was 
that of functional specialisation. Depending mainly on size, SBUs were 
headed up by a chief executive or managing director with a board of 
directors carrying responsibility for the key functions, or a divisional 
director supported by functional managers. Given this functional 
differentiation, three organisational design Issues stand out as 
Important 1n Investigating the inward transfer and assimilation of 
foreign technology:
(a) the need for organisational Integration 1n the light of rapidly 
changing requirements for Information processing and coordination;
(b) the persistent problem of how to Introduce new technology while 
managing ongoing operations (ie "innovation versus efficiency");
(c) the mechanism by which foreign technology enters the organisation, 
with particular reference to the key players In the transfer 
process.
Although the literature on strategy/structure, Integration/ 
differentiation, organic/mechanlstic structures etc provided a useful 
background for research, Important gaps were found 1n the theoretical 
and empirical underpinning of organisational design and the process of 
Implementation:
(a) little guidance 1s available on managing the Introduction of new 
technology, especially during a period of contraction;
(b) there has been an historical tendency for strategy formulation and
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implementation to be considered sequentially, with minimal regard 
for continuity and feedback;
(c) simplistic conceptualisations often Ignore the role of middle 
managers and the pervasive influence of political behaviour 1n 
accounting for divergence between Intended (1e planned) change and 
what 1s actually realised.
4.42 Organisational Integration : Prescriptions and Practice
Organisational integration carries the connotation of both a process and 
an outcome. Consideration of integration as a process 1s dlscernable in 
SBUs which have actively sought synergistic benefits from the 
cross-fertilisation of Ideas and experiences through using formal 
integrative devices and encouraging Informal interaction. Emphasis on 
integration as an outcome or condition is tied up with the notion of 
"internal consistency" and 1s characterised by an advanced stage of 
functional interdependence (1e the realisation of systems benefits, with 
the SBU recognised as the legitimate organisational unit representing 
collective Interests).
Higher orders of Integration may, of course, be desirable at the 
corporate/SBU level but these are not considered 1n the present 
analysis. Thus pertinent questions for senior executives in machine 
tool manufacturing SBUs are: (a) how much integration is desirable and 
possible, and over what time period, (b) 1s the self-interest so deeply 
rooted 1n social divisions and political power bases likely to result 1n 
rejection of greater interdependence, and (c) what is the probability of 
successfully promoting Integration through the Head of SBU or via the 
intervention of an external agent in the field of organisation
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development?
Consideration of these questions 1s not helped by statements from 
opinion leaders and reference groups with vested Interests 1n technical 
consultancy and the sale of related capital equipment. The following 
three perspectives extracted from the research are relevant to the 
confusing, and often acrimonious, debate:
(a) The most radical approaches are advocated by management
consultants and computer systems suppliers. Prominent among 
consultants In the field of factory automation Is Ingersoll 
Engineers, whose high profile polemical style has stimulated 
awareness of the need for a "total business" response to wealth 
creation and competitiveness. Unfortunately, their repeated 
criticism of UK manufacturing practices has also had negative side 
effects. Evidence from this study suggests that some of 
Ingersoll's more important messages may be losing Impact on an 
Increasingly saturated audience and they may have inadvertantly 
alienated themselves from large sections of industry, especially 
the machine tool manufacturers themselves. Part of the problem 
would seem to be of their own making, but this cannot be easily 
separated from two related Issues: firstly, up to 1988 Ingersoll's 
US parent company was Involved In machine tool manufacture; and 
secondly, the 1980's saw waves of enthusiasm and scepticism 
concerning the likely pay-offs from computerisation In office and 
factory automation.
Ingersoll, to their credit, have never been associated with 
"technological fix" solutions and can probably claim greater 
concern for human factors than computer systems suppliers, who
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frequently seem preoccupied with information flows and leave the 
onus for organisation design with their customers.
(b) The larger machine tool manufacturers, as both suppliers and 
potential users of advanced manufacturing systems, have found 
themselves occupying the middle ground. Their promotional effort 
has largely centred on 'step-by-step' or modular aproaches, In an 
attempt to play down some of the wilder claims for computer 
Integrated manufacture. Machine tool manufacturers were found to 
recognise that the bulk of their medium/long term business will 
comprise stand-alone machines and small scale flexible 
manufacturing cells. Though they have a keen eye on computer 
integration and the Implications for information flows, they tend 
to equate integration with machine system compatability (1e 
technical change) rather than organisation structure (1e socio­
political change).
(c) Proponents of continuous or Incremental change were found In large 
numbers in the majority of SBUs studied. Executives 1n these SBUs 
were well aware of external calls that functional structures are 
anachronistic but notions of a "grand plan" for re-organisation 
were viewed with suspicion and often perceived to be 'platitudes', 
'a passing fad' or ....'to hide ulterior motives'.
There are Inherent dangers 1n the generalisation that nothing less than 
radical Interventions are necessary or that incrementalism 1s 
sufficient. Different SBUs operate in different segments of the machine 
tool market and each SBU 1s at a different stage of readiness to change. 
Executives In all but the most laggardly SBUs were aware of the need for 
organisational adjustments of some kind and the general direction these
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should take. Greater flexibility, responsiveness, adaptability and 
Integration were repeatedly espoused as desirable attributes for the 
future. Nevertheless, when executives were asked about the magnitude of 
the strategic problems facing them and the time frame for action, 
'short-term survival' was Invariably stated as their main aim, with the 
corollary of minimum cost and disruption. Thus 1t was not surprising to 
find that: (a) organisation structures proved remarkably resilient 
during economic recession and throughout the 1980's, and (b) executives 
were satisfied with downscaling operations, while simultaneously 
attempting to modify individual group roles (1e settling for "first 
order" change). In short, executives possess only two of the three main 
Ingredients of the so-called "change equation": dissatisfaction with the 
present and a vision of the future. Few could extricate themselves from 
the short-term pressures to articulate the third Ingredient - a 
comprehensive and practical action plan.
4.43 The Complementary Nature of Differentiation and Integration and 
the Role of Middle Managers
Executives exhibited varying perceptions of the need for Integration 1n 
their SBUs. One proposition to which I continually returned throughout 
this research was that: the need for Integration recedes along the 
strategy continuum from leader to fast follower and late follower. The 
reasoning behind this proposition seemed obvious Initially and Is well 
grounded 1n the literature, but became progressively more complex as 
various Interactions were explored. SBUs close to the frontier of 
technology tend to be product-driven and employ more specialists, 
leading to a higher degree of functional differentiation. Further, 1t 
is widely accepted that functional groups are differentiated by their 
general outlook, educational background, priorities and time scales of 
their members; and that the mutually reinforcing effect of
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specialisation and organisation structure makes such differentiation 
highly visible. In contrast, 1n follower SBUs, where product 
specifications are clearly defined and they can focus on the leader, the 
need for Integration may be less pressing and functional differentiation 
less visible.
Integration, It was assumed, would be equally amenable to observation 
and that a qualitative picture could be built up of coinin'tment to 
integration by probing the Incidence and membership of new product 
comnlttees and problem-centred task forces, the 'handing over' of work 
at functional Interfaces, etc. Unfortunately, while 1t was possible to 
discern a receding pattern of differentiation along the continuum, 
Identification of the extent of complementary Integration was much more 
problematic. This approach proved fruitful in Identifying localised 
technical benefits, but the nature of wider organisational benefits was 
often obscured by internal turbulence among the ranks of middle 
managers.
During the first round of Interviews with senior executives, 1t appeared 
that certain highly differentiated leaders had encouraged the use of 
Integrative devices no more rigorously than found 1n many 
Iess-d1fferent1ated followers. This anomaly preoccupied my thinking for 
a considerable time and 1t was not until Informal discussions had been 
held with middle managers and lower level staff that tentative 
explanations began to emerge. Leaving aside the massive redundancies 
and their effect on morale, middle managers appeared to absorb the full 
brunt of rationalisation. Some emerged overloaded, having found their 
new roles enlarged and/or unclear; and In several SBUs, contraction had 
meant the removal of a complete layer of management. This precipitated 
high levels of Insecurity among these managers, often exacerbated by the
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growing threat from computerisation to their traditional role as 
"information brokers" and integrators. Two observations relating to the 
information processing role of middle managers and their discretion for 
self-initiated action are relevant in the context of strategy 
implementation :
(a) Leaders and fast followers were installing office and
factory-based information technology at a faster rate them other 
SBUs. These developments were gradually displacing routine 
administrative aspects of middle manager's work but there was 
little evidence that they had devoted more time to work of higher 
priority. Indeed, life had become more frenetic. Much of the 
congenial face to face contact accompanying routine tasks was 
replaced by contact under conditions of increasing conflict, as 
typified by production managers "firefighting" to accommodate 
fluctuations in throughput and higher levels of customisation.
(b) Some middle managers described how they had experimented with
integrative devices and, to a lesser extent, liaison roles; but 
staff reductions during recession had taken up the "organisational 
slack" and allowed teamwork to fall into neglect. Problems which 
might have almost automatically resulted in the formation of ad 
hoc cross-functional teams in better times were frequently being 
tackled by one person on a part-time basis with minimal resources.
Different interpretations of the meaning of integration were noted with 
position in the hierarchy and functional location. Heads of SBU 
emphasised broad communication issues and many regurgitated slogans 
associated with computer integrated manufacture, whereas functional 
directors and middle managers were more concerned with narrower
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operational aspects of coordination and control, often preferring to 
talk about flexibility more than integration. Further generalisations 
across the main functions should be treated with caution. While there 
is evidence to suggest that product engineers saw themselves at the 
centre of Integrative activities, and sales and production staff as 
making their separate inputs, positive responses to this line of 
questioning tended to be skewed towards larger SBUs among the leaders 
and fast followers, especially those involved In customisation. Passive 
or nil responses were common among late followers and smaller SBUs, 
where it was often impossible to pursue a sensible discussion on 
Integration.
On two issues, however, there was unanimity: (a) middle managers are 
relied upon to Implement change, and (b) project management 1s the most 
popular way of handling technological change. Middle managers in 
leader and fast follower SBUs were highly project-orientated and 1t was 
here that new product Introductions and contracts for complex machines 
provided the focus for integration. Further along the continuum, among 
the late followers and laggards, discrete projects were numerous but 
less visible, because technology was applied 1n a tactical way to update 
ageing product ranges or support customisation.
The main conclusion from this part of the research is that: (a) much of 
what had been achieved 1n the way of integration hinged on initiatives 
taken by middle managers, and (b) their style of communication, 
participation and negotiation provided a major Influence on "realised" 
strategy. Further, 1t was clear from discussions with middle managers 
that inward transfers of foreign technology, whether from parent 
companies or licensors, were treated In a similar way to Internally 
generated technology. Most SBUs forced foreign technology into their
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existing structures and procedures by setting up a project, largely on 
the premise that the introduction of any new technology is disruptive 
and exhibits peaks of activity. The critical difference eluding many 
senior executives was that while discrete projects have well defined 
beginning and end points, the inward transfer and assimilation of 
foreign technology develops into an ongoing relationship requiring 
boundary-spanning roles. SBUs with earlier learning in technology 
transfer catered for these roles in the design of their formal 
structures, whereas newcomers to technology transfer tended to proceed 
on a trial and error basis.
4.44 A "Funnel" Model of Inward Technology Transfer
Widespred adoption of functional organisation structures 1n 
product-driven machine tool manufacturing SBUs has led me to propose the 
three-stage "funnel" model of Inward technology transfer and 
assimilation shown 1n Figure 2. The model is based on the transfer 
process in 17 US-owned SBUs and 27 UK-owned SBUs. Its significance will 
be apparent in the discussion under the present working proposition 
regarding the suitability of functional organisation structures, and 
further unfold under the next two working propositions on the evaluation 
of technology packages and the relative merits of various modes of 
transfer.
The first stage is consistent with models of strategic problem 
formulation, whereby product engineering considerations were found to 
strongly Influence the definition of technological gaps and how they 
might be closed. This is not to suggest that Inputs from other 
functions are excluded at this stage. Participation 1s a matter of 
degree. From cumulative analysis over the previous three sections it is
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clear that the Inward transfer process is far from neutral and 
"funnelling" is likely to be accompanied by substantial "filtering" of 
incoming information, with the product engineering function providing 
the main entry point. Moreover, 1t 1s likely that combined funnelling/ 
filtering will be a feature of all modes of Inward transfer, and more 
Intense among leaders and those exhibiting high levels of customisation.
The second stage involves increasing participation by other functions 
and its overlap with the first stage will be mainly dependent on when a 
formal project 1s set up and who is appointed to manage it. It Is 
generally agreed that early formation of a project team, preferably a 
multifunctional team, encourages commitment and the interchange of 
Information. Since project leaders or co-ordinators are normally 
seconded from the ranks of middle managers, however, the extent to which 
they represent continuity of existing values within SBUs, especially 
reinforcement of functional bias towards product engineering, may be a 
limiting factor on receptivity to Incoming technology and on Information 
dissemination. Other contingencies affecting assimilation at this stage 
include: (a) amenability of the technology to codification, (b) 
compatibility of supplier/rec1p1ent operating systems, and (c) 
capability of the recipient 1n adapting the technology at various 
receiving points within the SBU. The last point is related to the 
"critical mass" of skills and capital Investment made available.
The third and final stage centres on the ongoing nature of supplier/ 
recipient relationships after the bulk of the technology has been 
transferred. Some technologies are concise and the project may be wound 
up when the recipient achieves an agreed level of commercialisation. 
Other technologies require a long umbilical cord between supplier and 
recipient. Individual transfer projects are embedded in a wider network
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of formal and Informal relationships in which ownership, control and the 
aspirations of senior executives play a prominent part. Formal ties 
between parent/subsidiary may be quite different from those between 
joint venture partners and independent 1icensors/1icensees.
Nevertheless, whether relationships turn out to be close or arms-length, 
transitory or open-ended, may ultimately depend on perceptions of the 
value of continuing relationships among senior executives and their 
willingness to nurture human contact.
Superimposed on all three stages of the proposed model are boundary- 
spanning roles. Some roles may be formally designated, while others may 
be called informal "gatekeeping" roles, emerging over time to make up 
for inadequacies in the formal system. Identifying and characterising 
gatekeeping roles was relatively easy 1n the case of long standing 
parent/subsidiary and llcensor/licensee relationships compared with 
recent inward licensing arrangements. By probing well developed 
networks of relationships In which power bases had stabilised, 1t was 
possible to rapidly converge on incumbents of the gatekeeping role. In 
contrast, recent transactions were still in the early project stage 
and Informal relationships tended to be In a state of flux. Thus 1t was 
necessary to split up the various transactions Into subsets of 17 
Intra-company transfers between parent and subsidiary, 14 inward 
licences signed prior to 1980 and 17 inward licences signed after 1980. 
The following observations provide Insights Into the nature of 
gatekeeping behaviour in relation to position on the strategy continuum 
of leaders, fast followers and late followers:
(a) Heads of SBU were key individuals 1n facilitating the Inward flow 
of technology through both formal and Informal channels. Together 
with engineering directors, they played a prominent gatekeeping
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role In leader and fast-follower SBUs and handled proportionally 
more of the international communication than their counterparts 
among the late followers. This Is consistent with earlier 
findings that Heads 1n leader SBUs were thoroughly Immersed 1n 
product engineering Issues and often travelled overseas 
accompanied by their technical directors.
(b) Middle/lower level gatekeepers emerged In leader and fast follower 
SBUs to handle technical complexity and they were mainly located 
In the product engineering function. These people were 
particularly important 1n the transfer of product applications 
know-how in technological segments such as special purpose 
machines, automated assembly equipment and robotics. Product 
engineering gatekeepers were observed 1n both US and UK-owned SBUs 
but in the former there were often other gatekeepers in the sales 
and production functions. The question of whether this is related 
to the enduring relationships said to be associated with parent/ 
subsidiary ownership will be addressed in a later section.
(c) There was prlma facie evidence to suggest that Informal 
gatekeepers were not Important 1n the transfer of mature and 
well-codified technology. Formal administrative channels appeared 
to be adequate In most cases and recipients able to assimilate the 
technology. Codification, however, has ramifications which are 
often overlooked. It not only Includes drawings, manuals, 
computer software and other essential documentation, but also 
"embodied know-how" 1n the form of imported components, kits, etc. 
This on the one hand obviates the need for gatekeepers by easing 
assimilation, especially during start-up. On the other, there Is
a tendency for product-driven SBUs to opt for only those elements
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1n the technology package which are easily codified (eg product 
technology) and to Ignore or Improvise on less cod1fiable elements 
(eg manufacturing process know-how).
(d) The highest Incidence of middle/lower level gatekeepers was
expected to be found 1n SBUs positioned along the middle portion 
of the leader/follower continuum. Unfortunately, many of these 
SBUs exhibited high levels of turbulence and lack of continuity, 
making it somewhat easier to locate gatekeepers than to assess the 
quality of their contribution. Certain gatekeepers Interviewed 
early 1n the research, for example, had left the SBU by the time 
of my next visit. Some had departed of their own accord and 
others were declared redundant, yet senior executives were 
frequently unaware of the voids left behind 1n the Informal 
communication system. This in Itself Is a valuable finding for 
organisational design but 1t precludes the kind of neat 
sodo-metric mapping associated with some of the earlier research 
conducted In organisations during times of greater Internal 
stabllty. Indeed, It is difficult to see how some of the 
contingency school of researchers have reached such positive 
conclusions about the direction of causality 1n strategy, 
structure and peformance, especially where their findings are 
based on static cross-sectional studies.
The validity of the "funnel" model of inward technology transfer hinges 
on the dominance of product engineering in functional organisation 
structures and the hitherto sequential nature of strategy formulation 
and Implementation. I have since observed these two conditions In other 
product-driven engineering companies and the model may well have wider 
external validity. Nevertheless, the model emerged Inductively from the
research and further refinement and testing would require the collection 
and analysis of new data. An obvious starting point would be to conduct 
an 1n-depth analysis of the background and behaviour of Informal 
gatekeepers, a<med at answering such questions as: (a) what are their 
personal characteristics, (b) what other boundary-spanning roles do they 
perform complementary to the Inward transfer of foreign technology; (c) 
what Improvements might result from suitable training and from job 
rotation, and (d) should these roles be designed into the formal system?
4.45 Robustness of the Funnel Model
The origins of the proposed funnel model may be traced through periods 
of relative stability during economic upturn and Increasing turbulence 
during prolonged economic recession. Since recession trlggerd a burst 
of activity in the Inward transfer of technology, 1t 1s worth briefly 
analysing in general whether the extreme case of "crisis" suggests any 
modifications to the model. An Interesting proposition, for example, 
might be that formal organisation structures are irrelevant In times of 
crisis and therefore do not present a barrier to Inward technology 
transfer and assimilation. The following observations relate to this 
proposition:
(a) There 1s substantial evidence in the literature and from this 
research to support the view that an Impending crisis allows 
turnaround decisions to be carried through by senior executives 
which would be considered unpalatable or totally rejected at other 
times.
(b) Executives were observed to be making decisions under personal 
stress, relying on judgement with less consultation, minimal
- 203 -
supporting Information and 1n a much-reduced time scale. In 
earlier sections, examples were given of unprecedented 
rationalisation, Introducing new technology and signing licence 
agreements 1n situations where the external threat to survival was 
sufficient to allow these decisions to pass virtually 
unchallenged.
(c) Crisis Is a temporary phenomenon. Resistance to change and 
self-interest rooted 1n traditional power bases was suspended 
during crisis and turnaround, but soon returned when the Initial 
pain of recession had passed and stability was 1n sight. Again, 
although "second order" cultural change may have been desirable, 
only "first order" change was actually achieved.
The Implications for the funnel model of inward transfer and assimilation 
are clear. Rationalisation and staff redundancies tend to be one-off 
decisions, albeit far-reaching, whereas the Introduction of new 
technology has to span the full period from Initial decision to 
go-ahead, through to commercialisation and on an ongoing basis 
thereafter. It Is here that the recurring problems of sequential 
separation of strategy formulation from Implementation are to the fore, 
suggesting that: (a) stage 1 of the model, Involving the Initial 
decision and "transfer" of foreign technology, 1s most affected by 
crisis, and (b) stages 2 and 3 which encompass "assimilation", are least 
affected. With reference to the proposition, It would seem that the 
Influence of organisation structure 1s relaxed, rather than Irrelevant, 
under crisis conditions. In reacting to short-term threats, senior 
executives and middle managers seldom change the behaviour of a 
Hfe-tlme.
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The position of middle managers 1n the hierarchy and their functional 
location emerged 1n this research as a critical determinant of 
Information processing efficiency at key points along the locus of 
innovation and technology transfer. Lack of attention to the burden 
placed on these managers impeded cross-functional Initiatives as 
organisational slack was taken up, decisions were forced upwards and 
many managers retreated to the technical aspects of their functional 
specialisation. This regressive behaviour accentuated Inherent biasses 
1n the prevailing internal power structure over the period when SBUs 
were at their most vulnerable and some were struggling to assimilate 
foreign technology.
Further research would require consideration of the opposing forces for 
centralisation and delegation of decision-making affecting middle 
managers. Their Importance was underestimated at the outset of this 
research and, consequently, some of the subtle hierarchical and 
cross-functional linkages may have been missed. Middle managers are an 
obvious target for management development, such as team-building, but 1t 
would be foolish to pretend that successful Interventions are possible 
without first ensuring: (a) deeper understanding of human resource 
issues on the part of senior executives, (b) offering positive guidance 
on the direction and timescales for change, and (c) assurances that 
raised expectations can be met.
4.46 Penalties Associated with the Funnel Model
The fourth working proposition that current organisation structures 
provide a barrier to the Inward transfer and assimilation of foreign 
technology is tentatively accepted. My reservations on full acceptance 
relate to lingering doubts surrounding the operationalisation of this
- 205 -
proposition, mainly due to the problem of characterising behaviour 
during such a period of Intense change. Some comfort 1s sought In the 
fact that such eminent researchers as Lawrence & Lorsch and Burns A 
Stalker encountered similar methodological difficulties under less 
turbulent conditions!
On the positive side, there Is evidence to show that rigid adherence to 
functional structures and failure to promote adequate levels of 
Integration 1n machine tool manufacturing SBUs has allowed 
discontinuities at functional Interfaces and Inhibited organisational 
learning. Given the imbalance 1n Internal power relationships in favour 
of product engineering embodied in the funnel model, the dangers cannot 
be Ignored:
(a) Internal product engineering capability may become uncoupled from 
market need and/or out of line with external reality;
(b) packages of foreign technology may be sought and evaluated on 
their product-related elements and not on total benefits;
(c) product engineers may dominate formal and informal channels for 
technology transfer to such and extent that non-product elements 
are filtered out.
4.5 UNPACKAGING INWARD LICENCE AGREEMENTS
The fifth working proposition Is:
Major benefits are likely to accrue to licensees who "unpackage" 
agreements when evaluating the technology on offer from foreign 
licensors.
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4.51 The Process of "Unpackaging"
Technology 1s normally licensed In the form of a "package" or "bundle" 
of tangible and Intangible benefits and attributes. Conversely, 
"unpackaging", as recommended in most guidelines on Inward technology 
transfer, 1s based on a systematic approach to evaluating the content of 
licence agreements. Emphasis 1s placed on separating out those elements 
which are associated with start-up and occur once (eg search costs, 
adaptation of documentation, Initial training, purchases of capital 
equipment, down-payments) from other ongoing transfers (eg tied imports 
of Intermediate components and materials, updated know-how) and deferred 
payments based on sales (eg royalties on Intellectual property rights). 
Hence use of the word "accrue" In the framing of this working 
proposition In recognition of the dynamic and cumulative nature of 
technology transfer over time.
Consideration of the Incremental contribution of each element 1n the 
package might be expected to give tactical advantages during negotiation 
and clarify the nature of long term commitment Inherent 1n agreements.
By raising these issues In turn with UK licensees and selected US 
licensors, 1t was possible to assess policy and attitudes towards 
unpackaging 1n such areas as core/per1pheral technology, product/process 
technology, the form of payments, division of markets, etc.
Particularly relevant In this respect was the need to explore: (a) 
whether licensees attempted to maximise or optimise perceived benefits 
while minimising costs, and (b) the existence of some rank order of 
preference for various elements of the package and sensitivity to 
trade-offs.
4.52 To What Extent Does Licensing Resemble "Systems Selling"?
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For foreign machine tool licensors to adopt some of the 
customer-orientated principles of systems selling they would have to be 
willing to tailor their technology packages to meet the requirements of 
Individual licensees.
Notions of licensors rigidly Imposing their perception of what 1s 
required for successful transfer on prospective licensees, perhaps 
compelling them to pay for elements they do not need, are deeply rooted 
in the literature on technology transfer from Western countries to 
developing countries and, to a lesser extent, underlying the kind of 
negative feelings alluded to earlier. Abuses of power are not unknown 
In machine tools but only a small minority of UK licensees accused their 
foreign licensors of employing arrogant "we know best" approaches and 
showing little sensitivity to their needs. Evidence from this research 
suggests that such rigidity was often tolerated by licensees 1n the 
short term or 1n the case of "static" agreements largely comprising 
patent rights. Since 94 per cent of agreements were found to be 
"dynamic" (1e they Involved ongoing flows of technology) then this would 
discourage improvements over the duration of the licence and any 
possible extensions.
Proponents of packaging, who were found to be mainly licensors, often 
cogently argued that the various elements of the package are so 
Inextricably linked and the synergistic benefits so vital to a 
successful transfer that what they were offering must be viewed and 
evaluated collectively. Some prospective UK licensees were Initially 
put off by the hard line on packaging pursued by US licensors during the 
pre-signing period. This was probed In discussions with US licensors.
It was revealed that by far the most Important factor underlying their 
reluctance to diverge from a standard tried and tested package was fear
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of losing control, especially 1f their trade mark was Included 1n the 
package. Additionally, executives 1n licensor companies transferring 
technology deemed to be close to the state-of-the-art, were worried 
about secrecy and performance guarantees. It Is Important to note, 
however, that much of the seemingly uncompromising behaviour of US 
licensors during the early stages of negotiation was considerably 
relaxed once the transfer process got underway. Moreover, the 
composition of packages actually transferred depended largely on 
licensees' requests for assistance, with UK licensees often perceived as 
'undemanding' by their licensors.
Further useful comparisons may be made with systems selling 1n that 
customers have been observed to evolve from being "unsophisticated 
generalists” to becoming "sophisticated specialists", tending to 
multisource Inputs to the package, handle Integration themselves and 
Increasingly focus on price. Thus 1t would be reasonable to propose 
that: the more sophisticated the UK licensee, the more likely they would 
be to unpackage agreements for both analytical purposes and to seek only 
those elements for which they perceived themselves to be deficient. 
Sophistication 1n this sense being assumed a function of: (a) the 
licensee's general level of proficiency as a machine tool manufacturer, 
and (b) their experiential learning from earlier licensing transactions 
and other commercial arrangements of an International nature. Licensees 
might also be expected to focus on price (1e downpayments and royalties) 
as the technology approaches maturity and becomes more widely available.
4.53 A Brief Note on UK, US and Japanese Negotiating Styles
Although no attempt was made 1n this study to reconstruct the complex 
dynamics of licensing negotiations, two patterns of behaviour emerged
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from the Interviews with senior executives which were corroborated 
through analysis of the composition of technology packages and further 
interviews. These concern the response of UK executives to the 
contrasting negotiating styles of US and Japanese licensors:
(a) US licensors have shown historically a high propensity for 
licensing "blanket" coverage of their product lines and 
territories outside their domestic market. This Is believed to 
reflect preoccupation with their home market, marginal Interest in 
exports and a desire for administrative simplicity. US licensors 
exhibited a marked aversion towards complex packages and dwelling 
on any point that might prolong negotiation. Such a loose 
approach to commercial exploitation was often at odds with their 
lawyer's emphasis on legal detail 1n contractual arrangements. In 
contrast, Japanese machine tool manufacturers, having learnt 
extensively from Inward licensing In the 1950's and 60's, tend to 
licence selectively, product by product; showing caution in 
respect of granting territorial exclusivity and only moderate 
Interest 1n contractual documentation.
(b) US licensors and UK licensees share many common aspects of culture 
and it would seem that the way they prepare themselves for, and 
conduct, negotiations 1s almost a mirror Image (1e a well defined 
process Involving 'concessions leading to compromise').
This negotiating behaviour contrasts sharply with experiences of 
negotiations described by executives In prospective UK licensee 
companies dealing with Japanese manufacturers. A small minority 
of UK executives had prepared themselves 1n almost normative 
fashion, while the majority 'played things by ear', often
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exhibiting social and commercial nlalvlty In the extreme. 
Executives In the first category had conducted extensive desk 
research and sought local assistance. Some were familiar with the 
cultural nuances of Japanese business methods from experiences 
gained through earlier agency agreements. The second category Is 
typified by the example of a managing director on his third visit 
to Japan who described h1s surprise and discomfort 1n finding that 
his Japanese counterparts were unwilling to adopt a 
confrontational style of negotiation. As he put It: 'I met a lot
of people and 1t took a long time to get things moving ___they
kept saying "yes" to everything I said ---but I never quite knew
where I stood until the day I left'. Another managing director 
visited Japan for the first time to sign a licence agreement.
Much to the chagrin of his fellow directors, one of whom recounted 
the story, he spent only five days on the round trip, foregoing 
the opportunity to enhance his knowledge of Japanese industry and 
almost certainly offending h1s hosts.
The above observations are based on substantial experience of Inward 
licensing from US companies over the postwar period and recent, though 
somewhat limited, experience of Japanese companies. US and Japanese 
International business strategies evolved under different competitive 
conditions and much of the evidence Is anecdotal, but it Is revealing 
and suggests that US licensors have been closer than Japanese licensors 
to the "systems selling" model. In practice, the leading Japanese 
machine tool manufacturers, like US manufacturers before them, have 
recognised that their technology 1s In demand and are exploiting It as 
part of a global strategy. The difference Is that Japanese machine tool 
packages are tighter In every respect and they are as much about the 
control of markets as they are about technology.
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4.54 Composition of Licence Agreements
4.541 The agreement as a point of reference for research
The licence document sets out the rights, duties and obligations agreed 
by both parties. As such 1t gives clues as to their Intentions and 
provides a legal record of the outcome of negotiations.
When extracting the main elements of licence agreements for analysis and 
discussion with executives, 1t was found that the sequence of clauses 
followed widely accepted checklists, but the length of agreements and 
level of detail varied considerably, even for nominally the same machine 
tool technology. I had expected that product range and complexity of 
the technology would dictate the level of detail. This proved unfounded 
and licensor's attempts to circumscribe the technology and rights 
offered under licence were largely a function of their lawyer's approach 
to drafting agreements. The style of agreements ranged from tightly 
worded contracts aimed at covering every angle, to pragmatic working 
documents which relied on mutual goodwill and extra-contractual 
arrangements. Executives In licensor and licensee companies had a 
general preference for the latter, with the legal dimension perceived to 
Impose 'a necessary constraint' on the relationship.
Three Inter-related commercial and technological aspects of Inward 
licensing were explored through the unpackaging process:
(a) Scope of agreements: Including the definition of licensed
machines, duration of agreements, exclusivity In manufacturing and 
sales territories.
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(b) Industrial/lntellectual property: specifically the strength of 
patents, use of trade marks, designs and copyrights, and know-how.
(c) Method of payment: Including the relative importance of down 
payments and royalties, and the sensitivity to trade-offs Implicit 
In (a) and (b).
Each of the above elements has Its own set of legal constraints and 
implications for strategy and operations.
4.542 The scope of licence agreements
The following observations on the scope of agreements provide insights 
on how licensors staked out their technology and licensees accepted 
restraints on coimiercial exploitation:
(a) A precise definition of subject matter is generally regarded as 
important because it puts "a fence" around the technology package 
by stating what will be supplied at the time of signing and over 
the duration. The wording of these definitions was found to be 
remarkably loose In machine tool licences, especially 1n the width 
of product ranges, rights to Improvements 1n technology and the 
identification of Intellectual property.
(b) The duration of agreements did not emerge as a contentious Issue. 
Fixed terms of 5 or 10 years were by far the most common, mainly 
depending on the expected length of time taken to transfer the 
Initial part of the technology and to reach commercialisation.
For some executives, expiry always seemed a long way off. Others 
typically assumed that almost automatic extension of the normal
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life of agreements on a year-to-year basis would take place. Few 
had assessed the exposure of their core technology after 
termination or the risks of premature termination.
(c) The extent of exclusivity of manufacturing and selling rights 1n 
various geographical territories was expected to be a key 
bargaining Issue. In practice, the notion of evaluating and using 
territorial rights as a trade-off against other components of the 
package provoked little response among UK executives, other than 
defence of their negotiated outcome. Few had taken the stance 
that extending territorial rights offers the opportunity for 
future growth or a way of stemming the encroachment of foreign 
licensors who, outside the licensed territories, are 1n most 
respects competitors. The reasons for this lack of dynamism 
appear to H e  partly 1n the disparate negotiating styles alluded 
to earlier, and partly In the inescapable fact that prospective 
UK licensees came to the negotiating table from a position of 
perceived weakness. Against ethnocentric US licensors, there 
would always be the real possibility of achieving manufacturing/ 
sales exclusivity 1n Western Europe, whereas globally-minded 
Japanese licensors had already gained a high degree of market 
penetration 1n Europe and could choose among prospective 
licensees. Most UK executives were satisfied with achieving their 
base-line position on territories of UK exclusivity 1n 
manufacturing and non-exclusivity In sales throughout the EEC.
4.543 Industrlal/lntellectual property
Executive's perceptions and the actual Incidence of the four main
elements of 1ndustr1al/1ntellectual property 1n machine tool licence
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Table 15. Average Weighting Attached to Licensed Patents, Trade Marks, 
Designs and Know-how by Heads of SBU for the Five Main 
Technological Segments
Turning Milling Grinding Metal Automation
Patents 1.3 2.1 3.0
Forming
1.8 3.1
Trade Marks 1.7 3.1 3.7 4.5 4.3
Designs 3.3 3.6 4.0 3.6 4.4
Know-how:product 3.0 3.9 4.3 3.0 4.5
process 1.0 1.6 2.0 1.8 1.3
commercial 1.7 1.6 1.5 3.0 2.2
Number of agreements
analysed 3 7 3 11 7
Scale : l(low) to 5(high)
Table 16. Incidence of Patents, Trade Marks, Designs and Know-how in 
Licence Agreements for the Five Main Technological Segments
Patents Included 
at the time of
Turni ng Milling Gr1nd1ng Metal 
Formi ng
Automation Total
signing agreement 2 5 2 7 5 21
Trade marks:
Licensor's mark 2 2 2 7 2 15
Joint mark 1 4 1 3 3 12
Licensee's mark 0 1 0 1 2 4
Designs 3 6 3 11 6 29
Know-how 3 
Number of agreements
6 3 10 6 28
analysed 3 7 3 11 7 31
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agreements are presented 1n Tables 15 and 16 respectlvely. The data was 
broken down by machine tool technology segment 1n order to capture the 
concentration of elements in particular licensing situations. The 
following observations give an overview of the key findings from an 
extensive analysis of the composition of technology packages:
(a) Patents were rated of low importance by Heads of SBU across the 
range of machine tool technologies, yet over two thirds of 
agreements included active patents at the time of signing. This 
is believed to reflect desire on the part of licensors, or more 
specifically their lawyers, to bring agreements under the 
umbrella of patent law, though the presence of patents frequently 
offered limited competitive advantage. This Is not to suggest 
that sharing a key patent position has no techno-commercial value 
or offered no legal protection. The lawyer's maxim of "separating 
mere shadow from substance" should be applied when evaluating the 
contribution of Intellectual property to technology packages.
Both US and Japanese licensors had a higher propensity to patent 
their technology than their UK licensees. Indeed, this may well 
be symptomatic of the generally low level of understanding 
surrounding Intellectual property and competition law among UK 
executives.
(b) Trade marks provided a useful focus for the assessment of
marketing Inputs to the evaluation of technology packages and 
revealed many of the constraints inherent In the "product-driven1 
paradigm in machine tool manufacturing SBUs. Executives 1n UK 
licensee companies felt uncomfortable when evaluating trademarks 
and this provided one of the few points of divergence from their
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generally similar approach to US licensors. Trade marks tend to 
be grossly undervalued by UK executives. Is this because 
understanding of their use as a positioning tool Is not as well 
developed as In the US?
Several examples were revealed In this study of machines embodying 
relatively mature technology, yet enjoying strong awareness and 
reputation worldwide. This tended to be dismissed by product 
engineers and sales engineers 1n these licensee companies as of 
minor significance. They found the acquisition of such licences 
difficult to reconcile with cutbacks In their development budgets, 
leading to simmering discontent and partially thwarting attempts 
at repositioning.
On the positive side, exceptions were found among niche exploiters 
1n special purpose and metal forming equipment, where executives 
rated trade marks highly and had sought qualitative answers to the 
question: "what benefits does sole or joint use of a licensor's 
trade mark bring?" From the tone of their replies, however, while 
they had consciously attempted to reposition themselves and 
followed this through 1n their marketing communications strategy, 
they relied heavily on Internal assessments of "current" and 
"desired" position.
(c) Designs and Copyrights were rated highly across the range of
machine tool technologies because they provide the main vehicle 
for communlcation. The quality of design drawings was found to 
have an Important psychological Impact on UK licensee staff, 
particularly middle managers, and this emerged as a key factor 1n 
gaining early acceptance of Incoming technology.
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(d) Industrial "know-how" has been widely Interpreted as the
cumulative stock of skills, expertise, knowledge, experience and 
Information of a commercial and technical nature. Know-how 
covered by machine tool licence agreements 1s normally specific to 
particular projects, products and processes, and secret to the 
organisation 1n which 1t has been generated.
Strictly, know-how is not "Intellectual property" and, therefore, 
does not enjoy the additional measure of legal protection and 
limited monopoly rights associated with patents, registered 
designs etc. Such a conceptual dichotomy has Important 
implications for licensing: firstly, because the competitive 
advantage bound up 1n know-how depends on confidentiality and 
safeguards against leakages turn on what can be achieved as a 
contractual obligation of the licensee; and secondly, due to 
different treatment by the tax authorities and Interpretation 
against the broader framework of competition law.
Know-how 1s the least concise element 1n the technology package 
and the most difficult to evaluate and transfer. This was no more 
apparent than during the pre-s1gn1ng period when licensors sought 
a balance between whetting the prospective licensee's appetite and 
not divulging too much Information 1n the event of negotiations 
falling through. The risks to the licensee are partially 
alleviated 1n the licensing situation because the technology has 
already been commercialised. Despite assurances from the 
licensor, the value of the know-how and the efficiency with which 
It will be transferred 1s unknown to the licensee. As one senior 
executive In a UK company fourteen months Into a licence agreement 
comnented: 'When you visited us a year ago we were In a state of
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euphoria. Our feet are now firmly on the ground and we have begun 
to find out just what 1t was that we licensed.' This "assymetry 
of Information" often leads the prospective licensee to value the 
know-how less than the licensor. Yet such know-how is often hard 
won and the end result from many years unproductive exploration of 
blind alleys.
The findings on the relative weightings attached to product and 
process know-how leave much to be desired. To some extent this 
reflects the wider deficiencies of resource allocations to 
product/process development In machine tool manufacturing SBUs and 
willingness to improvise among manufacturing/production staff.
More Importantly, it suggests a bias towards product-related 
know-how when sourcing foreign technology.
The foregoing observations suggest that machine tool licences may be 
described as "low patent content - high know-how content" with growing 
Importance attached to trade marks. Thus 1n order to evaluate the 
benefits stated 1n the working proposition, 1t 1s essential that the 
implications of high know-how content and trade marks are fully 
appreciated. Firstly, access to both of these elements of Industrial 
property may continue indefinitely, providing there are mutual benefits 
for the foreign licensor and UK licensee. Secondly, unless It 1s 
continually updated, the competitive advantages embodied In licensed 
know-how may erode over time as 1t enters the public domain. Discussion 
on the kind of Hcensor/llcensee relationships required to facilitate 
this updating, particularly 1n the case of tacit know-how, will be 
deferred to analysis under the sixth working proposition. Thirdly, 
evaluating and realising the market potential of a licensor's trade mark 
depends on substantial skills in marketing. In future, UK licensees
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must be more pro-active 1n tapping their licensor's commercial know-how. 
4.55 Method of Payment
The payment provisions 1n machine tool licence agreements normally 
Involve some combination of down payments and royalties. The breakdown 
of these transactions for the 31 agreements analysed Is set out In Table 
17.
Table 17. Incidence of Various Forms of Payment 1n Machine Tool Licence 
Agreements
Form of Payment Number of 
Agreements
m
Downpayment on disclosure of 
written-up part of the technology: 10 32
Progress payments: 2 6
Minimum royalty payments: 7 23
Running royalty payments as 
percentage of Invoiced sales 
price or a net sales price: 29 94
Running royalty payments as 
a fixed sum per machine: 2 6
N=31 agreements
It can be seen from the above Table that running royalty payments 
provided the main focus of attention 1n the evaluation of technology 
packages. Three observations are relevant here:
(a) Most executives appeared to operate a "rule of thumb" for royalty 
rates with very little questioning of the base figure used for 
calculation, Its relationship to cost structure and external
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comparisons of the going-rate for similar technologies.
(b) More experienced executives stood out from the rest due to their 
considered approach to inward licensing and their Impressive 
commercial negotiation skills. They had sought trade-offs between 
royalties and downpayments, and related the former to "value 
added" Instead of merely accepting the imposition of a percentage 
on Invoiced sales price. It is not considered coincidence that 3 
of these executives were the only ones to mention sales growth and 
market share targets, and their agreements were also among the 
lower quartile 1n terms of cash royalty payments.
(c) All executives had made rough estimates of payback period and 
translated royalty rates into what might be born as an expense in 
their margins. Less than one quarter of cases revealed a serious 
attempt to assess the yield or sensitivity of future streams of 
income over the duration of agreements.
The above observations show a greater preoccuption with costs (royalty 
payments) than benefits. When asked, for example, "what benefits does 
this licence bring to your company?", replies were predominantly 
product-related and centred on buying lead time. These findings 
correlate with earlier findings on short-term "order book" horizons, 
lack of market research and general Inability to assess the long term 
impact of Investments 1n technology and establishing market positon.
4.56 Elusive Linkages Between Costs and Benefits
The primary Issue addressed by UK executives appeared to be whether or 
not to acquire a licence from a particular foreign manufacturer. From
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thereon, all other considerations were secondary. Executives often 
dismissed the additional cost and time associated with an extended 
search for licensees as not worthwhile, preferring Instead to rely on 
'commercial judgement' along the way to negotiating a satisfactory 
outcome. Although 'compromises' and 'mutual benefits' were said to 
reflect the dynamics of licensing negotiations, these had to be 
reconciled with later admissions by executives of either not knowing 
what to expect or rapidly modifying their expectations during the 
negotiation process. These are characteristics of 'satisficing' 
behaviour.
It Is not pretended that unpackaging Is easy to operationalise nor that 
it Is feasible to source various components of the package separately 
from different suppliers as in the "make or buy" decision. Indeed, 
Interactions are as critical as contributions from Individual 
components. What 1s striking about the analysis under this fifth 
working proposition 1s that the learning process of unpackaging machine 
tool licence agreements Is as Important as the need to arrive at an 
acceptable form and magnitude of payment. It 1s, therefore, concluded 
that a more systematic evaluation would force executives to consider the 
strategic Implications of their Increasingly tactical approach. The 
fifth working proposition Is therefore accepted.
4.6 TECHNOLOGY SUPPLIER/RECIPIENT RELATIONSHIPS
The sixth working proposition 1s:
The closer the machine tool technology 1s to the state-of-the-art, 
the greater the need for close relationships between technology 
supplier and recipient.
-  222 -
4.61 Key Issues in the Transfer Process
This deceptively simple proposition is grounded in the literature, which 
portrays "state-of-the-art" technology as uncodified, undiffused and 
relying heavily on human interaction in the transfer process.
The empirical evidence presented so far in the previous sub-sections 
suggests that while ownership and control are key issues in the transfer 
of state-of-the-art technology, some of the generalised assumptions 
underlying normative choices of the mode of transfer may require 
qualification in the context of machine tools for the following three 
inter-related reasons:
(a) although the bond of ownership appears to best facilitate early 
access to new technology, my experience elsewhere suggests that 
this is seldom a sufficient condition to guarantee rapid adoption 
by the recipient;
(b) much of the theoretical and empirical work on international 
technology transfer in the past has been from the supplier's 
perspective to the relative neglect of recipient characteristics 
and supplier/reciplent Interaction;
(c) because state-of-the-art technology 1s tacit and 111-structured,
1t 1s open to selective Interpretation and manipulation, depending 
on prevailing value systems and political behaviour among 
participants In the transfer process.
4.62 Macro-Level Observations on the Transfer of State-of-the-Art 
Technology
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The most visible national preference for "human bridges" has emerged in 
the case of Japanese manufacturing companies, whether in the guise of 
the "ringi" system of achieving Internal consensus or their approach to 
overseas Investment and technology transfer. For evidence of their 
employment of ex-patriate managers and secondment of engineers during 
start-up, one need look no further than UK experience of Inward 
Investment In the electronics and automotive Industries (eg Sony,
Nissan, Komatsu). In the machine tool industry, the UK subsidiary of 
Yamazaki, the world leader 1n CNC lathes and machining centres, is the 
only example.
During commissioning of Yamazaki's greenfield plant at Worcester, 
temporary secondment of parent company staff peaked at 65 people, mainly 
engineers and technicians. When full production Is reached, it is 
envisaged that about 10 of the 230 permanent employees will be 
ex-patriates. Including the managing director. Similar involvement of 
Japanese nationals was known to have occurred when Yamazaki comnlssloned 
Its first overseas plant in Kentucky, USA. It should be noted that I 
visited both plants during the course of this research. Others have 
also exhibited a high propensity for technology transfer through people, 
though their magnitude of Investment and starting point varied 
considerably in each case. Okuma, for example, set up a greenfield 
plant 1n the USA; Makino chose to gradually acquire LeBlond 1n the USA 
and Heidenreich 4 Harbeck In West Germany; and Toyoda and Amada acquired 
Ernault and Promecam respectively, In France. All these Japanese 
manufacturers had established distribution networks in the host 
countries before Investing In manufacturing plants. The spate of 
Japanese direct investment 1n the USA Is expected to continue in 
response to the voluntary restraint on machine tool imports.
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The experience of US machine tool manufacturers in setting up UK 
operations is somewhat different. Many executives 1n the 17 US-owned 
subsidiaries 1n this study spoke of substantial capital Investment 1n 
plant and equipment, updating product ranges and training during 
start-up; yet the notion of appointing ex-patrlate top management and 
the permanent secondment of staff was almost unknown. The reasons for 
this seemingly "hands-off" approach were cited by US executives as a 
combination of common language and culture and an historical belief in 
the capability of UK management. The last point implies the absence of 
a "managerial gap" and should be viewed with caution. There 1s 
contradictory evidence suggesting that plausible alternative 
explanations lie In the preoccupation of US executives with their home 
market and their faith in communications channels related to formal 
planning procedures. Over the course of this research only three US 
chief executives and one director were resident in UK subsidiaries.
These exceptions were believed to be mainly In response to managing down 
operations during economic recession.
Discussions with Japanese executives revealed a deep concern about the 
effect of language and cultural dissimilarities on success of their 
overseas operations, together with a strong desire to expose employees 
to Western culture. This partially explains Japanese manufacturers' 
high propensity for Interchange of people In the transfer of tacit 
knowledge, information and experience. There Is also reason to believe 
that codification of new technology and Its role in diffusion carries 
greater priority than In US and European machine tool manufacturers.
Sufficient anecdotal evidence emerged from interviews to suggest that a 
"standard design" may emerge earlier 1n Japanese manufacturers and that 
they have been able to compress time scales for new product innovation.
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Japanese parent companies have sought rapid codification of technology 
through production engineering, often to the extent of replicating 
plant, equipment and systems 1n their overseas subsidiaries.
Propositions along these Unes would need to be tested In greater depth 
than Is possible here. If these were accepted, 1t would mean that 
investing 1n computer-aided design and manufacturing systems, for 
example, presents opportunities to erode Japanese competitive advantages 
along the dimension of lead time. What Is more difficult to match, 
however, 1s Japanese up-front commitment to production engineering and 
joint development with component suppliers which underpins opportunities 
to speed up the international transfer of technology.
4.63 "Access" to Technology 1s Not the Same as "Use" of Technology
From a sub-set of 17 Intra-company transactions and 22 Inward licensing 
transactions, the following comparison highlights the constraints 
Imposed on access to technology and Its commercialisation:
(a) Most UK subsidiaries were allowed relatively free access to their 
US parent companies and other subsidiaries. Some UK executives 
were members of corporate new product/process committees, giving 
them the opportunity to assess new technology as.it unfolded.
Such early access, however, was found to be a poor guide to 
whether UK subsidiaries would be permitted to build and/or sell 
particular models and product lines. US parent companies exercise 
tight control over product range, sourcing arrangements and sales 
territories. There is also a strong tradition among parent 
companies of testing prototypes and early production models in 
their domestic market for at least 6-12 months before giving the 
go-ahead to UK subsidiaries. The first few machines sold by UK
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subsidiaries were typically Imported, followed by kit assembly and 
full manufacture. Decisions regarding progression are often 
linked to volume sales and there 1s no guarantee that full 
manufacture will ever be reached, nor that production will not be 
switched to another location at some future date.
(b) Licensees normally only gain access to their licensor's technology 
after 1t has been proven in the market place and after an 
agreement has been signed. Because of the assymetry of 
Information between licensor and licensee, the latter 1s 1n a 
state of "buyer uncertainty" which hinders assessment of the 
technology on offer. There may also be other delays due to search 
procedures and protracted negotiations. The same sequence of 
Imported machines and kits through to full manufacture Is also 
evident 1n licensing. Licensors normally place territorial 
restrictions on sales; but unlike the case of subsidiaries, 
licensees retain greater control over the composition of their 
product range and Its manufacture.
The trade-off Implicit 1n the above comparison Is clear. Foreign 
ownership may facilitate earlier and fuller access to state-of-the-art 
technology than 1s likely via licensing. The downside Involves foreign 
control over manufacture and commercialisation. From the data 
In Table 18, UK subsidiaries of foreign parent companies also appear to 
commercialise new models and reach full manufacture quicker than 
licensees. This may be largely attributed to the In-built delays 
Inherent 1n external transactions.
The crude data on transfer times Indicates the scope available to US 
parent companies and their UK subsidiaries 1n reducing lead time should
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Table 18. Timescales for the Inward Transfer of Technology
Stage 1n the Transfer 
Process
Intra-Company 
Transfer Times 
(months)
Llcensor/Llcensee 
Transfer Times 
(months)
Mean time from the decison 
to go-ahead 1n the new 
product area to:
(a) commissioning of the first 
Imported machine from the 
parent company or licensor
16.1
(SD-7.1)
18.3
(SD-8.3)
(b ) reaching 70 per cent local 
manufacture by value
23.6
(SD-9.8)
31.5
(SD-12.2)
N=12 N=14
they decide to opt for simultaneous model launches or shorten testing 
times in their home market. The wide dispersion about the mean in both 
modes of transfer 1s due to the mix of standard and customised machines 
in the subset of transactions studied.
Wholly-owned operations present opportunities for more enduring and 
far-reaching relationships than found in most licensing arrangements. 
This 1s not to suggest that all parent/subsldiary relationships are 
completely open and conflict-free, nor that all licensor/Hcensee 
relationships are adversarial and conducted at arms length. Indeed, it 
1s possible to point to examples of parent/subsldiary relationships at 
such a low ebb as to be almost unworkable and to examples of licensing 
where the social bond transcends the formal techno-commercial 
arrangements laid down In the agreement. But even in the most stable 
licensing relationships, the underlying competitive situation Is prone 
to surface; perhaps triggered by one party feeling the need to 
reallocate resources away from the licensed technology or pressure to
- 228 -
renegotiate the agreement, especially during a period of prolonged 
economic recession and technological change.
On closer examination of the subset of Intra-company transactions and 
Inward licensing transactions it was found that after the first lump of 
technology had been transferred at start-up, the onus for Initiating the 
continuing flow of technology tended to switch from supplier to 
recipient. This means that 1f recipients fall to "pull through" the 
technology, then the dynamic state-of-the-art element will be lost.
This point 1s crucial because executives 1n several US licensor 
companies perceived their UK licensees as 'undemanding' and not always 
making full use of the technology available. Similar views on the 
apparent laggardllness of UK subsidiaries also emerged in Interviews 
with executives 1n three US parent companies. On following through 
these views in UK subsidiaries and licensees, what was perceived by US 
executives as laggardliness or d1s-1nterest was In reality the potent 
combination of the tendency of UK staff to undervalue external sources 
of technology and the pervasive belief that they could tackle any 
problem that came along. This places a high premium on top management's 
ability to recognise the need for Interaction and their willingness to 
invest 1n 1t.
The managerial style of top executives emerged as a major determinant of 
the nature and extent of Interaction. State-of-the-art technology 
flowed most freely In cases where UK executives encouraged middle 
managers and engineers to visit their parent company or licensor, 
thereby allowing Informal communications channels to flourish. In the 
case of wholly-owned subsidiaries the frequency of overseas visits by 
middle level staff was estimated to be qualitatively higher, 1n several 
cases an order of magnitude higher, than found In licensing
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arrangements. Moreover, while staff visting parent companies tended to 
be drawn from the three main functions of product engineering, sales and 
production; staff visiting licensors were predominantly product 
engineers. This bias 1s a further manifestation of the product-driven 
approach to technology transfer. On the negative side, some top 
executives in these subsidiaries and licensees seriously Impeded the 
flow of technology. This was not a deliberate attempt to sabotage 
relationships, but by insisting that all communications should be 
channelled through themselves. Such behaviour, reinforced by functional 
organisation structures, obscured access to the potential competitive 
advantages from state-of-the-art technology and reduced the efficiency 
of assimilation.
4.64 The Special Case of Applications Know-How
Some machine tool technologies are more know-how Intensive than others. 
Automated assembly machines, robots, transfer and special purpose 
equipment were found to be particularly dependent on applications 
know-how. Progress towards machine systems has given new meaning to the 
expression "the products of the machine tool Industry are the processes 
of user Industries".
State-of-the-art applications know-how Is generated at the machine tool 
manufacturer/user Interface. This makes 1t customer-specific and one of 
the most sensitive forms of know-how. Both parties stand to benefit 
from developing closer relationships, particularly in dealing with 
complexity and reducing time scales; yet Western companies have not 
found It easy to reconcile the competitive advantages with their worries 
about becoming locked-1n to each other.
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Machine tool manufacturers have access to many users and their 
cumulative stock of applications know-how Is much sought after. Herein 
lies the sensitivity: on the one hand, transferring this know-how to a 
third party such as a subsidiary, joint venture partner or licensee 
raises questions of leakage and breaches of confidentiality. On the 
other, 1f both machine tool manufacturer and user are multinationals, 
then distinct commercial and technological benefits may accrue to 
participants 1n an extended network of relationships. Many Instances 
were Identified 1n this research of UK subsidiaries and licensees 
gaining orders for machines on the strength of their ability to meet 
specifications of US origin combined with assurances of local supply and 
after sales service.
State-of-the-art applications know-how was found to be a complex amalgam 
of ideas about the right and wrong ways to do things, often Involving 
hard won experience through a process of trial and error. Executives 
views about how this know-how should be transferred varied according to 
the complexity of the package. Know-how associated with say a robot 
gripper or a way of using jigs and fixtures, was often considered as 
embodied 1n the skill of applications engineers and easily transferable 
via "show-how" on a "learning by doing" basis. In contrast, the 
configuration of machining cells or complete flexible manufacturing 
systems was regarded as team-specific, requiring enduring relationships 
If the know-how Is to be transferred project by project or as 1t 
unfolds. These extreme examples provide prlma facie evidence for 
wholly-owned operations as the appropriate mode of transfer, with 
numerous opportunities for considering Intermediate levels of direct 
Investment such as joint ventures.
4.65 Why 1s there a Low Incidence of Joint Ventures In the UK Machine 
Tool Industry?
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There Is strong evidence to show that licence agreements have been 
preferred to joint ventures by US and UK machine tool manufacturers over 
the post war period. Does this Indicate that licensing 1s perceived as 
a more versatile mode of transfer than advocated in the literature? 
Alternatively, does 1t suggest that only mature technology 1s traded In 
the external market or Is there some underlying objection to joint 
ventures?
Only two current joint ventures were Identified and Investigated 1n this 
study. Both Involved Japanese partners 1n 50:50 equity holdings and the 
motivation for forming the venture was said to have come from the 
Japanese partner who contributed the technology. Operating 
responsibility lay with the UK partner but there was little to 
distinguish behaviour of these joint ventures from that of conventional 
licensing arrangements. At the time of writing (1e about 5 years after 
start-up) neither had progressed much beyond low volume kit assembly.
One of the main reasons for the absence of joint ventures lies In the 
historical dominance of the US as the source of machine tool technology 
and the uncertainties surrounding anti-trust legislation. The US 
Department of Justice Interprets the competitive effects of joint 
ventures under a "rule of reason" and the courts have Increasingly 
recognised the benefits of Increased efficiency through Integration. 
Nevertheless, US executives have avoided forms of "collaboration" 
Involving shared ownership and feel much happier with arms length 
licensing. There 1s also fragmented evidence to suggest that some US 
manufacturers treated their licensing transactions as "windfall" Income 
and were not prepared to enter Into the kind of managerial commitment 
Implied 1n joint ventures.
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Interviews with UK executives revealed that the low Incidence of joint 
ventures may be partly attributed to fears of domination by a stronger 
partner and loss of Independence, particularly In smaller companies; but 
mainly due to the startling Ignorance of collaboration In general. From 
a subset of 27 UK-owned SBUs, 15 per cent of respondents were 
predisposed towards joint ventures, 29 per cent against and 56 per cent 
offered no opinion. 62 per cent of respondents were not aware of at 
least one of the two UK/Japanese joint ventures mentioned previously. 
Despite Increasing exposure of collaboration 1n the press, 71 per cent 
were unable to point to joint ventures outside the machine tool Industry 
as a possible vehicle for discussion. An estimated one third of the 
Inward licence agreements covered In this study had not given serious 
consideration to joint ventures as an alternative mode of transfer.
These findings present further evidence of the narrow domain scanned by 
executives.
4.66 A Note on the Codification and Assm1m1lat1on of Machine Tool 
Technology
Returning to the theme of technological gaps, acquiring state-of-the-art 
technology to catch up Involves recipients moving from an existing 
position of dealing with predominantly mature (codlfled/dlffused) 
technology to a new position which requires the capacity to handle new 
(uncodlfled/undlffused) technology. A similar problem arises when 
machine tool manufacturers acquire technology to diversify. Though they 
may be leaders or fast followers and competent 1n machine tool 
technology generally, the Incoming technology 1s still new to them and 
highly specific to the supplier.
Extending this line of reasoning further Is Important because the most 
difficult transition 1s normally encountered In manufacturers of
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standard machines 1n medium/high volume. This 1s where the greatest 
mismatch is found between technology supplier and recipient, and where 
externally sourced technology is disruptive to existing operations which 
use dedicated plant and equipment. Conversely, manufacturers of highly 
customised, low volume machines are often sufficiently adaptive as to 
assimilate Incoming technology with minimal dislocation. These 
operations currently represent end points on the spectrum of batch 
production processes, with most manufacturers falling in the middle 
ground and drifting towards higher levels of customisation. The 
Introduction of flexible manufacturing systems will move batch 
production closer to that of continuous production. Whether this 
increase in sophistication and capital Intensity will ease assimilation 
of foreign technology, may ultimately depend on compatibility between 
the equipment and internal systems of supplier and recipient.
4.67 Progress 1n the Technology of Technology Transfer
Faced with shortening model life cycles and lengthening development 
times, three trends present major opportunities to accelerate 
dissemination of firm-specific technology:
(a) Computer-aided design/manufacturlng (CAD/CAM) databases offer 
considerable potential for codifying and sharing technology, 
providing both supplier and recipient possess the requisite 
hardware and software and there 1s compatabH1ty of systems.
During rny visit to the USA, the status of CAD Installations was 
investigated. It was noted that 12 of the 16 US parent companies 
studied had installed CAD systems from reputable suppliers (eg 
IBM, Computervlslon, Integraph), but only 3 of their UK 
subsidiaries had compatible systems. A further 2 UK subsidiaries
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had received approval for capital expenditure. At that time, 19 
of the US licensors and 4 UK licensees were known to have 
installed CAD systems but none were compatible. This shows the US 
lead in the application of CAD 1n machine tools and raises 
questions about the kind of commitment required 1f the benefits 
are to be realised. Compatibility 1n CAD/CAM 1s a pre-requ1s1te 
of joint design and development programmes.
(b) Telecommunications technology 1s likely to enhance the transfer of 
know-how by lessening the need for expensive and time consuming 
meetings between supplier and recipient. Facsimile machines have 
added a welcome new dimension to written communication in the 
1980's and teleconferencing 1s promising to be the most Important 
development in the 1990's. Large multinationals In computer 
systems and office automation are among the early adopters of 
teleconferencing. Sharing experience 1n the design and operation 
of complex machining cells and large flexible manufacturing 
systems seem obvious applications. Adoption by machine tool 
manufacturers will largely depend on reducing the cost of 
transmission.
(c) Expert systems and diagnostics equipment provide further examples 
of how computerisation might enhance the transfer of applications 
know-how.
The above developments further emphasise the widening gap between: (a) 
manufacturers of stand-alone machines and those active In automated 
systems, and (b) between global and domestic players In machine tools. 
Introducing new informatlon/communlcations technology Into the transfer 
process Itself opens up avenues of speculation about shifting Internal
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power bases and the likelihood of triggering new forms of political 
behaviour.
4.68 Unqualified Support for the Adage "Technology 1s Best Transferred 
Through People"
Access to state-of-the-art technology and Its rapid adoption are 
pre-requisites to achieving and sustaining International "best practice" 
In mainstream machine tool segments and In narrow niches. Given the 
tacit, ill-structured and proprietary nature of state-of-the-art 
technology, acceptance of the proposition turns on empirical evidence of 
recognition of the need to develop close relationships between supplier 
and recipient. The normative stance is that such relationships are best 
facilitated by wholly owned operations, with joint ventures and 
licensing as second and third preferred modes of transfer respectively. 
No evidence was uncovered to suggest that this order of preference 
should be rejected.
The extent to which ownership, hierarchy and control impinge on 
supplier/reciplent relationships and what Is actually transferred 1n the 
technology package, 1s a matter of concern. Consideration of Inward 
transfer of the "dynamic" elements of state-of-the-art technology, 
especially applications know-how, from US machine tool manufacturers 
supports the view that the "potential" for close and enduring 
relationships resides 1n ownership.
One of the main factors 1n determining whether the benefits are realised 
In practice 1s executive behaviour. Cooperative styles of management 
and encouragement of boundary-spanning roles at key points along the 
locus of Inward technology transfer were found to greatly enhance the 
internal dissemination of technology. Foreign direct Investment by
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Japanese machine tool manufacturers also lends support to this view, 
though they are at a different stage of international development and 
comparative evidence is incomplete. Experience so far, suggests that 
due to cultural dlsslmiliarities, UK employees may need to substantially 
modify their approach in order to accommodate the differing style of 
assimilation 1n Japanese companies. It is one thing to note Japanese 
willingness to invest in plant and equipment, and their penchant for 
secondment of people. It is quite another to characterise the social 
processes among ex-patriates and permanent UK staff so vital 1n the 
transfer of a comprehensive package of managerial and technological 
know-how.
Joint ventures have emerged as a compromise solution in machine tools. 
This is partly the desire to retain some of the commitment and close 
relationships believed to underpin wholly owned operations, and partly 
to attract Japanese technology. The low incidence of joint ventures 1n 
the UK machine tool Industry was disappointing from the empirical 
perspective. It was hoped at the outset of this study to match pairs of 
joint ventures and Inward licences to compare transfer mechanisms. 
Establishing the underlying reasons for reluctance to enter Into joint 
ventures 1s In Itself a valuable finding for Intervention, especially 1n 
the light of recent UK Government Initiatives to promote intra-EEC 
collaboration. Once again, however, this points to the recurring danger 
that the Government may be urging manufacturers to collaborate, without 
understanding the sensitive Issues underlying its historical absence.
There seems little doubt that the proposition should be accepted. Close 
relationships between supplier and recipient were found to be at the 
heart of successful transfer of state-of-the-art technology. This was 
crucial in the past when technology transfer focussed on stand-alone
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machines and will be Increasingly Important 1n the future with 
Increasing scale and/or complexity of manufacturing systems.
4.7 THE LOCATION OF RESEARCH, DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT FACILITIES
The seventh working proposition Is:
Foreign parent companies of UK subsidiaries operate an 
International technological division of labour; centralising their 
research, design and development activities 1n their home country, 
to the detriment of the UK Industry.
4.71 The International Technological Division of Labour
Resurgence of Interest 1n the location of technical facilities 1s mainly 
due to the wave of Japanese direct Investment (albeit from a low base)
1n Europe and North America, and the continuing debate on the nature of 
globalisation. While 1t Is Inappropriate here to present a detailed 
account of the many facets of globalisation, analysis will focus on two 
Inter-related Issues:
(a) the response of foreign machine tool multinationals to the 
shifting pattern of world competition, with particular reference 
to the technological dlvlson of labour;
(b) the repercussions felt by their UK subsidiaries.
Selection of the above Issues represents a deliberate attempt to widen 
analysis on the foreign sourcing of machine tool technology by examining 
empirical evidence against developments 1n such thorny areas as parent 
company ethnocentrlsm, the divisibility of RAD, Government Intervention
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and perceptions of "good citizenship".
4.72 US Machine Tool Multinationals : From Ethnocentrlsm to 
Polycentrism?
Prior to 1979/80 there was ample evidence to support the first part of 
the working proposition. Many of the larger US multinationals operated 
corporate R&D facilities and technology flowed primarily from parent to 
subsidiary. Numerous examples of parent/subsldiary and sibling rivalry 
were uncovered but the nature of the relationship was clear: the role of 
the UK subsidiary was to concentrate on the "Europeanisation" and minor 
"customisation" of US designs. Modifications regarded as outside the 
scope of customisation had to be referred back to the parent company for 
approval.
The first challenge to this historical dominance came mainly with 
diverging requirements of the European and US markets, repeatedly stated 
by executives in UK subsidiaries as the need for "flexible" and 
"dedicated" machines respectively. These executives charged their 
counterparts 1n US parent companies with slowness in recognising world 
trends and felt that US customers would eventually demand greater 
flexibility. Many examples were cited in this research of conflict 
surrounding the choice of CNC systems and myopic response to particular 
machine features and configurations. That UK executives should accuse 
their parent companies in this way is an Interesting paradox in the 
light of what has been stated already about UK SBUs in which 
parochialism and the "not-lnvented-here" syndrome are rife.
These shortcomings were exposed during the 1980's and there were 
knock-on effects In UK subsidiaries.
From Interviews with US executives and subsequent tracking of the
-  239 -
strategic behaviour of parent companies, there is mixed evidence to 
suggest that attitudes towards dispersion of research, design and 
development were radically changed during and after recession. One 
vice-president regarded dispersion as 'unthinkable' and another as 'not 
on the agenda'. Several others clearly favoured centralisation of 
research in the US but were unsure about the future dispersion of design 
and development. Computer aided design was recognised as creating an 
opportunity for partial dispersion which avoided duplication and 
retained parent company control. The strategic impact of CAD, however, 
as a tool for international technology transfer, possibly two-way, had 
received little serious thought; mainly because short-term "survival" 
was the main priority and foreign operations seldom considered a 
significant part of total operations.
The UK was perceived by most US executives as a sluggish economy with 
weak customer Industries and so did not warrant setting up an RAD 
facility. When asked to expand their view of the UK In the wider 
context of Europe and the benefits of perhaps selectively locating RAD 
facilities close to centres of excellence (eg Universities possessing 
world-wide reputations for machine tool technology such as Aachen, and 
lead users such as Ford), the responses were shallow and Ill-Informed. 
This line of questioning carried the Implicit proposlton that RAD 1s 
becoming more "footloose" than In the past and was also used as a 
vehicle for opening discussion on the desired mix of research, design 
and development. West Germany was often cited as strong In both machine 
tools and the motor Industry, but US executives appeared to know very 
little about Individual manufacturers and recent developments.
Though corporate RAD facilities were often the last part of the parent 
organisation to be rationalised, most were eventually reduced in size
- 240 -
and refocussed or dismantled. From the point of view of UK 
subsidiaries, the outcome was not all bad and some were the 
beneficiaries of their parent company's review of international 
logistics. As the following important exceptions show, after years as 
recipients of technology, four UK subsidiaries were assigned major 
responsibilities and given the freedom to generate their own technology:
(a) Cincinnati Milacron, once the largest machine tool producer in the 
world, implemented three major reorganisations in the 1980's.
After an expensive, aborted attempt to gradually shift its RAD 
resources towards new business areas such as silicon wafer 
technology; it continued to support machine tools, robots, 
plastics processing, controls and software. It was the last 
reorganisation involving the setting up of "focussed factories" 
that proved to be the most far-reaching. The UK subsidiary 
emerged as the world source for machining centres, and for the 
first time, it was given design and manufacturing responsibility 
for two new vertical models launched in 1989. In contrast, the 
main loser in Europe was Cincinnati's sister plant 1n Holland with 
the decision to centre the grinding machine product line at a site 
in the US.
(b) Ex-Cel 1-0 was another US manufacturer to embark on an extensive 
rationalisation programme Involving devolution of responsibility 
for machine tool technologies to Its two European subsidiaries In 
the UK and West Germany. The UK subsidiary had expertise 1n 
transfer equipment and high precision grinding machines and wished 
to reduce Its dependence on the automotive Industry. Aerospace 
was Identified as a target segment and project leadership was 
awarded for a new range of CMC form grinding machines for turbine
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guide vanes and segments. Unfortunately, although this venture 
was highly successful technically, the European operations were 
subject to a management buy out in 1987 led by the dominant West 
German company who closed the loss-making UK manufacturing 
operations a year later with the loss of 250 jobs.
(c) Litton Industrial Automation Systems provides an outstanding 
example of what can be achieved when policy on the external 
sourcing of technology is relaxed. In 1982, Litton's UK 
subsidiary, Landis Lund, received the go-ahead to design and 
develop a range of sophisticated CNC cam lobe grinding machines 1n 
collaboration with the Cranfleld Unit for Precision Engineering. 
Orders for this machine passed the 100 mark 1n mid-1987 and the 
company received the Queens Award for Innovation.
(d) And finally, the UK subsidiary of Bridgeport Machines designed and 
developed Its own range of vertifical machining centres alongside 
its inward licence agreement with Yasuda of Japan for horizontal 
machining centres.
Four examples do not constitute an Industry-wide transformation but they 
do Illustrate diverse recovery strategies towards similar ends.
Cincinnati Milacron and Bridgeport compete against low cost Japanese 
manufacturers such as Yamazaki, Okuma and Makino 1n the crowded 
mainstream machining centre segment. They meet these formidable 
competitors worldwide and are two of the few Western manufactureres 
capable of mounting a challenge to Japanese superiority. Ex-Cell-0 and 
Landis Lund operate 1n different narrow niches 1n the grinding field, 
where product innovation and early capture of key customers are 
determinants of success. Ex-Cell-0 is holding its own against
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Hauni-Blohm, and Landis Lund against Schaudt and Fortuna. Taken 
together, these four represented 55-60 per cent of the sales turnover by 
value attributed to US subsidiaries 1n the UK 1n the mid-80's.
Bridgeport and Landis Lund were two of only a handful of companies 1n 
the UK to report a stream of profits throughout the 1980's.
4.73 The Feasibility of Seeking Safeguards
There is a school of thought which generally favours inward foreign 
direct investment but preferably accompanied by assurances of a 
comprehensive transfer of technology and monitoring procedures. 
Responsibility for such procedures normally falls on government agencies 
and may be observed 1n its extreme form 1n the Eastern Bloc and 
developing countries. The closest the UK has ever been to vetting and 
monitoring foreign direct Investment was In the late 1960's when the 
Ministry of Technology requested disclosure of Information on a range of 
sensitive policy Issues such as composition of the board of directors, 
expansion plans and intra-company trading. This approach brought 
resentment from the multinationals and was eventually relaxed because 1t 
was impossible to police. It would seem that the only way to provide 
effective monitoring is from the inside (1e via a share holding of some 
kind which permits access to key decisions). This would, of course, 
find little support in the UK political climate of the 1980's and Into 
the 90's.
Despite Government reluctance to intervene 1n corporate affairs, the UK 
Is vying for inward foreign direct Investment 1n the EEC along with 
other member nations and various financial Incentives are being offered. 
These Incentives present an opportunity to seek safeguards In the 
“national interest". In practice, their scope has tended to be limited
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to specified levels of local content and proportions of production for 
export. Assurances In the case of Yamazakl, for example, were 60 per 
cent local content and 80 per cent exports. The DTI was unable to 
persuade them to manufacture CNC systems 1n the UK (1n collaboration 
with Mitsubishi) and to set up an R4D facility. It 1s reasonable to 
speculate that further constraints may have caused Yamazakl to site 
their new plant elsewhere. Similar fears of switching resources were 
apparent in decisions concerning Incremental investment by US-owned 
machine tool manufacturers In the UK who possess other plants In the 
EEC, though the threats have never been as blatant as 1n motor vehicles, 
pharmaceuticals and electronics.
Further scope for encouraging local RAD and the full transfer of 
technological know-how lies In providing "conditional" support for 
product/process innovation and plant modernisation. Two examples 
illustrate these points and the difficulties that arise:
(a) In 1979, Unimation, the US pioneer In robotics technology,
received joint funding from the Department of Industry and the 
National Research A Development Corporation for the design, 
development and production of the Puma electric robot at Telford. 
The award was conditional on achieving 75 per cent local content 
within 3 years and they actually reached 90 per cent In a few 
months. Unimation went on to establish a development unit at the 
University of Warwick Science Park and announced a £10 million 
expansion programme, which Included the formation of a new systems 
engineering division.
In 1984, the US parent company was acquired by Westlnghouse who,
In an effort to rationalise operations and achieve profitability,
-  244 -
transformed it from a highly entrepreneurial organisation to a 
division subsumed In headquarters bureaucracy. Telford was 
retained as Un1mat1on's European headquarters. Later, when the UK 
market for robots failed to live up to expectations, a decision 
was taken to retain production 1n the UK and move European sales 
and support operations to Frankfurt where the market was 
relatively buoyant.
(b) The DTI's list of authorised consultants In advanced manufacturing 
systems provided an opportunity to encourage the accumulation of 
systems expertise In the UK. Several UK subsidiaries of foreign 
machine tool manufacturers received approval under the scheme on 
the strength of their parent company experience. Yamazaki and 
White Consolidated Industries, for example, were approved under an 
arrangement whereby UK staff handled the Initial proposal and 
staff from their parent companies 1n Nagoya and 
C1nc1nnat1/Belv1dere respectively would be called upon to prepare 
a full project study. Four years after receiving approval, 
Yamazaki's president gave further assurances that technology 
transfer would be 'aggressively promoted' and the UK managing 
director announced that a 'systems engineering division' would be 
set up at Worcester. In contrast, within two years of approval, 
White Consolidated was the subject of a buy-out by Its UK 
managers, reverting to Its former name of BSA Tools and severing 
the formal links on which approval was based.
The significance to machine tool manufacturers of gaining approval 
as consultants lay In specifying, albeit Indirectly, their 
equipment 1n feasibility studies on which the client user would 
then be awarded a DTI grant. The disappointing feature of the
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scheme was not that approval of foreign owned subsidiaries as 
consultants was wrong 1n principle nor that their parent companies 
lacked the credentials. With lagging experience of flexible 
manufacturing systems and robotics Installations in the UK, an 
external stimulus was necessary and the scheme provided a vital 
contribution to creating awareness and practical assistance. 
Unfortunately, the DTI virtually absolved itself of responsibility 
and approval required little more than answering a questionnaire. 
Imposing criteria regarding the number and quality of "permanent" 
UK staff would have simultaneously raised credibility of the 
scheme and tested the commitment of foreign parent companies In 
transferring systems know-how.
From this short analysis and earlier discussion on the technological
division of labour, two observations may be made:
(a) agreements with foreign-owned machine tool manufacturers at the 
time of the investment may change radically with ownership and 
market conditions, especially 1n the case of embryonic 
technologies;
(b) safeguards are difficult to negotiate from a position of relative 
competitive weakness and require a level of sustained Intervention 
beyond that which the present UK Government 1s prepared to 
support.
4.74 Decentralisation and the Divisibility of Research, Design and 
Development
The pattern of reorganisation among machine tool multinationals
throughout the 1980’s suggests that the first part of the proposition no
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longer holds as a generalisation. It Is, however, difficult to envisage 
decentralisation of R4D to the UK by foreign multinationals on a grand 
scale over the next 5-10 years. Exploitation of firm-specific 
advantages related to superior R4D remain their raison d'etre, even 1f 
these have been eroded 1n recent years, and managerial attitudes still 
favour retention of R4D in the home country.
Assumptions about economies of scale and locational advantages were 
found to be at the heart of the centralisation Issue. R4D 1s 
labour-intensive and there are often sound communications reasons for 
retaining team-specific skills on one site and then transferring their 
output to various subsidiaries when it Is available 1n more codified 
form. Many parent companies were in danger of throwing the baby out 
with the bathwater when they dismantled their central R4D facilities. 
This is particularly noticeable in the case of new product development, 
which is multidisciplinary 1n nature and appears to exhibit a higher 
minimum scale efficiency compared with other technical activities such 
as customisation and applications development.
Conversely, for leaders and fast followers, a powerful strategic option 
1s that of seeking optimal locations for R4D, based on the cost and 
availability of specialised skills worldwide. The scope for considering 
this option, however, has been limited by unwillingness to challenge the 
status quo and poor knowledge of what Is happening elsewhere. 
Unfortunately, technology-related Incentives to set up fully-fledged 
machine tool R4D facilities In the UK are nowhere nearly as attractive 
as 1n say pharmaceuticals and chemicals, where there 1s a strong 
corporate and university research tradition and a pool of highly trained 
scientists at hand. Similar observations have been made 1n respect of 
weaknesses 1n the machine tool customer base 1n the UK, 1n which the
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benefits arising from user-initiated product Innovation may be limited.
For explanations of the four-exceptions to the historical trend outlined 
earlier it is necessary to briefly comment on the divisibility of 
research, design and development. Machine tool manufacturers tend to be 
more design and development-intensive than research-intensive, and many 
new developments originate 1n component supply companies. Thus it was 
not surprising to find that the four subsidiaries were able to cope with 
their new status and responsibilities. They had maintained the critical 
mass of adaptive design capability necessary to handle Incremental 
product Innovation and were among the most capable at purchasing, 
subcontracting, key component manufacture and assembly. At the time of 
writing, it remains to be seen whether these policy changes represent a 
"world product mandate" of the kind found 1n groups such as IBM and 
Hewlett Packard, or whether they are pursuing 'multifocal strategies', 
decision by decision. This point is important because specialisation 
and switches from multi-national integration towards national or 
regional responsiveness involve substantial trade-offs in the areas of 
cost, coordination and control. Furthermore, policies which delegate 
responsibilities and discretion to subsidiaries are difficult to reverse 
If they are deemed at some later stage not to have worked or external 
circumstances change.
4.75 Sovereignty Issues
The second part of the working propositions (1e that centralisation of 
RAD by foreign machine tool multi-nationals 1s detrimental to the UK 
Industry) 1s Intimately tied up with Invasions of sovereignty and what 
Is In the national Interest. Macro-level Interpretations are normally 
left to the political mechanism, moderated by the lobbying power of the
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Industry, against a background 1n which the mere presence of 
multinationals often evokes a response somewhat disproportionate to 
their overall economic impact. Compelling arguments were put forward 
during the depth of recession that the industry was 'perilously close to 
collapse', moratoria on R4D expenditure were said to have 'mortgaged the 
future' and the strategic Importance of machine tools had been ignored. 
To encourage inward foreign direct Investment and 1n particular, to 
attract a world leader In machine tools, was a bold step by the 
Government, which sent a tremor through the UK and the rest of European 
Industry.
The presence of Yamazaki will increasingly provide a focal point for 
debate as they move towards higher levels of capacity utilisation and 
the true meaning of the President's promise of full technology transfer 
1s revealed. The plant is state-of-the-art 1n both product technology 
and manufacturing technology. There is no reason to believe that the 
parent company will not update the technology as it unfolds. The 
"demonstration effect" of the plant 1s highly beneficial and has forced 
indigenous manufacturers to reconsider their competitive position in the 
light of Yamazaki's openly declared Intention to Increase Its UK market 
share in CNC lathes to about 20 per cent and machining centres to 30 per 
cent. The absence of an Integrated R4D or production engineering 
function remains the most contentious Issue and little 1s known of their 
future plans In supplying flexible manufacturing systems. There will 
always be those who cry "Trojan horse" but no adequate answer was 
forthcoming 1n this study to the question: what company, other than 
Yamazaki, would have had the ambition to Invest ¿35 million 1n the UK 
machine tool industry at a time when levels of profitability were at an 
all-time low?
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4.76 The Generation and Commercialisation of Technology
Much of the discussion under this proposition has focussed on the 
location of RAD activities by machine tool multinationals; mainly 
because Industry experts, government officials, and executives in both 
parent companies and subsidiaries, regarded this as Important aspect of 
Inward foreign direct Investment. At times, this bears a striking 
resemblence to the polarised views of technology supplier versus 
recipient found 1n the literature on developing countries! While only a 
small minority of opinion leaders could be accused of perceiving RAD as 
an end 1n Itself, there 1s persuasive evidence that greater attention 
has been paid to the "generation" of technology than its 
"conrnerclallsation". As David Flshlock (Financial Times, 20/12/88) 
succinctly put 1t:
'The lesson for a technology-based business is that 1t Is more 
Important to have technology when 1t is needed, than to worry 
about where 1t comes from. It can be a hard test of research 
management, however, to reconcile this fact with the pride of a 
business's own scientists and engineers.'
In conclusion, the first part of this seventh and final working 
proposition 1s accepted and the second part tentatively rejected. There 
1s little convincing evidence to suggest that centralisation of 
research, design and development facilities overseas 1s detrimental to 
the UK machine tool Industry. The point needs to be underlined that 1t 
Is the rate at which technological advantages, Irrespective of source, 
are embodied Into products and processes that Influences growth rates.
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5. WIDER IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERVENTIONS
5.1 A SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS
The picture emerging from this research Is of an Industry 1n long-term 
decline and 1n need of regeneration. Working from the assumption that a 
broadly-based machine tool Industry 1s desirable, the research has 
examined various strategies for restoring International competitiveness 
at the level of Individual business units.
The following conclusions have been drawn from analysis under the seven 
working propositions:
(a) There Is an urgent need to challenge the set of beliefs and values 
pervading "product-drlven" machine tool SBUs. This Is not to 
suggest that there is something intrinsically wrong 1n striving 
for distinctive competence 1n product engineering. But serious 
problems were shown to arise when deeply rooted Imbalances lead to 
neglect of other functional Inputs and there 1s a tendency to 
cling to outmoded assumptions of market reality.
(b) The strength of the prevailing product-driven paradigm was found 
to be a pervasive Influence on technology strategy development, 
most notably In the diagnosis of technological deficiencies and 
receptivity to particular strategic options.
(c) Considerable "potential" exists for supplementing Indigenous 
machine tool technology with foreign technology as a strategy for 
catching up on International best practice. The managerial
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problem lies In realising this potential given that it represents 
a challenge to self-sufficiency In technology and threatens the 
status quo.
(d) Inward direct Investment by foreign owned machine tool 
multinationals has brought substantial benefits to the UK 
industry. That parent companies decide the location of their R&D 
facilities and seek to control exploitation of their technology is 
their own concern. This must be set against the benefits accruing 
to UK subsidiaries from access to parent company technology and 
their customer base. The last point 1s often under-rated, 
especially when assessing the relative merits of Japanese and US 
participation in UK industry. While some US machine tool 
manufacturers may be 1n poor shape, the US is still a dynamic 
economy and remains in the forefront of developments in CAD/CAM, 
applications software and management techniques.
(e) Inward licensing opportunities will continue to arise 1n machine 
tools because of the fragmented nature of the industry and the 
relatively small size of manufacturers worldwide. There will 
always be a large pool of foreign manufacturers willing to share 
their technology without the strings attached to ownership or 
other equity arrangements. Taken on its own, inward licensing 1s 
about buying lead time to pursue a follower strategy. For fast 
followers or those wishing to stay a comfortable distance behind 
the leader, licensing provides a quick way of repositioning 1n 
existing product/market segments or diversifying Into growth 
segments. For aspiring leaders, licensing Is the first step In 
the catch1ng-up process. Leaders continue to move forward and the 
only sure way of keeping abreast of them, and eventually
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displacing them, 1s to generate state-of-the-art technology 
yourself.
(f) Joint ventures offer an alternative to Inward licensing, mainly 1n 
cases where the technology Is complex and/or unfolding and where 
the partners wish to have a greater say In commercial 
exploitation. The limited experience of joint ventures 1n machine 
tools may be mainly attributed to reluctance on the part of both 
US and UK executives to enter Into equity arrangements and almost 
certainly to their Ignorance of what joint venture strategies 
entail.
(g) Each mode of technology transfer above Involves different formal 
hlerarchlal structures, mechanisms and legal obligations.
Ownership was found to facilitate a more enduring relationship and 
speed up the transfer of tacit state-of-the-art know-how. Beyond 
this, the actual day-to-day transfer of technology was remarkably 
similar 1n each mode, with the role of senior executives noted as
a key factor In promotlng/retardlng Interaction.
(h) The composition of packages of technology In each mode of transfer 
tended to be biased towards product-related know-how, reflecting 
the Influence of the product engineering function during 
negotiation, transfer and assimilation.
(1) Concepts of Internal organisational Integration and external
Integration through strategic alliances with suppllers/customers 
1s not well developed In the UK machine tool Industry.
Consequently, though considerable learning had been gained by UK 
staff exposed to Japanese operations, some of the competitive
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advantages related to Infrastructure were not transferable.
(j) Two pre-requisites for successful Inward technology transfer 
strategies Identified 1n this research were: firstly, the 
Importance of analysing competitor activities and closely 
monitoring technological developments worldwide; and secondly, the 
need to maintain a "critical mass" of indigenous skills and 
capital investment at various receiving points within the 
organi sation.
5.2 IS THERE A ROLE FOR UK GOVERNMENT?
Throughout the 1980's the UK Government has adopted broad measures to 
restore competitiveness, showing a marked aversion for sector strategies 
and Increasingly promoting the notion of an "enterprise culture". 
Compared with earlier decades, structural Intervention has been minimal. 
Instead, the Government, through the Department of Trade S Industry 
(DTI), has preferred to stimulate awareness of various "enabling" 
technologies and to partially fund innovation. On occasions, 1t has 
also been prepared to "open doors" and act as a marriage broker to 
facilitate Inward foreign direct Investment and collaboration. No 
special treatment has been forthcoming to the machine tool industry.
Any UK-based company eligible to take up the schemes could do so and the 
general message continues to be: "problem ownership lies with Individual 
companies".
It was not initially Intended in this research to examine whether 
greater Government Intervention Is desirable; nor to speculate on what 
mix of foreign direct Investment, collaboration and Indigenous 
technology would be tolerable In the party political sense. The machine
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tool Industry, however, Is firmly in the political arena for two main 
reasons: (a) senior executives and politicians have vivid memories of 
the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation (IRC) and the subsequent 
demise of Alfred Herbert as national champion, and (b) there have been 
calls for protectionism to reduce Japanese Imports and a controversial 
subsidy was given to Yamazaki's Investment 1n a UK manufacturing plant. 
In the case of the IRC and Alfred Herbert, there is fair consensus of 
opinion among all stakeholders in the industry that this was Government 
Intervention at Its worst and should not be repeated. Recent experience 
of similar Intervention in the French Industry reinforces this view.
Though observers often point to the Japanese model of government 
Intervention, economic development and inward technology transfer; 1t Is 
time-bound and unrealistic in the UK context of the 1980's in three key 
respects: (a) the Japanese Government cacooned their machine tool 
Industry in import tariffs and quotas, (b) they excluded Inward foreign 
direct investment, and (c) they closely controlled the type of 
technology selected for indigenous development and acquisition. 
Protectionism beyond the Imposition of the "voluntary" limit on Imports 
would be anathema to current Conservative party ideology. While formal 
tariffs or quotas may gain a temporary breathing space for UK-based 
machine tool manufacturers, there 1s a strong argument that such action 
would penalise machine tool users and be Impossible to enforce within 
the EEC. On the wisdom of attracting a major Japanese producer, the 
same arguments are appearing as when the first wave of US machine tool 
manufacturers came to Europe 1n the 1950's and 60's. Opinion is divided 
between those who are affected directly and those who, after weighing 
the pros and cons, marginally favour Japanese plants sited in the UK 
than elsewhere in the EEC.
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It must be concluded from this research study that executives would not 
welcome more direct "hands on" intervention from Government, such as 
might be implicit in sectoral planning and subsequent rationalisation of 
the industry. In contrast, DTI initiatives such as "Support for 
Innovation" and its successor, "Research & Technology", have been 
received favourably; suggesting that there is considerable opportunity 
for government and industry to jointly devise schemes which build on 
past successes. The following criticisms concerning DTI initiatives 
emerged from this research:
(a) Most DTI schemes have emphasised "technology push" to the relative 
neglect of market aspects of technology. Applicants for funding 
are required to establish commercial viability of their proposals; 
but in many cases, market surveys lack substance and have been 
used to justify product decisions already taken. This is 
notoriously difficult for an external assessor to detect. 
Nevertheless, more detailed scrutiny of market potential and the 
resources allocated to commercial exploitation and sustaining 
presence in markets should be a feature of future initiatives.
(b) DTI advisory schemes have remedied temporary shortfalls in key 
skills (eg marketing, design, quality) and many executives took 
advantage of this form of subsidised consultancy. This seems to 
be as far as the DTI is prepared to go in the skills area; mainly 
leaving continuing education, training and human resource issues 
to other government departments or individual companies. Such 
fragmentation is partly responsible for the poor appreciation of 
managerial components of technology.
(c) In cooperation with UK commercial attaches and counsellors in
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foreign countries, notably the US and Japan, the DTI provides an 
excellent business Intelligence service for companies wishing to 
locate potential partners overseas. For those who have not sought 
assistance, a perceptual problem must be overcome: executives are 
often reluctant to Involve themselves with bureaucratic government 
departments and are put off by their Inability to offer 
"problem-specific" assistance. Consequently, the service Is 
under-utilised and mls-represented. The spectre of Europe 1992 
provides a testing example of DTI accessibility and further 
judgement will be made by executives on Its ability to live up to 
the claims of Its promotion campaign.
(d) Two further operational factors continue to Inhibit the
effectiveness of DTI Intervention: firstly, the lack of continuity 
of staff and schemes; and secondly, the requirement for staff to 
be active across too many fronts. Many executives praised DTI 
officials for their competence and tenacity against adversity; but 
there was an over-whelming feeling that as soon as experience 1s 
accumulated, officials will be moved on and schemes substantially 
modified or abandoned. The five-month moratorium placed on 
financial support for Innovation 1n 1984/85 1s a case 1n point.
My own dealings with DTI officials throughout the 1980's confirm 
this view.
The main hope for DTI Intervention lies In the opportunity for officials 
to become more attuned to the kind of strategic problems facing 
particular groups of companies. In this sense, 1t Is suggested that the 
classification "machine tool Industry" may be redundant and have led to 
partial views of competitiveness. Rethinking competitive situations 1n 
more holistic terms, such as networks of relationships, may well provide
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a better focus on Individual inputs and Interactions than the arbitrary 
notion of an Industry. Grouping machine tool manufacturers, users, 
systems integrators, specifiers, sub-contractors, component suppliers, 
etc., would be a useful starting point. To-date, the motor vehicle 
manufacturers and Government defence procurement executive have used 
their purchasing power to convene such groupings. There are many other 
smaller groupings with less dominant lead users which would benefit from 
external intervention to provide a forum for discussion and to stimulate 
collaboration. This Is consistent with DTI Initiatives 1n "enabling" 
technologies and does not treat technology 1n Isolation from context and 
envi ronment.
At the time of writing, the Research £ Technology Initiative 1s turning 
more towards funding collaborative ventures, particularly within the 
EEC. It Is imperative that DTI officials understand the antecedents to 
collaboration and the sensitivities underlying any attempt to prise 
machine tool manufacturers away from their narrow concept of machine 
tools as metal cuttlng/formlng/handl1ng devices. The last point 1s not 
just a question of "systems thinking" related to the convergence of 
technologies, It 1s part of wider problems of strategic re-orientation 
and internationalisation of markets.
5.3 IS THERE A ROLE FOR INDUSTRY-LEVEL ORGANISATIONS?
Following on from the previous discussion, 1t would appear that the gap 
between Government and Individual manufacturers 1s wide. Indeed, at 
several points In this study, the roles of Industry bodies such as the 
Machine Tool Trades Association (MTTA) and Machine Tool Industry 
Research Association (MTIRA) have been criticised for their 
fragmentation and lack of lobbying power; and wider representation
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through the National Economic Development Office (NEDO) and the now 
defunct Manpower Services Commission (MSC) for falling to provide any 
real dialogue with Government. The MTTA has provided a poor service to 
Its members and vice versa. Its Inability to resolve the continuing 
dilemma of simultaneously voicing the views of both Indigenous 
manufacturers and Importers has won It no friends. The MTIRA has 
belatedly widened Its scope Into user problem-solving, thereby placing 
1t in competition with other research associations; but the separation 
of commercial and technical representation remains questionable 1n the 
competitive climate anticipated In the 1990's.
A cursory examination of various Industry bodies Immediately reveals 
that most exist to promote sectional Interests. In contrast, NEDO is 
worthy of special mention because, like the MSC, 1t was set up as a 
tripartite organisation comprising government, Industry and trade 
unions. Despite criticism of Its Sector Working Parties degenerating 
Into a 'talking shop' and their 'lack of teeth', NEDO 1s one of the few 
organisations to have approached strategic Issues 1n a balanced way. It 
has commissioned a number of excellent Industry reports 1n the past and 
1n 1989 launched a useful diagnostic aid to company performance called 
"The Innovation Management Tool Kit". Unfortunately, the Conservative 
Government has not embraced the philosophy of NEDO and Its future, at 
least In Its present form, seems uncertain. Similar political 
uncertainty surrounded the MSC and Industry Training Boards which also 
suffered from the lack of staff continuity and diluted effort 
characteristic of the DTI.
The principle of placing problem ownership with Individual companies 1s 
sound In theory but what 1f executives do not recognise that they have a 
strategic problem? Whatever the party political stance, there Is a need
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for an adequately funded, stable body, Independent or quasi-government, 
which carries sufficient credibility to act as an external catalyst for 
change and 1s able to coordinate a campaign to stimulate strategic 
reorientation. Taking Into account all facets of the need to tackle 
the product-driven paradigm 1n machine tool manufacturing SBUs, the 
external body most likely to succeed 1s the Engineering Council (EC).
The EC was set up within the period of office of the present Government 
and thus carries political acceptability. It 1s an existing body 
representing professional and technician-engineers, thereby obviating 
the creation of a new body which might take a long time to set up and 
only increase fragmentation. The EC has within Its terms of reference: 
general management capability and the effective use of design, 
production and marketing resources. It 1s already successfully 
promoting multi-disciplinary approaches to International competitiveness 
and continuing education for managers, and specifically, the use of the 
"technical review" as a planning tool for which 1t has received DTI 
funding. Any Initiatives 1n management development would necessarily 
have to be aimed at the broad range of engineering Industries to attract 
Government funding, rather than narrowly targetted at machine tools. 
There 1s no reason to believe that other engineering Industries have a 
lesser need. The EC 1s well placed to penetrate Individual companies 
because It can use professional Identity as a platform for Intervention. 
The Director General Is known to be sympathetic to this view and willing 
to work alongside Industry bodies such as the MTTA and centres of 
excellence 1n the organisational development field.
5.4 INTERVENTIONS AT CORPORATE LEVEL
Investigation of the corporate/SBU Interface was highlighted as an
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important shortcoming of this study. The more this interface was 
probed, the more the methodology appeared inadequate for handling the 
complexity and dynamics of relationships. The residual feeling, having 
completed research in the 75 per cent of SBUs in which this was 
relevant, was one of having merely scratched the surface.
A sufficient number of Issues emerged to indicate that this 1s a fertile 
area for further research, with the related topics of corporate/business 
planning systems and capital Investment decisions offering possible 
vehicles for 1n-depth analysis over time. Such research might, for 
example, explore propositions on the composition and political behaviour 
of corporate and business unit boards of directors, the compatibility of 
financial and technological criteria, and various Inhibitors to 
strategic choice and resource allocation. This would almost certainly 
require re-opening the debate on the appropriateness of SBUs In a 
dynamic economic and technological environment.
One particular topic worthy of empirical research at the corporate level 
is the possibility that changes of ownership and/or management may 
facilitate strategic change. Incoming owners/managers typically possess 
a legitimate mandate for change, at least for a limited period. Having 
rejected direct Government Intervention 1n restructuring the industry, 
then any changes must either be left to market forces or await corporate 
responses such as divestment of SBUs to more dynamic owners and 
management buyouts. It 1s possible to point to two successful buyouts 
in this research {Verson International and Bridgeport) and several 
others in which the experience has been mixed.
5.5 INTERVENTIONS AT BUSINESS UNIT LEVEL
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There 1s little doubt that machine tool manufacturing companies 1n the 
UK are 1n need of strategic reorientation. The traditional prescription 
for achieving this reorientation would be to devise some form of 
organisatlon/management development programme based largely on team 
building. Such programmes typically commence with an exploration of the 
prevailing attitudes, values, beliefs and aspirations held by senior 
executives; aimed at establishing their dominant "world view". It would 
then be necessary to use various re-fram1ng and surfacing techniques 1n 
order to challenge deeply rooted assumptions underlying their 
conventional wisdom and move towards a shared vision of the future. 
Beyond this, generalisations are unhelpful and the appropriate 
Intervention must take Into account differing magnitudes and time 
scales of the task, receptivity towards change and the capability of 
senior executives to manage change programmes.
The difficulty 1n machine tools lies 1n bringing about change In an 
Industry possessing a poor record of Investment and struggling to 
attract high calibre people. Yet beneath this depressing facade, tny 
research has Identified pockets of capability and enthusiasm waiting to 
be released. Indeed, I was frequently Impressed by the outstanding 
abilities of certain Individuals across the full range of SBUs. They 
were to be found 1n general management, 1n all functions and at all 
levels, no matter how progressive or laggardly the SBU overall. Within 
their own function, these same people often showed a remarkable capacity 
for Improvisation, as evidenced In their response to customisation and 
tenacity to make things work under severe resource constraints.
Many observers have tended to view this propensity for Improvisation In 
a pejorative way (1e as Indicative of sloppiness, Inconsistency and out 
of control). Viewed from another angle, this represents tolerance for
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adaptation and these people may be the potential catalysts for change. 
Their location In the organisation would emerge from an audit of human 
resources. The organisational development task would then become one of 
releasing stored up energy 1n an organisational setting 1n which others 
around them, Including senior executives, may not necessarily perceive 
there to be a problem. This again highlights two facets of strategic 
management capability: (a) problem recognition on the part of top 
managers, which may require an external stimulus, and (b) the ability to 
diagnose and manage sensitive socio-political processes. Two 
exemplorary cases of strategic reorientation were found among machine 
tool manufacturers (1e Verson International and Bridgeport) and there 
are parallel developments taking place elsewhere which provide external 
benchmarks as well as grounds for optimism.
Take, for example, attempts by ICL to build general management skills 
and Improve communication across functional Interfaces. One simple 
feature of ICL's development programme has been their encouragement of 
mult1-d1sc1pl1nary teamwork and 'co-location' through bringing people 1n 
different disciplines together 1n close geographical proximity. Similar 
interventions Involving team building are known to be proceeding 
successfully at Lucas Industries. At Honeywell Bull and Black £ Decker 
I have Inside knowledge of what can be achieved In changing Internal 
culture to accept the Implementation of organisation-wide systems such 
as marketing planning, quality management and customer service. The 
common Ingredients of success 1n these two companies would appear to be:
(a) a clear vision of what Is required in business terms, (b) top 
management Involvement 1n Implementation, (c) detailed attention to 
responsibilities, procedures and re-training, and (d) a sense of 
leadership by top management. Clearly, these limited examples suggest 
that executives 1n machine tool manufacturing companies must be urged to
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widen their domain and learn from experiences elsewhere. Closer 
relationships with some of their more progressive customers and 
suppliers would provide a useful starting point.
5.6 INTERVENTION AT FUNCTIONAL LEVEL
Team building within functions might Improve hierarchical communications 
and facilitate a more focussed approach but there 1s an Inherent danger 
1n pursuing this line too far In that greater cohesiveness may merely 
reinforce existing values and beliefs. Without an infusion of new blood 
and extensive personal development of existing staff 1n some SBUs, 
Improvements In effectiveness may be impossible or simply take too long. 
This Is not to advocate "scare tactics" but more drastic measures are 
necessary in some long-established SBUs to eradicate complacency before 
the next downturn in the economy.
Functional interventions, therefore, should centre on the need for 
continuing education, retraining and recruitment of staff. While this 
calls for management and personal development programmes of a highly 
situational nature, several common themes may be highlighted:
(a) Engineerlng/Technlcal Function: The priorities for development of 
product engineers 1n most SBUs are managerial rather than 
technical. Keeping abreast of technical advances 1s vitally 
Important and there will always be a need for technical updating. 
The problem 1s that much of the progress has been fragmented and 
of questionable cost-effectiveness. Product engineers must be 
encouraged to scan external developments on a wider front and 
become more receptive to International sources of technology.
There 1s little point 1n allocating scarce resources to projects
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which reproduce what is already available quicker and cheaper 
elsewhere.
The cost of the product engineering activity 1n machine tools 1s 
small in relation to its impact on the overall business. Product 
engineers need to become much more aware of their cross-functional 
responsibilities and their contribution to competitive advantage. 
There 1s an urgent requirement to manage the conversion of 
technical success Into commercial success.
(b) Marketing/Sales: Staff in this function were heavily criticised 
for adopting a tactical role and their lack of professionalism.
The skills deficiency 1s widespread 1n the Industry and requires a 
more determined effort to raise standards than Is possible through 
DTI consultancy schemes. Market research, commercial negotiation, 
product/market segmentation and positioning stand out as priority 
areas, especially In small SBUs operating In multiple niches.
While most executives had conducted market surveys of some kind 
prior to the Introduction of new models, little attention was paid 
to customer-based perceptions of product attrlbutes/beneflts and 
competitor dynamics. It should be noted that weaknesses 1n 
competitor analysis have a dual effect In the context of this 
research: knowledge of competitors is essential not only to 
Identify and exploit differential advantage, but also to Identify 
potential partners for collaboration.
Marketing was at Its worst In companies drifting towards higher 
levels of customisation where, despite widening product/market 
scope, there was a tendency to think of differentiation as 
unchanged and for It to be subsumed under what they believed to be
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"customer-orientation". Many sales engineers, for example, were 
being asked to take on higher level sales development and 
problem-solving with little or no re-training. Nothing short of a 
major education and training progranme will remedy these 
shortcomings.
(c) Product1on/Manufactur1ng: Substantial support was found for the 
view that the production function 1s Inward looking and carries 
low status, that managers join the strategy debate late and this 
puts them in "response mode". It 1s possible to state with 
confidence that 1n most SBUs the quality of representation at 
board level left much to be desired. Few production directors 
appeared to play an active part 1n strategy formulation. They 
offered little direction and their managers were Invariably 
Involved in "firefighting", feeling unable to find a way out of 
their short-term predicament. The presence of certain competent 
individuals 1n key jobs was observed to 11ft the status of 
productlon/manufacturing from Its generally low level throughout 
the Industry. Upgrading the quality of production management and 
manufacturing systems expertise 1s deemed to be critical, whether 
pursuing strategies based on low cost production of standard 
machines or cost containment 1n customised machines.
Many of the aforementioned deficiencies can be alleviated by selective 
formal business training, either via open or 1n-company programnes. A 
less tractable problem Is the downward spiral In which executives are 
reluctant to Instigate Internal retraining, fearing loss of key staff 
such as sales engineers, manufacturing systems engineers, software 
specialists, once they have updated their capability. Yet at the same 
time, these executives were found to be poaching staff from competitors
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and other engineering companies. This is a national problem, extending 
beyond the remit of the current research. The serious Implication for 
machine tool manufacturers is that they are perceived to be among the 
least attractive employers for the range of commercial and technical 
skills In most demand. Once again, Government Intervention 1s required 
to break the spiral, anticipate future problems and Initiate training 
programmes.
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6. RECOMMENDATIONS
6.1 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR UK GOVERNMENT:
(a) Continue the policy of minimal structural Intervention, 
emphasising the Government's role of creating a soclal/lndustrlal 
climate conducive to change, offering selective support for 
awareness campaigns and the adoption of "enabling" technologies.
(b) Department of Trade & Industry (DTI) Initiatives should place 
greater emphasis on market feasibility and the "application" of 
machine tool technologies.
(c) International aspects of business should permeate all DTI 
Initiatives. This to Include a higher profile for the Overseas 
Technical Information Unit, Improved collation of international 
statistics, special funding for overseas Industry tours 
(especially for young managers).
(d) DTI "Enterprise" schemes should be extended to Include consultancy 
on technology acqulsltlon/transfer. This Is especially Important 
In the case of small companies. The Support for Innovation scheme 
requires extension of Its current limited scope of 1ntra-EEC 
collaboration, to Include collaboration with any appropriate 
foreign partner.
(e) The DTI should convene "market development" seminars on Issues of 
current Interest to particular groups of companies. These could 
Include : joint ventures within the EEC, export consortia
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approaches, market IntelHgertce, Eastern Europe etc.
6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INDUSTRY ORGANISATIONS:
(a) The Engineering Council (EC) must take a stronger role In the 
professional development of Its members In the spirit of the 
Flnnlston Report. The EC should raise its visibility as the 
national body representing professional engineers by campaigning 
for additional funding and proposing selected Interventions aimed 
at the regeneration of key sectors of engineering. Such 
interventions should be primarily focussed on training and 
developing the human resource base.
(b) The Machine Tool Trades Association (MTTA) should merge with other 
related organisations such as the Advanced Manufacturing 
Technology Research Institute (formerly Machine Tool Industry 
Research Association), British Robot Association, Metal Forming 
Machinery Makers Association, Association of Machine Tool 
Merchants, Production Engineering Research Association etc.
Industry representation In the UK is too fragmented. The ultimate 
model 1s the powerful Verband Deutscher Masch1nen-und Anlagenbau 
(VDMA) 1n West Germany.
6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MACHINE TOOL MANUFACTURERS:
(a) The first priority Is for chief executives, managing directors and 
divisional directors to take a more strategic approach to their 
role as general managers. This quality, of thinking and acting
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strategically, 1s a pre-requisite to effective and efficient 
business operations. The leading business schools cater for this 
need in their senior management programmes.
(b) General management capability must be developed among functional 
directors, not only because they carry board level 
responsibilities but also to aid succession planning. This could 
be handled pro-actively by participating 1n some combination of 
"open" or tailored 1n-company programmes offered by business 
schools and seconding staff to special assignments of a business 
development nature.
(c) Management training for executives and senior specialists 1n the 
three main functions of sales, product engineering and production 
Is required to break down barriers at functional interfaces. This 
would normally Involve teambuilding and Inter-personal skills 
training as part of an Integrated management/organlsatlonal 
development programme.
(d) There Is a need for managers at all levels to become more 
Internationally-orientated. Foreign parents/subsldiarles, 
llcensors/Hcensees and joint venture partners possess the 
opportunity for an Interchange of staff. UK companies with no 
formal overseas contacts must encourage visits to International 
trade shows, export tours and participation 1n overseas trade 
delegations. In-company workshops and briefings on International 
business are also useful ways of exposing staff to recent 
developments. Specifically, deficiencies have been Identified 1n 
the areas of EEC competition law, Intellectual property, joint 
venture strategies, commercial negotiation skills and languages.
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(e) At the functional level, priority should be given to general 
marketing and manufacturing engineering skills.
The recommendations from this research may be generalised to product- 
driven manufacturing companies In certain other engineering Industries 
(eg capital equipment manufacturers In printing, textiles, mining, food 
processing, chemical processing, etc). These are highly cyclic and 
heterogenous Industries 1n which product specifications and varying 
degrees of customisation are typical. It should be noted that much of 
n\y recent professional activities are 1n these types of company. Less 
confidence 1s attached to expectations of similar behaviour 1n larger 
companies In mass produced standard products (eg motor vehicles, 
consumer electronics, white goods) where sales and production may well 
dominate internal power relationships.
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APPENDIX A DETAILED METHODOLOGY
This Appendix provides supporting data on the research sample and 
questionnaires outlined 1n Section 3.
A. 1 THE SAMPLE OF MACHINE TOOL MANUFACTURERS
The exploratory research study identified 330 suppliers of machine tools 
in the UK in 1984, of which 205 could be classified as manufacturers. 
These manufacturers are broken down into the five technological segments 
in Table 19:
Table 19. Breakdown of Suppliers of Machine Tools By Machine Tool 
Technology for the Years 1979 and 1984
Estimated Number of Estimated Number of
Suppliers 1n UK Manufacturers 1 n UK
1979 1984 1979 1984
Turni ng 185 150 80 47
Milling 161 149 58 30
Gri ndi ng 116 114 38 29
Metal Forming 112 70 53 34
Automation 
(Inc. robots) 132 251 111 195
Total 351 330 221 205
Notes : The term "suppliers" includes all Import distributorships, 
sales subsidiaries of foreign manufacturers, and UK-based 
manufacturers. It should be noted that some UK-based 
manufacturers hold distributorships. By example, the above 
table should be read as follows: there were 150 suppliers of 
turning machines 1n the UK 1n 1984, of which 47 were 
manufacturing in the UK.
Source: Directories, Trade Show Handbooks, Direct Mail Lists.
From the population of 205 manufacturers, 65 were approached In the 
course of this research, of which 54 agreed to cooperate. The breakdown 
of the sample by UK and US ownership 1s shown 1n Table 20. A further 
breakdown by machine tool technology 1s presented 1n Table 21.
Table 20. Breakdown of Sample of SBUs by Ownership and Response
Sample Size Number of SBUs Response
of SBUs Interviewed (%)
UK-owned SBUs 46 36 78
US-owned SBUs 19 18 95
55 5T 55
From Table 20 it can be seen that the response rate 1n the case of
UK-owned SBUs was lower (78%) than with US-owned SBUs (951). This may
be attributed to the generally higher level of interest 1n International
technology transfer in the latter and,, possibly, their prior knowledge
that I would be visiting the USA at some later date.
Table 21. Breakdown of Sample of SBUs by Ownership and Machine Tool
Technology
UK-Owned US-Owned Total
SBUs SBUs
Turning 11 8 19
Milling 9 7 16
Grinding 7 3 10
Metal Forming 7 4 11
Automation 12 6 18
Notes : (a) 18 SBUs 1n the sample were manufacturing machines in more
than one technological segment.
(b) 20 of the 36 UK-owned SBUs had contractual links with
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foreign companies for the Inward transfer of technological 
know-how.
(c) 16 of the 18 US-owned SBUs had formal Inward marketing and
manufacturing agreements with their parent company and 3 
SBUs had agreements with unrelated licensors. The parent 
company of one SBU was not active in machine tool 
manufacture in the USA.
A.2 THE NON-RESPONSE
The following reasons were given by executives in the 11 non-responding
SBUs for not wishing to be interviewed:
(a) One managing director and one divisional director politely refused 
due to 'pressures of work'.
(b) Two managing directors and one divisional director (1n the only 
non-responding US-owned SBU) did not actually refuse but showed 
their reluctance by giving a series of excuses over the telephone 
as to why an Interview date could not be given. These companies 
were known to be In strategic trouble. One further company was 
placed for sale 1n late 1984 and another went into receivership 
within three months of last contact.
(c) One managing director of an SBU active In licensing replied 
immediately 1n writing that:
'....1t Is not our policy to divulge details of our license
arrangements under any circumstances --- Our only comment
would be that we have had numerous license agreements over 
the past 30-35 years 1n many different areas of technology. 
We have always found them successful where they have given 
the licensor access to a satisfactory revenue and ourselves 
access to good technology at a price cheaper and less risky 
than internal development'.
(d) One managing director said that inward licensing was not relevant
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to his company's operations and he had no interest in my research 
programme.
(e) An interview with one managing director was arranged and later 
cancelled due to the company calling in the receiver after the 
date had been agreed. I was turned away at the factory gate.
Three other SBUs had been selected in the sample but went into 
receivership before being approached.
A.3 HOMOGENEITY
During the first stage of Interviews 1t was possible to meet the Head in 
45 of the 54 SBUs studied, representing 82 per cent of the target 
respondents. This is considered to be a set of respondents of 
acceptable homogeneity. Second and third choice respondents were the 
engineerlng/technical director and marketing or manufacturing directors 
respectively.
In only 3 cases was the true Head of the SBU wrongly Identified 
Initially. This became apparent during questioning, when 1t was clear 
that strategic decisions were made at a higher level. The material from 
these Interviews was relegated to background Information and personal 
Interviews held at a later date with the appropriate person.
In 2 cases the Head of SBU was deliberately not Interviewed because they 
were recent external appointments and deemed to have Insufficient 
knowledge of the company and Industry to provide meaningful answers at 
that time.
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Of the 4 remaining Heads not interviewed, two were regarded by their 
senior managers and sales representatives as 'inaccessible' to outsiders 
such as academics and the press. The remaining 2 Heads were absent from 
the office over the period when I had grouped interviews for 
geographical convenience. None of these 4 Heads was averse to allowing 
senior colleagues to be interviewed.
A. 4 MODES OF INWARD TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
The research was restricted to the "inward" flow of foreign machine tool 
technology into the UK via three formal modes - direct investment, joint 
ventures and licensing arrangements. Other transfers may result from 
the outright purchase of technology, consultancy, technical service 
agreements, subcontracting etc., and indirectly through technology 
embodied in imported machines, components and equipment. Indirect 
transfers were considered only when they formed a vital contribution to 
formal technology packages. Conceptually, all three formal modes of 
transfer have one theme in common - the inward flow of technology.
Research of this kind does not have a tidy starting point. It involves 
intervention and picking up the threads of continuing relationships 
where there is cumulative experience and "sunk" costs of setting up 
subsidiaries, joint ventures and licensing arrangements. Moreover, each 
of the three modes require investigation of the role of foreign 
ownership and control: (a) because these constrain strategic choice; and 
(b) since industrial property rights are involved, there are 
implications for the "permanence" of technology transfers to the UK.
The classification of transfer inodes is not a simple process. It is 
more realistic to view transfer inodes as lying on a continuum, with the
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possibility of equity participation and various contractual arrangements 
existing in all three modes as follows:
(a) Licensing Is a negotiated "leasing" arrangement for the transfer 
of technology rights between the foreign supplier (licensor) and 
the UK recipient (licensee). The two parties are normally 
independent, giving an "arms length" relationship. They may also 
be related by small equity stakes and, 1n some cases, may share 
technology by entering into cross-licensing agreements.
(b) Joint ventures are negotiated collaborative arrangements which may 
be of a contractual nature and/or Involve the formation of a joint 
company with various levels of equity holding. Executive control 
may reside with the dominant share-holder but this is often offset 
by the technology-contributing partner retaining ownership of the 
technology rights by licensing the joint company.
(c) Direct Investment Involves the "internalisation" or intra-company 
transfer of technology. Foreign parent companies and their 
divisions frequently operate licence agreements or management/ 
technical service agreements with their UK affiliates. Even 
though the UK recipient may be a wholly-owned subsidiary, the 
separation of ownership of the technology 1s claimed to be 
desirable by foreign parent companies to preserve autonomy among 
divisions, to provide a channel for the remission of royalties 
(Irrespective of whether the subsidiary is profitable) and as a 
safeguard against the nationalistic tendencies of host 
governments.
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A.5 QUESTIONNAIRES AND LISTS OF DISCUSSION ISSUES
A.51 Semi-Structured Questionnaire Used With All Heads of SBU
Preamble: describe my personal background/experience. Outline the 
research brief: emphasise confidentiality, anonymity and non-alignment 
with competitors.
Would you please describe your company and its activities?
(eg ownership, structure, organisation at board level, functional 
responsibilities, age/experience/education of board members, events that 
have shaped the company and Its direction)
How many people were employed by your company:
(a) In mid-1979 (pre-recession) (b) at date of interview?
What are your main products? (order of importance)
Who do you regard as your main competitors?
(national, international, order of importance, probe knowledge of 
competitors and how they are monitored)
How often do you hold formal board meetings?
(explore who attends, length of meetings, interaction, importance of 
Informal meetings)
What items would typically be on the agenda?
(request example of last meeting, note top five Items)
Has the agenda changed much in recent years?
(Impact of recession, financial pressures, introducing new technology)
Do you have formal business planning procedures?
(existence of document, standard format, time horizons, performance 
criteria, who coordinates the plan)
In what way 1s technology Introduced/dlscussed at board meetings?
What are your company's current technological strengths?
Have there been any significant breakthroughs in technology 1n your 
company over the last five years? (examples, perception of leadership/ 
followership)
What technological strengths will your company need 1n say 10 years 
time?
What do you find Is the main constraint on your company 1n keeping 
abreast of technological developments? (request examples, how does he 
monitor technological change)
- 278 -
How important are inputs from your component suppliers and 
sub-contractors? (examples)
How important are inputs from your customers?
(examples, importance of specifications/procedures)
How do new products typically start off in your company?
(examples, time scales, product/process development, market research)
Is it necessary to have an order before you start the design of a new 
product? (extent of standardisation/customisation, cash constraints)
Have you considered and/or taken up any of the DTI's financial support 
schemes for product design/development?
Has the DTI's SEFIS II scheme proved useful to your company 1n 
stimulating demand?
Are "experience/learning" curves important 1n your operations?
(explore views on cost reduction)
Do you think that "reverse engineering" 1s prevalent among machine tool 
manufacturers? (explore value engineering/analysis)
Do you manufacture overseas?
If yes, through wholly-owned subsidiaries, parent company, associate 
companies, joint ventures? (countries)
If no, explain why not (any bad experiences)
Do you export overseas?
If yes, through wholly-owned sales offices, parent company, assodate 
companies, joint ventures, agents/d1stributors? (countries)
If no, why not? (any bad experiences)
Do you hold Import agencies/distributorships?
If yes, for which products and countries?
If no, why not? (any bad experiences)
Are there any other factors that Impinged on your decision to take an 
Import agency? (consideration of alternatives, eg developing their own 
product. Inward licensing, acquisitions)
Do you have any policy guidelines on the acceptable mix of 
manufacturlng/export/import operations?
(corporate constraints)
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How often have your Board members made overseas visits in the past two 
years?
To Europe To Japan To USA
Managing director: ....  ....  ....
Marketing/Sales director: ....  ....  ....
Engineering/Technical director: ....  ....  ....
Manufacturing/Production director: ....  ....  ....
Others: ....  ....  ....
Did your company exhibit or send delegates to any of the following 
recent trade shows?
As Exhibitor As Visitor Number of Delegates
Chicago:
Hanover:
Osaka:
Paris:
A.52 Semi-Structured Questionnaire Used With UK Heads of SBU Only.
The British Government is encouraging direct investment by foreign 
machine tool manufacturers in the UK. Is this a good thing for the home 
industry?
Inward licensing and other forms of collaboration are also being 
encouraged. Are these worthwhile?
(a) to the country (b) to the licensee?
(probe respondent's knowledge of UK licensing activities)
Is your company: (a) a licensee, (b) a licensor, (c) a partner 1n cross- 
licensing, (c) a joint venture partner?
Should the British Government act as a technology "marriage broker" 1n 
some way?
A.53 Semi-Structured Questionnaire Used With Heads of UK Subsidiaries of 
US Parent Companies Only
Is there a licence agreement In existence between your division and your 
US parent company? (any other form of agreement, eg 
management/technlcal )
Are you required to take on your parent company's product designs and 
know-how? (explore standardisatlon/customisation of designs,
Interchange of staff, value of know-how)
Do you pay your parent company a royalty or some other fee on the 
technology?
Is the flow of expertise one-way or both ways?
(test perception of "poor relation", examples of inward/outward flow of
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know-how, cooperation/conflict)
Are you free to look outside your parent company for technology? 
(examples)
If yes, does your parent company impose criteria?
If no, how do you feel about this constraint?
Have there been Instances of technology originating elsewhere in your 
Group being transferred to the UK (eg form a sister company, central R&D 
laboratory)?
A.54 Record of Inward Licensing
Licensee: .......... Year of signing:..........
Licensor: .......... Duration:..........(ine. extensions)
Products/processes:..........
Who is responsible for licensing In your company (job title)?
Who negotiated the agreement?
How did you know that the technology was available through licensing? 
Who Instigated the licence:
(a) your own company, (b) the licensor, or (c) other?
How many potential licensors were there?
How many licensors did you assess:
(a) initially, (b) short 11st?
What particular features of the licensor attracted you to them?
What particular features of your company do you think made you 
attractive as a licensee?
Why did you seek a licence?
Which of the following Items are covered by the licence?
(a) patents, (b) trade marks (licensor's mark, joint mark, own mark),
(c) designs, (d) know-how, and (d) other (name).
Form of payment:
(a) down payment, (b) progress payment(s), (c) single payment for full 
package, (d) minimum royalty, (e) running royalty (basis for 
calculation), and (f) fixed sum per unit of output?
Is there In existence a separate technical service or management 
contract?
What territorial restrictions has the licensor Imposed? 
(eg exclusivity in manufacturing/sales)
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Is there a "grant-back" clause whereby licensor and licensee agree to 
exchange details on product/process Improvements? (examples)
Has the licensor applied "tie clauses" (1nc. ex-agreement) concerning 
the Import of key equipment, raw materials and components from himself 
and/or a named supplier?
Are you selling the licensed product(s) back to the licensor?
What proportion of the total manufacturing cost of the licensed product 
1s accounted for by bought-1n materials and components?
At the time of signing the agreement, had your company the resources to 
design/develop the product In-house?
What was the estimated cost and time period 1f you had opted for 
1n-house development?
How did you assess the value of the licence package?
(explore the process of "unpackaging" and weightings attached to each 
component).
What was the time period from the decision to go-ahead in the product 
area to actually signing the agreement?
What was the time period from signing the licence to first sale of the 
product:
(a) for machines Initially Imported from the licensor,
(b) for machines assembled from kits supplied by the licensor,
(c) for machines manufactured in the UK?
What were the main problems In adopting/adaptlng the licensed 
technology? (examples)
What were the benefits? (examples)
Did the licence require expansion of your facilities?
Did the licence Introduce any new methods of working? (examples)
What proportion of your total sales 1n machine tools manufactured In the 
UK 1s based on licensed products?
Based on your experience to-date, would you I1cence-1n technology again? 
Is your view shared by other Board members?
What would you do If the licensor withdrew the licence?
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A.55 Issues Explored During Informal Interviews with:
(a) UK Functional Directors and Senior Managers, and
(b) UK Middle Managers, Sales Engineers, Applications Engineers
Experience, career progressslon, external activities, overseas visits. 
Perceptions of their role.
Impact of recession, sales trends, competitors activities.
Extent of standardisatlon/customisation.
Cross-functional Interaction.
Relationships with suppliers, sub-contractors, customers. 
Product/process development.
Attitudes towards foreign technology.
Relationships with parent/Hcensor (where appropriate).
Content of licence agreements (where appropriate). 
Evaluation/negotiatlon of licence agreements (where appropriate). 
Technical matters.
A.56 Issues Explored During Informal Interviews With US Vice-Presidents 
and Senior Managers
Trends in US market.
US/UK relationships.
The technology transfer process.
Location of research/deslgn/development facilities. 
Technical matters.
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APPENDIX B SUPPORTING DATA/ANALYSIS ON TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY AND INWARD 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
This Appendix provides supporting data and analysis for the themes 
explored under the working propositions In Section 4, with particular 
reference to industry/company performance and the process of technology 
transfer.
B.l THE UK MACHINE TOOL INDUSTRY
B.ll An Overview of Competitive Performance
Since approximately 40-45 per cent of machine tool production enters the 
world market, it Is clear that the competitive performance of the UK 
Industry must be assessed on an International basis. The following 
observations relate to the comparative statistics presented 1n Tables 
39-43 at the end of this Appendix:
(a) the UK has fallen from the position of fourth largest world 
producer and exporter 1n 1965 to eigth and seventh respectively 1n 
1987;
(b) West Germany has maintained a long term position of strength as 
both a producer and exporter;
(c) Japan has emerged as the main challenge to West German supremacy, 
largely at the expense of the USA;
(d) there has been a dramatic rise 1n Import penetration In all 
machine tool producing countries, except In Japan;
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(e) Japanese and West German producers have maintained a high level of 
patenting activity in the important US market.
Trends in the UK machine tool industry are captured in Tables 44-53.
The following observations may be made on these statistics:
(a) in real terms the UK industry is in long term decline;
(b) UK production by value has fallen by almost one half in real terms 
since the peak year of 1969/70 and employment reduced by 56 per 
cent between 1978 and 1988;
(c) the UK has become a net importer from 1984 onwards;
(d) the EEC is an increasingly important source of imports and 
destination of exports.
Figure 4  illustrates the cyclicality of machine tool order intake, 
showing the peak years of 1969, 1973 and 1979, followed by considerable 
decline thereafter.
At the level of individual segments of the industry, it can be seen from 
Table 49 that UK production of turning machines has declined by 67 per 
cent in real terms over the 1980's, grinding by 62 per cent, metal 
forming and automation equipment by 54 per cent. Only the milling 
segment has shown recovery to the peak year of 1979/80. UK performance 
in turning and milling may be expected to improve substantially as the 
Yamazaki plant reaches its design capacity of 1200 machines per year in 
the early 1990's.
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From the above observations it can be seen that the 1980's has been one 
of the most turbulent decades in the history of the UK machine tool 
industry, it began with an unprecedented downturn in the order cycle, 
followed by a period of retrenchment and then developed into a prolonged 
struggle to catch up on world best-practice.
B.12 The Critical Influence of Developments in Control Systems on 
Technology Strategy
The basic principles of the main metal cutting, forming and workpiece 
handling processes have been known for many years. Machines 
incorporating these processes have evolved partly through "technology 
push" by manufacturers combining the technologies of mechanical 
engineering, electronics and confuting; and partly by "market pull" 
from users demanding improvements in performance and efficiency.
It was possible in the 1930's to envisage the general direction in which 
machine tool technologies were going and by the 1950's, the concept of 
the automated factory was well developed. Less clear was the magnitude 
and timing of investments in technology to achieve workable solutions 
and the rate of adoption among machine tool users.
It is not intended here to present a detailed description of the 
technological evolution of the industry. For the purposes of this 
research, it is sufficient to note that the industry has been studied by 
various committees and research organistions over the post-war period 
and several useful reports have emerged. Most reports are at a high 
level of aggregation but two far-sighted reports are worthy of special 
mention in relation to technology strategy: the Mitchell Report (1960)
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and the Way Committee Report (1970). Both reports highlighted the 
central importance of developments in control systems, a factor which 
subsequently had a major impact on the fortunes of the UK industry.
The Mitchell report recommended that UK machine tool manufacturers 
should not enter the field of electronic control systems design and 
manufacture. This was endorsed a decade later by the Way Committee, 
which noted:
(a) the future importance of 'systems engineering capability', 
recommending that responsibility for integration of mechanics and 
electronics should reside with machine tool manufacturers;
(b) that a few US machine tool manufacturers were developing control 
equipment in-house and a major producer in Japan had increased its 
output from 500 units in 1967 to 2000 in 1969.
Way doubted the UK industry's ability to keep pace with developments in 
electronics and hopes were pinned on the only surviving major UK control 
equipment manufacturer, Plessey Numerical Controls Ltd., which had been 
recently formed by merger of the control activities of Ferranti, Airmec 
and Plessey.
Although Plessey produced numerical controls (NC), and later, computer 
numerical controls (CNC) of its own design, its most sophisticated 
control systems were manufactured under licence in the UK from 
Allen-Bradley of the USA. Unfortunately, this arrangement only 
continued up to July 1979, when Plessey decided to withdraw from machine 
tool controls and Allen-Bradley acquired the business. With hindsight, 
it is tempting to speculate that with greater commitment, this
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arrangement might have provided the best opportunity to form an enduring 
strategic alliance which would have placed the UK Industry In a much 
stronger competitive position in the 1980's.
Meanwhile, Alfred Herbert had set about jointly developing its own range 
of microprocessor-based controls with a small company which, despite the 
recommendations of the Way Report, it later bought out. On the collapse 
of Alfred Herbert in June 1980, the controls business was acquired 
cheaply by GEC. Three years later, GEC had also failed to produce a 
competitive control system and the UK machine tool industry was left 
totally reliant on imports.
The rapid adoption of computer numerical control systems as a factor in 
competitiveness since the mid 70's is more than adequately illustrated 
in Table 22:
Table 22. CNC Machine Tools as a Percentage of Total UK Production for 
Years 1972-1988
Year % CNC of
Total Production
1988 44
1986 35
1984 32
1982 23
1980 15
1976 8
1972 6
Source: Machine Tool Trades Association
It is against this background of national deficiency in control systems 
that the technology strategies pursued by UK-based manufacturers must be
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judged. It serves to emphasise the critical Importance of monitoring 
technological change on a global basis and points to consideration of 
opportunities for strategic alliances as a means of gaining early access 
to new developments. The following short analysis of individual 
segments of machine tool technology will focus on the International 
dimension of technology strategy by drawing on selected cases to 
illustrate both the opportunities and pitfalls.
B.13 Turning Technology
B.131 Centre lathes
The volume production of turning machines 1n the UK Is dominated by 
Colchester Lathes and T S Harrison, both members of the 600 Group.
Their traditional strengths lie 1n centre lathes, for which they can 
probably claim 80-90 per cent of the UK market and a respectable share 
of export markets.
Colchester and Harrison were slow to move Into CNC and hence to trade up 
their customer base. CNC was initially the perogative of another 
division (Hydro Machine Tools) and this delayed its adoption throughout 
the group. Even as late as 1984, they were retrofitting some of their 
standard models and customer perception of their product range continues 
to be that of a centre lathe-derived machines rather than an Integrated 
approach to CNC.
B.132 Multi-spindle lathes
The demise of multi-spindle automatic lathes, one of the most Important 
segments of turning technology historically, provides a powerful lesson
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for complacent machine tool executives. The hard truth 1s evident from 
the statistics In Table 23, which show that production of multi-spindle 
automatics declined dramatically over the decade 1976-86.
Table 23. UK Production of Multi-Spindle Lathes for Years 1976-1986
Year Production
Units F"> CS*
(Inf adj)
1986 39 4.8 3.1
1980 329 20.5 20.5
1976 419 12.4 22.2
Source: Machine Tool Trades Association
Note: * 1980=100
Inseparable from the stastlcs in Table 23 1s the case of Wlckman, which 
provides one of the rare examples of senior executives being prepared to 
comment publicly on the poor strategic management of technology 1n their 
company.
In January 1984, Allan Gormly, managing director of the John Brown 
Group, announced the Group's withdrawal from machine tools, tracing 
their failure back to the 1960's. The Wlckman multi-spindle lathe 
business was doing well and the Group sought expansion through the 
acquisition of Webster & Bennett (boring machines), John Stlrk (planing 
machines), Taylor & Challon (presses) and others. When the UK market 
entered recession in the mld-1970's and computer numerical control began 
to appear, these weaker companies were the first to be shown as 
outdated. Management time was concentrated on rationalising them, while 
Wlckman's declining fortunes were read as short term. Gradually, the 
challenge from CNC turning machines and changing user requirements
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eroded demand for cam-operated multi-spindle lathes, yet Wickman 
management remained optimistic. Gormly said that the next phase was
spent trying to solve manufacturing problems --- 'without realising that
the fundamental problem was technological obsolescence'.
In essence, Wickman Ignored the signals on two fronts: (a) metal parts 
traditionally machined on multi-spindle automatics were gradually being 
substituted by other materials and processes, and (b) as users attempted 
to reduce working capital tied up 1n stocks and work-in-progress, they 
reduced batch sizes and CMC turning machines offered a more flexible 
alternative. Few users would doubt the performance of cam-operated 
lathes 1n batch sizes of 20,000 or more, but changeovers are cumbersome 
and with the domestic market largely dependent on such ailing Industries 
as motor vehicle components, fasteners, consumer electronics, etc. It 
was clear that orders for new machines would never return to the levels 
enjoyed In the 1960's.
A former executive described Wickman as suffering from 'technological 
conceit'. And 1n similar vein, a former middle manager suggested that
---'they were 1n the mechanical age when everyone else was into
electronics', going on to describe their West German competitor, 
G1ldeme1ster, 1n the late 1970's, as '....strengthening up to cover all 
eventualities by becoming a turning specialist, whereas Wickman remained 
1n multi-spindle machines'.
To be fair to Wlckman's senior management, they had attempted, albeit 
half-heartedly, to offset overall decline In their automatic machines 
business. In 1977, for example, they had negotiated an Import agency 
for CNC lathes from Nakamura of Japan with an option to manufacture 
under licence, only to be thwarted by trade union resistance which
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Included shop stewards dictating where the machines should be made.
An arrangement was later concluded with another Japanese manufacturer, 
Talyo Seikl, 1n 1979, whereby Wickman agreed to provide the 
specification and conceptual design for a CNC turning machine, from 
which Taiyo Seiki would then carry out detail design and build 
prototypes. It was put to the workforce that models would be made In 
the UK when the costs could be matched. After considerable re-design, 
about 100 machines were eventually ordered from Japan, largely based on 
forecasted sales to the USA. These failed to materialise due to 
continuing recession.
And finally, 1n 1982, John Brown acquired Olofsson, a reputable US 
manufacturer of CNC chucking automatic machines. The transfer of 
technology to the UK had just got underway when 1t fell foul of a major 
rationalisation programme 1n which the Group board declared machine 
tools as not one of their future core businesses.
B.133 CNC lathes and turning cells
Inspection of the financial performance in turning technology 1n Table 
34 shows the difficulties experienced by manufacturers In generating 
sufficient cash to re-lnvest in their operations. The case of TI 
Machine Tools (now Matrlx-Churchill) will be used to Illustrate how 
these manufacturers slipped Into "stuck-in-the-m1ddle" strategies 1n the 
early 80*s, mainly through product prol 1feratlon and failure to update 
their manufacturing base.
On acquiring the lathe business of Alfred Herbert from the receiver 1n 
1983, TI Machine Tools's managing director boasted their ability to
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offer 'the widest range of CNC lathes in Europe'. Customisation had 
provided apparent differentiation In the market place and their product 
technology was comparable with major competitors. Considerable progress 
had been made 1n the modular construction of lathes to offset the cost 
of customisation but many of the benefits were negated by their 
willingness to fit control systems from any one of four suppliers. This 
multiplied the cost of "interfacing" and servicing CNC machines. To 
avoid warranty problems, 1t was often necessary to source other 
components such as spindle motors and servo-drives from each controller 
supplier.
Even though TI claimed the largest domestic market share 1n CNC lathes, 
together with their machining centre and grinding machine businesses, 
they still could not match the throughput and sophistication found in 
the plants of Japanese competitors. TI could point to the installation 
of their own CNC machines, particularly at their Blaydon plant, and a 
demonstration area at Coventry; but they had foregone the opportunity 
for early in-house user experience 1n flexible manufacturing systems and 
damaged their credibility as suppliers of advanced automation.
When a new managing director was appointed 1n January 1985 to turn 
around the company, he made the scathing public statement that TI was 
'organised for failure', saying that they had been using hammer and 
chisels on the shop floor while telling their customers that high 
technology 1s the only way to survive. Ironically, though the Blaydon 
plant had attracted the most investment over the years, it was closed in 
a further round of rationalisation in 1986 and production switched to 
Coventry where a major modernisation progranme had been initiated.
In 1987, TI Machine Tools was the subject of a management buyout and
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became Matrix-Churchlll (supported with Iraqi funds!), with the new 
board of directors declaring in the company newspaper that they were
seeking --- 'growth through international cooperation with other
companies - possibly licensing deals, joint ventures or partnerships'. 
No such deals had materialised over the three years following buyout, 
though the new management had achieved fair success In the field of 
small flexible manufacturing systems (FMS) built around their CNC 
turning machines.
In addition to Matr1x-Church1ll, there are other manufacturers offering 
stand-alone CNC machines and cells, not the least of which 1s Yamazaki. 
By 1989, there was little indication that Yamazaki had decided to offer 
FMS's and speculation surrounding their deliberate strategy of being a 
follower. This is to some extent consistent with their approach 
elsewhere. Even though Yamazaki has accumulated substantial in-house 
FMS experience, they are not noted for going beyond supplying machining 
cells to external customers. Other manufacturers of CNC machines such 
as Dean Smith & Grace, BSA Tools and Beaver (a late entrant to turning 
technology) have adopted a cautious strategy; but unlike Yamazaki they 
are relatively small, have limited experience of In-house FMS and face a 
higher order of risk.
B.14 Milling Technology
In the high volume production of milling machines the UK situation 1s 
similar to that for centre lathes. One company, Bridgeport Machines, 
dominates production. It is Bridgeport's repositioning strategy to 
compete in the CNC machining centre segment, however, that provides an 
excellent illustration of what can be achieved over a five-year period.
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The first stage 1n Bridgeport's revival was the Introduction of an 
1n-house designed range of vertical CNC machines 1n 1982 which allowed 
them to trade up on their existing customer base. The next stage 
Involved a thorough search for potential licensors of machining centre 
technology, culminating 1n the signing of an Inward licensing agreement 
with Yasuda of Japan to manufacture and sell a 300mm cube horizontal 
machine. In addition to giving Bridgeport reduced lead time 1n the 
market, the incoming know-how enabled them to speed up the design and 
development of two new vertical machining centre models 1n-house. 
Building on the success of the first licence agreement with Yasuda, a 
further agreement was signed 1n late 1986 covering the rights to a 450mm 
cube horizontal machining centre.
Bridgeport's strategy has been to carefully expand their product range 
from the lower end of the market where they have a position of relative 
strength. The market for each new model 1s thoroughly researched before 
approval and their policy Is to produce only standard machines. A 
feature of their mixing of In-house and foreign sourcing of technology 
has been their willingness to continually Improve on Incoming product 
design and manufacturing know-how. In their modern plant, sets of 
prismatic machine parts are produced on machining centres using 
palletised loading on a 3-shlft system (one minimally-manned).
Bridgeport was one of only three machine tool manufacturers 1n the UK 
known to report pre-tax profits over the economic recession from 1980 
onwards.
Bridgeport 1s currently competing successfully against Japanese 
manufacturers such as Yamazakl, Okuma and Maklno, and provides one of 
the most visible shifts from late followership to aspiring leader.
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Some machining centre manufacturers have sought to establish a presence 
1n flexible manufacturing systems (FMS) and computer Integrated 
manufacturing (CIM) systems. Many, however, have had to come to terms 
with the far-reaching policy Implications of "sole responsibility" and 
concluded that the risk of going beyond machining cells and small FMS's 
is too great. An order for a single FMS could, In some cases, represent 
an unacceptable proportion of their annual turnover. For all but the 
largest SBUs, software Is a major hurdle to be overcome.
The problem for machine tool manufacturers Is that CIM has made the 
boundaries of the industry more difficult to define. Proficiency 1n 
software, either in-house or through collaboration, is already 
distinguishing those machine tool manufacturers who will remain 1n 
stand-alone machines from those who will participate 1n higher added 
value systems. KTM, for example, formerly part of the Vickers Group, 
has formed strategic alliances with Siemens to develop modular software 
for FMS and with the Hoskyns Group on CIM. Overall, however, the lead 
In systems "Integration" Is currently being taken by multinational 
computer manufacturers and management/engineering consultancies: partly 
reflecting the diminishing role of machine tool hardware in the total 
CIM package, and partly the need for manufacturing to be 
business-driven.
B.15 Grinding Technology
For many years, grinding technology has been labelled a "black art".
This 1s mainly due to the complexity of the process brought about by 
continually changing wheel topography and the difficulty 1n controlling 
various machine parameters. These deficiencies meant that grinding 
failed to attract the attention of major CNC systems manufacturers and
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early developments were carried out 1n-house by machine tool 
manufacturers such as Jones 4 Shipman, Newall and TI. Most designs for 
control systems were crude, impossible to enhance and never got past the 
prototype stage. Later, these manufacturers switched to proprietary 
systems as they became available and this raised the prospect of greater 
compatibility with other metal cutting machines.
Current trends 1n grinding technology include:
(a) higher metal removal rates offer a feasible alternative to turning 
for primary machining operations;
(b) along with most machining processes, grinding machines are 
becoming increasingly multi-functional;
(c) machine features offer the benefits of continuous wheel dressing, 
in-process guaging, wheel breakage monitoring, vibration damping 
etc;
(d) automation, such as gantry loading and machine mounted robotic 
devices, has improved the efficiency of non-machining operations.
Grinding was held up as one of the most successful segments of the UK 
industry 1n the late 70's. Growth rates were twice that for all machine 
tools but sales were largely of the manual type and producers paid 
insufficient attention to the next generation of CNC. Indeed, the 
Science 4 Engineering Research Council spent i.3m on grinding research 1n 
UK universities and polytechnics to remedy the situation. With the 
exception of turbine blade applications, few manufacturers were able to 
translate the benefits of the research, some of it misdirected, into
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sustained growth 1n CNC machines.
Inspection of the financial performance of grinding machine 
manufacturers in Table 34 shows that only the US-owned company, Landis 
Lund, claims the distinction of remaining in profit throughout the 
1980's. In real terms its sales turnover has declined. Although Landis 
Lund offer a range of special purpose machines, Its success lies mainly 
In a CNC cam-lobe grinder, a joint development with the Cranfleld Unit 
for Precision Engineering. This has commanded a strong niche leadership 
position and greatly enhanced their credibility 1n grinding technology.
There are no other exemplars in the grinding field. Jones A Shipman, 
for example, the largest UK-based manufacturer of grinding machines, 
compete in the broad market for reciprocating and cylindrical machines. 
They have suffered 1n the same way as other machine tool manufacturers, 
unable it would seem to establish a defendable position as either a 
mainstream player or specialist nicher.
B.16 Metal Forming Technology
The metal forming segment encompasses a wide range of applications: from 
large hydraulic presses to sheet/co1l processing equipment, press brakes 
and shears. As with grinding technology, metal forming machines were 
late to adopt CNC and when it came, it was smaller companies such as 
Cybelec and Hurco, who pioneered Its use on press brakes - one of the 
few standard products in the fragmented metal forming segment. Metal 
forming cells and FMS are a relatively recent phenomenon, showing 
several years lag on metal cutting technologies.
The major global players in mainstream segments of metal forming
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equipment are the Japanese manufacturers Amada and Komatsu, and Trumpf 
in West Germany. Large US manufacturers seldom compete outside their 
domestic market. With the exception of Verson, UK manufacturers such as 
Edwards-Pearson, E W Bliss, Press 4 Shear and Joseph Rhodes are 
substantially smaller than their foreign competitors and compete In 
mature segments (eg press brakes, shears, punch presses, forging 
presses). They cannot hope to match the level of Investments being made 
in the growth segments of laser cutting machines and handling equipment. 
Consequently, the performance of most UK manufacturers has been 
unspectacular.
The exemplar in metal forming technology in the UK is undoubtedly Verson 
International. Verson 1s one of the most internationally-orientated 
manufacturers in the industry and Its dynamic chief executive has openly 
stated h1s ambition to become a world player.
The company's origins H e  with the Verson Allsteeel Press Company in the 
USA which set up Verson International (VI) as its international sales 
organisation in the late 70's. VI acquired Wilkins 4 Mitchell, the UK 
power press manufacturer, from the receiver In 1982 and the HME coining 
press business from Cincinnati MHacron 1n 1984. When the US parent 
company ran into financial difficulties in 1985 (1 e at the time of my 
visit), VI became the subject of a management buyout (with the equity 
participation of Citibank). Within a year, VI had negotiated a 
"reverse takeover" of Bronx Engineering, a UK quoted company 
specialising 1n metal processing equipment.
VI continued to expand through further acquisitions. In 1988, 1t 
purchased the Intellectual property rights of Taylor Wilson (aluminium 
finishing), Bronx's long standing US licensor; and Daniel Smith (cold
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roll forming). By 1989, Vi's sales turnover reached £40m and £lOm had 
been invested throughout the group.
The successful strategy underlying Vi's acquisitions programme 1s one of 
multiple niching. Ailing businesses were selected on their potential 
for group synergy and regeneration given access to an international 
sales network. This was explained by the Chief Executive as offering a 
range of related products to a common international customer base. A
virtuous circle of --- 'the more sales offices we have, the easier it is
to increase turnover of our companies; and the more the turnover of our 
companies increases, the easier It 1s to support the opening of new 
sales offices'. Vi's exports were running at 75-80 per cent of total 
sales by 1989.
Strong features of Vi's regeneration of its acquired companies have been 
the paring down of 'non-essential overheads' (eg separate dining 
facilities, company cars and other management perks) and focus on 
managing the dynamics of change. Each business 1s said to be small 
enough for everyone to be on first name terms and the Internal climate 
is conducive to teamwork. Nothing appoaching Vi's attempt to manage 
strategic change was revealed 1n this research.
B.17 Automation and Special Purpose Equipment
B.171 An heterogeneous segment
The boundaries of the automation and special purpose machine segment are 
111-defined. The segment includes a wide variety of metal cutting and 
handling equipment, such as rotary and in-line transfer machines, 
automated assembly equipment, robotic devices and numerous items of
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special purpose equipment. With the exception of Industrial robots, 
production is characterised by one-off or low volume orders to 
customer's specification. The key success factors are listed under 
"customised machines" in Table 33.
B.172 Transfer lines and automated assembly equipment
The strategic problem facing manufacturers of transfer lines has been 
how to manage the rapid transition from "dedicated" to more flexible 
automation. Even though the signals of impending change were long 
visible in machining centres, the thinking of many executives was still 
locked into the kind of high volume operations required for engines 
transmission units etc In the motor industry. Few machining systems can 
approach the productivity of conventional transfer lines but user 
requirements changed and parallels may be drawn with the earlier example 
of multi-spindle lathes.
The trend towards flexibility has been assisted by developments on two 
fronts: (a) Incorporation of programmable logic controllers and ac 
servodrives, and (b) "operator friendly" monitoring/diagnostic systems 
to locate the source and cause of breakdowns. The last development has 
also enabled manufacturers to reduce machine downtime.
Successful strategies in the 1980‘s have depended on the rate of 
adoption of these Innovations, mainly originating outside the Industry. 
Often the credibility of manufacturers has been at stake. Overall, 
however, there has been little to distinguish the technology strategies 
of individual manufacturers pursuing orders worldwide, such as Cross A 
Trecker, Joseph Lamb, Ingersoll, Hiller and Comau. Cursory examination 
of the orders won by these companies suggests that it is their
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commercial aggression and tenacity which has made them international 
players. This 1s not the case with UK-based manufacturers, who, apart 
from perhaps Cross International and Ex-Cell-0, have been more limited 
in their aspirations. Although manufacturers such as KTM, Marwln and 
Kingsbury have successfully commissioned various Installations In the 
motor Industry, they must be regarded as "second division" suppliers 
both In their outlook and International track record.
Activity In automated assembly equipment 1n the UK Is extremely low by 
international standards. Assembly technology has experienced the same 
demands for flexibility as found in transfer lines. The future need 
will be to: (a) assemble families of parts with rapid changeover times, 
and (b) to incorporate vision and sensing systems. Electronics Is the 
"lead user" industry for automated assembly, yet no UK-based 
manufacturer has had an Impact on the fast-growing application area of 
surface mount technology.
B.173 Industrial robots
Tables 50-53 show the dominating position of Japan 1n terms of the 
number of robot Installations. Despite the controversy surrounding the 
definition of a robot (1 e as a "re-programmable" device in the UK), it 
is generally acknowledged that Japan accounts for about 60-65 per cent 
of the world Installed base. In revenue terms, however, the largest 
manufacturer 1s Asea Brown Boverl with 17.4 per cent share of the $1400 
m world market in 1988, followed by Yaskawa with 8.6 per cent and G M 
Fanuc with 7.0 per cent.
The two US pioneers 1n Industrial robots, Unlmation and Cincinnati 
Mllacron, have had mixed fortunes and just managed to stay 1n the top
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dozen or so manufacturers. Their financial performance has never 
matched their technical excellence. Indeed, they were both victims of 
industry shakeout in the 1980's - Unimation was acquired by Westinghouse 
(USA) and later Staubli (Switzerland), and Cincinnati Milacron by Asea 
Brown Boveri (Sweden).
Unimation has a manufacturing operation at Telford and is the largest 
UK-based manufacturer. It is interesting to note in the context of this 
research that Unimation initially chose to exploit its technology in 
Europe in the mid 60's via a licence agreement with GKN Engineering and 
in Japan with Kawasaki. The agreement with GKN was terminated after 
only two years, at GKN's request. GKN was not committed to developing 
electro-hydraulics technology and inward technology transfer never got 
beyond the supply of fixtures and kit assembly. In contrast, the 
licence with Kawasaki flourished and they went on to claim almost 5 per 
cent of the world market in 1988.
Leaving aside Unimation, there are about 30 robot manufacturers in the 
UK, mainly pursuing narrow niche strategies. These include GEC Robot 
Systems, Fairy Automation and 600-Fanuc Robotic Systems. None has 
produced profits and it is doubtful whether they have the resources to 
sustain continuing presence in their chosen field. As shown in Table 
52, UK-manufactured robots have been largely aimed at simpler tasks at 
the lower end of the price range, compared with Japanese robots in the 
middle range, and mainly Scandinavian robots in the higher price range. 
This is hardly a sufficient base on which to sustain a UK robotics 
industry.
B.2 INWARD TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER THROUGH LICENCE AGREEMENTS
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B.21 Characteristics of Licensee Companies and Agreements
The analysis presented here covers 31 inward licence agreements in 22 
strategic business units (SBUs), employing 7,780 people in 1984. The 
estimated total sales turnover of these SBUs amounted to £ll6m, of which 
about ^ 28m (24%) may be attributed to the sale of licensed machines. It 
Is expected that when several of the later agreements reach full 
production, the 24% will rise to 30-35% as these cover licensed 
manufacture or assembly of machines of relatively high unit price.
Table 24. Distribution of SBUs and Agreements by Annual Sales Turnover 
and Number of Employees in 1984
Sales Turnover Number Number of Employees Number Number of
£"» of SBUs Agreements of SBUs Agreements
0.5 1 1 0-50 4 4
0.5-1.0 4 4 51-100 6 9
2.0-3.0 8 11 101-200 7 8
3.0-5.0 2 3 201-300 2 5
5.0-10.0 3 4 301-500 1 1
10.0-20.0 2 5 500+ 2 4
20.0+ 2 3
7 7 IT
77 IT
It can be seen from Table 24 that over half the agreements were 
concentrated in 12 SBUs having annual sales turnover below &3m. Further 
analysis revealed that 7 of these SBUs were privately owned companies,
1n which Inward licensing was considered a useful way of making up for 
resource deficiencies without loss of Independence. 4 of the remaining 
5 SBUs in this relatively low sales turnover and employment category 
were divisions of much larger groups and at an early stage of licensing.
The changing structure of inward licensing is Illustrated in Table 25.
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Up to 1980, the USA accounted for 90-95 per cent of agreements but by
Table 25. Country of Origin of Licensed Technology
Country Number of 
Agreements
m
USA 18 58
Japan 10 33
Europe 2 6
Other 1 3
IT TÜÜ
1984 this was reduced to 58 per cent, mainly due to the burst of 
licensing activity from Japanese manufacturers aimed at circumventing 
the "voluntary" restraint on imports. 7 of the 10 agreements with 
Japanese manufacturers Investigated Involved CNC machine tools and 
robots. It Is not generally known that there were at least 3 agreements 
for other types of machine tool in existence between UK and Japanese 
manufacturers prior to 1981.
Table 26. Who Instigated the Licence?
Instigator Number of 
Agreements
(%)
UK Licensee 19 61
Foreign Licensor 4 13
Mutual Approach 1 3
Other Third Party 3 10
Not Identified 4 13
IT TÖÜ
Table 26 shows that 1n 19 (61%) of the 31 agreements the UK licensee was
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the party making the first approach, suggesting an element of 
"opportunism" underlying the statistics. Where possible, this was 
cross-checked with other executives In both licensor and licensee 
companies. It should be noted that at the time of the first round 
interviews, the Heads of SBU associated with 21 (68%) licence agreements 
had also been involved 1n the negotiation of the original agreement. In 
only 4 cases was 1t not possible to ascertain which party initiated the 
approach due to longevity of the agreement and many staff changes.
The unique position of 5 SBUs as the prior distributor of the licensor's 
machines effectively gave them "sitting tenant" status, requiring 
conversion of the distributorship to a sales/manufacturlng licence. At 
this point in the relationship, the market for the machines had been 
established and both parties knew enough of each other's capabilities 
and aspirations to set the licensing arrangement on a firm footing.
Only one SBU, a division of a large diversified UK group, overtly 
operated a "trap search" or "trawl" for a licensor, whereby they let it 
be known that they were seeking certain technology and awaited 
approaches from foreign licensors. The SBU claimed to have carried 
this out successfully in other areas of their business and 1t 1s 
suspected that a similar mechanism may have attracted potential 
licensors to at least two other SBUs once their Intentions had been 
signalled to the market.
The four main reasons cited by the Heads of SBUs for them entering Into 
licence agreements with foreign manufacturers are listed In Table 27.
This data was extracted from replies to open-ended questions 1n the 
Interviews In preference to requesting ranking according to a 
predetermined set. This maintained continuity of discussion and avoided
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exposing respondents to alternatives that they might not have otherwise 
considered. Further, by allowing them to
Table 27. Main Reasons Cited for Inward Licensing
Reason Frequency of Occurrence
Number of 
Agreements
(%)
To acquire complementary products 
quickly (ie buying lead time): 26 84
UK licensee did not possess the 
resources to design and develop 
the machines at the time: 23 74
Response to an opportunity not 
to be missed: 15 48
To achieve progression towards 
flexible manufacturing system: 7 23
articulate their motivations for licensing in their own way, an attempt 
had been made to minimise the probability of normative replies and 
prompting replies to later questions.
In the 84 per cent of agreements in which complementary product 
technology was cited as a reason for Inward licensing, executives 
expressed this as extending or filling gaps in their product range by 
'buying lead time’. The licensing option was attractive to 
manufacturers faced with the recurring problem of defining priorities 
under conditions of stretched resources. Many respondents said that 
licensing had allowed them breathing space to catch up in an existing 
technology or diversify Into a related area quickly. They fully 
recognised the difficulty of keeping abreast of competitive developments 
on all technological fronts. Licensing was found to be an acceptable 
“follower" strategy for introducing proven models with low cost and
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The second most common stimulus to inward licensing, underlying 74 per 
cent of agreements, represented a complex combination of skills 
shortages, lack of training and the heavy emphasis on product technology 
in some SBUs. Implicit in the decision to take a licence was the 
assumption that incoming know-how could be assimilated. No attempt was 
made to examine the detailed change in skills profile of technical staff 
in licensee companies over say a five year period, but it was observed 
that while staffing levels had reduced in all areas of the company, 
there was evidence of recruitment of electronics, software and 
applications specialists appropriate to future requirements of the 
licence. The serious shortfall appeared to H e  in updating 
manufacturing and production engineering skills, though this was seldom 
mentioned by executives and it was widely assumed by them that almost 
any machine could be manufactured with acceptable quality and 
efficiency.
Of the 15 (48%) agreements classified as "response to an opportunity", 8 
were related to the pending termination of an existing licence held by a 
competitor in the UK. These were easy to verify and typically Involved 
the UK holder withdrawing from the business or falling Into 
receivership, or one party not wishing to renew the agreement beyond Its 
original duration. 6 of the 8 agreements transferred to another UK 
manufacturer resulted from approaches Initiated by the new licensee and 
one by the licensor. The Instigator of the remaining one was not 
satisfactorily determined.
When a licence agreement changes hands, the prospective new UK licensee
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may seek to employ one or more key staff from the previous licensee, 
thereby smoothing the transition and simultaneously strengthening the 
new licensee's negotiating position. When Vaughan Associates, for 
example, fell into receivership in 1982, their US Bodine licence for 
automated assembly equipment was acquired by Bridgeport Textron along 
with the product team and a number of partially completed orders.
The other 7 agreements loosely falling in the "opportunistic" 
classification emerged from Intelligence gathered from networks of 
personal contacts, leads followed up after an overseas visit or 'by 
accident'. Early access to Information about the future availability of 
licences and speed of reaction were perceived to be important dimensions 
of competitive advantage. Moreover, the decision processes associated 
with these agreements were characterised by participation of only a few 
executives over a highly compressed time scale. Special research 
programmes were rarely Initiated to assess the fertility of markets and 
the relative merits of the licensor vis a vis competitors. Choice was 
restricted to a go/no-go decision on the single licensor under 
consideration based on what was known collectively at the time. There 
was a strong feeling among these executives that if they had not moved 
quickly to secure the licence, then a competitor would certainly have 
done so.
Table 28 examines the timing of progression to various levels of 
1n-house manufacture associated with the 17 agreements signed after 
1980. This data quantifies the "lead time" perceived to be Important by 
executives 1n UK licensee companies, showing substantial dispersion 
about the mean due to varying levels of technological complexity.
Estimates by executives of how long it would have taken their company to
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Table 28. Time Scales for the Inward Transfer of Technology
Stage in the Transfer Process Mean Time 
(months)
Estimated time period from the decision 
to go ahead in the product area to 
actually signing the licence agreement:
11.7
(SD=7.4)
N=9*
Time period from signing the licence 
agreement to first sale of the machine:
(a) for machines Initially imported from 
the licensor*:
6.6
(SD=5.2)
N=9*
(b) for machines assembled from kits 
supplied by the licensor:
13.4
(SD-11.0)
N“7**
(c) for machines manufactured in the 
UK (over 70 per cent by value):
17.7
(SD=10.5)
N=14
Note: * excludes five UK licensees who were already importing machines 
before entering into the agreement.
** includes two joint ventures
commercialise an equivalent machine of in-house design yielded little in 
the way of usable data. Feasibility studies were notably absent from 
the dec1s1on-making process 1n about 50-60 per cent of cases and most 
executives said that design would never have been attempted from 
scratch. Those 9 executives who, 1n hindsight, were prepared to give 
their best estimate, Indicated that times from product concept to 
achieving full manufacture and commercialisation were reduced by 2 to 
3.5:1 through Inward licensing. Some Individual conments on lead time 
and economies of scale in design and development were revealing:
'We thought that we could have done the job 1n the same time frame 
as our licensor but they were over two years ahead ....It turned 
out that we would have been too optimistic In time and cost.' 
Developing software and setting up manufacturing operations were 
highlighted as main sources of variance. The technology was in 
the very early growth stage.
'The sheer scale of design and development precluded our starting 
from scratch and we were too late anyway. We would never have 
recouped the Investment and have starved our other projects.' At 
the time of signing, the licence provided related diversification.
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The technology was In the early maturity stage but capable of 
enhancement.
'My engineering and production directors said they could come up 
with the goods: they probably could have done ....eventually! The 
risk of introducing new machines of our own design 1s too 
frightening to contemplate. The licence has bought us valuable 
lead time.
B.22 Scope of Licence Agreements
B.221 The licence document as a point of reference
The scope of a licence agreement defines the techno-commercial 
boundaries of the manufacturing and selling right granted by the 
licensor to the licensee. Leaving aside the technological content for 
more detailed analysis later, the three major components of "scope" are: 
(a) the definition of products and their field of use, (b) duration of 
the licence, and (c) degree of exclusivity. These relatively short 
statements require careful thought at the outset because they establish 
certain commitments from both parties over the life of the agreement.
If it can be assumed that the licence document is the point of reference 
for what was agreed at the time of signing, then It must be concluded 
from this research study that the scope of licences was loosely defined 
and subject to considerable drift. Often, verbal descriptions from 
executives bore little resemblence to the wording 1n the original 
agreement, although 1t could be implied from subsequent correspondence 
and actions that the scope had changed. This partly reflected the need 
to build-in flexibility and partly the difficulties encountered 1n 
assessing the future Impact of particular technologies and the way 
product/market segments might develop. While the general direction may 
be forecast with some certainty; at the level of Individual machine
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design and application, there are problems surrounding the timing of 
technological Innovations by machine tool component suppliers, 
manufacturers and users.
B.222 Definition of the licensed products
Machine tool licence agreements normally relate the technology to 
particular machines and the trend has been to name In the agreement 
Individual models or use the generic term covering a range of models. A 
common way of delineating the licensed product(s) found in the 
agreements studied was by size of workpiece handled by the machine; such 
as the "swing" of a lathe, sheet width of a plate forming machine, 
payload of a robot etc. Other classifications involved the use of 
machine configurations (eg vertical, horizontal, radial), drive 
mechanisms (eg mechanical, hydraulic, electrical), sophistication of 
control technology or some combination of these. No restrictions on 
field of use were found (1e exclusions for particular applications, 
customers, Industries), largely because 1n machine tools they would be 
Impossible for the licensor to police and there would be no point 1n 
retarding applications development.
It was not unusual to find a broad range of machines being offered, 
covering new and mature designs and both standard models and specials. 
Only In exceptional cases had licensees, faced with such variety carried 
out a market survey for each model. This would have helped them during 
negotiation to decide whether to accept a "blanket" royalty rate on all 
models, to seek a reduced rate for mature models or have some models 
deleted from the package. Alternatively, the UK licensee might have 
considered acting as an agent for some models of low or doubtful volume, 
possibly with an option to build under licence at a later date if the
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volume should justify it. The kind of predicament that can arise 
through overlooking this aspect of licensing strategy 1s best 
Illustrated by reference to an example where the Interpretation of 
product scope and the spirit of a licence agreement were questioned.
A small UK company had successfully Imported certain machines from the 
USA for several years and had been pleased to manufacture them under 
licence 1n the smaller sizes. Up until that time, sales of smaller 
machines had by far exceeded those of the larger machines, and 1t was 
agreed that the latter would continue to be imported. Relationships 
between licensor and licensee staff were said to be excellent. Later, 
the balance of orders (by value) switched to the larger machines and the 
licensee repeatedly requested extentlon of the scope of the agreement to 
accommodate the change. The US licensor wished to retain manufacture of 
the larger machines to preserve volume production but by 1979/80, also 
to take advantage of the low dollar/sterl1ng ratio.
By 1984 the currency advantage had reversed and the licensor was more 
amenable to extending the range but Insisted on a higher royalty rate 
for the larger machines. The UK licensee felt "locked-1n" to the 
situation and following a bitter round of meetings, reluctantly accepted 
the higher rate. Neither party wanted a break nor any damage to the 
external reputation that might result from open conflict. An executive 
In the US licensor company described the new arrangement as Justified 
because 1t involved a 'solution to a new set of problems, requiring a 
"step" Increase 1n know-how In-line with the scale-up to the larger 
size'. Managers 1n the UK licensee company felt that they were the 
victim of powerful licensor.
The foregoing example 1s by no means unique. Close examination of
- 313 -
agreements which restrict the range of machines manufactured under 
licence by some arbitrary split in size or capacity showed areas of 
potential conflict seldom anticipated at the signing date. Licensors 
and licensees were generally able to cope with single orders outside the 
range of machines manufactured under licence but the sourcing problem 
became more acute during recession and several clashes were discovered 
as both licensor and licensee found themselves bidding for the same 
orders in third markets.
B.223 Duration of licence agreements
The rationality for arriving at a particular duration for licence 
agreements and extension periods was not obvious. Some executives had 
perceptions of what was "normal" or "correct" for machine tools within 
the limits of their own experience. Others were guided by their 
corporate lawyers and industrial property specialists. And yet others 
accepted what was penc1lled-1n to the agreement drafted by the licensor. 
Most seemed to think along the lines of 5 years as short term for 
original agreements and 10 years as long term. Table 29 shows that 30 
per cent and 49 per cent of agreements fell Into these respective time 
periods.
According to the literature, licensors tend to favour a shorter term of 
years than sought by licensees, because the former have more to lose if 
the transaction does not work out well and they do not wish to be 
committed for a lengthy period to an, as yet, untried licensee. Such 
caution on the part of licensors 1s not unreasonable, nor was 1t absent 
from the present study. As a generalisation 1n machine tool licensing,
1t may have been more applicable to the 1950's and 60's when the lower 
sophistication of machine design facilitated an easier transfer over a
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Table 29. Licence Duration, Extension and Proximity to Expiry Date
Number of 
Agreements
m
Original Duration of Agreement:
3 years 2 6
5 years 9 30
6-9 years 2 6
10 years 15 49
15 years 1 3
20 years 1 3
Indefinite 1 3
Agreements within 1 year of expiry date: 10 32
Agreements within 2 years of expiry date: 15 49
Extended beyond original duration:
on a year to year basis 2 6
by 5 years 1 3
by 10 years 4 12
by 20 years 1 3
shorter period. As shown in Table 28, the complex product and 
manufacturing know-how of the 1980's has taken up to 3 years to transfer 
in some cases, making 10 years duration a practicable proposition for 
both parties. Licensees are then able to build up production levels and 
reap economies of scale and experience. In return, licensors accumulate 
royalties long before expiry of the agreement.
Agreements of shorter duration may only span one business cycle and 
their success may be more dependent on timing considerations and the 
frequency of orders than on technological complexity. Most of the 9 UK 
licensee companies accepting agreements of 5 years duration were well 
known to the licensor and their capability to build and sell particular 
machines not In doubt. The machines were mainly of either the metal 
forming or special purpose type, perhaps only attracting a handful of 
orders over the 5 year period. Invariably these machines were 
originally licensed to enable the UK manufacturers to supply complete
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packages as part of much larger capital equipment projects. When 
executives were asked 1f the duration stated 1n the agreement was 
shorter than they would have liked, they seemed unconcerned, giving
answers such as --- 'it was about right' and '----duration was not a
major issue'.
B.224 Exclusivity and territorial restrictions
The allocation of territories on an exclusive basis 1s one of the most 
controversial commercial restraints In licensing. The problem lies In 
the Inherent conflict between the legitimate exploitation of 
Intellectual property rights intended to give their owner a protected 
and privileged position, and their use to restrain trade unreasonably. 
Since the UK is a member of the EEC and most licensors in machine tools 
are US companies, then any contractual arrangements must be examined 
against a background of competition and law in Europe and North America.
Table 30. Exclusive Sales Territories Named in Inward Licensing 
Agreements
Territories Number of
Agreements
UK or UK/EIre only 12
EEC (Inc. UK) only 7
EEC and other Western Europe 10
01 d/Existing Commonwealth 7
World 2
The position with regard to exclusive territorial restrictions 1n UK 
licence agreements Is shown 1n Table 30. It can be seen that 
exclusivity 1n sales was generally restricted to either the UK or 
extended to the whole of the EEC and other Western European countries.
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The most striking feature when examining these territories was the 
pattern discerned in the granting of exclusivity and non-exclusivity, 
depending on whether the foreign licensor was a US or Japanese company 
and the extent of their licensee network worldwide. This showed clearly 
the "triangular" technology trading situation emerging 1n the 1980's, 
with the main inflow to Europe coming from the USA and to a lesser, but 
growing, extent from Japan. Not surprisingly, licensors would not allow 
access to their home market, except under special circumstances of "buy 
back". US licensors tended to retain Canada, Central America (1nc. 
Mexico) and Japan for themselves. Japanese licensors retained the USA 
and certain Far Eastern countries for their own exploitation. Nine 
(29%) licensor companies had licensing operations for identical products 
in more than one country. Five of these were US companies which had 
licensees 1n both the UK and Japan.
Seventeen (55%) agreements named non-exclusive sales territories in 
addition to those exclusive territories listed 1n Table 30. US 
licensors appeared more liberal in granting non-exclusive territories 
than Japanese licensors, though this may relfect the relatively recent 
entry of Japanese manufacturers Into outward licensing and the stage 
reached in developing their network compared with US manufacturers. Of 
particular interest In this respect was the treatment of territories 
such as the Soviet Union, Itself a net importer of technology, and the 
Eastern Bloc Comecon countries which are large consumers of machine 
tools. US licensors were generally of two persuasions. On the one 
hand, some US executives were fiercely nationalistic and did not wish to 
see machines using their technology destined for Comecon countries and 
they morally supported the NATO CoCom embargo. On the other hand, there 
was a willingness to let licensees exploit their geographical proximity 
without Interference. In contrast, Japanese licensors preferred to
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retain Comecon countries and were adopting a more cautious line on other 
trading blocs. A particular case in point was the advantage seen by US 
companies in allowing their UK licensees to exploit Commonwealth links. 
Export orientated Japanese manufacturers have regarded this route as of 
diminishing importance and have tended to set up their own sales offices 
or agencies.
B.23 Patents
Patents 1n machine tool technology were found to cover complete machine 
configurations or specific devices such as toolchangers, spindle 
assemblies, grippers etc. Instances of manufacturers allegedly copying 
and, therefore, infringing patented technology were often cited by 
executives but it was revealed that cases had normally been settled 
without litigation, either by the infringing party withdrawing from the 
product area or taking a patent licence. These seemed to have a 
localised impact on certain companies and in particular sub-segments of 
machine tool technology. Their precise nature was difficult to 
determine. It was considered sufficient here to note that in cases 
where infringement did not reach the courts, there lingered considerable 
uncertainty about whether competitors would acquiesce 1n their pursuance 
of their patent rights and the extent of real or imaginary threats of 
litigation. Questions of validity and infringement of patents may be 
covered adquately in licence agreements but these were seldom found to 
relieve anxiety.
Data on the incidence of one or more patents in the technology package 
1n Table 16 revealed that 21 (68%) agreements included active patents at 
the time of signing. The salient pattern to emerge from interviews with 
executives was the general lack of knowledge on the patent situation
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concerning their inward licence agreements. At least two thirds of 
respondents had to refer to the agreement to ascertain whether patents 
were included and if so, whether these were still active. In several 
cases patents had expired and the licences, which were originally 
combined patent, trade mark, design and know-how licences; had reverted 
to licences covering the last three. On a cross-sectional basis for the 
period 1984, it would be fair to estlmte that the 21 (68%) agreements in 
which patents were a feature on signing had reduced to 16 (52%).
Most agreements merely mentioned patents in passing, using such wording 
as: ....'all patents and other intellectual property related to the 
reference products'. This vague description was not regarded as 
important by executives, though a number said that having been asked 
questions about patents they would seek clarification. Of the six 
executives followed up by the author on this Issue, one agreement was 
discovered to contain two patents stated as “pending" at the time of 
signing six years earlier but had not been granted. The executive said 
that he would not pursue the matter further with h1s licensor as patents 
were not a major consideration. The remaining 5 executives had not 
reassessed the patent situation In their agreements over a three month 
period subsequent to being Interviewed.
A schedule of patents was known to be provided with the agreement 1n 
only 8 cases. Of these, 4 were In SBUs of large groups which had their 
own Corporate patent section. Respondents 1n these companies gave the 
Impression of being well Informed about the strength of their licensor's 
patent position and valued professional corporate assistance both prior 
to signing the agreement and subsequently In monitoring patent 
developments. A further 6 SBUs had used the services of Independent 
patent agents when assessing the technology on offer but there was a
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marked propensity to follow the same approach found in US licensor 
companies of 'leaving the legal aspects to the lawyers'.
It 1s impossible to say whether the patents included 1n long standing 
agreements were rigorously assessed by prospective licensees during the 
period of negotiation. Agreements were largely drafted by the licensor 
on their terms and the weight of evidence points to patents appearing in 
technology packages more for the licensor's added protection from patent 
law and exemptions from aspects of competition law than for their 
contribution to "core" technology. Such competitive advantage from 
patents as existed 1n ageing agreements in 1984 was relatively weak and 
infringement by competitors had passed unnoticed and/or unchallenged.
B.24 Trade Marks
Manufacturer's names and trade marks have always played an important 
role 1n the marketing of machine tools. It is, therefore, not 
surprising to find them appearing as a key element in technology 
packages as licensors seek exposure of their marks worldwide and 
licensees wish to share in the "goodwill" and standards of quality they 
confer. Table 16 shows that 15 agreements covered use of the licensor's 
mark and 12 involved joint names.
Long established foreign manufacturers offering licences for machines 
with no close competitors were 1n a strong position to impose their own 
conditions. At least 6 licensors were known to have made clear their 
desire to include trade marks 1n the package at an early stage of 
negotiation. A statement of their use In promotional material, together 
with the wording and size on the machine nameplate, was also a feature 
of such agreements. This did not appear to be a point of contention.
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It Is not known how many negotiations were terminated on the Issue of 
trade marks. Even allowing for post-rational 1satlon on the part of 
executives faced with preconditions, UK licensees were more than willing 
to be associated with prestige trade marks. Several executives felt 
that acquiring certain licences for their company was a major coup and 
they openly admitted that use of the mark had enhanced their standing 
amongst customers, gained entree to export contracts and often provided 
spillover to other product/market segments not covered by the licence. 
Positive attempts had been made by these manufacturers to re-position 
themselves.
A similar situation was discovered with joint use of licensor and 
licensee marks. There was some evidence of licensors opening 
negotiation by taking a rigid stance on the use of their marks but they 
seemed to have readily compromised on the form of a joint mark. This is 
commonly found in agency agreements for imported machines and recognises 
the contribution from both parties. According to EEC law, the licensor 
may impose h1s mark so long as the licensee can also put his name on the 
machine. Additionally, there is a minor commercial advantage to be 
gained from the company whose name appears first as 1t is this which 
dictates their location in trade directories. 9 of the 11 joint marks 
had the UK licensee's name first.
Only 4 licensees were using their own trade mark on machines 
manufactured and sold under licence. These were all divisions of large 
engineering groups and expressed Interest 1n maintaining a consistent 
product and corporate Identity.
Overall, UK licensees had only moderate appreciation of the use of trade 
marks and very little thought had been given to evaluating their
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contribution to the package and the long term Implications. When asked 
about the trade-offs, such as possible reductions in royalty rate likely 
to arise from the three situations of licensor's mark, joint mark and 
own mark; 1t was clear that financial considerations were not to the 
fore. As will be discussed later, the presence or absence of the 
licensor's name or mark becomes and important Issue when the agreement 
expires or is terminated. Unlike patents and other forms of 
Industrial/intellectual property, trade marks have an Indefinite life 
theoretically.
B.25 Designs and Copyright
The written-up part of the technology transferred to licensees normally 
involves engineering drawings, schematics, manuals, specifications, 
product literature, software etc. These Items are an essential part of 
the communications process and the foreign licensor can protect them 
against unauthorised reproduction at minimal cost simply by claiming 
copyright. For designs which are novel but lack the inventive step 
necessary for the granting of a patent, the licensor may seek monopoly 
rights by formal registration with the Patent Office. Alternatively, 
designs which do not meet the criteria for registration may be afforded 
a measure of protection under the peculiarly British concept of design 
copyright.
The Incidence of registered designs 1n this study was minimal. The US 
system of "design patents", which 1s roughly equivalent to the UK system 
of registered designs, was used to probe the attitudes of executives 1n 
US licensor companies towards registering designs as a possible 
Intermediate level of protection between that of patents and copyright. 
Compared with patents, there was virtually no enthusiasm for registering
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designs in the UK as a pre-requisite to licensing and the significance 
of design copyright had not been understood. A typical reply from US
executives was that they --- 'left those sort of questions for their
lawyer to answer'.
Engineering drawings comprised the bulk of the documentation and these 
were supplied mainly 1n the form of blue prints or microfilm. Since 
drawings are a highly "visible" component of the technology package and 
the first to be disseminated within the licensee company, their 
psychological impact on expectations was found to be critical.
Engineers in licensee companies recalled that the first batches of 
drawings were eagerly awaited and qualitative judgements on the value of 
the technology were quickly formed from them.
Redraughting of the licensor's drawings was fairly common 1n UK licensee 
companies: to "Anglicise" or "Europeanise" them; to recode parts 
schedules to accommodate local suppliers; and in some cases, to convert 
the format to house style. Licensees, less concerned with perfection 1n 
draughtsmanship, scribbled notes on blue prints in the early stages but 
it was observed that eventually, a large proportion of production 
drawings were redraughted. Engineers and design office staff in UK 
companies in which licensing was a way of life, seemed to take such 
matters in their stride; as did those well experienced in working with 
other manufacturers and sub-contractors. Newcomers to licensing 
generally underestimated the cost and effort required to tailor designs 
to their own procedures and market requlrements.
The high standards set by UK companies 1n the presentation of 
engineering drawings and their use as the main medium for communication 
alongside product know-how, frequently provided the focus of attention
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during discussions with staff at all levels. While documentation from 
licensors for external use (eg sales literature, training manuals) was 
felt to be acceptable with only minor changes, the quality of drawings 
for internal consumption was singled out for criticism. Many US 
licensors, for example, seemed to have merely bundled drawings together 
for transferring to their UK licensees. The quality of some drawings, 
particularly 1n detail design, was judged to be so poor that 
redraughting was necessary before they could be passed over to the 
production department or sub-contractors. Similar problems were 
discovered with other foreign licensors but since they were fewer In 
number than US licensors, generalisations become more difficult. All 
that can be said is that the resolution of conflict between US licensors 
and UK licensees with regard to designs was greatly facilitated by 
common language and cultural values. Several senior executives, having 
experience of both US and Japanese licensing and agency arrangements, 
felt that the Importance of language showed Itself mainly In day to day 
problem-solving situations. Whereas a US licensor might be consulted 
immediately by telephone or telefax, a Japanese licensor might not be 
contacted at all and the solution sought within the licensee's own 
engineering department.
Cultural factors affecting approaches to design by Japanese licensors 
emerged from discussions with electronics and software engineers, though 
these would require further Investigation to ascertain their wider 
occurrence. One Head of SBU I1censing-1n Japanese technology spoke of 
the 'Illogicality' of electronics circuitry and software design' and the 
problems this Introduced for fault-finding and future enhancement. 
Another referred to the controller on h1s licensed machine tool as 
'functionally reliable with an aesthetically pleasing facia panel but 
crude and not too logical at the back.' The last view was shared by
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other engineers 1n the SBU who also added observations on flimsy design 
and 'engineering down to a specification, and no more1. Such comnents 
correlate with more widespread opinions among non-licensees concerning 
'lack of ruggedness' and 'built-in obsolescence' of Japanese machine 
tools and robots. Perceptions related to the illogicality of designs 
may be rooted in the education and training of designers 1n Japan 
compared with Europe and North America. At no time during this study 
was criticism to be heard of the reliability and performance of machines 
In service.
B.26 Know-how
Heads of SBUs Identified know-how as a vital element in 28 of the 31 
agreements. In roughly three quarters of these, know-how was felt to be 
of greater importance than patents. In the remaining 3 agreements, 
know-how may be classified as "ancillary" to the patent licence (1e just 
sufficient to allow the patent(s) to be worked). With few exceptions, 
the efficient transfer of know-how during the start-up period was 
claimed to be more critical than ongoing know-how 1n later years.
It was found that during the first 2-3 years, transfers of machine tool 
technology were "licensor-led", followed by a tapering off 1n the flow 
of know-how as licensees gained confidence and licensors adopted a 
"responsive" role, the main mechanism for the transfer of know-how 
during start-up was the training of licensee staff and the progression 
from Imported machines to kit assembly and full manufacture. Engineers 
spent a few weeks at the licensor's plant learning procedures and 
participating 1n all stages leading to the commissioning of a finished 
machine or preparing a kit for export to the UK. This was Invariably 
followed by engineers and others from the licensor company assisting the
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licensee to produce the first few machines during the transition from 
kits to full manufacture.
The costs Incurred by the licensor and licensee during start-up depended 
on the complexity of the licensed products and their manufacture. Most 
agreements specified the costs to be borne by the licensor - normally 
expressed as a maximum number of man days for staff of a given level, 
with some accompanying statement regarding obligations to pay for 
travelling expenses and accommodation. The number of man days spent at 
each location varied from a few days in the case of transfers of 
essentially product technology, to several months where there was 
extensive reorganisation and updating of manufacturing facilities.
Beyond the agreed periods for training and commissioning, any additional 
costs were the responsibility of the licensee. In practice, licensors 
were found to absorb or share costs incurred 1n response to reasonable 
requests for assistance.
In UK companies which had recently entered into licensing agreements, 
the likely Impact of know-how on the company's fortunes was a major 
talking point. Announcements had received a fair amount of publicity 1n 
the technical press and it was Interesting to observe how executive's 
elation and enthusiasm was often tinged with post-licensing anxiety as 
they attempted to rationalise the decision and reduce dissonance. Such 
worries as surfaced at the interviews were largely related to whether 
the licence represented merely another machine added to the range, a 
minor switch of direction or more central input to the company's 
survival strategy. Executives with prior experience of International 
licensing operations 1n machine tools or other engineering products, 
appeared better able to cope with the Intangibility of know-how, 
although some perceived their personal credibility to be at stake in the
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event of the licensed know-how not turning out to be what was 
purportedly on offer. Some found comfort 1n observing that their UK 
competitors had licensed-in similar know-how.
Licensees of Japanese manufacturers faced greater external pressure and 
press scrutiny than other licensees during the early 1980's. The 
alleged reluctance of export-orientated Japanese machine tool and robot 
manufacturers to progress beyond the assembly of imported kits and 
questions about the transferability of Japanese know-how were recurring 
themes. By 1988, only one licensee, Bridgeport Machines, had moved 
swiftly towards full manufacture of Yasuda horizontal machining centres 
to prove the critics wrong. At least three others had successfully 
assembled kits but the prolonged recession had caused sales projections 
to be revised downwards and target dates for part/full manufacture to be 
postponed.
Inward licensing had created quite disparate demands for know-how 1n UK 
companies depending on their previous experience in machine tool 
manufacture and the maturity of the technology. The following examples 
illustrate how contextual factors dictated the know-how content:
(a) Several UK licensees were using know-how to quickly update their 
product range and manufacturing operations by a whole generation 
of sophistication. An obvious example was the shift from manual 
to computer numerical control. This brought with it the need for 
electronics and software know-how, together with markedly higher 
standards of precision. Although CNC units were typically 
bought-1n as a proprietary item, the licensor's know-how In 
interfacing with the machine was important and there were other 
control requirements to be met such as routines for diagnostics,
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tool condition monitoring and touch-trigger probing.
Demands for improved positional accuracy and repeatability 
manifested themselves 1n finer dimensional tolerances and better 
surface finish on machined components, incorporation of 
recirculating ball-screws, spindle bearings with thermal control, 
low fr1ction/wear way slides, substitution of electric motors for 
gears and hydraulics etc. Similarly, more rigorous assembly 
procedures were introduced forcing licensees to use techniques 
such as laser alignment and the sub-assembly of key items 1n 
"clean" rooms. These changes required the transfer of substantial 
product and production engineering know-how and were often 
accompanied by much-needed investment in new equipment.
(b) Some UK manufacturers, long established in customised machines, 
had licensed-in know-how for standard machines hoping for longer 
production runs and possibly flow-line assembly. The reverse 
situation was also coimon, as manufacturers strived to achieve 
what they believed was a better balanced product mix and cash flow 
situation. Licensees following the former route to 
diversification had recruited and retrained staff to absorb the 
incoming know-how, especially in the manufacturlng/production 
function. It is important to note that by the time technological 
know-how associated with standard machines is available for 
licensing, it 1s usually entering the mid-growth phase of its life 
cycle and semi-codified. Thus a continuing flow of know-how was 
important to ensure that cost-reducing benefits emerging from 
subsequent re-design and value analysis by the licensor were 
translated quickly into price competitiveness by the licensee.
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(c) Licensees wishing to position themselves close to the frontier of 
a fast-moving technology (eg robotics applications) frequently 
I1censed-1n know-how almost as it unfolded and long before patents 
were granted. This presented special problems because the 
know-how was so dynamic and fragmented that by the time it was 
codified, it was either In the public domain or approaching 
obsolescence. One UK licensee In this position relied heavily on 
the verbal pass1ng-on of know-how and claimed to have two or three 
staff in the licensor's plant and development laboratories at any 
point 1n time. The agreement was Interesting because it had to 
accommodate the quite different organisational styles of foreign 
licensor and UK licensee. The licensor was said to be
---'entrepreneurial, creative and exhibiting some difficulty 1n
recognising that they had moved Into the production phase'. In 
contrast, the UK licensee, a new entrant, had strengths 1n 
electronic systems know-how and extensive experience of 
implementing business planning and project control procedures.
This was believed to have led to good conmercial and technological 
fit.
(d) Small Independent UK companies operating 1n particular market 
niches had sought technological progress through licensing on a 
more modest scale than 1n the previous three cases. One licensee, 
for example, wished to move from a product range totally dependent 
on mechanical design to encompass electro-hydraulic systems. The 
primary objective was to I1cense-1n complementary products which 
not only embodied the licensor's proprietary know-how but also 
obviated the need to employ an hydraulics specialist In-house.
UK licensee companies which had passed the half-way stage 1n their
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agreements were In a better position to judge the value of know-how and 
staff were generally willing to share their experiences. It should be 
pointed out, however, that there was considerable variation in 
perceptions found at different levels within and across functions.
Heads of SBU were remarkably consistent In the generality of their 
replies. There was evidence of most of them treating inward licensing 
as a project during start-up and of positive attempts to prepare budgets 
and compile schedules. While cost and time over-runs were admitted 1n a 
few cases, It was difficult to get behind the "public face" response 
that the inflow of know-how had been well managed and assimilated with 
minimal disruption. Cross-checks with lower level staff often revealed 
that claims of having absorbed know-how "within budget" often disguised 
the fact that projects were under-resourced and there were hidden 
adoption and dislocation costs which passed unrecorded.
Under-resourcing was a symptom of a wider problem in UK machine tool 
manufacturers, in that tight constraints in all functional areas had led 
to the deployment of people and cash to licensing constituting little 
more than would normally be allocated to an agency agreement. Comments 
from directors, managers and engineers on the resourcing problem were 
rooted in what they saw as the erosion of staff numbers 1n product 
engineering and manufacturlng/productlon, resulting 1n "f1re-fighting" 
and diluted effort across all fronts. Many engineers mentioned that the 
build-up of work associated with the inward licensing project was 
uneven; they were required to switch tasks at short notice and to fit 
work Into an already demanding day. Further probing revealed that this 
was partly due to the rigid functional organisation structure commonly 
found 1n UK machine tool companies. While about one third of licensing 
projects could be said to have been handled flexibly by small teams and 
task forces, the absence of a colleague from the department on temporary
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secondment to the project or on training with the licensor had caused 
other work to suffer, with little or no understanding from top 
management.
The gradual thinning of human resources had not escaped the eye of US 
licensors, for they too were facing similar problems. Some executives 
were clearly worried that at a time of growing technological change and 
complexity, UK licensees were increasing their dependency on Incoming 
know-how and effectively shifting costs back on the licensor. The 
impression was gained that the continuing employment of certain key 
people in the UK licensee company would be a major determinant in future 
re-negotiation or possible termination on expiry of the agreement.
These people were typically middle managers and senior engineers well 
versed in the licensor's systems and appeared to act as "gatekeepers" 
for dissemination of the licensor's know-how.
A critical aspect of know-how examined 1n the unpackaging process 
concerned the continuing flow over the life of the agreement. The 
existence of clauses requiring the two-way exchange of Improvements 1n 
know-how was identified in 25 of the 28 agreements 1n which know-how was 
a main feature. At least 6 of the older agreements contained wording 
that amounted to a "grant back" situation (1e that all patents and 
Improvements by the licensee should automatically be assigned to the 
licensor). Such one-sided agreements reflect the relative bargaining 
power of licensor and licensee at the time and would be unlikely to 
survive challenge under UK, EEC and US competition law unless changed to 
a mutual and non-exclusive sharing agreement.
A two-way flow of Improvements in know-how was welcomed by UK licensees. 
Evidence in the form of actual examples suggested that these were minor
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or Incremental 1n nature and mainly flowed from licensor to licensee. 
Some innovations originated within the foreign licensor company and 
others could be traced to inputs from their component suppliers, the 
know-how finding its way to the UK licensee by virtue of early use by 
the licensor. This gave certain UK licensees a head start over their 
competitors and it would be reasonable to suggest that adoptions would 
have been much delayed or ignored without "licensor pull". Electronics 
design and applications engineering accounted for most of the 
improvements in know-how, with the latter relying heavily on informal 
channels of communication.
The transfer of know-how followed this pattern up to the mld-1970's when 
the advent of microprocessor control systems began to threaten the 
product competitiveness of both parties. Machines that were envisaged 
as "manual" at the commencement of agreements had programmable logic 
controllers or full CNC applied to them in the early 1980's. This 
technological leap forward severely tested some licensing relationships 
as foreign licensors and UK licensees consulted their agreements to 
ascertain the original scope of models offered under licence, the status 
of derivatives and what had been said about the exchange of know-how. A 
wide variety of responses were Identified from UK licensees ranging 
from: (a) do nothing and let the agreement run Its natural course, (b) 
set up a parallel 1n-house development project, (c) propose a joint 
development project, and (d) let the licensor update his know-how 
accordingly on the premise that he had a contractual obligation to the 
licensee.
It was encouraging to discover 6 cases where the UK licensee had 
approached a more equal partnership with the foreign licensor and this 
had resulted in joint development programmes. It is likely that each
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partner would have proceeded alone 1f the other had not been Interested 
1n collaboration. But there were tangible benefits to be had through 
shared costs, reduced royalties and the future prospect of joint 
ventures or cross-1Icensing arrangements. The partners had also noted a 
boost to personal relationships. These positive attitudes to the 
dynamics of technological change contrast markedly with the precarious 
strategy of UK licensees who shifted the responsibility for progress on 
to the licensor. This was detected as a factor underlying at least 7 
agreements and at Its most sensitive 1n one particular case where the 
foreign licensor was reluctant to pass on state-of-the-art know-how in 
CNC because the updated machine was 'still in the experimental phase'. 
Executives in the licensor company were silent on whether they 
considered the advance fell within the scope of the licence agreement, 
which was within 2 years of expiry. They were clearly retaining 
know-how as a bargaining ploy. Also at stake, and of considerable 
importance to the UK licensee, was the potential for machine 
refurbishing business and the retrofitting of CNC.
And finally, a controversial clause concerning know-how In many old 
agreements, deleted In subsequent re-negotiations or totally absent from 
recent agreements, was that which formally tled-in the licensee to 
purchasing certain components, Intermediate assemblies, materials and 
equipment from the licensor or a nominated supplier. "Ty1ng-1n" 
provisions are normally regarded as anti-competitive because licensors 
can utilise them to Increase exports at Inflated transfer prices and as 
an Indirect control over licensees. In practice, they exist on an 
extra-contractual basis because they represent "embodied know-how" and 
ease the transfer process, especially during start-up. This does not 
put them beyond the reach of the law. Most participants argued 
justification on grounds of technical necessity for exploitation of the
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Invention, attaining minimum quality standards and the existence of 
reasonable alternatives.
Excluding the UK licensees importing kits during 1984, there were 7 
agreements in which complex components (eg leadscrews, spindles, 
Intricate castings, gears) were being imported from the licensor. In 
each case it was considered by both parties as uneconomic for the 
licensee or sub-contractors to Invest in tooling and other special 
facilities to accommodate low volumes.
On the face of it, 8 agreements were discovered to Involve importation 
of the same proprietary components (eg controllers, servo drives, 
motors, bearings) as used and preferred by the licensor. However, the 
circumstances surrounding imports of these Items were often as much due 
to the licensor's recommendation as to the possibilities of gaining 
discounts on purchases and responding to the demands of certain large 
customers. Some multinational customer companies narrowed down the 
licensor and licensee's freedom of sourcing components by listing their 
own approved suppliers. This occasionally hid nationalistic tendencies. 
It also represented a policy to achieve commonality in their plants 
throughout the world.
In the case of capital equipment purchases, the licensor's own or 
preferred make had often been Imported, not because there was no 
equivalent available 1n the external market, but to ensure compatibility 
of systems between licensor and licensee.
B.27 Payments
Licensing is a negotiated transaction, the outcome depending on how
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well informed the two parties are about each other's position, the 
competitive situation with regard to the technology on offer compared 
with similar offers elsewhere, and sensitivities towards "up front" 
payments and "deferred" payments. It is not Intended here to give a 
full exposition on the dynamics of bargaining. I was not present during 
negotiations and since executives In less than one third of licensor 
companies were actually met during the course of the study, the account 
would be biased In favour of the UK licensee and clouded by post facto 
rationalisations. Models for the negotiation of licence payments are to 
be found in the literature. It is my contention that these are too 
simplistic and lack the depth of understanding of political behaviour 
that could only be approached by a series of longitudinal studies. Thus 
the objective in this part of the study has been to explore the 
"unpackaging" of payments for Inward licences and to Identify some of 
the factors affecting the weighting of each element.
The form of payments in licence agreements 1s well established and 
normally involves some combination of the following:
(a) Down payments on release of the documented part of the technology 
(eg engineering drawings, machine specifications, parts/process 
schedules, instruction manuals).
(b) Progress payments leading up to commissioning one or more machines 
to the licensor's specification.
(c) Minimum annual royalty payments are sometimes applied on a stepped 
basis over the first 2-3 years as an Incentive to the licensee to 
enter the market as quickly as possible or as a punitive measure 
over the full duration of the agreement In the event of
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non-performance. Mínimum royalties may be Inflation-adjusted 
according to some mutually agreed price index and often go 
hand-in-hand with exclusivity.
(d) Running royalty payments are normally expressed as a percentage of 
invoiced sales price or net selling price, or as a fixed sum of 
money per unit of output. Percentage royalty rates tend to be 
preferred because they are automatically adjusted for Inflation 1n 
the licensee's country.
Tables 17 and 31 set out the incidence of each of the above elements in 
agreements and the breakdown of running royalties by technological 
segment. Further disaggregation was avoided to preserve the anonymity 
of companies active in turning and grinding technology where there were 
only three inward licence agreements in each segment.
Down payments were Included 1n 10 (32%) agreements and ranged from 
£2,500 to 4300,000 (adjusted to 1983 currency). Part payments were 
found in only 2 agreements. One Involved three amounts, one lump sum on 
signing and the others at the end of the first and second years. The 
second agreement required a first payment on signing and a second 
smaller amount on completion of the tooling phase.
The acceptability, 1n principle, of downpayments by UK licensees raised 
the full spectrum of responses from executives and there was not always 
unanimity at board level. Some executives were vehemently opposed to 
up-front payments of any kind and saw them as 'lack of trust' 1n the 
licensee and a 'grab and run' tactic. This attitude was more prevalent 
In manufacturers of metal forming machines and may be partially related 
to custom and practice within that segment of "one-off" International
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licensing of designs where all payments tend to be wrapped Into a single 
royalty on completion of the order. However, such strongly held views 
were Inconsistent with their position as manufacturers and sellers; 
their terms of sale requesting stage payments to assist in financing 
work 1n progress! A second reason for opposition to down payments was 
the status of several licensees as the prior distributor of the 
licensor. Executives in these cases felt that a degree of product 
know-how had already been transferred and it would be impertinent of the 
licensor to request a lump sum at that stage in the relationship. 
Executives in 4 licensee companies said that down payments had been 
imposed on them.
Executives willing to concede that a down payment might have been a 
reasonable request from the licensor to cover the cost of transferring 
know-how during start-up, were more concerned about the actual magnitude 
of the payment. Discussions from hereon followed a convoluted and
Table 31. Breakdown of Running Royalty Payments by Technological Segment
Turni ng Milling Grinding Metal
Forming
Automation Total
Number of
Agreements 3 7 3 7 11 31
Mean running
royalty (%) 5.0 4.8 7.2 4.9 6.4 5.7*
Note : * The running royalty rate was not disclosed in the case of two 
agreements, one in milling and one 1n metal forming technology; 
and two agreements involved royalty payments in the form of a 
fixed sum per unit. The overall mean royalty of 5.7% is 
therefore based on N=27 (SD=2.2).
sometimes embarrassing path, as opinions on the purpose of down payments
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emerged. Small down payments of less than¿5,000 were regarded as an 
administrative cost and not a point of contention. It was the extent to 
which licensors should base the payment on complexity and modernity of 
the technology, and attempts to recover "sunk" development and 
commercialisation costs that proved the most controversial. Executives 
generally had a sound grasp of all these issues. There was, for 
example, no disputing the higher costs to the licensor of transferring 
manufacturing-intensive know-how and the difference between licences for 
mature and "state-of-the-art" technology; but they struggled with 
intangibility and soon resorted to 'Intuition' and 'professional 
judgement'. In the same way as executives' estimation of their own cost 
of assimilating the technology left a lot to be desired, It was observed 
that there was much to be gained from licensees putting themselves 1n 
the licensor's shoes.
Strongly held beliefs about how to approach the payment question 
invariably found expression 1n "rules of thumb" and simple payback 
calculation. One executive said that down payments should not exceed 
twice the selling price of the licensed machine. Another suggested one 
year's projected royalty payment as a useful guide. In practice these 
amounted to the same thing. It was suspected that the guidelines were 
formulated (or rationalised) a long time after negotiations had been 
concluded. In only 5 cases was there any clear Indication of attempts 
to use discounting techniques related to the time value of money. The 
prevailing view on royalty payments was that 5 per cent of Invoiced 
sales price was ‘about right' with higher percentages for product 
uniqueness and lower for mature products.
Discussions on the magnitude of down payments could not be completely 
divorced from considerations of running royalty payments as several
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executives regarded them as interchangeable. Given flexibility to trade 
off reductions in down payments for a marginal increase in royalty rate, 
some executives in SBUs of large groups felt on safer ground when 
seeking corporate approval: (a) because royalties represent a deferred 
expense which aids cashflow and most Importantly, is within executive 
control, and (b) because capital payments normally attract greater 
corporate scrutiny. One extreme extension of this behaviour was the 
managing director of a US-owned subsidiary who was pleased to have 
negotiated an inward licence agreement which involved only running 
royalty payments. The percentage rate was over three points above the 
mean for technological segment but was certain to find favour in the US 
parent company because the vice-president, to whom he reported, was 
sensitive about capital expenditure as 1t provided the basis on which 
his annual bonus compensation was computed.
Establishing an opening bid and setting an acceptable upper threshold 
appears to have been a hit and miss exercise 1n large and small SBUs 
alike. As one managing director of a small Independent machine tool 
manufacturing company who had recently completed negotiations on a 
licence agreement for the first time explained: 'They wanted 7 1/2 per 
cent royalty and a 10,000 down payment but I got them down to 5 per 
cent and 5,000'. He was happy that a compromise had been reached and 
the technology had satisfied his expectations. Like many other 
licensees he felt that he could 'afford the down payment' and 'bear the 
royalty payment 1n his margins'.
Evidence from an historical study of postwar licences and from 
agreements current in 1984, showed that royalty rates were generally 
higher In the 1950's and 60's. This was probably due to (a) the lower 
intensity of price competition at the time, (b) the absence of Japanese
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machine tool manufacturers and competition from Taiwan, Korea and other 
newly Industrialised countries, and (c) the dominance of manufacturers 
in one country, the USA, as suppliers of technology. The highest 
running royalty rate discovered In any agreement during the course of 
this empirical study was 15 per cent (1964) and the lowest below 1 per 
cent (1975). Of those agreements which had been in existence for more 
than 10 years, royalty payments had normally been maintained at the 
agreed rate on signing, reduced on a step basis or renegotiated 
downwards. Only two cases of Increased royalties were found. One had 
exceptional circumstances Involving extension of the scope of the 
licence to Include a more sophisticated machine with a well known trade 
name. The second reflected the Isolation that some small/medium sized 
companies experience when pursuing a negotiated settlement. When the 
Head of SBU 1n the latter company was asked about the Increased rate he 
replied that they had drifted Into 1t ....'with hindsight, the original 
x per cent on selling price was a high royalty and the current y per 
cent very high ---  We didn't know what to expect'.
The Imposition of minimum royalty requirements received similar negative 
comment as 1n the questioning on down payments. They were not liked, 
but tolerated In 7 agreements. Two licensees of long standing had such 
low demand during the recession of 1980-84 as to find themselves paying 
the minimum royalty. The actual sums of money paid were low but it was 
an event which had seemed highly unlikely on signing the agreement.
Several features surrounding the compromise on running royalty rate were 
present In some agreements and known to have been rejected during the 
negotiation of others:
(a) Different rates for spares, refurbished machines, tooling and
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accessories: This was one of the sticking points 1n certain 
agreements because 1t provided lucrative business during economic 
recession. It was not unusual to find a higher royalty rate on 
spares, 1n one case twice the rate of complete machines; and lower 
rates for repair, refurbishment and tooling. In one case, the 
licensor had offset the cost of stock-holding Incurred by the 
licensee In recognition of the Importance of spares and after 
sales service.
(b) Different rates for different models: The potential for bargaining 
on this Issue was alluded to in the earlier discussion on scope of 
agreements. Only one current agreement contained such a division, 
based on mechanical and hydraulic machines. Imposition and 
acceptance of a blanket rate without thorough consideration of 
product mix was widespread and the potential for other 
permutations such as a single rate for common modules with 
different rates for "customised" Items was seldom explored. 
Irrespective of whether this would have been acceptable to the 
licensor, the exercise would have quantified the cost of 
administrative convenience. Most UK machine tool manufacturers 
have strength In customisation and adaptation know-how and there 
Is sound argument that with the exception of certain applications 
know-how, they should not have to pay a licensor for Its use.
(c) No cases were Identified of foreign licensor companies negotiating 
equity holdings in their UK licensees as a substitute for down 
payments or to offset royalties. One licensor had held a 14 per 
cent stake In the UK licensee for some years. This was the legacy 
of restructuring and change of ownership rather than due to a 
straightforward licensing arrangement. Conversely, two UK
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licensees had minority equity holdings in their licensor company. 
The seat on the board accompanying the investment was felt to 
bring participation in decision making and greater stability to 
the licensing agreement. But from thereon, the business 
philosophies of the two licensees diverged. In one case the 
initial cash stake on signing the inward licence agreement was 
almost doubled later when an option for further investment was 
taken up. The aim of the UK licensee being to fund growth of the 
licensor. Equity participation In the second case was a complex 
combination of the UK company 'protecting an existing outward 
licence', which later turned Into a cross-licence, and '....access 
to a foreign manufacturer active in the supply of machines in an 
expanding and competitive market (1e Japan)'.
(d) No differentiation between the transfer of "static" and "dynamic" 
(ongoing) know-how was found to be reflected In royalty rates.
The rates were the same at the beginning of the agreed duration as 
towards the end, yet some licensees had noted the expiry of 
patents and a diminishing flow of know-how with the passage of 
time. The findings of this study suggest that the notion of 
royalties as a deferred payment may provide the simplest 
explanation. Since most machine tool licence agreements Involve 
greater Intensity of technology transfers at start-up, 1t may be 
that the value of know-how 1s "averaged" over the duration along 
with similar valuations of longer lasting Industrial property 
rights in trade marks and copyrights.
Royalty rates were seldom a function of product range and 
uniqueness of the technology. The width of the product range 
seemed to make no difference within a given technology. But
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generalisations about uniqueness are questionable for two reasons: 
Firstly, design, reliability, maintainability, etc. are 
technological attributes which translate Into product 
differentiation, which In turn can be enhanced 1n the market 
through the use of trade marks. UK licensees frequently spoke of 
how their licensed machine was the "Rolls Royce" of the segment In 
which they operated and they were prepared to accept a premium on 
royalty rate due to the use of trade marks and the absence of 
close competitors. Secondly, viewed from another angle, where 
uniqueness is coupled with leading edge technology, this 1s often 
accompanied by complexity, and lead time is of value. Royalty 
rates and down payments are affected by uniqueness and complexity 
of the technology In as much as they may shift the upper and lower 
threshold royalty rates which determine the flexibility zone for 
bargaining.
(e) The actual sums of money paid over to the licensor as royalties 
are a function of the royalty rate and the definition of selling 
price, ex-works price or some other base figure used to make the 
calculation. The extent to which this simple concept had eluded 
licensors and licensees during negotiation could not be determined 
with precision. Examination of the 29 agreements Involving 
percentage running royalties revealed that the calculation was 
based on invoiced sales price 1n 15 cases, net selling price (1e 
less packaging, transport and distribution costs, duties, VAT) 1n 
14 cases, and further deductions for components Imported from the 
licensor and certain proprietary components 1n 12 cases. The 
Importance of gaining these concessions cannot be over-emphasised 
as royalties may be requested on both the "bought-1n" materials, 
components and services and on the "value added" portion of
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selling price. The former frequently exceeded the latter due to 
sub-contracting. Again, UK executives experienced In contract 
negotiation and well down the learning curve for licensing had 
used this to advantage.
(f) Territory restrictions seemed to have Influenced the magnitude of 
royalty payments only in respect of home market exclusivity. The 
absence of exclusivity would almost certainly have caused most 
licensees to withdraw from negotiations. Assessing their 
sensitivity to further trade-offs 1n royalty rate based on an 
hierarchy of exclusive and non-exclusive sales territories was 
problematic. Having extracted the territory rights In agreements 
for discussion, few executives could justify the inclusion of 
particular territories and very little market research had been 
carried out to establish their fertility for sales of licensed 
machines.
B.23 Termination and Expiry
Licence agreements normally state an expiry date, together with 
provisions for the handling of disputes, arbitration and termination.
The existence of an expiry date, as opposed to an indefinite 
arrangement, reinforces the permanence of the licence.
Executives' views on expiry and termination were sought because 1t 
placed a different perspective on the technology package by allowing 
further exploration of what they regarded as their company's "core" 
technology. Particularly revealing were comnents on (a) the extent to 
which some licensees were dependent on their foreign licensor, (b) how 
this fitted 1n with the licensor's aspirations and objectives, and (c)
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the propensity of the parties to seek recourse to litigation.
The first area to be explored concerned the rights and obligations that 
might survive termination or expiry of licence agreements. This was 
especially pertinent to the 10 agreements that were within 1 year of 
expiry and the further 10 within 2 years listed in Table 29. In some of 
these cases, the question was timely as they had decided not to 
negotiate extension of the agreement and wished to continue 
manufacturing machines under their own name using what they deemed to be 
their own technology. Although the circumstances prevailing at the time 
varied widely, the Interpretation hinged on the status of patents and 
know-how.
Two agreements each covered patents and improvement patents at different 
stages In their life, making It uncertain whether the effective duration 
could be extended by the licensor to the life of the most recent patent. 
Similarly, there was Intense debate on the relative proportions of 
know-how that had been transferred permanently, that which the licensee 
was 'permitted to use' and was therefore repossessable by the licensor, 
and that which had entered the public domain. It was interesting to 
note that copyright 1n the drawings was felt to be of minor Importance 
and dismissed by one executive 1n the comment ....'they can have those 
back along with the other Items of documentation'. It was likely that 
near-perpetual obligations would not hold up 1n law and that 1n one 
case, the Improvement patents were weak and supporting a mature product. 
Nevertheless, both licensees appeared resigned to compromising on a 
reduced royalty fee for several years as the worst outcome.
The question of premature termination frequently provoked Instant 
reactions, such as: ....'it couldn't happen in our case' or ....'we
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would sue for breach of contract'. It was only when 1t was put to 
executives that termination might arise through default and conflict of 
Interest, perhaps due to unacceptable successors In business as the 
outcome of an acquisition or merger, that consideration of 
vulnerabilities and contingency plans entered the discussion. One 
executive In a UK licensee company, for Instance, Indicated that he had 
recently signed an agreement with a foreign licensor, only to find three 
months later that the company had fallen Into receivership and the 
attitude of the new owner was unsympathetic. Such matters of 
termination before the agreement has run Its natural course are covered 
by appropriate clauses In the agreement. Normally, the onus would be 
placed on each party to prove default or for them to arrive at some 
mutual understanding. Executives were 111-prepared for events of this 
kind and generally frightened by the threat of litigation. This was 
particularly noticeable among executives 1n small/medium-sized licensee 
companies. While they were not Inhibited In seeking external legal aid 
in perusing the terms of the agreement before signing, they clearly felt 
disadvantaged compared with the corporate resource available to their 
licensors.
B.24 Cross-Licensing
As the cost of machine tool design and development has risen, some 
executives have considered ways of sharing and exploiting technology 
with foreign partners. One mechanism for doing this without necessarily 
entering Into a relationship Involving equity ownership 1s through 
cross-licensing. Put simply, the partners agree to manufacture and sell 
under licence each others' selected complementary machines In defined 
markets.
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The two-way flow of technology may involve reciprocal access to patents, 
designs and know-how without payment taking place, but the exchange 
process is more likely to be formalised by separate Inward and outward 
licences in parallel. The last point is a sound one commercially 
because different companies and markets tend to change at different 
rates. There 1s a lower probability of conflict arising at a later date 
if any Imbalance Is built into the flow of royalties accruing from sales 
of machines based on the respective technologies.
Cross-licensing, as a bilateral mode of international technology 
transfer, 1s poorly developed in machine tools compared with other 
industries such as electronics, chemicals and pharmaceuticals. This may 
be due to: (a) the relative ease with which concise designs, 
formulations and process instructions are transferred, often at "arms 
length", in the last three industries, and (b) because of their 
oligopolistic market structure and the dominance of multinational 
companies In the generation and exploitation of technology.
Cross-1Icensing normally takes place between companies of equal 
commercial and technological standing.
Discussion on cross-licensing with senior executives In US and UK 
machine tool companies was a frustrating and almost fruitless exercise. 
Over half of the licensors and licensees Interviewed fell into the "no 
opinion" category and there was a tendency to lump cross-licensing under 
the blanket term of "collaboration". US executives were very cautious 
of any transaction perceived as likely to fall foul of anti-trust 
legislation.
In the UK, cross-licensing was not found to be an option that had 
received much serious consideration. Only 4 cross-licensing
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arrangements for machine tools were discovered to be 1n operation during 
1984. Due to assurances of confidentiality and anonymity the detailed 
product/market circumstances surrounding each cross-licensing case will 
not be divulged here. It 1s sufficient to record that 1n one 
arrangement of 10 years duration, the UK partner had achieved production 
of 50 machines per year up to 1980, when 'the market collapsed with the 
recession'. The licence got them into the market quickly but there was 
some disappointment at the lack of updated technology from the foreign 
licensor partner. In contrast, the foreign partner abandoned production 
of machines to UK designs after total sales of only 12 machines over 
about two years. Eventually, as the relationship became one-sided and 
the grounds for mutual Interest receded, It was clear that the 
agreements would not be extended. It would be fair to say that the 
foreign partner had outgrown the UK partner 1n machine tool production 
capability and overall sales turnover.
The second case of cross-1 Icensing was of 5 years duration and covered a 
range of equipment of low volume. The relationship seemed to have 
worked well over the first two years and both partners expressed some 
admiration for each other's capabilities. Unfortunately, a change of 
ownership by one of the partners made the possibility of renewal of the 
agreements remote as 'the relationship with the new owner had not 
gelled'. A potentially synergistic technological arrangement had been 
frustrated by a clash of personalities and business philosophies.
The third and fourth cases Involved a UK manufacturer entering into 
cross-1Icensing arrangements with a Japanese and a US manufacturer. The 
Inward agreement with the Japanese manufacturer was for 5 years duration 
and Involved a minority share holding by the UK company. The agreement 
with the US manufacturer was originally for 10 years duration and had
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been extended for a further 10 years. Orders for equipment 1n both 
cases were Intermittent and there were several competitors with similar 
technology worldwide. Competitive advantages from cross-licensing were 
described as a way of offering complete equipment packages and 'an 
opportunity to earn money'.
It Is impossible to generalise beyond the experience of only four cases, 
except to observe that each UK company had succeeded in Increasing Its 
stock of knowledge and gaining additional business. All claimed to know 
their respective partners well before entering Into cross-HcensIng. At 
the time of signing and over the course of the agreements, there was 
little to distinguish these cases from the conventional mode of one-way 
licensing.
B.3 TABLES AND FIGURES
The following set of Tables and Figures support earlier analysis 1n this 
Appendix.
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Table 32. Summary of the Five Forces Affecting Competition in the 
Machine Tool Industry
Standard Machines Customised Machines
(a) Industry Competitors: 
Intense rivalry due to a large 
number of competitors offering 
similar products.
Few competitors in highly 
sophisticated machining systems. 
Strong competition for sporadic 
orders. Loss of a few large 
orders may put the business in 
jeopardy.
(b) Potential Entrants:
Low threat of new entrants. High 
barriers to entry due to experience/ 
scale effects. Late entrants would 
require high investment in cost­
saving technology and access to 
distribution channels.
New entrants would not possess 
required credibility and track 
record. Easy to enter 
unsophisticated end of the market 
on a "jobbing" basis.
(c) Suppliers:
CNC systems dominated by a small 
number of suppliers in a global 
market. These suppliers also offer 
other key components in a package 
cocooned in guarantees.
Bargaining power of suppliers is 
high due to low usage of 
components in machine tools 
compared with other industries. 
Software services may be 
important in the future.
(d) Buyers:
Greatest concentration is in 
automotive sector. Remainder spread 
across a wide range of engineering 
industries where switching is a 
possibility.
Highly concentrated in automotive 
sector. Some buying companies 
are backwardly integrated in 
automation systems. Others are 
attempting to set de facto 
standards in systems 
compatibility and controlling 
machine specifications.
(e) Substitutes:
Main threat is from customised 
machines of similar type. Also 
substitution of machining processes 
(eg grinding for turning, electro­
discharge machining for grinding).
Some customised machines are also 
"dedicated" machines. A  threat 
has emerged from flexible 
machines.
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Table 33. Summary of Critical Success Factors in the International 
Machine Tool Industry
Standard Machines Customised Machines
Recognition that the main high 
volume segments for general purpose 
machines are increasingly commodity- 
like in a global market.
Performance to tight 
specifications. Customers seek 
machine reliability, 
productivity, after sales service 
to minimise down-time.
Price competitiveness. Production 
engineering skills are necessary 
to systematically drive down unit 
costs and support price 
sensitivity.
Applications engineering. High 
level of product engineering 
skills required to solve 
customer machining problems.
Machine reliability. Depends on 
rigorous specification and quality 
control of bought-in components. 
Assumes greater importance 1n 
manufacture/assembly of multi­
function machines.
Cost Containment. Preparing 
realistic proposals and 
controlling the manufacture of 
"specials" to avoid cost over­
runs. Highly customised machines 
are moderately price sensitive. 
Customers pay attention to 
initial capital cost and
Sales coverage through a network of 
distributors to assure availability 
on a global basis. Associated with 
strong commitment to building/ 
defending market share.
operating costs over the service 
life of machine. Commercial 
skills In bidding/tendering and 
negotiating required, supported 
by market Intelligence.
Market research. Vital to identify 
the width of product range and 
minimise overlaps between models.
Ordering patterns erratic. Close 
manufacturer/customer 
relationships ensure early 
warning of potential orders and 
changing customer requirements.
Credibility/image. Credi bi11ty/1mage.
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Table 34. Summary of Financial Performance of the Sample Companies for 
Years 1978-1986
♦Index 1980*100
Company 1978 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Turning:
Binns 4 Berry:Sales(jÉm) 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.3
R0S (%) 6.9 3.2 (3.4) (1.8) (0.2) 1.4 2.1 6.4
R0CE (%) 34.0 10.4 (11.4) (6.9) (1.0) 5.9 7.9 9.5
♦Salesgirl) 1.4 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9
Inf Adj
BO
Brown & Ward
consolidated accounts
0.85 0.53 0.82 
(28.5) (0.6) 
(47.9) (1.6) 
0.85 0.49 0.70
0.59
(1.9)
(3.7)
0.48
2.0 closure 
est
closure
Colchester Lathes 20.1 28.6 21.3 15.7 14.5 13.9 22.3 28.7
7.7 3.5 3.3 (4.6) (4.0) (15.0) (0.2) 2.1
12.9 7.2 5.0 (6.4) (10.2) (27.3) (0.6) 7.3
26.9 28.6 19.8 13.6 11.8 10.4 15.4 18.7
Dean, Smith & Grace 6.5 10.4 8.8 6.5 4.9 6.3 7.2 8.1
9.2 7.2 (3.2) (7.7) (31.3) (10.1) 2.3 (0.9)
15.5 13.8 (5.4) (10.5) (50.6) (18.3) 4.9 (2.1)
8.7 10.4 8.2 5.6 4.0 4.7 5.0 5.3
EMI-MEC 7.7 12.9 6.7 5.4 3.0 4.5 6.4 4.8
26.5 19.0 10.9 5.1 (21.5) (20.9) (1.9) (5.1)
87.3 94.1 19.0 10.2 (34.4) (39.7) (5.2) (17.9)
10.3 12.9 6.2 4.7 2.4 3.4 4.4 3.1
T S Harrison 8.8 11.4 9.7 5.8 7.4 8.4 10.0 12.0
16.7 14.7 5.7 (10.6) (1.8) 2.6 9.7 11.8
34.8 32.7 4.9 (6.0) (5.5) 16.6) 34.0 11.9
11.8 11.4 9.3 5.0 6.0 6.3 6.9 7.8
Hepworth consolidated accounts
Key : Under each company heading, the first line = sales turnover (fm), 
second line * return on sales (t), 
third line * return on capital employed (%), 
fourth line * inflation adjusted sales turnover (Cm) 1980=100
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Table 34 (continued)
Company 1978 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
T I Matrix 49.0 5.9 6.6 7.3 8.8 11.8 24.5 N/A
3.7 (0.9)(29.9) 3.4 (7.9) (8.2) (15.3)
7.4 (2.91(26.8) 3.5 (25.2) (53.6) (66.8)
65.6 5.9 6.1 6.3 7.1 8.9 16.9
Warner & Swasey 7.3 8.9 7.8 7.2 3.9 abandoned
17.3 10.9 (9.6) (79.2) (13.5) manufacturing in
18.5 10.8 (7.8){159.3) (1.3) UK
9.8 8.9 7.2 6.2 3.2
WCI consolidated accounts
(formerly a division 
of Alfred Herbert)
Wickman 8.0 10.3 19.3 10.8 N/A divested
10.8 7.9 4.0 (32.4)
49.0 31.3 31.4 N/A
10.7 10.3 18.0 9.3
Milling:
Ajax N/A N/A N/A 3.1 4.9 5.2 6.3 6.7
(3.2) 2.0 4.7 6.2 6.4
(8.5) 9.2 21.0 40.0 45.0
2.7 4.0 3.9 4.3 4.4
W Asquith 0.5 2.3 2.7 2.9 4.4 3.7
(start-up 1981) (10.0) (0.1) 5.1 (8.2) 4.0 0.1
(10.9) (0.9) (21.3)(104.9) 17.0 0.3
0.5 2.0 2.2 2.2 3.0 2.4
Bridgeport consolidated1 accounts (est; 40m sales 1n 1986/87)
Cincinnati Milacron 36.2 46.7 41.1 30.9 27.1 28.5 25.3 28.8
8.9 9.1 (12.5) (5.3) (0.2) 1.0 (2.8) (2.0)
15.8 16.1 (22.0) (8.0) (0.2) 1.4 (3.9) (3.0)
48.4 46.7 3.8 26.7 22.0 21.4 17.5 18.7
De VIleg 6.3 8.8 2.6 3.2 6.3 9.0
(formerly a division 14.6 8.3 (74.8) (28.2) 2.9 5.1
of Alfred Herbert) 30.0 14.1 (58.2) (36.8) 6.6 15.0
5.9 7.6 2.1 2.4 4.3 5.9
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Table 34 (continued) 
Company
G £ L-F
Hurco
KTM
Kearas-RIchards 
J Parkinson
Pollard
Wadkln
Grinding:
AMT
1978 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
7.7 10.3 11.6 7.8 8.5 5.3 8.2 N/A
10.6 11.9 5.1 (2.6) (10.2) (30.6) 1.6
13.8 17.3 7.7 (9.2) (17.9) (47.0) 3.3
10.3 10.3 10.8 6.7 6.9 4.0 5.7
16.2 3.1 4.5 6.8 10.0
(4.8) (14.5) (18.1) (51.3) N/A
6.6 (2.2) (24.0) N/A N/A
14.0 2.5 3.4 4.7 6.5
15.1 24.6 25.7 21.8 13.8 8.8 16.6 20.8
9.9 10.8 (1.2) (4.9) (17.3) (33.4) 0.7 1.2
18.3 26.2 (2.9) (12.8) (56.6) (52.3) 1.9 4.9
20.2 24.6 23.9 18.8 11.2 6.6 11.4 13.5
management buyout from N/A N/A
Staveley Industries 1983 N/A N/A
33.5 14.1
2.4 2.0 2.9 2.0 1.7 2.2 closure
4.9 (1.7) (0.9) (3.7) (2.9) (12.3)
9.4 (1.8) (0.9) (2.6) (1.7) N/A
3.2 2.0 2.7 1.7 1.4 1.7
4.8 5.8 5.3 3.9 3.4 4.7 6.0 6.6
16.2 15.7 4.3 (1.4) 1.2 8.3 4.0 3.1
33.9 27.5 6.6 (1.6) 1.2 10.8 6.5 5.3
6.4 5.8 4.9 3.4 2.8 3.5 4.1 4.3
consolidated accounts
0.6 0.9 1.0 1.1
0.4 1.7 2.4 65.0
N/A N/A N/A N/A
0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0
2.2 2.6 2.3 2.2
3.8 0.5 (5.9) (1.6)
22.6 (2.0) (25.8) (8.3)
2.9 2.6 2.1 1.9
1.6 2.4 3.2 2.9
(3.7) 4.5 4.0 2.4
(6.7) 11.6 13.2 8.1
1.3 1.8 2.2 1.9
2.0
1.9
0.7!
1.6
Catmur N/A receivership
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Table 34 (continued)
Company 1978 1980
Jones 4 Shipman 17.0 22.2
17.2 9.7
29.4 16.7
22.7 22.2
Keighley Grinders 2.5 4.4
15.6 0.4
35.0 1.2
3.3 4.4
Landis Lund 6.7 9.8
32.3 29.5
36.6 43.6
9.0 9.8
Newall 10.5 14.3
12.8 6.0
26.9 13.1
14.0 14.3
Oerlikon 3.0 5.0
7.5 8.6
15.1 20.9
4.0 5.0
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
16.7 13.8 13.6 16.9 19.9 21.0
3.8 (7.8) (5.5) 6.3 10.7 11.0
5.0 (9.7) (7.6) 10.0 17.5 17.4
15.5 11.9 11.0 12.7 13.7 13.7
merged with Newall
10.7 10.2 9.6 5.6 7.1 N/A
27.2 25.4 16.2 6.2 7.9
42.2 35.1 20.2 4.6 8.8
10.0 8.8 7.8 4.2 4.9
14.5 10.9 10.5 7.8 12.5 N/A
1.4 (5.1) (10.6) (12.3) 0.0
3.1 (11.1) (40.5) (65.6) 0.0
13.5 9.4 8.5 5.9 8.6
4.6
1.2
2.1
4.3
3.6
(5.0)
(5.9)
3.1
11.0 est closure
Metal Fornii ng:
E W Bliss 2.9 3.2 3.1 2.9 2.5 est
15.1 (1.4) 8.0 0.6
9.7 (0.8) 5.1 0.3
3.9 3.2 2.9 2.5
Henry Berry consolidated1 accounts
Bronx 12.2 14.8 7.5 13.5 10.4 7.1 22.1
2.6 3.4 (11.8) 4.0 2.0 (9.0) 4.2
9.3 11.6 (28.1) 15.4 5.9 (23.2) 13.6
16.3 4.8 7.0 11.7 8.5 5.3 15.2
Davy McKee consolidated accounts
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Table 34 (continued) 
Company 1978 1980
Ex-Cel 1-0 2.2 7.0
closure 1987 19.2 22.1
22.5 37.4
2.9 7.0
GEC Robotics 
(start up in 1981)
Kingsbury 8.5
0.7 
1.3 
8.5
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
5.5 8.8 9.8 6.6 7.6 N/A
2.7 (5.4) (8.6) (1.7) 2.9
3.3 (11.9) (26.6) (3.7) N/A
5.1 7.6 8.0 5.0 5.2
0.9 1.4 1.2 0.8 0.7 N/A
(63.3) (24.2) (46.3) (1.8) (4.6)
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
8.3 1.2 1.0 0.6 4.8
7.1 6.1 7.4 10.3 N/A N/A
(3.4) (1.5) 2.3 7.3
(5.5) (2.4) 4.1 15.5
6.6 5.3 6.0 7.7
LaPointe consolidated accounts
2.9 4.3 4.1 3.3 3.5 closure of
8.6 8.8 (1.5) (31.0) (29.4) machine tool
15.5 16.8 (2.1) (37.9) 57.1) operations
3.9 4.3 3.8 2.9 2.8
Redi ffusion consolidated accounts
Systems Control
600 Fanuc
Unimation 0.7 2.9
33.8 (5.5)
0.9 2.9
V S Remek 
(start up in 1981)
3.5 4.7 
10.8 6.7 
25.5 13.0 
4.7 4.7
0.3 0.5 N/A N/A N/A
est
0 0.4 0.9 1.0
- (81.3) (28.2) (30.6)
N/A N/A N/A N/A
0.3 0.6 0.7
3.2 6.7 8.7 7.6 12.1 N/A
(20.0) 7.9 (20.4) (26.7) (22.2)
3.0 5.8 7.1 5.7 8.3
0.8 0.1 acquired by
VS Group
5.9 4.1 5.0 3.7 3.5 4.4
14.1 (5.4) 3.4 2.3 (1.1) 9.4
26.5 (7.4) 5.4 2.7 (1.3) 13.2
5.5 3.5 4.1 2.8 2.4 2.9
Wavis
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Table 35. Age Profile of Senior Executives in Machine Tool Manufacturing SBUs 
as at 1984
Average Age 
(years)
Range
(years)
Head of SBU 
(N=54) 51 36-64
Marketing/Sales Directors 
(N-31) 47 34-63
Engi neeri ng/Techn1cal D1rectors 
(N*30) 50 33-65
Manufacturing/Productlon Directors 
(N=28) 49 26-67
Table 36. Continuity at SBU Board Level
Number of Years 1n Post as at 1984 Total
<1 2-3 4-5 6-10 10+
Heads of SBU 8 13 12 8 13 54
Marketing/Sales Director 3 6 2 2 18 31
Englneering/Techn1cal 
D1rector 2 6 2 4 16 30
Manufacturlng/Production 
D1rector 2 5 1 1 19 28
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Table 37. Frequency of Overseas Visits by Senior Executives 1n UK-Owned 
and US-Owned SBUs for Years 1981-83
To Europe To Japan To USA
UK-Owned SBUs:
Head of SBU 
(N-32)
X=8.2 
SD-6.5 
Range=0-20
X-0.9
SD-1.7
Range=0-8
x-3.7
SD-3.0
Range=0-15
Marketlng/Sales 
Directors (N=18)
X-13.8 
SD-9.1 
Range=2-40
8-1.1
SD-2.2
Range=0-8
X-4.3 
SD-6.3 
Range=0-15
Eng1neer1ng/Techn1cal 
Directors (N=16)
x=6.6
SD-7.2
Range=0-30
X-6.3
SD-1.6
Range=0-6
8-2.3
SD-3.0
Range=0-6
Manufacturi ng/Producti on 
Directors (N=15)
X-3.8 
SD-8.3 
Range=0-15
X-0.5
SD-1.5
Range=0-6
X-0.7 
SD-2.6 
Range=0-10
US-Owned SBUs:
Head of SBU 
(N-18)
5c=12.2 
SD-6.9 
Range=0-25
x-0.9
SD-2.4
Range=0-10
x-7.5 
SD-9.4 
Range=0-16
Marketlng/Sales 
Directors (N=10)
X-13.0 
SD-9.5 
Range=0-30
X-0.4
SD-0.7
Range=0-2
X-3.7
SD-4.5
Range=0-13
Engineerlng/Technlcal 
Directors (N=10)
X-3.0
SD-3.8
Range=0-10
X-0.2
SD-0.4
Range=0-1
X-2.8
SD-2.8
Range=0-8
Manufacturing/Product1on 
Directors (N=13)
8-1.3
SD-2.6
Range=0-8
X-0
SD=0
Range=0
X-0.9
SD-1.9
Range=0-6
Key: N * Number of usable responses, 1? * average number of visits.
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Table 38. Particlpatlon/Attendance at Major International Trade Shows
By Senior Executives in UK-Owned and US-Owned SBUs for Years
1981-83
Trade Show Exhibiting Through Number of SBUs Number of Visitors
Parent, Own SBU, Sending Visitors per SBU 
Distributor or 
Llcensor/Llcensee
UK-Owned SBUs:
Chicago SBU 4, D1st 3, Lie 3 7 x=4,SD=3,Range=l-15
Hanover SBU 8, D1st 2. L1c 0 19 X=5,SD=4,Range=l-20
Osaka SBU 0, D1st 1, Lie 3 4 - Range=l-2
Paris SBU 8, D1st 2, L1c 0 18 x*6,SD=4,Range*!-25
US-Owned SBUs:
Chicago Parent 15, Dlst 1, L1c 0 13 x=6,SD=5,Range=l-20
Hanover Parent 9, D1st 2, Lie 0 11 x*ll,SD=9,Range=l-41
Osaka Parent 3, Dlst 0, Lie 6 2 -
Paris Parent 7, Dlst 1, Lie 0 12 X*7,SD*5,Range*l-20
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Table 39. Estimated National Shares of World Machine Tool Production
for Years 1965-1987
Year
Country 1965 1974 1981 1983 1985 1987
(%) (*> m (%) {%) m
W Germany 17.5 17.8 15.3 15.7 14.2 19.9
Japan 4.1 12.9 18.2 18.6 24.0 20.5
Switzerland 3.2 3.6 3.1 3.9 4.4 4.7
UK 8.2 4.6 3.5 3.1 3.7 3.0
Italy 2.6 6.1 5.3 5.2 4.8 6.8
France N/A N/A 3.1 2.7 2.1 2.3
USA 28.4 16.9 19.5 9.9 11.7 7.8
USSR 14.9 14.6 12.2 16.0 13.8 12.7
E Germany N/A N/A 2.9 4.4 3.6 4.2
Source : American Machinist, OECD , NMTBA
Table 40. Estimated National Shares of World Machine Tool Exports for
Years 1965-1987
Year
Country 1965 1974 1981 1983 1985 1987
(%) (*) m (%) (%) (*)
W Germany 27.2 31.0 24.2 23.0 20.0 22.6
Japan 3.3 6.5 16.4 15.1 22.1 20.0
Swi tzerland 7.5 8.0 7.0 8.3 8.8 9.3
UK 7.5 5.3 4.7 4.1 3.6 3.4
Italy 5.5 6.5 6.8 7.1 6.4 7.6
France N/A N/A 3.8 N/A 2.4 N/A
USA 14.1 9.6 11.1 4.6 4.7 7.8
USSR 14.9 14.6 12.2 16.0 13.8
E Germany 9.0 10.9 5.3 8.5 7.8 8.1
Source : American Machinist, OECD, NMTBA
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Table 41. International Comparison of Imports of Foreign Machine Tools
as a Share of Domestic Consumption for Years 1963-1988
Year
Country 1963 1975 1980 1985 1988
(%) (%> (%) (*) (l)
W Germany 5.2 13.8 23.2 32.6 35.8
Japan 21.9 14.2 8.5 6.5 7.1
Switzerland N/A 40.9 55.1 58.9 61.7
UK 26.0 37.7 45.3 47.4 47.4
Italy N/A 32.4 29.2 30.3 25.7
USA 5.2 13.8 23.2 44.7 52.3
Source : 
Note :
VDW, CECIMO
Apparent Domestic Consumption=Production-Exports+Imports
Table 42. International Comparison of Exports of 
Share of National Production for Years
Machine Tools 
1966-1988
as a
Year
Country 1966 1975 1980 1985 1988
(%) (t) m m (%)
W Germany 54.9 72.7 62.5 60.8 61.9
Japan 19.1 29.5 38.1 39.8 38.9
Sw1tzerland 67.4 81.7 87.2 87.3 87.2
UK 29.4 49.9 60.8 44.1 45.8
Italy 63.0 48.4 49.1 57.9 39.2
USA 12.9 23.2 21.8 17.3 24.6
Source : VDW, CECIMO
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Table 43. Machine Tool Patenting Activity in the USA by Foreign 
Manufacturers, 1966-81
Country No
1966
(*)
Patents
No
Granted
1971
(%)
and
No
Shares
1976
(%) No
1981
m
W Germany 129 (29.6) 262 (28.2) 152 (23.3) 193 (27.8)
Japan 28 (6.4) 124 (13.3) 131 (20.1) 160 (23.0)
Switzerland 26 (6.0) 55 (5.9) 36 (5.5) 27 (3.9)
UK 98 (22.5) 135 (14.5) 78 (12.0) 67 (9.6)
Italy 12 (2.8) 32 (3.4) 22 (3.4) 25 (3.6)
France 45 (10.3) 85 (9.1) 52 (8.0) 32 (4.6)
Source : Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex. Cited In 
Jones, D.T. (1983). Machine Tools: Technical Change and A Japanese 
Challenge. Ch 8 1n Shepherd, G. Duchene, F & Saunders, C. Europe's 
Industries. Frances Pinter, London p204.
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Table 44. UK Production of Machine Tools By Value for Years 1960-1988
Year Production
dm)
Index*
(1980=100)
Inflation-Adjusted 
Production (£m)
1968 842 165.0 510
1987 652 159.3 409
1986 614 153.7 399
1985 606 145.0 418
1984 497 133.2 373
1983 413 123.1 335
1982 477 115.7 412
1981 434 107.4 404
1980 593 100.0 593
1979 549 85.0 467
1975 317 47.8 663
1970 219 21.8 1005
1960 95 14.4 660
Source : Department of Trade S Industry and Machine Tools Trades 
Association based on Activity Heading 3221.
Note : * Index based on the annual average of quarterly producer 
price indices for metalworking machine tools published by 
the Business Statistics Office.
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Table 45. Breakdown of Employment 1n the UK Machine Tool Industry for 
Years 1978, 1984, and 1988
Occupation
Managerial staff
Sci ent1sts/Technologi sts
Technlcians/Draughtsmen
Administrative/Profess1onal Staff
Clerical
Supervlsors/Foremen
Craftsmen
Operators/Other
Total
Number of People in Occupations
1978 1984 1988
2366 1475 1727
277 195 348
4476 1930 2125
2146 955 1220
5605 1942 1941
2149 925 943
16932 6715 7442
13325 4634 4868
47276 18771 20614
Source : Engineering Industry Training Board Statutory Returns for 
Activity Heading 3221
Table 46. Index of Production and Employment for the UK Machine Tool 
Industry 1979-1988
Year Index of Index of
Production Employment
(1985*100) (1985=100)
1979 133
1980 128 _
1981 88 135 est
1982 81 125
1983 72 109
1984 83 98
1986 98 98
1988 113 100
Source : Department of Employment and 
Department of Trade A Industry
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Table 47. UK Exports and Imports of Machine Tools for Years 1960-1988
Year Exports Imports Exports
<fm) (£m) Imports
1988 386 411 0.94
1987 306 323 0.95
1986 269 381 0.71
1985 266 304 0.87
1984 226 256 0.88
1983 210 194 1.09
1982 273 234 1.17
1981 281 213 1.32
1980 292 268 1.09
1979 223 285 0.78
1975 164 115 1.43
1970 88 57 1.55
1960 28 22 1.26
Source : Overseas Trade Statistics and HM Customs
4 Excise
The EEC 
Exports
as a Source of UK Imports and 
for Years 1972-1988
Destination of UK
Year
EEC as a Source 
of UK Imports(%)
EEC as a Destination 
of UK Exports {%)
1988 42 38
1986 45 32
1984 49 24
1982 49 20
1980 48 26
1978 53 20
1976 48 20
1974 54 24
1972 52 25
Source : HM Customs A Excise
Stastlcs Include both new and used machines
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Table 49. UK Production of Machine Tools By Value for the Five Main
Technological Segments for Years 1980-1988 (*Index 1980=100)
Machine Tool 
Technology
1988
Turning: 
Production (jfm) 72
Inf Adjusted* (jtm) 44
% CNC 37
Milling: 
Production (im) 113
Inf Adjusted* (im) 68
% CNC 88
Gri ndi ng: 
Production «.m) 37
Inf Adjusted* (<_m) 26
Metal Forming: 
Production (¿m) 86
Inf Adjusted* (<m) 52
Automation+ : 
Production (£m) 34
Inf Adjusted* (jtm) 21
Year
1986 1984 1982 1980
76 60 83 135
49 45 72 135
46 50 47 23
82 46 41 60
53 35 35 60
85 69 46 35
35 27 34 69
23 20 29 69
88 68 82 114
57 51 71 114
23 21 51 46
15 16 44 46
Source : Business Monitor PQ332 up to 1982 and PQ3221 thereafter.
Notes : + Statistics for "unit construction" and single/multi- 
station transfer lines only.
The MTTA estimates that the above data captures only about 
60-70 per cent of machine tool production.
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Table 59. International Comparison of the Growth In Industrial Robot
Population for Years 1980-1988
Cumulative Number of Robots Installed
Year UK Japan USA France W Germany Italy
1988 5034 176000 32600 8026 17700 8300
1986 3683 1160001 25000 5270 12400 5000
1984 2623 67000 13000 2750 6600 2600
1982 1152 32000 7000 1385 3500 1000
1980 371 N/A N/A N/A 1255 N/A
Source : International Federation of Robotics.
Table 51. Country of Origin of Industrial 
for Years 1982 and 1988
Robots Installed In the UK
Robots Installed
Country of 1982 1988
Origin Number (*) Number (%)
UK 101 23 277 38
Japan 110 25 136 18
USA 64 15 13 2
W Europe 164 37 308 42
(exc UK)
Total 439 100 734 100
Source : International Federation of Robotics and British Robot 
Association
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Table 52. Country of Origin of Industrial Robots Installed 1n the UK 
for Year 1988 By Price Range
Country of Robots Robots Installed 1n a Given Price Range
Origin Installed
< iio o o o Ì10-20000 £20-30000 >£35000
UK 277 47 152 55 23
Japan 136 35 2 60 39
USA 13 8 1 2 2
W Europe 
(exc UK)
308 53 109 84 62
Total 734 143 264 201 120
Source : British Robot Association
Table 53. UK Applications for Industrial Robots for Years 1982 and 1988
Robot
Appiication
Machine loading 
Arc welding 
Injection moulding 
Assembly
Education/research 
Handli ng 
Spot welding
Robot Population
1982 [%) 1988 (%)
10 12
14 13
14 20
3 10
3 6
4 4
22 12
for 1988 * ¿30m
Source : British Robot Association
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